

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

**THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SOUTH
CAUCASUS PEACE PROCESS**
AND
CONTRIBUTION OF TURKEY

Master's Thesis

GÖZDE TÛTÛNCÛ

İSTANBUL, 2010

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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İSTANBUL, 2010

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SOUTH CAUCASUS PEACE PROCESS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF TURKEY

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South Caucasus Region has always drawn attention of the European Union and Turkey, both with its strategical position and its social and cultural structure and ethnic diversity. Nevertheless, with the energy and transportation projects developed recently within the region, the policies of the EU and Turkey toward the region has gained a new dimension. Since the region is situated within the frontiers of the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU, it is one of the main targets of the EU in its immediate surroundings to provide the security, stability and democratization of the region. With the same intention, Turkey has realized various development and integration projects towards this region which is located in the eastern border of Turkey.

As soon as the region countries achieved their independence in the beginning of 1990s from the Soviet Union, they started to establish close relations with the EU and Turkey. However, there are two main historical problems occur in the region: the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the border conflict between Turkey and Armenia. Beside the tight connections date back to history, Turkey has a set of problems with Armenia, which are mainly based upon Armenian assertions and historical demands. Despite the concrete improvements provided, it is observed that the wealth and the order has not been fully established in the region yet.

Keywords: South Caucasus, European Union, Turkey, Peace Process, Security

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN GÜNEY KAFKASYA BARIŞ SÜRECİNDEKİ ROLÜ

VE

TÜRKİYE’NİN KATKILARI

Tütüncü, Gözde

Avrupa Kamu Hukuku ve AB Entegrasyonu

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Güney Kafkasya Bölgesi hem stratejik konum, hem de sosyal ve kültürel yapısı ve çeşitliliği itibariyle her zaman Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye’nin ilgisini çeken bir bölge olmuştur. Bununla beraber, son yıllarda bölge çapında geliştirilen enerji ve taşımacılık projeleriyle AB ve Türkiye’nin bölgeye yönelik politikaları yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Bölge, AB’nin komşuluk politikasının sınırlarının içinde yer aldığından bölgenin güvenliğini, istikrarını ve demokratikleşmesini sağlamak AB’nin çevre sınırları içinde önem verdiği başlıca amaçlarından biridir. Aynı hedefle, Türkiye de doğu sınırlarında yer alan bu bölgeye yönelik çeşitli kalkınma ve bütünleşme projelerine imza atmaktadır.

Bölge ülkeleri, Sovyetler Birliği’nden ayrılıp 1990’ların başlarında bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarıyla birlikte AB ve Türkiye ile yakın ilişki kurmaya başlamışlardır. Fakat bölgede iki önemli tarihsel sorun mevcuttur: Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında Dağlık Karabağ çatışması ve Türkiye-Ermenistan arasında sınır problemi. Türkiye’nin özellikle Ermenistan ile tarihe dayanan sıkı bağlarının yanısıra Ermenistan’ın iddialarına ve tarihi taleplerine dayanan birtakım sorunları da mevcuttur. Sağlanan somut ilerlemelere rağmen bölgede henüz refahın ve düzenin tam olarak yerleşmediği görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : Güney Kafkasya, Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Barış Süreci, Güvenli

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ABBREVIATIONS

American Israel Public Affairs Committee	: AIPAC
Azerbaijan International Operating Company	: AIOC
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline	: BTC Pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline	: BTE Pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project	: BTK Project
British Petroleum	: BP
Caspian Pipeline Consortium	: CPC
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform	: CSCCP
Commonwealth of Independent States	: CIS
Europe-Caucasus- the Central Asian Transport Corridor	: TRACECA
European Coal and Steel Community	: ECSC
European Economic Community	: EEC
European Neighbourhood Policy	: ENP
European Parliament	: EP
European Political Cooperation	: EPC
European Security and Defence Policy	: ESDP
European Union	: EU
European Union Special Representative	: EUSR
International Crisis Group	: ICG
International Monetary Fund	: IMF
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe	: INOGATE
Justice and Development Party	: AKP
Main Export Pipeline	: MEP
Non-Governmental Organizations	: NGOs
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	: NATO
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	: BSEC
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development	: OECD
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	: OSCE
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements	: PCAs
Stability Pact for the Caucasus	: SPC
State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic	: SOCAR
Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States	: TACIS
Turkish Armenian Business Development Council	: TABDC
Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission	: TARC
Turkish Grand National Assembly	: TGNA
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency	: TIKA
Turkish Petroleum Corporation in Azerbaijan	: TPAO
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	: USSR
United Nations	: UN
United Nations Security Council	: UNSC
Vienna-Armenian-Turkish Platform	: VAT

1. INTRODUCTION

The Caucasus, which is a substantial transition zone between East-West and North-South, is situated on the intersecting point of energy and transportation corridors established in Eurasia in the aftermath of the Cold War period. It is part of the entire Caucasus geographical region that essentially divides the Eurasian transcontinent into two parts. Since the region's strategic position has developed on account of its geographical situation, the region has gained an increasing significance in terms of establishment of stability and prosperity in Eurasia.

The first part of the thesis contains the historical background of Turkey and the EU as well as contribution of the EU and Turkey to the security circle in the South Caucasus region. Principally, the deficiency of the structural function and security instruments of the EU while providing security in the region, as observed in the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) mechanism, has led to absence of the EU assistance in the region. This absence drove Turkey forward in contributing to the region security and improving the stability with the projects that are introduced for the energy transmission, in other words, the security of oil and gas pipelines. The main theme of the second part is consisted of two main disputes where the EU and Turkey's involvement in peace attempts are widely discussed. These two main problematic issues are the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the troubled relations between Turkey and Armenia due to the closed land border although there are certain improvements provided by the mutual protocols signed on October 10, 2010.

In this context, this thesis has been prepared according to the considerations regarding principally the role of the EU in South Caucasus Peace Process in terms of security, its developments and deficiencies and Turkey's contributions to the South Caucasus Peace Process principally with energy and transportation projects joint by the cooperation of region countries.

In the 2nd chapter, the historical background of the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have been briefly explained. In fact, the roots of Turkey's European adventure have dated back to centuries. Europe symbolised modernity notion for Turks especially in "Tanzimat Period". With the foundation of new Turkish

Republic in 1923, Turkey's European image continued with more concrete steps. The principal target of Atatürk was to reach the level of contemporary civilizations.

The initial step had been taken with the application for association to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 by the expectations of modernization, independence, human rights, plural democracy and spread of liberal economic and political system. In the following process, the Association Agreements were signed in 1963 through the establishment of a Common Customs Union which still provides the primary legal basis of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. In 1987, Turkey officially applied for full membership to the European Community, then it succeeded to get a candidacy status at Helsinki Summit in 1999. As from 1998, the European Commission has been annually publishing a "Progress Report" considering all necessary facts about Turkey's development. By the decision taken in the European Council Summit Meeting in December 17, 2004, it was decided that the accession negotiations could be opened on October 3, 2005.

In an attempt to be a part of Europe not only territorially but also strategically, which means to be involved in the decision-making mechanism, Turkey has spent a great effort during the harmonization process. Thus far, the negotiations have been maintaining with great attention, that even a special minister who is responsible for the EU Affairs was appointed for this significant but challenging negotiation process. So far, negotiations have been opened totally on twelve chapters.

In the 3rd chapter, the historical background of relations, the geopolitical position of the region, diversified, fragmented and problematic structure of the South Caucasus region as well as its importance regarding energy resources have been expressed both for Turkey and the EU. As a part of "zero- problem policy" with its neighbours, Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy, and holds a constructive mediation position in its near abroad. In this context, Turkey attributes a great significance to the South Caucasus region by defining it as "*Caucasus is a natural golden door opening to Central Asia*". Similarly, the Southern Caucasus Policy of the EU has been explained. The attention of the EU towards the region has increased since 2000 in an attempt to search new energy sources as an alternative to Russia.

In the 4th chapter, the contributions of the EU and Turkey to the settlement of peace in the region have been analysed. In this context, Turkey put forward “The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” (CSCP) which is a considerable project that mainly focuses on providing security, stability, prosperity and economical improvements in the region. In the same manner, the EU has provided the ENP for its neighbours with no perspective of full membership. The chapter maintains with the energy and transportation projects within South Caucasus enforced by the contributions of the EU and Turkey. Herein, it is stated that Anatolian and the South Caucasus territories became the major trade route again on the historical Silk Road and Spice Road. In this scope, Europe’s “common neighbours” approach is in contradiction with Russia’s “Near Abroad Doctrine”. Additionally, in the thesis the significance of energy projects are mentioned extensively as a whole and each transportation or energy transmission project is analysed one by one.

After the security and stability efforts of Turkey and the EU as well as the projects in the whole region, the principal conflicts in the region have been mentioned in detail in 5th chapter including its reasons, the treaties signed during the development process and the results, if achieved. The region itself is very conflictual as a result of diversified communities that are in search of having a territory belonged to themselves, or a country insists on occupying other’s land with the desire of extending its own territory and integrating all its citizens in one country. In this context, the biggest problem in the region is no doubt the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia occupied 20 per cent of Azerbaijan territory after a while of its independence. The occupation was illegal; however the sanctions were not sufficient and recognize an extensive manoeuvre area for Yerevan. In the second part of 5th chapter, the relations between Turkey and Armenia are clarified inclusively. Herewith, Turkey is one of the prior countries that recognized the independence of Armenia. Then, Turkey has marked on the establishment of good relations with Armenia in terms of “goodwill”. However, with the illegal occupation of Kalbajar Rayon of Azerbaijan by the Armenian troops in 1993, the “good-will” relations have entered a conflictual period. As Armenia insisted on not abandoning the occupation, Turkey was obliged to take a serious measure by closing its eastern borders with Armenia, which aroused a great impact among Armenian authorities. After a while, the bad relations have entered into the détente

process with the President Abdullah Gul and his Armenian fellow Serge Sarkisian, within the context of Cheese and Football Diplomacy. In this framework, the Armenian-Turkey relations as well as Ankara's reactions and conditions to the Armenian assertions are extensively expressed from both parties' viewpoint. In last part of 5th chapter, the protocols that were signed between two neighbours have been analysed in an extensive approach. In fact, this chapter expresses the approachment period among Turkey and Armenia due to the signature of these vital protocols. Their extensive analysis and the impacts on moderating relations have been touched on this part.

Consequently, the main theme of the thesis is the conflictual situation of the South Caucasus region and the explicit diversity between the region countries and the contributions of the external powers mainly the EU and Turkey to the peace process by implementing an amount of structural policies and energy and transportation projects toward the region. Since the South Caucasus is close to the Caspian Basin and have rich natural gas sources, and while the EU needs an alternative gas supplier rather than Russia and Middle East, the region has attracted more attention in the last years as it became a place of competing interests. The dominant powers, whose interests are intersecting, are endeavouring to hold the leadership position both politically and economically in the Caucasus Region.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The deep rooted history between Turkey and Europe has dated back to very old times. During their long-standing background, they shared many common values, qualities, life style, social values, cultural traditions and perception of civilization which were shaped by their different beliefs. However, due to the strategic position and the conquests of the Ottoman Empire as well as the imperialist desires of Europe, they were always in connection with each other in trade activities or commercial bargainings and thus, they established long-term strategic partnerships.

Until the Tanzimat period of 1839-1876, the Turks were holding Europe in contempt so they preferred to abstain from Europe, but since they started to lose power by entering under the authority of weak monarches and faced with mismanagement, from the 19th century forth, they commenced to approve the superiority of European civilization. Thus, Ottoman Empire launched the westernisation movements by the fundamental alternations in terms of economic, political and historical structure. These movements had been accelerated with the foundation of new Turkish Republic, thus, a European type of system in every field of life was established by the structural reforms. In 1923, when the new Turkish Republic dismantled the Ottoman Empire, the principal target of its founders was procuring the acceptance of Turkey as a European state that keeps up with western values. Striving for developing its relations with the western nations, Turkey became official members of many international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Council of Europe, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Turkey became a part of European alliance during the Cold War with its affiliation to the western ideology and with its statements that bolsters independence, human rights, plural democracy and spread of liberal economic system. During that period, Turkey based its foreign policy upon European values and expectations .

Building a bridge of tight relationship in political field established a ground for cooperation in economic field. As a matter of fact, in such a short time following the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey made an application

for association to the EEC in 1959. Thereupon, the EEC offered the establishment of a Council to be concerned with the membership process of Turkey through the EEC.

In 1963, the Association Agreement, namely the Ankara Agreement, was signed in order to bring Turkey and the EEC to a common Customs Union which would provide a basis for an efficient economic integration as well as determining a road map for Turkey with the aim of achieving a full membership. Ankara Agreement, which entered into force in 1 December 1964, still provides the primary legal basis of the relationship between Turkey and the EU.

In 1987, Turkey officially applied for full membership to the European Community (EC) based on Article 237 of Rome Treaty, Article 98 of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Article 205 of the Euratom. Following the next two years, according to the avis on Turkey's application for full membership published by the EC Commission on December 14, 1989, *"Turkey is a competent country to participate in the Community; however, on the ground of economic, social and political reasons, both the Community and Turkey are not ready to realize the participation. Turkey's application will be reconsidered after 1993 provided."* It means, the EC was not ready to digest a new member before completion of its own internal market (1992) requirements and the necessary provisions in terms of economical, social and political developments that should be fulfilled before Turkey's pre-accession. Hence, Turkey's membership was postponed for a particular time.

By January 1, 1996, the Customs Union provided in industrial products and manufactured agricultural products entered into force. In November 1998, the first "Regular Progress Report for Turkey" prepared by the Commission, was published in the light of criteria for membership to the EU. As from 1998, the European Commission has annually published "Progress Report" annually considering the inadequacies, negative sides and positive developments of Turkey during the challenging path of EU membership. In December 11-12, 1999 the candidacy status of Turkey was recognized in European Council Summit Meeting in Helsinki and thereby, the preparatory process initiated for Accession Partnership. In accordance with the decision taken in the Summit Meeting of EU Head of State or Government in December 17, 2004, regarding Turkey's

sufficient efforts in fulfilling the Copenhagen Political Criteria, it was stated that the accession negotiations could be opened for the EU Accession.

As a matter of fact, by the decision taken in Luxembourg on October 3, 2005, EU decided to start the negotiations with Turkey which aims for the full membership. At the same date, the “Negotiation Framework Document”, which determines the procedure and the basis of the negotiations, was approved. Since then, a newer and more extensive process has been initiated by overcoming a crucial milestone between Turkey and the EU (Demirağ, Karadeli 2006).

While trying to be a regional power with its policies “zero-problem with neighbours” and “balance policy” in pursuit of balance between the EU and the US; undertaking the mediator role between the parties in Middle East and South Caucasus regions, and trying to compete with global actors in political and economic terms, Turkey has insistently refused the term of “privileged partnership” proposed particularly by Chancellor Merkel in Germany and President Sarkozy in France, and has insisted to take a role in the decision-making process with the full membership status given by the EU.

There are totally 35 negotiation chapters between Turkey and the EU.¹ Until today, negotiations have been opened totally on twelve chapters (*Science and Research Enterprise and industry, Statistics, Financial Control, Trans-European Networks, Consumer and health protection, Intellectual property law, Company law, Information society and media, free movement of capital, taxation and environment*). The “Environment” chapter has been opened following the publishment of 2009 Progress Report. The Screening Reports approved at the Council of the EU with benchmarks are composed of eight chapters²: *Free movement of goods, Right of establishment and Freedom to provide services, Public procurement, Competition policy, Financial services, Agriculture and Rural development, Food safety- veterinary policy, Social*

¹ For detailed information, see <http://www.ikv.org.tr/pdfs/0d4f52a7.pdf>

²The decision sets out that negotiations will not be opened on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions regarding the Republic of Cyprus and no chapter will be provisionally closed until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement.

policy and Employment, Customs Union). In addition, two chapters are to be opened (*Economic and Monetary Policy and Education and Culture*).³ So, during the participation process, only one chapter, *Science and Research*, was provisionally closed. The December 2006 Council decision remains in force.

According to 2009 Progress Report announced by the European Commission, there is no progress since the announcement of 2008 Progress Report, of a total of 33 screening reports, one has still to be delivered by the Commission to the Council while nine reports are still being discussed in the Council.⁴ The enhanced political dialogue has continued between Turkey and the EU. Political dialogue meetings were held in May and September 2008 and March 2009 at ministerial level and in February and July 2008 and 2009 at political director level. These meetings focused on the main challenges faced by Turkey in terms of the Copenhagen Political Criteria and reviewed progress towards fulfillment of Accession Partnership priorities. Foreign policy issues related to regional areas of common interest to the EU and Turkey, including the Caucasus, were also discussed on a regular basis. A number of official high-level visits from Turkey to the European institutions were located in the reporting period.

The EC-Turkey Customs Union contributed to a further increase in bilateral EU-Turkey trade, nearly € 100 billion in 2006, and exceeded €100 billion in 2008, thereby making Turkey the EU's seventh biggest trading partner. Almost half of Turkey's total business have been done with the EU. The EU asked Turkey to remove all remaining restrictions on the free movement of goods, including restrictions by means of transport and opening ports regarding Cyprus.⁵ By the Accession Partnership document adopted in February 2008, the EU provides information to the authorities concerning reform priorities. Progress on these reform priorities is encouraged and monitored through the bodies set up under the Association Agreement.

³ Republic of Turkey Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Current Situation in Accession Negotiations, 2009 <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=65&l=2>

⁴ For further detail, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf

⁵ European Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2009 Progress Report, Brussels 2009, p.6 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf

3. THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION

Strategically, the South Caucasus is located in one of the most important regions in the world. This geopolitical region is situated on the border of Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia also referred to as Transcaucasia. The South Caucasus is located on the intersecting point of ancient transportation and trade routes starting from the inland of Russia in the north and extend along to Anatolia, Middle East and Africa in the south. Starting from China and extensive Central Asia territories from the east, the ancient “Silk Road” which reaches forth to Europe and the Mediterranean in the west also passes over the Caucasus. With its specific geopolitical structure, the Caucasus is located in the crossroad of important seas such as Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, etc. over Central Asia, Europe and Middle East.⁶

The mountainous structure of the region makes a direct impact to the region’s economy, transportation, political and cultural structure. In this mountainous structure, it encompasses varied sorts of ethnic groups. Beside its structural features, the region itself has a wide range of language and religion diversity owing to many ethnic groups.

The South Caucasus includes three main states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which gained their independence by the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1991. Following the breakup of the USSR, the new world balance emerged with the shift in international relations parameters and the new independent states made a great impact on the foreign policy attitudes of region countries and exterior powers which have considerable interests in the region. After the independence, the region states firstly rebuilt the public order and public institutions which were governed by the rules of Communist regime for decades. As independent states, they had a challenging restructuring process during 1990s. Since this process was quite problematic, leaving them to face with many challenges, so that in the beginning of the 21st century, Georgia and Azerbaijan opted to take side in favor of western-oriented policy with the Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003 and Azerbaijani “Colour

⁶ Ozbay,F. Uluslararası Politikalar Ekseninde Kafkasya. *BİLGESAM*, Report no:15,2009. p.7

Revolution” in 2005. On the other hand, Armenia preferred to be allied with Russian Federation.

The problems of South Caucasus countries can be gathered in four topics. These are, domestic political structure and democratization, economic problems, ethnic problems and international competition. In recent years, particularly the impacts of two historical issues, apart from many other issues, have taken part in the increasing importance of Caucasus and Caspian Basin. The first issue is the disintegration of Soviet Union which paved the way for termination of the Soviet domination over the energy sources in the region. The second issue is the terrorist attacks upon the US on September 11, 2001. After September 11 attacks, the search has advanced for new energy sources that can be an alternative to the Middle East, which mercurially become unstable in politics, has currently possessed 65 per cent of the world’s known petroleum and 40 per cent of the world’s natural gas.⁷(Pamir 2006, p.2) Hereby, the groundwork for the increase in international investments has accelerated.

Currently, the South Caucasus constitutes a prominent place in the international relations with its rich oil resources, geopolitical structure, geostrategic importance, and the problems derived from its multicultural and multiethnic structure. The multiethnic structure of the South Caucasus sometimes create violent conflicts and divisions between the people. Thus, the region is exposed to foreign involvement owing to its positive characteristics such as its strategic position, rich natural resources and proximity to the Caspian Sea where the richest energy resources are found after the Middle East; and challenging features such as conflicts between various ethnic groups, economic problems, domestic political instability, etc. Strategically, the Caucasus countries are surrounded with powerful states such as Russia, Turkey and Iran. In fact, the history of the region is shaped by the grand conflicts of interest of these powerful three states.

A set of projects have been signed between Azerbaijan and western oil companies concerning subtracting and transportation of the Caspian oil. The South Caucasus has

⁷ Pamir, N., 2006. Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzasındaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarının Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri, *Istanbul-Harp Academy Studies* , p.2
<http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp15.pdf>

drawn a lot attention of big powers as the region is located on the route of international energy oil and gas pipelines (subtracting from the Caspian Sea and Central East, principally from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), and is situated on the area where the international land and railway transportation webs between Asia and Europe are found. So, the great powers launched more active policies in order to provide the security of energy pipelines and to secure the interest of their oil companies established in the territory of the region countries. In this context, the significant alternative gas transit routes from the Caspian Sea to the EU, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, TRACECA (Europe-Caucasus-Central Asian Transport Corridor), INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), New Silk Road project, etc. depend on stability in the South Caucasus.

In the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR, a power gap have emerged in the South Caucasus region since there was a Russian hegemony over the territory for long decades. Although Russia considered the region as its backgarden by the “Near Abroad” strategy in 1990s, other intraregional countries such as Iran and Turkey and extraterrial powers such as the US, the EU and China have desire to establish dominance over the region in their way to be a hegemonic power. The multinational energy companies and the military bases established in the region have set forth the hegemony desires clearly. The crisis which have long been existed between Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia-Russia and Armenia-Turkey and the maintainance of status quo regime in the region, have been making the complicated situation even more complex and far from being transparent and peaceful. (Özbay 2009, p.12)

Related to the region, as a part of actor-based approach, the relations between the EU-South Caucasus Region and Turkey- South Caucasus Region are extensively analysed in the following part.

3.1 EUROPEAN UNION AND SOUTH CAUCASUS RELATIONS

3.1.1 Historical Background of the Southern Caucasus Policy of the EU

The relations between the EU and Southern Caucasus were launched in the middle of 1990s when the Southern Caucasus countries achieved their independence. In this context, the backbone of the relations between the EU and the Southern Caucasus were established by the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (PCAs) which were prepared in a bilateral form according to the situation of each Caucasian country and were fully entered into force in July 1, 1999 for an initial period of ten years and from now on they will be automatically extended on a yearly basis.⁸ PCAs mainly covers economic and technical issues where TACIS acted as the main financial instrument⁹ with its annual budget around 45 million €. Further, the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements were concluded between the EU and New Independent States.

As the PCAs were entered into force, the EU initiated its active political activities toward the region. The EU enhanced its political dialogue with the region countries in various subjects such as ethnic conflicts, disagreements, etc. Additionally, in the context of South Caucasus Action Programmes, the EU supported the institutional, legal and administrative reforms and contributed mainly to economic development, private sector and infrastructure networks.

Additionally, the South Caucasus countries were involved in such TACIS regional programmes such as TRACECA, INOGATE and the Regional Environmental Center for the Caucasus. Although leading the transboundary energy projects, the EU could only played a limited role in achieving a solution to prevent the long-lasting ethnic conflicts in the region.

⁸ Demirağ, Y. & Karadeli C., 2006. *Geçmişten günümüze dönişen Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*. Ankara: Palme Publishment, p.131

⁹ Tamrazian H., 1999. *Caucasus: EU Seeks to Bolster Transition in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, *RFE/RL Research Report*, <http://www.rferl.org>

In 2001, it was observed that the EU should restructure its policies toward the region since the PCAs were not sufficiently fulfilled and the ethnic conflicts were continued to break out. When the concrete steps became fail to meet the expectations, the European Parliament(EP) brought forward an initiative called “Southern Dimension” similar to the stability pact applied to Balkan countries. The EP offered sending a special representative to the region and organising a South Caucasus conference where all parties join. Additionally, within the same year, the first minister-level Troika summits were carried out in the capital cities of the region. During the meeting of General Affairs Council in 16 February 2001, a set of declarations have been made concerning that the EU shall undertake more efficient role in the region.¹⁰

Referring to the developments after 2003, by the political events initiated with the Georgian Rose Revolution on November 2003, which was an indicator for Georgia to orienting towards western type of management, the relations between the EU and South Caucasus Region gained a new dimension. While the EU was considering Azerbaijan and Georgia as potential NATO members, Russia strongly opposed to that perception since its sphere of influence might badly affected with their possible membership. Therefore, the South Caucasus Region constituted a constant debate issue in the meetings of the EU and Russia in the context of “common neighbours” and contradicted with Russia’s “Near Abroad Doctrine”. To provide stability and security, the EU tried to approach Azerbaijan and Georgia to the western values with the political revolutions and NATO military practice in May 6, in Georgia.

The EU has determined its priorities related to the fields of independence, security and justice until 2010. Hence, relevant to the same fields, the EU approved Lahey Programme in November 2004 and then Action Plan in May 2005 to activate the Lahey Programme.

In order to strengthen the relations between the EU and the South Caucasus, a high level delegation from the EU paid a visit to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in February 4-6, 2008. The officers of delegation, Benita Ferrero Waldner, the Commissioner

¹⁰ Wallace, W., 2003. Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25, *Notre Europe Policy Paper*, **Issue 4**, p.16-17

responsible for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy; Dimitrij Rupel, the former President of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council and Slovenian Foreign Minister and Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus actively participated in the meetings. By the official visits, the significant issues such as energy, human rights, ethnic and regional conflicts, principally the separatist movements in the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the conflict in Azerbaijani region Nagorno-Karabakh were discussed in detail in these official meetings.

Recently, as the meetings between the EU and the Southern Caucasus countries were held in late September 2009, the Cooperation Council meetings in the margins of the General Affairs and External Relations Council were held on 26 and 27 October 2009 to discuss the issue further.¹¹

3.1.2 The Draft Report on an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus

In the Draft Report on an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus published by the Committee of Foreign Affairs of European Parliament on May 20, 2010 it is specified that the EU should play greater role for stability, prosperity and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The region is considered as central to the EU's energy interests as it owns the South Caucasus Pipeline, transporting gas from the Caspian Basin to the Black Sea and Europe. According to the draft resolution adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee in April, Europe will have to tackle with a complex geopolitical situation, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-Russia conflicts as well as the border tension between Turkey-Armenia.

Although Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been partners of the ENP since 2004, a comprehensive regional strategy is still absent in the region. The requirement for such a strategy was declared in 2006, when the EP recommended an EU Stability Pact for the Southern Caucasus, in other words the Quartet, comprised of the EU, Russia, the US and the UN. The EP is willing to enhance a strategy for the region to focus on particular

¹¹ Council of the European Union, Press Release of General Affairs and External relations , Brussels, 2009. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st13/st13028.en09.pdf>

issues such as conflict resolution, promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law, economic cooperation and social improvement. The current situation in the region is so conflictual that the ‘frozen conflicts’ are the biggest obstacles to economic, political and social development. So, if intends to be an international actor, the EU should play an active role in improving conflict resolution in the region. Since the EU evaluates the significance of the region in terms of energy security and energy supply in particular, the EU mentions its support for the enhancing of the EU- South Caucasus cooperation in many energy projects such as TRACECA or Nabucco.¹²

The draft report underlined the need for a clear EU strategy for the South Caucasus by pursuing more active and efficient policy with respect to stability and promote the development in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan conflict, the most significant notion of this report is that the EP adopts a resolution for the first time which calls for Armenia to withdraw its forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan and also, permit displaced people to return to their homes.

Thus, the Southern Caucasus is situated at the intersecting zones of EU regional projects and initiatives such as the ENP, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. In recent years, the EU has been focusing more on the energy security issue since it is highly dependent on foreign oil. Nevertheless, the EU is willing to draw an efficient guideline with South Caucasus states, especially with Azerbaijan owing to its high energy potential, in the following years. Despite the significance of the South Caucasus in energy field, a considerable amount of European politicians still rule out the volume of the conflicts derived from ethnic violences in the region. These threats explicitly pose

¹² European Parliament website, South Caucasus: EU must play greater role in stabilising the region, say MEPs, 2010 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-72203-096-04-15-903-20100406IPR72190-06-04-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm

a threat to the energy security of the EU as shown in Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Related to the war and Caucasus regional conflicts, the EU was only limitedly involved in conflict resolution and peacekeeping measures. By the war broken out in August 2008, the EU had to conceive that in a complicated region like the South Caucasus, the set of priorities considering democratization, good governance, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rights of minorities and the rule of law should be established as basic principles for peaceful and democratic states. The unresolved conflicts in the region are the key obstacles to fulfill an efficient EU *“strategy to assist the transformation of the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity and to fully use its potential to contribute to the peaceful solution of the conflicts in the region by combining its soft power with a firm approach.”*¹³

It is inferred from the report that the ENP is not a conflict prevention or conflict settlement mechanism. However, the integration of the region into the ENP would require joint efforts to protect the South Caucasus countries and citizens against particular threats, principally to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For the development of the region, the EU and region countries should undertake more responsibility toward the stability of the region and the wealth and security of its citizens. Moreover, as a recent player, the EU has moving slowly in building consensus within the ENP, requiring to provide more resources to secure and stabilize the fragmented situation in the region. In particular, the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia after 2008 war displayed the signs of initial active EU involvement (Shiriyev 2010).

Another challenging problem within the EU is that since there is not a common foreign policy opinion within the EU toward third parties including the South Caucasus region as well, the EU’s manoeuvre power remains restricted in security field. As stressed above, since “sustainable peace, stability, security and wealth” are the strategic keywords of the EU for the region, the peace process in the South Caucasus requires more EU involvement in the fields where the EU has remained incapable. For instance,

¹³ The European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs , Draft Report on EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, Issue **2009/2216(INI)**, 2010.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/pr/799/799032/799032en.pdf

in the Balkan territory, the peace process and fulfillment of peace agreements have been improved by 2004 and 2007 membership opportunities. So, similar strategies for the South Caucasus by the ENP or similar projects should be applied in this region for the security of energy resources and wealth of its citizens and the region as a whole since it is strategically located on the Black Sea coast, in other words on the neighbour scope of the EU.

3.1.3 The Future of the South Caucasian Policy of the European Union

Historically, the EU was not an active player in South Caucasus during 1990s while the South Caucasus countries had been newly-established. Since then, the relations between two parties were carried out with the financement of various projects by the EU funding programmes. In recent years, it is obviously observed that the tendency and concerns of the EU have gradually increased toward South Caucasian region. Their approachment has started when the EU became neighbour with the Caucasian Region through the Black Sea by the membership of Bulgaria and Romania, two Balkan countries in 2007. Moreover, with Turkey's potential membership, this proximity will likely scale up.

With the aim of being an international power, the prior target of the EU is to establish a security bond in its immediate surroundings. The border of its surroundings has been reached to the Black Sea by 2007 enlargement. Georgia is also willing to be a full member of the EU in the long-term period, so do Azerbaijan. These are the indications of the eastern borders of the EU to be extended over Caucasus region in the near future. Since the EU has been searching for another alternative for oil rather than being dependent on Russia, the establishment and permanence of the energy lines that transport the Caspian Sea or Azerbaijani oil to Europe are considered as highly valuable. So, certain energy lines have been designated such as Nabucco starting from Erzurum, Turkey through the final destination in Austria. The EU has determined the prior problems to be dealt in its neighbour borders, such as terrorism, human trafficking, drug smuggling, illegal migration and the use of weapons of mass destruction; since the Caucasus region has been under the potential risk of these problems for years, it needs to benefit from the concrete EU helping resolutions for a longer time. The EU has intended to realize that aim under the ENP guideline, so that the South Caucasus countries were allowed to become the member of the ENP in 2004. Furthermore,

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the members of European Council, in this context it is observed that the EU has so many interests on the region that it can neither get away from the regional developments nor ignore the events or conflicts occurred in Caucasus.

The recent developments, principally the Georgian-Russian war re-emphasized the significance of stability and security in ENP. It was initiated in 2004, then it was complemented by the Black Sea Synergy in 2008, and was reinforced by the Eastern Partnership in 2009, which are clear indications of the importance that the EU attaches in bolstering regional cooperation and regional development in the problematic regions of South Caucasus. Lastly, regarding Turkey's position, the EU considered the "tripartial meetings" maintained at the level of Foreign Ministers among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as a substantial initiative in an effort to find concrete resolutions to the specific conflicts.

3.2 TURKEY-SOUTH CAUCASUS RELATIONS

3.2.1 Historical Background of the Southern Caucasus Policy of Turkey

As mentioned above, Turkey has pursued relations with the Southern Caucasus states since they achieved their independence. This strategic approach was embraced during former president Turgut Özal's presidency (1989-93). Throughout the 1990s, including Özal's term in office, the foreign policy objectives were seriously determined for the Caucasus region. In this respect, while undertaking a mediator role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as supporting the latter's territorial integrity, Turkey also pursued balance of power during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in the aftermath of Özal's death in 1993, for more than a decade, there was neither any strategic improvement was made concerning the rapprochement policy nor any sufficient effort was exerted in training qualified experts associated with the region.

The special attention toward the region was given in recent times, especially with the start of the second Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's term in office since July 2007. Owing to the current challenges in its immediate surroundings, Turkey has been undertaking the role of an energy relay center or energy bridge between the East and the West and a regional "soft power" in the Caucasus, while trying to assume the leadership of the Muslim world.¹⁴ These activities can be explained with Turkey's intention to diversify its foreign policy options, principally in finding an alternative option to the EU, after gaining limited achievements in decades of Europeanisation attempts. During the current globalized era, one comes up with the reality that the contemporary conflicts cannot be challenged by a country on its own; but it is necessary to take part in regional cooperations to overcome the challenges.

As President Abdullah Gul mentioned in his speech : *"There are a lot of frozen conflicts, but it would be wrong to attempt to keep them in the freezer forever"*. (Ghazinyan 2009)

Turkey pursues a more pro-active foreign policy in the Caucasus in the context of its "zero-problems with the neighbours" and the "maximum cooperation" approach. These approaches are correlated with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's "rhythmic diplomacy" and "Strategic Depth Doctrine"¹⁵, as part of a transformation towards more "independent and constructive" foreign policy formation. This is the result of the country's rising self-confidence and the emphasis on its multidimensional and "multigeographical" role as Davutoglu pointed out *"Turkey [...] is a Middle Eastern, a Balkan, a Caucasian, a Central Asian, a Caspian, a Mediterranean, a Gulf and a Black Sea country"*. (Davutoglu 2008). Turkey's rise as a candidate to hold the regional leadership with "soft power", could balance the historical role of Russia and increasing position of the US in the Caucasus, and thus, eventually consolidate Turkey's international position which would provide Turkey a more appreciable position in the

¹⁴Apart from the initiative for a "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" and its warming relations with Armenia and Russia, indications of such an aspiration are its mediation efforts between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, US and Iran, its role in Sudan, and its co-chairmanship of the "Alliance of Civilisations".

¹⁵For an extensive account on the AKP's foreign policy, see Davutoğlu, A., 2001 *Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu* (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position), Istanbul: Küre Publications.

west. Turkey's intention to move towards the South Caucasus in the context of enforcing its new regional strategy, also relieved the parts of the society related with the Caucasus such as Ahıska Turks, Caucasian lobbies, Diaspora, etc.

3.2.2 The Importance of South Caucasus for Turkey

Turkey has a unique geopolitical identity that build up the sole strategic connection with its territories that spread over a wide range of geography and also with its central situation since it is located between three continents and in the midst of South Balkans, Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asian States. Due to its western type of democracy and moderate Islamic panaroma, beside being the most modern one among the Muslim countries, Turkey also endeavours to hold the leadership position both politically and economically in the Caucasus Region.

The South Caucasus is a significant region from the pointview of Turkey. Since it has political, economic, social and cultural ties as well as kinship relationship and religious connections with the Caucasian public, it has opportunity to establish relations from socio-economical and political aspects. Principally, as Azerbaijan has a Turkish origin and due to the historical hatred settlement occured between Turkey and Armenia, it is required for Turkey to lean towards the regional requirements. Beside its strategic dimension, the procurement of prosperity and stability in the neighbour Caucasus region is another crucial issue for Turkey's own security and stability concept. From the perspective of Ankara, the Caucasus region functions as a golden door that is opening directly to Central Asia.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey has described Turkey's "South Caucasus" perception as follows :

South Caucasia, the transition zone among East and West, North and South, is located on the intersecting point of energy and transportation corridors constructed in Eurasia in the new world order in the aftermath of the Coldwar. The region, whose strategic position has developed further by the situation aforesaid, gain ever-increasing importance also by the establishment of stability and wealth in the whole Eurasian region. In this respect, Turkey is trying to treat equally in its relations with

Southern Caucasian countries and at the same time, expresses its perception about considering the region as a bridge to reach the Central Asia.¹⁶

Turkey's geopolitical structure urges it to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy and also to become effective by improving its problem-solving capacity depending on the events that occur around it. Its "zero-problem policy" with its neighbours is closely linked with the comprehension mentioned.

Since not only strategically but also morally and historically quite close, the Caucasus reserves a significant place for Turkey. The Caucasian issue is not only composed of the countries that are situated in that geographical region as well as the occurring events within these countries, their regional relations with Turkey, the impact of these relations to their foreign policies and also to Turkey's regional interests, but it has also become a conflictual zone where the dominant powers such as Russia, the US and Iran square their accounts and strive to get a share from rich gas resources.

The Southern Caucasus abounds in terms of natural resources, notably Azerbaijan, which is an oil-rich country. So, while in need of diversifying the oil sellers by searching an alternative oilfield to Middle Eastern and Russian oil and natural gas resources, it has been so logical that Turkey gravitates towards South Caucasian natural resources and trade activities by taking part in natural gas pipeline projects. For that reason, as a transit country, it is of vital importance for Turkey to transport the natural gas in the region safely to the international markets since hereby it can diversify the alternative options for its own products by reaching the natural resources of the region and generate an income by functioning as a transit country during the transmission of the natural gas to the European states.

It is worthwhile to indicate the point that Turkey has become one of the leading countries to recognize the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the following process, Turkey's relations with the region countries have been shaped in different manners. The attitudes of regional powers toward Turkey and the priorities of Turkey have played a major role in this manner.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Relations with South Caucasus Countries, 2009
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin_guney-kafkasya-ulkeleriyle-iliskileri.tr.mfa

Turkey's foreign policy toward the region is based on two major principles:

- a) Protection of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Caucasian states
- b) Resolving the disagreements in the region by peaceful means

In pursuit of USSR's breakup, Turkey immediately recognized the declaration of independence of the South Caucasian states without practising favoritism between the region countries. Turkey's approach to the South Caucasus is shaped by the desire of establishing a comprehensive cooperation in the region with the participation and support of the region countries. In this respect, Turkey attributes importance to developing their independence, protecting their territorial integrity and implementing their economic potentials. Turkey, additionally, actively supported the integration of region countries to the European-Atlantic organizations such as NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Council and also, to the regional organizations such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC) .

3.2.3 Turkey's Relations with the Region Countries

The region consists of three countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. While Turkey's relations are in a good level with two of them, the long-lasting political, historical and cultural conflict chain has still maintained with Armenia. Turkey believes that the peaceful solutions of all the conflicts may contribute to political stability and economic wealth in these countries and also, it may expand horizons for more regional cooperation. Turkey should assume the leadership position and involve into more regional cooperations to provide stability in the region.

Its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural links have still been maintaining with the region. In addition, due to a great amount of Chechenian, Georgian and Abkhazian originated citizens living in Turkey, it shall play more active role in defusing tension in the region.

Spending a great effort in procuring the borders' security, Turkey's interests should not begin from its frontier lines but should extend over the neighbouring countries which share a set of common historical and cultural values with Turkey. Such an approach will definitely create an opportunity for Turkey to become a regional power and also to make a manipulation in every field in an atmosphere where the political instability is existed.

Turkey's close neighbour Georgia is occasionally having an unstable condition. After achieving a result in the weakest separatist movement, namely Abkhazian issue, the Georgian government tried to find a settlement in the Ossetian issue which led to a war with Russia in August 2008. Turkey has always supported the territorial integrity of Georgia and desires to establish strong relations with Tbilisi which will provide a basis for an extensive solidarity in the Caucasus. For this purpose, it especially maintains its supports in the military field.

At the same time, Turkey calls upon to have a stronger relationship with Azerbaijan, which has a considerable ethnic and cultural background with Ankara that dated back to very old times. Their relationship has started as "two states, one nation". Although the domestic political turbulences in Baku sometimes leave Turkey in a tight spot, the close relationship and cooperation, principally in military field, have been maintaining among two neighbours for decades. However, the desired proximity has not been established yet. In fact, Georgia and Azerbaijan are under the influence of big powers, mainly the US and Russian Federation, and restrictedly Iran. By the recent political Rose Revolution, Georgia has driven under the influence of the capitalist western powers, mainly the US.

In fact, Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan on 9 November 1991 and the diplomatic relations between the two countries were established within 2 months, on 14 January 1992.¹⁷ In historical perspective, Turkey has very close historical, cultural and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan. In the strong partnership undertaken with Azerbaijan, Turkey concentrated its attention on the protection of its territorial integrity

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Relations with Azerbaijan, 2009

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>

and the promotion of its economic wealth that grows out of natural resources of the Caspian Sea. Turkey-Azerbaijani relations are multi-dimensional which has developed not only in the political field but also in other areas such as economy, trade, education, transportation, agriculture, social security, health, sports, culture, science, tourism, etc. The partnership between the two countries has been shaped by the legal agreements and high-level contacts. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is having a dilemma between east and west. While its policy has leaned toward the west, recently it is making substantial deals with Russia concerning its rich energy sources. It has problems with Turkey as well, as the recent flag crisis in October 2009 constitutes such an example (Cansever 2009).

The regional peace and stability harmonized with the recent Turkish foreign policy principle “zero-problem with neighbours” requires to overcome the Nagorno-Karabakh problem which affects Turkey’s relations both with Azerbaijan and Armenia since that conflict poses the principal obstacle to the regional stability and cooperation in Southern Caucasus. Therefore, Turkey has always been in favor of diplomatic solution regarding regional peace, and thus, has abstained from getting involved in any kind of military intervention.

Concerning Armenia, Turkey’s relations were always problematic with that country since Armenian foreign policy is based on two major issues. The first subject is Armenia’s willingness to represent 1915 events in the framework of “genocide”. Recognition of the so-called genocide would legalize the possible Armenian territorial demands from Eastern part of Turkey. As a second issue, since gaining independence from the USSR in 1991, although Turkey’s eastern borders had been drawn precisely with Kars Agreement in 1921, Armenia insistently refused to officially recognize the border between Turkey and Armenia. However, due to the protocols signed on October 10, 2010, a new detente period has emerged in Turkey-Armenia relations.

The South Caucasus region itself is quite fragmented and conflictual, so that a number of security and energy projects have been introduced to provide the harmony and wealth throughout the region. The following chapter is related with the energy and transportation projects which are expected to bring prosperity and strategical importance to the region countries.

4. THE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

If the last 300 years of Caucasus history have been taken into consideration, it would clearly be observed that the only possible fact to enable perpetual security and stability in the region could only be provided by gathering Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the same security cordon. Today, there are various sorts of security systems established in the region. The big powers involved in the region, Russia in the first instance, the US, the EU and Iran have been struggling to build up a security system that serves to their own benefits. While Azerbaijan and Georgia have been striving for being integrated into the western type of system dominated by the US and the EU; Armenia, on the other hand, endeavored for getting integrated into the Russian economic system depending on its long-lasting financial benefits. In this sense, while Azerbaijan and Georgia attempted to improve their political and economic relations with Turkey; Armenia, reversely, had chosen to stay out of this rapprochement process and tended to get closer to Russia. However, with the recent normalization process, Armenia and Turkey are in a struggle to regain their lost friendship.

The national security conception of the Caucasian states has relied upon the perception of threat arising from each other. This perception has caused the “security dilemma” which is obviously observed in the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, as well as, to a great extent, Georgia and Russia. The main reason for reluctance of cooperation in South Caucasus, which is viewed as a security complex, (Coppieters 1996; Cornell 2001; Eivazov 2002) is rooted in the specifics of the material source (territory, natural resources, kindred population), perceptual-behavioural component (the enemy image, alliances, counter alliances) and interdependence to the local states’ national security (Eivazov 2004).

The South Caucasian states are not exposed to the threat of being occupied by a powerful state whose territory is located away from the Caucasus region but they are facing with the threat from their border neighbours in the same region due to the political and military problems they already have. As a result of the political and military support given to Armenia as well as launching an integration process in the military and economic fields with its fellow Russian Federation, Yerevan found the

capacity, courage and power to occupy the Azerbaijani territory comfortably. Hence, depending on the occupation act, which was explicitly illegal, Azerbaijan and Georgia have started to perceive Armenia, and partially Russia, as of states which threaten the regional stability and security.

To be more precise, the region itself is so complicated for years. Starting from the last years of the USSR to proceeded until today, there have been loads of conflicts appeared in the region such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict occurred between Azerbaijan and Armenia; the Akhalsikhe conflict broke out between Armenia and Georgia; Abkhazia and South Ossetian conflicts emerged in Georgia which led to the Georgian-Russian war in August, 2008 etc. The tragic point is that most of these conflicts have been still continuing at present since the parties have not reached a perpetual concrete settlement yet. The dominant intraregional and exterritorial powers have been intervening to the conflicts and use all the opportunities to manipulate the events.

In the aftermath of political and economic events held in the USSR in the end of 1980s, the Russian influence reduced in Caucasus, and following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the South Caucasian countries declared their independence. However, Russia approved a military doctrine called the “Near Abroad” in November 1993. In the mentioned doctrine, Russia decided to attach priority in defence issues to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and collective defense mechanism within CIS. Furthermore, aggressive nationalism, terrorism and radical religious movements in the region have been perceived as a threat to Russian national security. Referring the local armed conflicts within the CIS, which were considered as the most prominent threat, Russia forced the former Soviet Republics to be an official member of the CIS which is a regional organization established during the breakup of the Soviet Union. The similar statements in the doctrine pointed out the actual “South Caucasus” perception of Russia which is clearly considered as its “back garden”. The doctrine also stated Russia’s orientation toward its “Near Abroad” and put forward Russia’s statement of regarding the former USSR territory as its own national security field.

In order to handle the problems and achieve a concrete settlement, both the intraregional countries and exterritorial powerful states have produced various projects. The principal targets of these projects are reaching a perpetual peace accord, improving the economic, political and social life and building an open market where the dominant powers can smoothly apply their economic policies toward the region, principally in the field of energy.

In order to come up with solutions for serious conflicts, the Caucasian countries became members of various organizations which are known as security mechanisms such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, namely Common Defence Policy; NATO Partnership for Peace Programme in 1994; GUUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, and others. However, none of them have been sufficient for achieving a settlement for serious conflicts in the region. In order to solve the problems and provide a financial improvement, a security doctrine which is approved by all the Caucasian states should be prepared and put into effect. Since the economic and political alignments have been taken into consideration, the difficulty of implementing such a doctrine is clearly observed. For these purposes, Turkey offered and pioneered the establishment of various projects, such as Economic Cooperation Organization, the BSEC and the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Moreover, by supporting “EU Partnership for Peace” project as a member of NATO alliance in 1994, Ankara substantially contributed to the involvement of the Caucasus and Central Asian countries into the project.

Since the dominant exterritorial powers have some particular interests concerning the region, the security of Caucasus goes beyond of being a regional problem and have gained an international dimension in a multilateral atmosphere. The regional power, Russia, has longed for continuing to dominate its “back-garden” while promoting its relations with Armenia in terms of economics, politics and military since Yerevan is the only ally of Russia in the region. Conversely, the US has desired to deploy its military forces to various convenient places in the region following the procurement of the control of Caspian energy sources. Similarly, the EU has been working to have its portion, principally in energy resources, however its efforts are in a low level.

Turkey, on the other hand, is cautiously moving from its foreign-policy principle “zero-problem policy with neighbours”, to a new phase denoted by “maximum cooperation” with South Caucasian countries adopted by Ahmet Davutoglu when he took the lead in Foreign Ministry (Today's Zaman 2008).

In this context, related to the actor-based approach, the concrete contributions of Turkey and the EU to the settlement of peace in political means will be focused in the following part.

4.1 EUROPEAN UNION’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE SETTLEMENT OF PEACE IN CAUCASUS REGION

4.1.1 How can the EU Contribute to the Peace Process in the Region ?

The Republics under the fragmental Soviet Union (e.g Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), the autonomous republics (e.g Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia) and autonomous regions (e.g South Ossetia) failed to become stable nation states after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, resulting in instability, insecurity, power struggles and incoherent wars in South Caucasus. The conflicts have been continued since 1990s, but since that time, a little advancement has been made for the resolution of these territorial disputes.

At the beginning, the European Union was a natural actor in conflict resolution. The supranational organisation has declared its commitment to conflict prevention and been more active in crisis management around the world since European Political Cooperation (EPC) from 1970s to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 1990s. The EU’s role as an actor in conflict resolution has been broadened in the post-Cold War period with the inclusion of the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and by the development of CFSP. As mentioned before, the EU launched a project to create a peaceful area with democratic government and higher economic conditions in its immediate surroundings, called ENP. The EU has been still struggling to be a coherent foreign policy actor in the international arena, but since it lacks of a common external policy representative, it is not able to combine different parts of its external policy.

The European Union represents a model for conflict resolution, by playing a role as a third party actor in the resolution of violent conflicts beyond its borders, in other words in its periphery, through financial aid, enlargement and diplomacy.

The EU had little reason to become involved in the resolution of these disputes until 2004 enlargement which brought its borders closer to the South Caucasus by covering Eastern Europe. For that reason, a new policy was required to deal with the “outsiders” (Smith 2005). Europe even became more closer to the Black Sea with the 2007 enlargement of two Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania. In this sense, although the South Caucasus is observed as a region with no candidacy possibility in the near future, its geographical situation (proximity to Caspian Sea) and national resources allow Caucasus to be important in oil and gas production.

Since 2003, the EU is more involved in security issues in the South Caucasus. It has appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and launched a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission. Then, it has included the South Caucasus countries in the ENP in 2004 and started Action Plan negotiations right after. Principally with the formation of ENP and ESDP, the EU has gained the instruments necessary for involvement in conflict resolution. Although the ENP Action Plans for the South Caucasus countries contain a range of principles from the peace building to the regional cooperation, the resolution efforts expend by the EU, either with the ENP instruments in general or the Action Plans specifically are not sufficient since most of the conflicts are still remained unresolved due to the status quo situation in the region.¹⁸

The EU is contributing to conflict resolution activity in two ways, namely mediation and peace building, as a third party intervener. These activities are fundamental forms of conflict management (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991). Additionally, it is beyond doubt that the EU has particular difficulties regarding procurement of energy supply and energy dependency. When these difficulties have been taken into account, the increasing importance of Transcaucasus countries which are located on the way

¹⁸ Poghosyan, A., 2010. EU's Current and Possible Role in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution Process, *Caucasus Edition*

<http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/eu-s-current-and-possible-role-in-nagorno%E2%80%93karabakh-conflict-resolution-process/>

through the Caspian Basin, are considered better from the standpoint of the EU. The relations between the Union and the region countries gained momentum in 2004 when the EU encompassed the region countries by the new initiation, ENP.

In the previous periods, the policies that were shaped within the PCAs and the financial aid provided within the scope of TACIS programme were not sufficient to bring harmony to the deep-rooted conflicts in the region. Hence, the EU has aimed for more concrete results with the ENP countries. The researches that focused on the approaches of the South Caucasus countries point out that these countries have expected a greater EU role in the resolution of the problems. Since the neighbouring countries have a desire for the membership, the EU is criticized for not granting them the right to be a European Union member. Currently, the role of the EU in the scope of the ENP neither satisfies the region countries nor comes up with a settlement to the deep-frozen conflicts (Poghosyan 2010).

Since the EU's concern toward the region is estimated to increase in the following years, providing the security of the energy transmission lines and establishing a political stability in the region hold a great significance for the Union. In fact, its not only the matter of politics or energy but also the problems of migration, frontier, and internal disputes within the region, which the EU does not want them to influence its own borders at all.

In order to reach its goals, the EU should determine and pursue more strategic targets toward the region by making more constructive considerations regarding the demands of the region countries and make the ENP a full-targeted policy. Not being as active as the other major powers in the region, still having some problems with the digestion of new participated countries, preferring to put Balkan territory instead of Caucasus in the priority list, and not having a common foreign minister or policy, all together constrains the EU in dealing with the regional disputes.

In this framework, the EU has launched several initiatives with the intention of improving its relations with the South Caucasian countries. The most significant initiative, namely "European Neighbourhood Policy" will be discussed in detail in the following part.

4.1.2 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

Due to recent enlargements, the EU had to adopt and renovate itself to the changing conditions and renewed atmosphere in the direction of varied interests and needs within the Union. By the new boundaries achieved, the EU had to produce new policies to mobilise against the threats from the regions which stand out of the enlargement policy. Therefore, the period of producing policy for the neighbouring countries by separating them into two groups, “the ones with the membership potential” and “the ones without the membership potential” has been over for the EU.

In this manner, on 11 March 2003, European Commission published a declaration “Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A new Framework For Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (11.03.2003, COM (2003) 104, Brussels) introducing the basic principles of European Neighbourhood Policy¹⁹. As a result, the Neighbourhood Policy was entered into force in 2004 and formalized the policy of the EU toward the Southern Caucasus region. The target of ENP is producing policies to provide prosperity, stability and security in order to share the benefits of the former enlargements, principally the ones in 2004 and 2007, with neighbour countries. The ENP aims to establish closer ties with countries located in southern and eastern part of the EU without offering them a membership status. Through this policy, the EU seeks to enhance economic development, stability and security and create better governance in its neighbourhood. It is not an enlargement policy, therefore it does not include countries which are in the process of joining the EU but it covers the countries which cannot achieve a membership status.

At the beginning of the ENP Process, the countries which became contiguous with the EU just after the enlargements as well as the neighbouring countries with whom the EU has maintained tight neighbourhood relations for decades had been incorporated, while the Southern Caucasus countries were precluded. Thereafter, the EU gradually started to realize the important interests existed in the Southern Caucasus territory. Thus, European Commission offered to incorporate the Southern Caucasus countries into the

¹⁹ For more information, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm

European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Security Strategy, accepted in December 2003, mentions that

[...] it is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling with political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region
(European Security Strategy, 2003: 7-8).

In parallel with the growing concerns, in July 2003, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative, Finnish Diplomat Heikke Talvitie, to the Southern Caucasus to contribute the targets of the EU in the region. (OJL 169, 08/07/2003; Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP) Talvitie was responsible for improving contacts with local actors, bolstering regional cooperation, and supporting conflict resolution. He was replaced by Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby in February 2006 with an expanded mission of contributing to regional conflict resolution rather than only assisting the UN and the OSCE (EU 2006).

During this term, according to the Strategy Report published by the EU Commission, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia (Solana 2003) were incorporated into the ENP. In March 2005, the first State Reports were published for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The EU has provided the South Caucasus countries an amount of 150 million dollar financial assistance within the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy for the period 2007-2010.²⁰ The Southern Caucasus Region is evaluated as a crucial region that the EU should consider the developing events in that region in its policies.

When the Action Plans signed with the Caucasian Republics are analysed, it is observed that the plans are shaped in the framework of similar provisions. However, different approaches are distinctly observed during application process. For instance, during the ethnic-based conflicts erupted in the region, while the EU underlines the significance of solving the Georgian ethnic problems in the framework of Georgia's sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and thus territorial integrity; on the other hand, it abstains

²⁰ European Commission Official Website, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, *Eastern Regional programme Strategy Paper 2007-2013*
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf

from putting forth a concrete solution in Nagorny-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While in Armenian Action Plan the EU agreed to mention about the peace practises based on international principles and procedures in the scope of the self-determination principle, it unwelcomed the Azerbaijani demand of having territorial integrity to be mentioned in Azerbaijan Action Plan. The policy contradiction of the EU was so clear that its attitude was exposed to particular criticisms. Thereupon, since that principle has a significant value for Azerbaijan, the EU had to make a manoeuvre and allowed the territorial integrity principle to be mentioned in general in Azerbaijan Action Plan. However, a new article was incorporated to the Action Plans of both sides, which mentions that if one of the parties may violate the international rules and procedures, the Action Plans might be suspended.²¹ This provision was not existed in the Action Plans before.

The success of the Action Plans varies from country to country according to the political, social and economic structures of the countries. For instance, while Saaskavili government pursues an approachment with the west in terms of NATO and the EU membership by takin steps forward towards democratization, liberalization and stability, Armenia especially could not achieve to get away from the pivotal of Russia.²²

In brief, together with Wider Europe- the Neighbourhood Policy, Europe claims that the insecurity around Europe would influence Europe in a badly manner, so that Europe is willing to be an international actor which carries on the responsibility in some issues such as terrorism, organized crime, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.²³

4.1.2.1 The Contribution of Turkey to the ENP

In this respect, the neighbourhood concept had an impact upon many policies by coming into prominence either in Turkey's foreign relations and during the enlargement process of the EU. The countries within the scope and target of the ENP are located

²¹ Ağacan,K., 2007. AB'nin Güney Kafkasya Politikası, *Strategic Analyses*, pp. 48-49.

²² Acar D., 2009. Kafdağı'nın Ardında Saklı Kalan Komşuluk:Avrupa Birliği ve Güney Kafkasya, *Black Sea Researches* , **Issue 22**(6), pp.21-42

²³ Türkmen,İ.,2004. European Neighbourhood Policy, <http://www.obiv.org.tr/ilter36.htm>

among the neighbouring and surrounding countries of Turkey. With this aim, its important to take into account if there is a parallelism or similarity existed between Turkey's neighbouring and surrounding countries policies' and goals of the ENP. Today, during Turkey's accession process to the EU, it is possible to pronounce that the enhanced cooperation between the neighbouring countries and the EU might have consequences upon Turkey as well. ²⁴

Although the ENP was established with the intention to enhance security and stability in its surroundings, due to several reasons it has difficulty to provide these intentions. First of all, as this EU geo-political doctrine emerges, problems caused by the inclusion and exclusion dynamics become apparent, despite the fact that this was the reverse of what the EU targeted. Since the EU membership is not an option for these states, which consider themselves to be close to the western ideology and the EU, becomes a considerable threat for the progress of the ENP. The inevitable result of admitting some countries to membership and while excluding the others from the decision-making mechanism of the EU have frustrated the neighbouring outsiders. The most prominent alternative to the exclusion treatment is the ENP. The second reason is that, by penetrating its own values and standarts as 'shared values', the EU moves away from stabilizing and securitizing its surroundings, and only creates a buffer-zone that shields Core Europe from threats of political and economic destabilization (Scott 2005, p.434). When the EU follows a strategy leaned towards stabilization and further integration, it attempts to bind third countries with the aim of internal policy goals without giving them the benefits of full membership, it tries to strengthen the reform processes in these countries, but they only benefit from the EU's problem-solving capacity both in political and practical means.

Nevertheless, the ENP is a process in which the EU was concerned primarily with itself, not really with the events happening around its borders. So, the ENP is conceived in terms of the 'interests' of the EU, and is far from providing security and stability to its periphery. But it rather provides security and welfare to its own citizens by providing an effective control of its borders.

²⁴ Tusiad Press Bulletin, "Avrupa Birliđi'ne Katılım Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Komşu ve Çevre Ülkeler Politikası - Stratejik Yaklaşımlar"
<http://www.tusiad.org.tr/FileArchive/2007.05.02-KomsuCevreUlkeler.pdf>

Since the European Commission recognized these shortfalls of the ENP, and its inability to prevent the future borders of the EU from contributing to the economic development of the EU's neighbours, the Commission paved the way for the need to Turkey to assume a constructive role within EU's external relations, principally in improving the ENP as it is situated in an important geostrategic and political location in the flummy area between Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus region, which include countries that are also aims of the ENP including Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

In this point, the importance of Turkey has come into prominence. However, a clear question sticks on the minds that whether Turkish foreign policy compatible with the ENP and in which ways? In recent years, Turkey has pursued peaceful foreign policy principle called "zero-problem policy with neighbours" and tight cooperation with its surrounding. As the ENP's targets are similar in a way of creating a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood, it is obviously observed that Turkey's foreign policy targets are in compatible with the interests of the ENP.²⁵

Regarding the benefits of Turkish accession to the EU, it would bring benefits, specifically in security means, and contribute in stabilizing EU's periphery. The EU's borders will extend to Turkey's neighbours, principally to the Southern Caucasus states of Armenia and Georgia, which are already taken place in the ENP, and to the Middle Eastern capitals that are substantial for the EU. When these countries become direct neighbours of the EU, the Union's foreign policy concerns through these regions will attract more attention because the EU lacks the means to tackle the problems originating in this region. The necessity to enhance the ENP is so clear that it will not only be a means of reinforcing the EU's internal security, but will also become a strong framework intending to widening security and stability to the EU's neighbourhood. As Turkey has close ties with the region and assuming a considerable role, its possible to contribute to the regional policies of the EU. In this context, Turkey's membership will not only reinforce the ENP, but also enhance the EU's role as an international actor. If it really wants to be effective in the region, the EU should have to pay more attention to the demands of the countries who are located in the ENP.

²⁵ Eriş,Ö.,2004. The European Neighbourhood Policy and Turkey,p.212

One of the noteworthy reasons for the formulation of the ENP related with Turkey is that since Turkey is situated at the heart of south-eastern peripheries of the Europe, the effects of any domestic unrest and internal chaos in Turkey is likely to spread into areas contiguous to it and easily reach the borders of the EU by the 2007 incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania. Thereby, Turkey as a member of the EU, would be a much better guarantor of stability, in particular if this is complemented with an effective ENP (Diez, 2004, p.10)

In brief, Turkey's accession to the EU will contribute to Brussels in the long run to realize its security interests, owing to Turkey would help to enhance the ENP, so that it is considered as an element providing security in the region.

Turkey has strong interests in the Southern Caucasus. Relations with Azerbaijan are strong; however influenced negatively on Turkey's relations with Armenia and the closed border issue. Relations with Georgia, are also good that Turkey becomes the principal "transit country" for the transportation of Caspian oil to Europe. However, unfortunately Turkey's strategy and experts were not sufficient toward the region for years, that means Turkey pursued a nebulous strategy and lack of developing a strong foreign policy towards the Caucasus region. However, the Caucasus -oriented strategies have increased and diversified at recent years.

On the other hand, the 'privileged partnership' offered to Turkey by the EU has many common points with the ENP. Significantly, it is not full membership, but an alternative to full membership, associated to the EU through harmonization of the EU laws (*acquis communautaire*) with national laws without incorporation of decision-making mechanisms, which means having lack of voting right in the EU institutions. This constitute the same logic as the EU had envisaged for the countries incorporated in the ENP. So, when some Europeans offer Turkey 'privileged partnership', it may be offering it a place within the framework of the ENP. However, it is certain that, although Turkey is interested to work for the enhancement of the ENP as a full member, it would never approve a privileged partnership with the EU (Eriş 2004, p.218).

The foundation of the ENP is important indication, revealing that the EU is trying to become an effective actor in world politics, and trying to secure its immediate borders. In fact, it is a mutual utilization, while Turkey plays a significant role for the ENP to realize its targets, on the other hand it is also important for Turkey that the ENP will be beneficial in stabilizing the ‘near abroad’ regions of the EU, as these are also Turkey’s neighbourhood. By ‘zero problems with neighbours’, and ‘maximum cooperation’ strategies, and desire to pursue dynamic policies to face with the problems in the region, Turkey shares similar targets with the ENP. Therefore, Turkey’s membership will gain the EU the opportunity to pursue its strategy toward the close environment which means Turkey’s potential membership of the EU will be advantage for both Turkey and the EU.

In conclusion, if the EU is willing to use the Turkish factor to reach the purposes of the ENP, it shall show good faith in Turkey’s accession negotiations and should not delay Turkey for all the details concerning reforms etc. Although help to promote the ENP as a full member and the EU to become an international actor, Turkey will never accept ‘privileged membership’ or a place in the ENP.

The second actor related to the South Caucasus Region is Turkey which started producing efficient policies toward the region in recent years with the approaches of “maximum cooperation” and “zero-problem policy” with its neighbour countries. In this context, Turkey and South Caucasus relations will be analysed starting from historical dimension up to the current cooperations with the region countries.

4.2 TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SETTLEMENT OF PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS REGION

4.2.1 How can Turkey Contribute to the Peace Process in the Region ?

The EU, Cyprus and Middle East, mainly Northern Iraq, have priority in the foreign policy list of Turkey. However, the Caucasus should be taken to this priority list as soon as possible to compensate the delay to attach the required importance to that region since Turkey has borderline with the Caucasus and it is the only country who has close kinship with the people located in Northern and Southern Caucasus.

So, in order to realize the projects related to technical aid, culture, education, finance, the activities of Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) could be enhanced in the region. Turkish civil society institutions which are disposed to operate should be encouraged to develop common projects with the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the region. A set of security policies should be produced not only special to a country but also for the stability of the whole Caucasus.

Turkey might lead the establishment and working of the regional cooperation institutions focused on the promotion of stability and wealth in the Southern Caucasus. In this context, “the Caucasian Stability Pact” project could be appraised with the purpose of providing stability and enhancing prosperity in the region with the participation of Turkey, Russia and the Southern Caucasus countries. Bolstering the idea of “Caucasian House” which is a platform among the Caucasian intellectuals, the resolution could be found for the conflicts that already arose in the region and also the potential conflicts that likely to erupt could be prevented. By the “Eurasia Cooperation Activity Plan” signed by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Russia in 2001, the cooperation in the fields of economy, culture and education can be reinvigorated in the Eurasia region as well as the Caucasus.

By the BSEC, established under the leadership of Turkey in 1992 and the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Pact, reestablished upon the proposal of Turkey and made public in 2008, in addition to the conflict-prevention, the activities on the restructuring process of the region can be initiated as immediate as possible.

The fact is that, Turkey calls for providing advantage during its EU membership process with its attempts in terms of energy and transportation projects in the Black Sea and Caucasus Region. Its geographical position, which is located on the energy transportation lines, holds a vital importance strategically, and noteworthy for assuming the leadership in the region as well. As a candidate country to the EU, Turkey is an important transit country on the way through energy sources.

4.2.2 The Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform (CSCP)

The initiative for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” was proposed by the former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel on 16 January 2000 in a press conference with former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in Tbilisi for the establishment of a “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” (SPC) under the aegis of the OSCE. The second Chechen war, also known as the “War in the North Caucasus”, launched in 1999, put forward the entailment for the original Pact due to the fear of spill over to the Southern Caucasus. Historically, “the Stability Pact for the Balkans” was created in 1999 with the aim of bringing the Caucasus closer to Europe after the end of the Cold War. (Celac, Emerson, Tocci 2000) In the past, similar initiatives were supported by the leaders of Southern Caucasus states; however, such attempts did not succeed due to several reasons. (Kanbolat 2008)

Regarding the establishment of the SPC, the former President Demirel took the initial step by sending letters to the leaders of the Western European countries as well as the countries in the Caucasus region. In the letter, he explained the significance of such a peace pact which might accelerate the resolution process of disputes in the region, and called for their support for the SPC proposal. He stated that the international community’s concerns have been leaning towards the Caucasus and the pact plan was supported by two considerable countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, he pointed out the need of urgent stability in the Caucasus region due to the ongoing disputes and conflicts which posed a huge threat to regional peace. Demirel mentioned that certain unresolved issues of the Caucasus were not only hindering the establishment of stability in the region, but also declining the opportunities for the development of multilateral and powerful cooperation. Among the countries which received the letter, the US, France, Germany, the UK, Ukraine, the EU and three Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan-Georgia-Armenia granted a positive reply to the pointed proposal. Hence, the first stage of the SPC proposal was accomplished by bringing the issue to the agenda of the international community. Then, the second stage called upon negotiation between the participating parties which were concerned to initiate. Although moved beyond the borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States , in other words former Soviet republics, the SPC proposal did not include the Russian Federation. Depending on the

conjuncture at that time, the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not welcome the idea of establishing a pact which excludes the Russian Federation.

On August 11, 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned that Ankara may launch an initiative for the establishment of a “Caucasus Alliance”, including Russia as well because Ankara was aware that such an alliance could not be stable without the participation of Russian Federation since it aimed to ensure harmony in the region. On August 12, President Abdullah Gül mentioned his support to the “Caucasus Stability Forum” idea voiced before by Erdoğan. He said

I believe the idea of establishing a Caucasus Stability Forum is important. If there is stability in the region and if problems can be solved before they grow in magnitude and if there is a secure environment, then this will bring economic development and welfare to the people in the region. (Kanbolat 2008)

Prime Minister Erdoğan announced his proposal for the foundation of a CSCP on August 13 in Moscow and on August 14 in Tbilisi, just a couple of days after the Russian-Georgian war.

In fact, Erdogan was the first prime minister to visit Tbilisi since the conflict in Georgia began. Turkey’s official presence in the capital of Georgia was a clear indication of Turkey’s recent decision to give priority to the South Caucasus within its foreign policy list.

Turkey exerted effort for the establishment of this cooperation pact with the incorporation of the South Caucasus Region, Russia and the western states which focuses mainly on security, stability and researches for improvements. The principal fields of the pact are restructuring economies of the Caucasian states, providing development and cooperation, enhancing economic cooperation with the world, encouraging liberal trade, bolstering the domestic private sector, ensuring environmental protection, regulating the administrative structure, providing administrative transparency, resolving the unsettled problems of refugees, principally in terms of their integration into the society and the last, but not the least is putting the energy and transportation lines into force. The originating point starts mainly from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the states around Caspian Basin, then the pipelines pass through Georgia or Turkey as the essential transit countries, and finally terminate in the west.

In other words, it is not limited for Turkey and the EU to contribute security and stability in South Caucasus region only by political means or diplomatic tools but they also contribute the peace process with the energy and transportation projects by the participation of the countries situated in the region.

4.3 ENERGY AND TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

By the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, the prominence of the Asian powers, and the acquisition of importance of the South Caucasus region, Anatolia once again started to rise to become the principal route on the historical Silk Road and Spice Road. In this context, BTC Oil Pipeline, the BTK Railroad and the Marmaray Projects might regain Anatolia the condition to become a trade route between East and West. In this context, Turkey has remarkable security and economic interests in these projects not only by playing a role as a transit country but also as being a potential candidate for an energy supplier with the oil refinery investments in Ceyhan.

The significance of these projects can be considered as such :

- a) A third and more secure energy corridor through South Caucasian Region was built apart from the Persian Gulf and Russia.
- b) The stability toward the territorial integrity of Turkey would be more compatible with the interests of the West as BTC Project and BTK Railroad are supported by the Western powers.
- c) After the BTC Project, it became easier for the Kazak and Turkmen petroleum and natural gas in Caspian Basin, which are the originating point of the project, to expanding to the world market via the same route.
- d) By the oil refineries established in Ceyhan, the foreign companies as well as the Turkish companies which make investments in Adana-Ceyhan have derived a

profit from sales and contribute to the economic development of the focused region.²⁶

- e) It is a good start for Azerbaijan to grow up economically following the BTC Project since it has a considerable energy supply to procure for the regional powers.

4.3.1 The History of the Oil Pipeline Routes in the Region

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, the countries rich in oil and petroleum reserves in Caspian Basin have been invaded by the western oil companies. British Petroleum(BP) in Azerbaijan, and Chevron in Kazakhstan emerged as the leading oil companies at that time. Although there were no exact determination concerning the size of the oil reserves around Caspian Basin, the true fact was that the original reserves were much more higher than the reserves testified during the period of USSR. The most significant part for the western companies in search of deriving a profit from the petroleum was providing transportation to the international markets. During those times, the only way to transmit the Kazakh and Azerbaijani petroleum to the international markets was to transmit the oil to the Novorossiysk Port of Russia in Black Sea by the pipelines through Russian territory.

At that period, the western oil companies were not working on a project to transmit the oil to overseas through Turkish territory until the inclusion of Turkey into Botaş pipeline working group in November, 1992. The first routes were Baku-Novorossiysk line via Russian territory for Azerbaijani oil, Baku-Poti line via Georgian territory and Tengiz-Novorossiysk line via Russia for Kazakh state oil which became the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) afterwards. Since the Botaş Pipeline became a part of the pipeline activity, the route workings have been diversified and thus, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was launched in 1992. The first route in Baku-Ceyhan pipeline passed through

²⁶ With the BTC Pipeline, approximately 700 oil tanker have been loaded and 600 million barrel crude oil have been exported until now, due to the commentaries made by Can Suphi, Turkey's General Manager of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Armenia and Nakhcivan and the second one passed through Iran and Nakhcivan and reached to Turkey as the final destination. The pipeline routes were determined according to political conditions rather than economic conditions.

From the policy-based perspective, Turkey and the EU's attitude toward energy and transportation projects in order to contribute the stability and security of the South Caucasus region is mentioned comprehensively in the next part. Firstly, Turkey's historical and current approachment toward the energy projects and oil /gas pipeline cooperations with the other region countries (mainly Azerbaijan and Georgia) will be expressed in the following part.

4.3.2 Turkey's Attitude toward Energy and Transportation Projects in the Region

Turkey has traditionally kept a low profile in the region. In fact, Turkey concerned with the preservation of the status-quo in the region for the purpose of maintaining regional stability, despite all the blockades, divisions and trade restrictions characterised the area. (Punsmann 2009, p.2) However with the recent developments, Turkey would have probably decided to pursue a lot more active foreign policy toward the South Caucasus. Notably, the significant steps taken with the recent energy and transportation projects such as the BTC oil pipeline, BTE natural gas pipeline, BTK railroad, the South Energy Corridor, and TRACECA, which are implemented together with Azerbaijan(as the main gas supplier) and Georgia(as the main transit country), clearly introduce Turkey's new policy toward the region.

As a result of Turkey's new foreign policy principles which are pursued in the fields of regional peace, stability, and security, such a concrete step has to be taken toward the South Caucasus. Thus, especially owing to the security concerns of BTC natural gas pipeline, the importance of security issue had been widely discussed and came to the agenda during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Hence, if a potential war or a conflict erupts in Caucasus, it would not only have a direct impact on Turkey in the energy and transportation projects in cooperation with neighbouring countries but also would affect the cooperations in the fields of trade, tourism, education, nourishment, navigation and architecture. In addition, the conflicts that have broken out throughout the region are also able to affect the situation in further troubled zones such as Nagorno-Karabakh,

Abkhazia, or Southern Osetia, and thus, either protract the resolution process or leave the conflicts unsettled by causing escalation of tension in those troubled regions.

Concerning Turkey's attitude toward the region, Turkish President Abdullah Gül said, *“Our policy is so clear. We want good neighborhood. We want good cooperation with all the countries in the region. There are some problems ; [those] should be removed. We want to see this region stable, peaceful. All the countries[may have an opportunity] to join regional projects if they recognize [the] territorial integrity [of neighboring states].”*²⁷

In the following part, the importance of Georgia is explained since the stability of most projects depend on the stability of Georgia since it functions as the door of Turkey and the EU which is directly opened to the Central Asia.

4.3.2.1 The Railway Projects in the Region and Functioning of Georgia as the “Golden Door”

In this context, it is important to establish refineries in the region with the cooperation of powerful states because substantial projects are enforced with the interstate agreements. The petroleum richness in the region will definitely contribute to the economic prosperity of Turkey and the South Caucasus region. It is beyond doubt that the stability of these projects are belonged to the stability of Georgia since it functions as the door of Turkey which is directly opened to the Central Asia. Similarly, since Nakchivan has no direct link with Azerbaijan, Georgia functions as an outdoor of Azerbaijan. So, one might designate the geopolitical position of Georgia as “the golden door” which provides the transition from east to west and vice versa.

While Turkey and Azerbaijan, the old allies, are making their connections via Georgia, the same situation can also be mentioned for the other tight allies in the region, Russia and Armenia. Georgia provides Turkey's transportation to Azerbaijan while hindering Russia to reach its biggest ally in Caucasia, namely Armenia, from the land route.

²⁷ The Armenian Reporter, Turkish President visits the closed Armenian Border, 2008. <http://www.reporter.am/pdfs/A0726-E.pdf>

Georgia constitutes a vital geopolitical situation for the Caspian Basin's energy sources principally due to the ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh zone and the economic sanction imposed on Iran by the US. Georgia holds an "exit point" and created positive impression on its neighbours except Russia owing to the war in South Ossetia.

Georgia is Turkey's key energy partner: the viability of the BTC and BTE pipelines, the Nabucco project, as well as the BTK railway, which will connect China with Europe, are crucial for Turkey's increasing domestic energy needs, as well as for its aspirations to become an energy transit state indispensable for Europe's need for energy diversification. (Giragosyan 2007)

Beside being an energy corridor for Turkey, Georgia holds a strategic significance for railway transportation as well. Georgia has provided railway transportation through the line starting from Turkey, Iran and continue over the Central Asia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Krygzistan. However, as this transportation line is rather long, costly and dependent on Iran as a transit point and since the land transportation over Georgia is high-costed and inefficient, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad Project was located in the 8th 5-Year Development Plan. The Marmaray Project, which is designed to integrate the two sides of Istanbul, is an important step through the harmonization with the fast train networks of Europe. By the effectuation of the Marmaray Railway Transportation Project and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project, a cost-effective, fast and non-stop railway connection will be provided from west to east, Europe to Asia.

In this framework, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project has designated to be actualised for providing cooperation in the region by the procurement of a railway transportation as well as an integrated zone among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

4.3.2.2 Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad Project (BTK Railroad Project)

As a matter of historical doctrine, Turkey's attempt to close the land border gates during Azerbaijan-Armenian war, in the beginning of 1990s, caused a disruption of direct railway connections in Turkey which were connecting the former Soviet countries by the railway through Armenian territory. As the European-Asian railway network has been still out of use, Turkey can not make railway transportation to Central Asia, China

and India through the Caucasian countries but over the territory of Iran. Nevertheless, on account of Turkish-Armenian frontier is still closed, it is unable to use the European-Asian railway network which makes up the East-West corridor, and further as the Russia-Abkhazia-Georgia-Armenia route which sets up the North-South corridor has been closed since the Abkhazian-Georgian war in 1992, the only possibility remained to Yerevan is to using the territory of Iran in order to realize its railway transportation to the outward.

Taking those events into consideration, and in order to promote new transportation projects, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed Memorandum of Understanding on December 28, 2004 to enforce the project. The parties established a working group, and decided to hold a meeting in the ministerial level. Concurrently, during the grand opening of the BTC oil pipeline project on May 25th, 2005, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed a declaration of intent to build a railway linking Kars in Turkey to Baku in Azerbaijan. They hoped that the railroad will link Europe with Asia. Financing of the railway was agreed upon by the parties in January 2007 but Armenia has objected that since the project bypasses Armenia. (Nichol 2008) Afterwards, a trilateral framework agreement was signed in Tbilisi on 7 February 2007, between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to launch the construction of the railroad in 2007. Hence, it started in Marabda (southern Georgia) in November 2007 for the Georgian part and in Kars in July 2008 for the Turkish part.²⁸

The railroad project is expected to open in late 2011. At first stage, it is expected to transport approximately 1-1.5 million passengers and annually 6,5 million tons of freight. Then, it is expected that this capacity will reach 3 million passengers and 17 million tons of freight in 2034. Its total length will be 826 km and the total cost of the project will be around \$600 million, including \$422 million allocated for the construction of a railroad between Kars and Akhalkaliki whose length is 105 km and for the renovation of the railroad between Akhalkaliki-Marabda-Tbilisi which is 176 km. (Lussac 2008, pp.212-224)

²⁸ Lussac,S. 2008. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad and Its Geopolitical Implications for the South Caucasus. [online] *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*,2(4), pp.212-224, http://cria-online.org/5_5.html#_ftn4 [cited 20 January 2010]

4.3.2.2.1 BTK Railroad: An Integrated Zone Among Azerbaijan , Georgia and Turkey (AGT)

The inauguration of the construction of a new railroad project between Kars and Baku via Tbilisi was laid down by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on November 21, 2007 in Marabda station, which is located 15 km away from Tbilisi. This project aims to set up a direct railway line between Turkey and Georgia; Turkey and Azerbaijan and Turkey and Turkic states via Tbilisi. Moreover, after the implementation of the East-West Energy Corridor, by activating BTC oil pipeline and BTE gas pipeline, BTK railroad will be a complementary step to the development of further regional cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

In order to specify in other words, the construction of BTK Railroad indicates a new step for the development of an integrated zone among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in the South Caucasus. When the presidents of these states met in Marabda in the inauguration ceremony of the BTK railroad, they signed a declaration on a “Common Vision for Regional Cooperation.” During his visit to Azerbaijan in November 2007, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul specified an opportunity to setting up a special economic zone between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey (Ibrahimov 2007). As it is obviously seen, the transportation projects are required tools for regional integration.

The construction of the BTK railroad may enable Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to diversify their political cooperation, orienting it towards good transportation, and also towards more circulation of people among these states. In this manner, the BTK railroad introduces a new step for Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish territory as they become a major bridge between Europe and Asia.

BTK project will set up a substructure of a considerable link between Asia and Europe with the railroad to be built between China and Kazakhstan's Aktau port over the Caspian in the east, and a significant link will be formed by the European railway network that passes through the Marmaray tube passage on Istanbul Strait in the west .

BTK Railway Project intends of having a direct railway connection between Turkey and Georgia and setting up a railway connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Central Asia, China, India, Mogolistan via Georgia. Hence, Turkey tends to use the Georgian territory in its railway transportation trade with the Eastern countries and the South Caucasian states.

4.3.2.3 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC Pipeline)

During the dissolution period of the USSR, the condition of the Caspian Basin, which was attached to the USSR until the end of the Cold War, was remained contradictive. In this context, the issues concerning by which states the natural resources in the Caspian Basin would be shared and in which ways they would be transported to international markets have occupied a considerable place in the agenda.

The first step regarding the pipelines was taken on March 9, 1993 when the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in Azerbaijan signed an agreement related to transferring the Azerbaijani petroleum via Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline.

As the discussions regarding the transportation of the Azerbaijani petroleum were added to agenda in the beginning of 1990s, a grand competition broke out between Turkey and Russia since both of them have a voice in the region but for decades, the latter have had monopoly over the domination of energy sources and transferring operations. During those years, the only way to transfer oil was to bring it to Novorossiysk port of Russia by pipelines and then distribute it from that port to the world market.

As a result of the negotiations between Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and Azerbaijani administration, three main routes were designated to transfer Azerbaijani petroleum to the western markets, these were Baku-Novorossiysk, Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan Pipelines. At this point, Turkey and Azerbaijan strived hard to make the Baku-Ceyhan route as the Main Export Pipeline (MEP) while Russia backed Baku-Novorossiysk line as the MEP and wanted Azerbaijan to forego project. The discussions regarding the MEP continued for a long time. Principally by the decisive

attitude of the former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and the British Petroleum-Amoco Partnership to abolish their reservations, the negotiations were initiated between the relevant energy companies and the state representatives. Following the challenging discussions, Georgia was chosen as the third country from where the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline would be passed over. In October 1998, US, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed Ankara Declaration of support for Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. In April 1999, Turkish and Azerbaijani governments formed a working group together with oil companies to draft a construction plan for Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline. On April 17, 1999 the construction of Baku-Supsa route, with a capacity of 115 thousand barrel oil per day, was completed and transmitted Azerbaijani petroleum to the Blacksea through Georgian territory and to the western markets from there. Its significance is such that it became the first pipeline which bypasses Russia.

The intergovernmental agreement on construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was signed during the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999. Hereby, the Presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed a “Declaration of Intention” Agreement which stipulated to transmit Azerbaijani petroleum to Ceyhan in 2004. At the same summit, pipeline was renamed as “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan”. Then, Azerbaijan formed a “sponsor group” on October 3, 2000 to support the BTC project. Two weeks later, on October 17, the members of this sponsor group composed of eight AIOC –member companies (SOCAR, BP, Unocal, Statoil, TPAO, Itochu, Ramco and Delta-Hess) were named as “MEP Participants” by signing “Finance and Cooperation Agreement of the Sponsor Group” . The final agreement of Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline project was signed in Turkey on October 19, 2000. Following the official working, BTC Company was established in London on August 1, 2002 to assume the construction and execution of the pipeline. During September and October periods Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish governments were gathered to take a resolution on the approval of BTC pipeline project (NTVMSNBC Economy News)

4.3.2.3.1 The Inaguration Ceremony and Importance of the Project

The basis of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline was laid down in Baku on September 18, 2002. President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev , Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze , US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and other related official authorities were presented in the inauguration ceremony. In the asaid ceremony, Heydar Aliyev declared that this project will bring stability and security to the South Caucasus and definitely connect Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey more tightly to each other. Beside referring the BTC as “the project of the Century”, he also touched on its importance in terms of introduction of Azerbaijani petroleum with the international markets.

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline will financially contribute a lot to Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the long term process. In addition to South Caucasian countries, it makes serious contributions to Turkey not only in playing a role as a transit country but also as a natural resource transportation corridor. In addition to its financial contribution, the BTC also consolidates the geopolitical position of Turkey and geographical significance of Eurasia which is located in the intersection point of east and west, Asia and Europe.

Although far from satisfying the expectations of Azerbaijan, Turkey has been maintaining a blockade on Armenia since 1993. In order to develop a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan and find an alternative power against Russian monopoly in energy matters, Turkey supported and played an active role in BTC Pipeline (Conciliation Resources 2005).

4.3.2.4 Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline (BTE Gas Pipeline , South Caucasus Pipeline or Shah-Deniz Pipeline)

At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, beside the BTC pipeline, another framework is laid down for the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey through Azerbaijan. At the beginning, Azerbaijan rejected to be a part of that project but then it admitted when the agreement allowed the transportation of new Azerbaijani gas to Turkey through the same line. This pipeline is known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, although later priority shifted from Turkmen to Azerbaijani gas and the pipeline is renamed as Shah Deniz pipeline. It was established on May 21, 2006 as the Azerbaijani

gas was pumped to the pipeline Sangachal Terminal (British Petroleum, 2006). It is a natural gas pipeline to transport natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Turkey. It starts from Baku (Sangachal Terminal), passes through Tbilisi and reaches to Erzurum where it is linked to the Turkish gas distribution system. It is an east-west direction pipeline which runs alongside with BTC crude oil pipeline. The length of the pipeline is 692 km and it is a lot low-cost than the BTC.

Similar to Turkey, the EU has involved in some projects about energy or transportation activities in the region as well. If the EU's dependency in Russian gas and Middle Eastern oil is taken into consideration, the importance of procurement the energy sources in South Caucasus region would be clarified from the EU's perspective. Hence, since the region is close to Caspian Basin, it constitutes a great alternative and opportunity for the EU in terms of energy. The most prominent projects are Nabucco Pipeline and TRACECA.

4.3.3 The EU's Attitude toward Energy and Transportation Projects in South Caucasus

It is not possible to ignore the considerable place of the South Caucasus Region within the sphere of security of Europe because the region has significant political and economic interests, principally since it functions as an alternative energy reserve to Russia and since it offers a potential opportunity for direct foreign investment for the multinational oil companies. Furthermore, the Caucasus might be an energy bridge between east and west due to its geographical position.

4.3.3.1 The Abundant Energy Sources in the Region: A Great Alternative for the European Union

In the scope of the Southern Caucasian geopolitics, Azerbaijan has the richest oil source, and the other two countries in the region, Georgia and Armenia, constitute the main transit routes. Russia's hegemony in gas policy, principally its policy of dictating supply of gas to Europe, and its potential strategies developed against Nabucco are

among the risk factors in terms of European energy security and the “sustainable dependency”.

Consequently, Europe is in search for alternative energy sources and thus guarantees its oil supply by turning toward Azerbaijan-sourced energy transmission projects through the Georgian or Armenian territory. Moscow will welcome these gas projects since they will abolish the isolation over Armenia and bring it financial income.

There are many points that influence the EU’s approach toward the region. One of the most important fact is the considerable energy reserve in the region. Since the EU has been searching for an alternative energy source to Russia’s monopol, the precious potential energy sources in the Caspian Basin constitute an attractive opportunity for the EU as well as the pipelines that pass through the region have been undertaking a vital importance for the energy security and energy demand of the EU. Currently, Russia is the most considerable gas supplier for Europe and at the same time, European natural gas market constitutes the largest part of Russian state income. Currently, approximately 25 per cent of European gas, in other words 300 million square meter gas per day, has been provided by Russia, which brings a huge dependence on Russian energy field. Between the dates 1 January- 15 March 2009, Russia exported 240 billion square meter gas to Europe. As a result of these high numbers and payments as well as its growing energy needs, Europe had to rotate its direction from Moscow to South Caucasus. Hence, the researches for cheaper energy sources attributed strategic significance to Caucasus region, and besides, the bargainings for supplying gas from the Caspian Basin have intensified diplomatic relations between the EU and gas exporter and gas-holder countries in South Caucasus.

4.3.3.2 The Nabucco Pipeline Project

It passes through the region (starting from Erzurum, passes through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and stationed in Austria as a final point) intends to reduce European dependence on Russian energy. Hence, the EU’s concerns toward the region have been gradually growing as the gas consumption is expected to increase from 502 billion cm in 2005 to 815 billion cm in 2030 which means Russia would not be able to meet the demand alone (Dempsey 2009). According to Nabucco pipeline project, which is

backed up both by the EU and the US, not only the gas in Caspian Basin but also the gas in Iran will be transported to Europe through the pipelines. Iran has the second biggest reserve capacity in the world after Russia. Additionally, Nabucco will carry over 30 billion cubic meter per year. This is an amount of 1/6 of Gazprom's sales. So, Nabucco will constitute a considerable threat for Russia's current monopoly.

Historically, the gas trade among Russia and EU started in 1961 and by years, it increased and reached the amount of 180 billion cubic meter in 2008. Gazprom's European market share holds an amount of 27 per cent currently. The EU's demand for natural gas will be over 40 per cent than the current one in 2030 which means a huge demand for natural gas in the future. Structurally, natural gas is offering a secure supply and its environmental impact is at a reasonable level. Hence, the EU has planned to rise the amount of the use of natural gas and thus attaches a great importance to Caspian Basin owing to its rich gas resources, and to Caucasus as a transit region as well as being the provider, mainly by Azerbaijan.

4.3.3.3 Transport Corridor Europe- Caucasus- Asia Project (TRACECA)

The modern interpretation of the Silk Road, or in other words, the present Eurasian renaissance of the Silk Road, are the potential explanations to define TRACECA, which is a transport corridor between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea, the countries of South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian countries by means of improvement of the international transport.

The project was launched in the framework of TACIS program by the EU in Brussels in May 1993 with the participation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The fundamental target behind this project is to enhance trade and improve Central Asia- Transcaucasus- European Transportation Corridor.²⁹ Intending more integration between the ex-USSR Republics and the West, this project took an important step for the Central East and Caucasus by introducing these regions to the world market and also, contributed to the development of region countries in political and economic means. An inter-state agreement called "Basic

²⁹ Baran,Z., 2003. The Caucasus: Ten Years after Independence, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/vo25/25.1baran.html

Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the Development of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia” was signed between twelve countries including Turkey, during the international TRACECA conference held in Baku on September 8, 1998. It is an EU-funded technical assistance programme, so that EU has financed 62 technical assistance and 14 investment projects thus far.³⁰

5. ETHNIC, TERRITORIAL AND BORDER CONFLICTS WITHIN SOUTH CAUCASUS

The ethnic conflicts constitute the greatest problem in South Caucasus. These are Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan-Armenia; and Russian-Georgian war as a result of Abkhazian and South Ossetian ethnic problems in Georgia.

The long-standing conflicts have occurred as soon as the South Caucasian countries acquired their independence during the dissolution process of the former Soviet Union. Beside these ethnic conflicts, the Turkish-Armenian border conflict still constitutes an impediment to the development of good relations between two neighbour countries. In this context, two main disputes will outline the primary concern of this thesis where the involvements of Turkey and the EU in peace attempts are widely discussed. The two main conflictual issues, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the problematic relations between Turkey and Armenia owing to the closed land border, are widely examined from two aspects in this thesis: actor-based approach from the viewpoint of the parties that are involved in the conflict (mainly the EU and Turkey) and policy-based approach including energy and transportation projects enforced over the territory of the region countries.

The first conflictual issue in the region is the Nagorno-Karabakh problem which constitutes the primary reason behind the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and also has made a negative impact on the relations between Turkey and Armenia.

³⁰ European Commission Website, External Cooperation Programmes, *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia(TRACECA)*, 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/transport/traceca_en.htm

5.1 ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJAN WAR (Nagorno-Karabakh Problem)

5.1.1 History of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The Nagorno-Karabakh is entitled as “mysterious territory” both by Azerbaijanis and Armenians, since they have claimed that their origins are situated in this enclave. Nagorno/y is the Russian word for ‘mountainous’. This holy land has been designated as “*hagh*” in Armenian language and “*toprak*” in Azerbaijani language. (Ter Minassian, op.cit.,p.67) Karabakh came under Ottoman rule during the reign of Sultan Murad III, and embroiled during 18th and 19th centuries as it switched hands among Turkey, Russia and Iran. The tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia has traced back to the first Russian Revolution in 1905. The separation of Shusha from the West Karabakh indicated the first signals of ethnic conflicts. By the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Transcaucasian Federation was established and declared its independence in 1918. However, the independence had lasted for a short period, until the Soviet army brought the Federation under control in April, 1920 (Demir,A., 2003, p.161).

Turkey started to correlate with the countries in the region and became effective in the regional conflictual issues during the building process of new Turkish Republic in the beginnings of 1920s. When the Turkish army left the region after the Mondros Armistice, the British army entered into the region and declared Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Then the Soviet Union declared Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh. According to Article 2 of Gümrü Treaty³¹ and Article 3 of the Treaty of Moscow signed on March 16, 1921 to confirm the principles of Gümrü Treaty, Turkey undertook to guarantee the rights of Nakhcivan.

Then, Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous region attached to Azerbaijan in 1923, then, despite all the reactions of Armenians, it became an autonomous Republic reaffiliated to Azerbaijan in 1924. While the Armenians in Karabakh demanded to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, their demand was rejected by the Soviet Union in 1929. However, the problems had been proceeded during the whole Soviet Period. The fact is that, the heavily centralized system of Soviet state failed to manage the political

³¹ Gümrü Treaty is the first international agreement signed on December 2, 1920 by the young Republic of Turkey to determine the eastern borders on the grounds of National Pact.

contradictions by achieving a consensus between the parties in Nagorno-Karabakh. During that time, the security and trust were established through fear, so that neither parties sincerely trust in Soviet management in Karabakh issue. So, under the rigid dominance of Soviets, the problem was preferred to be covered up until the last years of the USSR. In fact, Armenians demanded to take Karabakh as from 1960-70s. During the period of Gorbachev who took the lead in Russia in 1985, Armenians accelerated their efforts to attach Karabakh to Armenia, as they principally called for drawing advantage from “perestroika” and “glasnost” reforms of the former USSR. For that purpose, many letters had been sent to Gorbachev in 1986. Indeed, the problem, where the remnants have been still trying to be solved today, broke out in 1988 when the Local Council of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region decided to break apart from Azerbaijan and being attached to Armenia. However, the Executive Board of Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet proclaimed that the decision of the Local Council is invalid. (Arslanlı 2001)

The issue had been considered by the Executive Board of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Executive Board stated that the existence of Karabakh conflict is admitted; however, the conflict should be solved on the basis of respecting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the decision regarding the issue should be taken in accordance with Article 78 of the USSR Constitution.³²

In fact, Karabakh was mainly an Armenian populated region within the borders of the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic. During the 20th century, the growth of nationalism as a result of perestroika that prompted conflict between Azeri and Armenian communities in Karabakh. Calling for unification with Armenia, the Karabakh Armenians were calling for independence during the breakup of the USSR in 1991 (Astourian 1994 and Cornell 1999).

In 23 August 1990, the “Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Armenia”, was declared by the Supreme Council of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the Preamble, based on the decision on December 1, 1989, it had been declared that “*joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on*

³² Article 78: “Any border of the Soviet Republic cannot be changed without the consent of the USSR.”

the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh." It means the decision was taken in the direction of reunification of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh region.

It has been quite remarkable that an article indicating Armenia's separation from the USSR does not exist in the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Armenia. (Declaration of Independence of Armenia 1990). However, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia achieved their independence and pre-existing Nagorno-Karabakh problem gained momentum from this date forward. Following the Declaration of Independence, Armenia announced its independence on September 21, 1991. As the resolution taken in the Parliament on October 18, 1991, the Parliament of Azerbaijan adopted the Constitutional Act on Independence and by the decision taken in the Azerbaijan Parliament on November 26, the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was abolished and the region was attached to Azerbaijan. (Taşkıran 1995) However, on December 10, 1991 the Karabakh Armenians declared their independence and were recognized by the Armenians which caused the escalation of the tension.

The Karabakh conflict is one of the most devastating regional war after the Cold War period. In the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory was occupied by Armenian troops and thereby, approximately one million Azeri citizens have become refugees.

During that period, Azerbaijan's sole ally was Turkey, however Turkey tried to stay politically neutral at state level and attempted only for mediation. On the other hand, Armenia became allied with Russia, since Moscow backed up the separatist movements within Georgia and Azerbaijan both financially and militarily.

A considerable part of Azerbaijan territory was occupied in 1992. (see map 5.1) The ethnic cleansing conducted by the Armenian armed forces on the territory of the Mountainous Karabakh region, escalated during the genocide of Khojaly, an Azerbaijani town in the region, in February 1992. During the massacre which is called 'the largest massacre of the conflict' according to the Human Rights Watch, more than 800 Azeri civilians were slaughtered by the armed forces of Armenia. As a result of its reflections in Turkey, the President of the period, Turgut Özal, condemned Armenia

explicitly. (Cornell 1995, pp. no 64-65 op cit. p.60 ; Fuller 1992, p. 37) Turkey did not go beyond condemning because Ankara regarded the problem as an internal issue of Russia and preferred to stay uninvolved. The aggression of Armenian troops against Azerbaijani civilians had been continued even after the Khojaly Massacre, with the occupation of the Shusha and Latchin Regions of Azerbaijan. By that occupation, almost the whole part of Karabakh fell under the Armenian hegemony. In the meantime, along with the establishment of Latchin corridor the territorial integrity between Armenia and Karabakh have been provided.

On the purpose of establishing perpetual peace, Turkey pursued an active policy and activated the OSCE in 1992 with the common attitudes of the United States and Russia. As a result of the efforts of the UN and OSCE, the Minsk Conference was established in March, 1992. Upon the occupation of Kalbajar Rayon on April 4, which constituted the main reason for the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the decisions numbered 822, 853, 874 were approved in 1993. In the decision 822 , it was requested that the occupant forces should withdraw from Kalbajar District and from the recently occupied zones of Azerbaijan; however neither a sanction nor any disincentives have been imposed on the aggressive state.

Due to various reasons such as the domestic disturbance, Azerbaijan could not displayed a stable military success toward Armenians. Especially the loss of Kalbajar created a profound problem within the country. Nevertheless, the Karabakh conflict gained more positive dimension when Heydar Aliyev came to the power after Abulfaz Elchibey. Aliyev launched two considerable amendments: Firstly he supported the mediation efforts of Russia and secondly initiated a direct contact with Karabakh Armenians. Then, a cease-fire was signed in Sochi on Russia's mediation on April 8, 1993. (Le Monde 1993)



Map 5.1 : The map below indicates the Azerbaijani territory under the occupation of Armenia and the circumstance of Karabakh.

Source : www.karabakh.org (Azerbaijan Defence Ministry)

5.1.2 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia

On February 7, 2007, Armenian President Robert Kocharian signed a document setting the country's national security strategy. The National Security Strategy is a significant legal document which determines the general principles of its foreign policy, the guideline of its relations with its neighbours, the clues of its general strategy that should be pursued and the basic values of the national security of the Republic of Armenia. These values are independence, the security of the state and the people, peace, international cooperation and welfare of its citizens. The Strategy Document is composed of seven main chapters and a set of subchapters. In the chapter of Foreign Security Strategy, the issues concerning the attitude of Armenia in its relations with the neighbouring countries were discussed in a strategic manner. (Republic of Armenia Ministry of Defence, 2007).

In the subchapter regarding its relations with Azerbaijan, it is mentioned that diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been established due to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered as the main problem which determines the current and the future Armenian-Azerbaijan relations.

Both of these countries are the participants of various international organisations and wanted to be part of a regional cooperation. In the Strategy document, it is mentioned that the Azerbaijani attempt to keep Armenia away from regional cooperation opportunities is perceived as a threat to its national security and interpreted as a political indication which undermines the peace in the region. Further, Armenia stressed its faith and efforts to participate in the bilateral and regional cooperation which could build confidence and have a serious positive impact on the overall situation. In the document, 'the realities' are mentioned which stand by the position related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy, Sarkisian 2006).

The Security Strategy touched on three principles which Armenia had been taken into account in the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:

- a) To dissociate the Nagorno-Karabakh which is an encircled zone, from Azerbaijan; to draw the boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh.
- b) To take assurance from the international community concerning the integration initiatives of Nagorno-Karabakh
- c) The international community should be a guarantor in ensuring the security of Karabakh population and in avoiding to restart a war.

5.1.3 The Madrid Principles

One of the recent development regarding the Karabakh conflict is the meeting where the Madrid Protocol has been constituted by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group. The "Madrid Principles" which envisaged to form the basis of peace negotiations with the aim of establishing framework for future resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, were proposed in December 2007 by the French, Russian and the US co-chairmen of the Minsk group. The main points of the principles are:

- a) returning the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control

- b) an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance
- c) providing connection between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh by the Latchin corridor
- d) a future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding public expression of will through a referendum
- e) the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to turn to their former places of residence
- f) international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation
- g) the abolition of the barriers on external communication of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; the opening of Turkey-Armenian border (Khachatrian 2009)

In this context, the interesting point in such a document which is related to the resolutions of Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is the existence of an article related to Turkey-Armenian relations, which Turkey is not part of.

5.1.4 The Moscow Declaration

Following the Russian-Georgian war in August, 2008, Russia fell back upon the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh issue to contribute the peaceful settlement process. In fact, following the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia also took a concrete step in Nagorno-Karabakh issue to undertake the political leadership in South Caucasus. Russia's President Medvedev's efforts were concluded with the signing of "Moscow Declaration" among Russian Federation, Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2, 2008 by the mediation of the co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk group. The parties committed to reach "a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" via constructive mutual dialogues. (Armenian Reporter 2008)

The Moscow Declaration includes 5 points regarding the solutions of Nagorno-Karabakh issue : (Veliev 2008)

- i)** Declare that they shall contribute to the establishment of a healthier situation in the South Caucasus and securing regional stability and security through a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of principles and norms of international law and solutions and documents adopted in their frames, that would create favorable conditions for economic development and all-encompassing cooperation in the region;
- ii)** Confirm the importance of continued efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, with consideration of their meeting with the sides in Madrid on November 29, 2007, and subsequent discussions aiming at the development of basic principles of a political settlement in the future;
- iii)** Agree that the achievement of a peaceful settlement must be accompanied by legally binding international guarantees of all of its aspects and stages.
- iv)** Note that the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to continue to work on the development of a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including through future high-level contacts, and instruct their foreign ministers to activate further steps in the negotiations process, including in cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group;
- ix)** Consider important promoting the creation of conditions for implementation of confidence-building measures in the context of efforts toward settlement.

The declaration is considered as important since it was signed by the Presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is the first document to which Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders had put their signatures after 15 years. Hereby, it rises hopes and expectations for a peaceful settlement and generates a substantial turning-point. This kind of declaration, signed by both Presidents, constitutes the primordial attempt since May 1992.

While the most significant principle for Azerbaijan is the protection of territorial integrity, Armenia emphasizes the importance of sovereign self-determination. However, neither the territorial integrity nor sovereign self determination principles or any similar solution were emphasized in the declaration. But the first point referring the

political settlement would be ‘on the basis of principles and norms of international law and solutions’ might be considered as an advantage for Azerbaijan since Baku has intended to take a resolution in accordance with the norms of international law because Azerbaijan argues the fact that the the principle of ‘territorial integrity’ is superior to the principle of ‘self-determination’ in international law. So, in case of the enforcement, the Armenian troops have to abandon all the territories including the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region which are under its occupation. However, considering the point referring the ‘international law’ differently, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are in the opinion that this principle will grant the region citizens the right of self-determination. Being different from the Cease-fire Agreement signed in May 1994, there is not any principle existed concerning separatist Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in Moscow Declaration.

5.1.5 The Road-Map for Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Memmedyarov declared the “road map” which contains the following items:

The plan is composed of three phases. In the first phase, it is proposed that Armenia should terminate its occupations in five regions out of seven except Kelbajar and Latchin. These five regions are : Agdan, Fuzuli, Zengilan, Gabriel and Kubatli.

Yerevan will evacuate 13 villages which are located in Latchin region between Armenia and Karabakh.

In the second phase, all the transportation networks in the region will be repaired. Additionally, it is envisaged that Azerbaijan will take the rest part of Latchin region and the whole Kalbajar Rayon under its domination. Then, Azerbaijani immigrants will return back to their homeland regions under the control of the international observers.

In the third phase, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be discussed.

Mr.Memmedyarov indicated that neither stage of the peace process will undermine the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. *“If the Armenians withdraw from the occupied lands with their own consent, the war discourse will not need to be pronounced anymore.”* (NTV 2010)

5.1.6 The Recent Developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process

There was a meeting between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in St.Petersburg on June 4, 2009. In fact, it was not so efficient like the Moscow Declaration held in November 2008. During the meeting, tangible results were highlighted according to the demands of the parties, while Armenia emphasized the importance of ‘moving toward’ in Nagorno-Karabakh process, Azerbaijan mentioned ‘creating a basis for the continuation of the negotiations’ on the ‘constructive atmosphere’ in which the meeting was carried out, backed by the parties and also by the mediator, the OSCE Minsk group.

Considering Ilham Aliyev’s latest explanations, it seems that Azerbaijan is prone to use the Latchin corridor (see map 5.2), connecting the Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, jointly. Besides, it is inclined to recognize broad self-management right to Armenians who dwell in Nagorno-Karabakh. These are considerable developments in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, the similar steps should also be taken by Armenia as well.

Then, Russian, Azeri and Armenian leaders were gathered in a Russian city, Sochi in the end of January, 2010. As far as is known, Russia’s mediation position between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been proceeding at a rapid clip. The leaders discussed the new proposals in the gathering. Azerbaijan’s President İlham Aliyev and Armenia’s President Serge Sarkisian reached an agreement about the participation of Karabakh Armenians to the Karabakh peace process in the following stages. In addition, the leaders compromised on the preamble of an agreement which will settle a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh problem. According to the Russian officials, while the status of Karabakh has been determining in the document of reconciliation, “the right of self-determination” of the region people should be taken into consideration as well.

Even though the conflict had started a long time ago, neither of the parties decided to give up their claims; thus, until so far, no compromise has been reached on Karabakh issue. In this context, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian stated that Azerbaijani territory currently held by Armenian forces could be returned in exchange for security and self-determination for disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet, Sarkisian laid

down two conditions to return them back : granting the right of self-determination to the Karabakh citizens and the establishment of a security mechanism in the enclave.



Map 5.2 : Latchin corridor and the map of Karabakh

Source: <http://www.asbarez.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/275-nk-92spring.gif>

There are two kinds of approaches. On one hand, the pessimistic approach argues that although the little progress has been made, it was not sufficient for a concrete gain to be achieved as a result. While Azerbaijan has supported the military option for the liberation of the occupied zones from Armenian troops to achieve the principle of ‘territorial integrity’, Armenia is in favor of ‘the right of self determination’ in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Russia is opting for maintaining his alliance with Armenia and use the latter in its sphere of influence within the Eurasia region.

On the other hand, the optimistic approach defends that a tangible progress has been made so far, so there is a room for discussion since the parties are closer to reach an agreement. Some general outlines and treaties set forth the verification of their approach. In addition, its an obvious fact that there has been no widespread hostilities since 1994.

As an actor-based approach, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is examined in detail by the OSCE Minsk Group who played a constructive role in peace process, the EU and Turkey.

5.1.7 The Role of the OSCE Minsk Group in Karabakh Peace Process

The peace negotiations of Nagorno-Karabakh have been undertaken by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk group in 1992, which aims to find a political solution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani region under the occupation of Armenia. Thereupon, the Bishkek Protocol was signed between the officials of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Karabakh Armenians on May 9, 1994. By the protocol, a perpetual cease-fire had been declared although the Azerbaijani lands were under Armenian occupation. Following these developments, the Co-Chairmanship of the Minsk group, comprised of the US, Russia and France, was established in 1994 under auspices of the OSCE to facilitate the negotiations and provide a peaceful settlement for the Karabakh conflict. The current co-chairs of the Minsk group are, Ambassador Igor Popov of Russia, Bernard Fassier of France, and Robert Bradtke of the United States and Chairman-in-Office Ambassador Andzrej Kasprzyk. At the OSCE Budapest Summit in 1994, the Minsk group was given a mandate to promote the continuation of the cease-fire and to reach a political agreement on the cessation of armed conflict. At the OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996, the Minsk Group suggested three principles to the parties as the basis of an agreement: Armenian and Azerbaijani territorial integrity should be respected, the highest degree of autonomy should be given to Mountainous Karabakh considering its legal status within Azerbaijan, and the security of all the Nagorno-Karabakh citizens should be guaranteed. Although supported by 53 member states of the OSCE, the principles were vetoed by Armenia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement in 1998 and the cease-fire regime will be maintained until a comprehensive peace accord is reached. But still, both parties could not come up with a peaceful solution so far. The Minsk group, responsible from the solution of the conflict, has done a lot of work in past years, yet it has failed to achieve a concrete result. The Lisbon Summit of the OSCE held in 2000 determined three principles that would be a guideline for the peaceful solution of the conflict. These were; guaranteeing of the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Republics, granting a high degree of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan and guaranteeing the security of the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although the second principle damages Azerbaijani state sovereignty, they still adopted these three principles; despite Armenian reluctance to approve them.

In the meetings during the accelerated process of peaceful settlement, the co-chairs firstly drew up solution plans to be offered to the parties. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue, where the OSCE is holding a mediatory position, has a vital importance for the harmony of the Caucasus region. It is confirmed with the statements of some responsible officers in the Minsk group such as the speech made in Key West, Florida in 2001 by Carey Cavanaugh, the former US co-chair of the Minsk Group, mentioned *“It has to be a solution that works for the government of Armenia and the government of Azerbaijan, and the people of Armenia and the people of Azerbaijan”*(Jacoby 2005) Similarly, Terhi Hakala, Roving Ambassador of Finland to the South Caucasus, focused on a similar point while referring to the significance of the issue by her own words, *“To underestimate the position of Karabakh is a major mistake”* (Jacoby 2005).

In the sense of bringing coherent approaches to contribute the peace agreement for Nagorno-Karabakh, a couple of solution methods were offered in the late 1990s. The Package deal approach is one of the methods that the term of ‘package’ refers the simultaneous resolution of all remarkable issues, principally the issue of ‘status’. On the contrary, the step-by-step approach implicates a phased process considering the consequences of armed-conflicts on a preferential basis than the diplomatic issue of determination of ‘status’. However, neither of them were approved by the parties. Within this process, many plans and proposals were offered to the parties until 2000s; however all were declined because of disapprovals and rejections either by Armenia or

Azerbaijan. So that, dating from 2004, the OSCE Minsk group altered their work method. By the new method, they tried to provide a liberal discussion atmosphere by gathering the parties together. The new method is entitled as the “Prague Process”³³.

In 2004, the Prague Process was initiated under the leadership of Minsk group. The process was a long term approach that the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers were conducted eleven bilateral negotiations; however, the progress was not sufficient that not any solution had been reached owing to disagreements between the parties. In fact, there is no common vision for the region. Polarized integration into Euro-Atlantic and Russian dominated security structures is determined by military confrontation. Neither country is trying to enforce change in an environment conducive to peace. Much is dictated by internal politics. There is a sense that both sides are playing to emotions rather than to real settlement (Mehtiyev 2005). Then, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a document guiding basic principles at the OSCE summit in December 2007.

However, there are some issues in mediation process where the OSCE lagged behind. Firstly, the peacekeeping experience was lacked in OSCE Minsk group members in Europe. At the persistence of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is not a member of the OSCE, because it is part of Azerbaijan according to law. Thus, as Nagorno-Karabakh is not a formal member of the peace negotiations, the permanent conflict resolution is impeded (Hughes and Sasse 2002). Second, the deep historical background of the conflict and approximately 1 million displaced and homeless people problem have not been solved yet by the OSCE. Third, the lack of a considerable peacekeeping force of the OSCE would obstruct the implementation of any constructive resolution in a long term.³⁴ So, in regard to the OSCE’s capabilities and past failures in peacekeeping operations, it is time for EU to undertake the mission and support the conflict management issue by its own resources.

³³ The first meeting was gathered in Prague in April 16, 2004.

³⁴ DeRouen, K., 2007. *Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II*, Volume 2, ABC-CLIO Inc. p.156

Related to the Karabakh issue, Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that *“Since 1998, three major proposals have emerged as a result of the work of the parties themselves. They were the Common State, Key West, and the Prague process. The parties worked on these, engaged in give and take, leading eventually to a document. In the first two cases, Azerbaijan clearly backtracked”* (Fuller,2009).

5.1.8 The Role of the EU in the Karabakh Peace Process

While the Georgian Saakasvili government has bolstered greater EU participation in the Georgian conflicts, the EU has had virtually no role in Nagorno-Karabakh. It can be explained by the reluctance of the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia to search for EU assistance. In this context, as Armenia prefers to maintain its good relations with Russia; Azerbaijan is backed by Europe owing to its oil resources while taking a middle path between Russia and the West. The peace negotiations led by the OSCE Minsk Group is sensitive, after all, the EU member states are committed to their membership of the OSCE. If the achievements of the EU is questioned, it would be difficult to reply because the status quo is preferable to local actors instead of resolution of the conflict. However in Azerbaijan, there are particular signs that the public is ready to approve more involvement of the EU in the Karabakh conflict, which means a greater EU role in conflict resolution process of Karabakh (Grigorian 2003; Nuriyev 2007). However, due to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Azerbaijan authorities are disappointed that the EU is not willing to state clearly that Armenia occupies Azerbaijani territory (ICG 2006: 11). On the other hand, the EU attaches importance to protect its strategic interests in Azerbaijan as a memorandum of understanding on strategic energy partnership was signed between the EU and Azerbaijan in November 2006. However, as Nuriyev says *“conflict resolution should be regarded as a prerequisite for securing energy export routes”* (Nuriyev 2007 : 3).

Although the EU has played a fewer role in Karabakh resolution process, its role in the region was extended with the Special Representative (EUSR), the EU delegations in all capital cities of South Caucasus, and the border monitoring support staff in Tbilisi. It might been said that it neither plays power games in the Caucasus like other major

powers nor trying to extend its influence at the expense of other actors, in other words it is rather more 'honest broker in the conflict' (Lynch 2006; ICG 2006).

Being one of the most important conflicts in the region, a possible war over Nagorno-Karabakh would undermine the stability of the region, threaten the security of energy supplies from the Caspian Sea to the world market and would constitute a serious impediment to the regional cooperation and harmony. So, frozen conflicts and instability in Southern Caucasus constitute a huge threat to EU security.

In addition, as the EU's relations are not so well with Azerbaijan or Armenia, it is not directly involved in negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. So, only a small effort has been spent for the conflict resolution. In order to undertake an active role, the EU shall devise a comprehensive resolution plan for its involvement in the conflict solution process and should put efficient instruments into practise. For example, rather than waiting for an agreement on the resolution principles to the Karabakh conflict, the EU should devise a plan together with the other OSCE Minsk Group members in peace enforcement. In case of the suspension of peace agreements, the EU shall take a further step and prepare a set of alternatives in advance for the armed fight or conflict that can be taken place.

In principal, it is the work of OSCE Minsk Group to search for resolution of the conflict, in this context, the EU could only contribute by promoting support to create moderate atmosphere for diplomatic negotiations and for faster solutions to be found. However, when interviewed, the European Commission staff said, "*No one has allowed us to do anything in Nagorno-Karabakh... we would do something there if we were asked by the sides.*" (Crisis Group interview, European Commission staff, 2006).

In brief, it is possible to pronounce that the EU has denoted its willingness in contributing to the settlement of the frozen conflicts. As well as having special interests in the region concerning the energy hubs and supplies, the EU is also getting closer to the region countries and their cultures by recent enlargements. Beside trying to support South Caucasus countries to live together in harmony, the principal contributions of the EU are diversified including reform assistance, rehabilitation efforts, crisis

management, and border issues, etc. Furthermore, the EU has the potential to establish diplomatic dialogue with the conflictual region states and also, since the EU is eager to be an international actor and have a voice in the region, it is in pursuit of creating efficient stabilization strategies for the unresolved regional security issues.

5.1.9 The Role of Turkey in the Karabakh Peace Process

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses the principal obstacle to the regional stability and cooperation in the Southern Caucasus. As a member of the Minsk group, Turkey has regarded the Minsk process as a functional mechanism in order to reach a long-lasting settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which constitutes the key foreign policy issue of Azerbaijan for years.

Turkey has been the major ally of Azerbaijan in Karabakh conflict. Turkish authorities have many times highlighted the expression "one nation, two countries" with the intend of specifying close friendship of two countries which speak a similar language, share a common history and are located in the same geography. By the secularist modernization efforts in state governance including religious issues, Turkey has constituted an ideal model for Azerbaijan. Despite the substantial support given to Azerbaijan principally in military means and an economic blockade applied to Armenia since early 1990s, Ankara's influence has remained restricted in regional conflicts since Turkey is still dependent on Russia for energy resources and have fewer role within the Minsk Peace Process.

Turkey, actively participated in the meetings of Minsk Group willing to find a solution to the conflict within the framework of OSCE and believes that instruments which are required for an acceptable resolution in the conflict are the maintenance of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from illegally occupied territories of Azerbaijan and the return of displaced people back to home.

The Azerbaijani- Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a serious concern for the Turkish people. Turkey considers Nagorno-Karabakh territory as a part of Azerbaijan and urges for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied 20 per cent lands of Azerbaijan. Turkey has promised to Azerbaijan to not open the borders with Armenia before the ongoing occupation is terminated by Yerevan. Turkey intends for

normalizing its relationship with Armenia when the Armenian side takes a decision of making peace with its past, leaving the judgement of history to historians rather than politicians or bureaucrats,³⁵ and maintains the moderate atmosphere which was gained by the signature of the protocols on October 10, 2009.

Due to the interpretations, a concrete agreement that will be reached in the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is going to be definitely a required component for the regional conjuncture that enables the development of Turkey-Armenia relations as 'indispensable' and 'ready'. However, Armenia clearly opposes to terminate its illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

Turkish leaders have been constantly highlighting that the ratification of the normalization protocols is based on a settlement to the Karabakh conflict which would satisfy Azerbaijan. In this context, the former Foreign Minister Oskanian stated in 2007, *"Turkey's demands from us to end the Karabakh problem in Azerbaijan's favor and drop our genocide allegations, aside from the legal perspective, had no moral basis."* (Taraf 2007). The second conflictual issue is Turkey-Armenian Border conflict which constitutes a grand problem in terms of Turkey's relations with its eastern neighbour.

5.2 THE BORDER CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA

5.2.1 The Recent History of Turkey-Armenian Relations

Armenia was one of the first republics to declare independence from the USSR on August 23, 1990. Following a referendum on September 21, 1991, the state of Armenia was fully recognized. In order to establish good neighbourhood, Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia on December 16, 1991. Owing to the difficult economic conditions it encountered after its independence, Turkey sent humanitarian aid (food,electric, basic materials etc) to Armenia. In addition, Turkey facilitated to transfer the humanitarian aid to Armenia through its territory. Turkey bolstered Armenia's

³⁵ Ruysdael,S., 2002. *New Trends in Turkish Foreign Affairs: Bridges and Boundaries*, Writers Club Press

integration with the regional organisations, international society and the western institutions. In this context, Turkey invited Armenia as a founding state to the BSEC Organisation, established on July 25, 1992.

The good neighbourhood period was destroyed with the illegal occupation of Kalbajar Rayon of Azerbaijan by the Armenian troops on April 3,1993. On one hand, in the context of friendly demarche, Turkey called for Armenia to abandon the illegal occupation and on the other hand, it fractionally began to restrict its relations with Armenia to give diplomatic support to Azerbaijan.

Despite all well-disposed calls in a peaceful manner, standing firmly not to abandon its illegal occupying attitude, oriented Ankara to take a serious stand toward Yerevan. Thereby, Turkey decided to unilaterally close the Turkish-Armenian land frontier, namely 'Alican Border Gate' and 'Akyaka Railway Border' on April 5,1993 (Özdal 2009).

It was difficult for Turkey to develop diplomatic relations with Armenia due to its aggressive attitudes which threaten the stability and security of the region. Regarding the occupation issue, since ignoring the UNSC Resolutions No 822, 853, 874, and 884, Armenia maintained to disregard the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and thereby, occupied over 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory, rendering the local Azerbaijani people as homeless refugees.

However, depending on its good-will in process, Turkey held out an 'olive branch' to Armenia by considering that Yerevan's inclusion would make a considerable impact to the regional stability. In this framework, a dialog process had been initiated among the Foreign Ministries in an effort to normalize the relations by overcoming the problems between two neighbour countries. To contribute the process, Turkey adopted a couple of measures such as facilitating transit transportation, providing direct flight connections between Yerevan and various destinations in Turkey, supporting the intercourses between the NGOs. In this context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)

published a declaration on April 13, 2005 concerning the so-called genocide allegations of Armenia. In the declaration, it was stated that ³⁶

It is the belief of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, that both Turkey's and Armenia's interests lie in reconciling Turkish and Armenian nations who have lived for centuries on the same territory in mutual tolerance and peace, in setting them free from being hostage to deep prejudices emanating from the war years, and in creating an environment which will enable them to share a common future based on tolerance, friendship and cooperation.

In the declaration, the governing and the main opposition parties made a proposal envisaging the establishment of a “Joint History Commission” composed of historians from Turkey and Armenia, to shed light on historical facts through scientific researches. As well as the national archives, it was also decided to include the archives of related countries, if required. This proposal was officially submitted to former Armenian President Robert Kocharian by a formal letter sent by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on April 15, 2005.³⁷ Replying the proposal as “*Firstly, a political dialog should be established*”, Yerevan had intentionally blocked up the peace initiatives. With this response, it was understood that Armenia intended to open up the negotiations without withdrawing from the occupied Azerbaijani lands, and without abandoning its so-called genocide allegations and the land claims from Eastern Anatolian part of Turkey.

Although his constructive undertaking remained inconclusive, Erdogan launched a set of initiatives such as the Vienna-Armenian-Turkish Platform (VAT), and the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC); however all these initiatives failed to success due to the uncompromising attitudes of Armenia.

³⁶ Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, see the Declaration by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 13 April 2005, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/declaration-by-the-turkish-grand-national-assembly.en.mfa>

³⁷ The Official website of Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry's Declarations No:62 “Regarding the letter which was sent by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan in 15 April 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_62---15-nisan-2005_-basbakan-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan_in-ermenistan-devlet-baskanirobert-kocaryan_a-gonderdigi-mektup-hk_.tr.mfa

In fact, these were not the initial uncompromising attitudes of Armenia. The examples of its negative manner could be clearly witnessed before when Turkey invited the former Armenian President Robert Kocharian to the 17th NATO Summit which was held in Istanbul, on June 28-29, 2004, to establish a ground for a concrete dialog process. However, President Kocharian refused the invitation by mentioning “*Armenia can progress without the presence of Turkey as well.*”

In addition, according the declaration made by Vaha Hovhanisyan, the vice-minister of Armenian Dashnaktsutyun Party, on April 22, 2005, concerning Prime Minister Erdogan’s letter , “*in order to establish a mutual relation with Armenia, Turkey stipulates Armenia to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh, to abandon its genocide claims and to recognize the historical eastern land borders. But, accepting all these means losing the political and national conscience of Armenia.*” (Hovhanisyan 2005) The solemnity of the situation is explicitly clarified with these words.

In the framework of Turkey’s good-will initiatives, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the main opposition party’s leader Deniz Baykal made a common attempt in the direction of researching the archives by setting up a joint working group composed of the historians from both countries regarding the so-called genocide issue. In this context, they mentioned “*We opened our archives, let everybody to open them. Turkish and Armenian historians make their work under the supervision of UNESCO*.*” (Diplomatic Observation 2005) However the former Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian refused the good-will proposal of Turkish politicians, claiming that the proposal regarding the cooperation of historians does not constitute a ground, and according to him, the historians had already remarked what they have to say about 1915 events.

The steps toward having a relation with Armenia have accelerated as from 2007. As a concrete initiative of the good-will process of Turkey, The Church of the Holy Cross in Van was restored by Turkey in March 2007. A great number of bureaucrats, particularly the former Armenian Vice-Minister of Culture Gagik Gürciyan, attended to the opening ceremony of the Church. In the same year, Yerevan-Antalya flights have been initiated as well.

The historical background continues with the developments after February 2008 with the “Cheese Diplomacy and Football Diplomacy” which contributed to melting the frozen relations between Turkey and Armenia during the period of Armenian President Serge Sarkisian.

5.2.2 The Developments after February 2008 in the Sarkisian Period

5.2.2.1 Cheese Diplomacy and Football Diplomacy

By the elections held in Armenia in February 2008, Serge Sarkisian was chosen as the new President of Armenia. Thus, a new period has started in Turkey-Armenian relations. Owing to his constructive foreign policies, 2008 became an important year in the search of a new dialogue process to improve the relations between two neighbour countries. A set of concrete attempts initiated firstly with “Cheese Diplomacy” and then proceeded with “Football Diplomacy”.

First of all, it should be dwelled on the meaning of “cheese diplomacy”. In fact, it started with a “Caucasus cheese” project which was initiated by the cheese producers from Turkey, Georgia and Armenia who were attended in a fair in Kars. Actually, it inflamed the discussions toward the opening of Turkey-Armenian land border after such a long time.

So, the improvement of the relations between two neighbours starting from 2008 is clearly observed in Sarkisian’s positive foreign policy concept. In this context, the tragic developments which constituted the backstage for the most recent advance in Turkish-Armenian relations were launched by the “Football Diplomacy” in July 2008 when Armenian President Serge Sarkisian invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Armenia for the football match between two countries. During his symbolic visit to Yerevan in September 2008, President Gul watched a soccer match between Armenia and Turkey as part of World Cup Preliminaries. It was positively considered that the Turkish and Armenian national football teams have taken part in the same group in 2010 World Cup eliminations. As a result of substantial secret negotiations between Armenia and Turkey over re-establishment of diplomatic relations which were suspended since 1993, the “Football Diplomacy” became the turning point in the initial process for the construction of warmer relations between two countries.

Upon President Gul's symbolic visit to Yerevan, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian declared that he would come to Turkey to attend the return match which was scheduled to take place on October 14, 2009 only if there were some progress concerning the reopening of the border. As the protocols for the normalization of relations had been signed just a couple of days before the soccer match, the Armenian President came and watched the soccer match in Bursa as planned, but if his visit had been canceled, Turkey would definitely be exposed to accusing fingers pointed at Ankara claiming that it has neither a serious intentions nor a concrete initiative of resolving the conflict.

5.2.3 Turkey's Positive Attitude towards Armenia

Since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Armenia, Turkey has displayed positive attitude and tried to establish good relations with its neighbour in the eastern border. Or in other words, if Turkish-Armenian relations would be examined from the end of 1980s up to date, Turkey's attitudes in good-will towards its neighbour could be clearly observed.

The chronologic order of Turkey's well-disposed acts clarifies the situation:

Turkey sent aid materials to the Spitak earthquake (also called Leninakan Earthquake and Gyumri Earthquake) which is located in Armenia on December 7, 1988.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Turkey became one of the countries that primarily recognized the independence of Armenian Republic on 16 December 1991, even before the US had done so.

While having a financial difficulty and a shortage of energy in the beginning of 1990s, Armenia received an amount of support and humanitarian aid from Turkey. (Republic of Turkey, MFA 2008)

Turkey welcomed all the initiatives that integrate and build closer bridges among the region countries. Hereby, Turkey put forward considerable initiatives to foster interaction and harmony in the region and to ensure peace, stability and prosperity such as BSEC and the CSCP. In the former organisation, the countries which has coastline with the Black Sea were invited; however, based on its goodwill , Turkey invited

Armenia as a charter member to the BSEC in 25 June 1992 although it lacks of being a littoral country to the Black Sea (Turkish Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009).

Despite the negative reactions of Turkish public during the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1993, Turkey donated 100.000 tones amount of wheat to Armenia owing to its food shortage at that time. In spite of the illegal Nagorno-Karabakh occupation of Armenia, Ankara maintained to have a neutral policy by means of good relations and it also sent electricity to Armenia.

Upon the occupation of Kalbajar Rayon, Turkey closed the land frontier and airfield with Armenia. Although the border gate remained closed after the occupation of Kalbajar village of Azerbaijan by Armenian Republic in April 1993, Turkey allowed the opening of H-50 aerial corridor that permitted flights between Istanbul-Yerevan in 1995 and opened the airfield on October 16, 2003. Hence, Turkey started to use the airfield by allowing the flights between Yerevan-İstanbul and Antalya-Yerevan which are still proceeding. Then, direct flights were launched between two countries in 2003 without claiming any precondition in advance.

In an attempt to improve relations, the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission was established in July 2001 and concluded in April 2004.

In Article 11 of the BTK railway project signed between Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan in February 2007, Armenia was offered to give up the occupation and participate to the project. During the inauguration of the BTK railway project in Kars on July 24, 2008, Abdullah Gul obviously called for Armenia to abandon its occupation of Azeri territory and participate to the project.

Turkey tolerated approximately 100.000-120.000 Armenian illegal workers immigrated to Turkey via illegal ways and to work informally there. (Kirişçi 2003) Nevertheless, the entry visas have still been given to the Armenian citizens in border gates of Turkey.

As an attempt of a gesture, Turkey restored some of the Armenian churches in various regions of Turkey. For instance, the well-known thousand-year-old Akdamar Armenian Church in Van was restored and reopened as a museum on March 29, 2007.

On December 20, 2009, the Culture and Tourism Ministry allowed to be worshipped at the Church of Akdamar one day per year. In this sense, the mutual “good-will” attempts of both parties could be complemented by the opening the border soon. While Armenia is willing the border to be opened as soon as possible owing to the economic wealth that it would definitely bring, Turkey seems to maintain its hesitations in some issues as long as Armenia does not give up its territorial demands and constant propagandas of Diaspora related to the so-called Armenian Genocide.

5.2.4 The Historical Order of the Armenian Demands from Turkey

Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence adopted on August 23, 1990 refers to Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia and claims that this area is part of Armenia. Since the Armenian constitution recognizes as a basis “*the fundamental principles of the Armenian statehood and national aspirations engraved in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia*”, it likewise accepts the characterization of Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia and this translates into the advancement of territorial claims (Lütem 2007).

The Armenian politicians and school books call Eastern Anatolia of Turkey, ‘*invaded mother land of Armenia*’ and the school children in Armenia are grown up as being conditioned to be patriots to rescue their invaded land.

The Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921 ratified the border between Turkey and Armenia and recognized Turkey’s international eastern borders. However, due to the legal law adopted by the Armenian Parliament in February 1991, Armenia declared that it does not recognize 1920 Gumru Treaty and 1921 Kars Treaty in where the borderline between Turkey and Armenia were precisely determined. Although claimed that it recognizes the principles of Kars Agreement, Armenia abstains from specifying it in an official written document.

As playing a crucial role in state policy, Armenia underlined the importance to spread the Armenian claims of “so-called genocide” principally in world public opinion and in all worldwide platforms and obtain redress by imposing the claims upon Turkey. In other words, Armenia has been unwaveringly accusing Turkey with the claims of “so-called genocide” on all occasions.

Approximately 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory is under the occupation of Armenia since 1993. This unlawful detainer still proceeds despite the decisions of UN Security Council. In this point, the Armenian behaviour is a clear indicator to express the inadequacy of the sanction power of UNSC since Armenia does not feel itself obliged to implement the decision of the UN concerning the unlawful occupation.

By 19 April 1992 decision-dated, Armenia reapproved the State Arma which was used by the first independent Armenian Republic that prevailed during the period between 1918-1920. In the Article 13 Paragraph 2 situated in the new Constitution of the Republic of Armenia adopted on July 5, 1995, it was stated that “*The coat of arms of the Republic of Armenia depicts, in the center on a shield, Mount Ararat with Noah's ark and the coats of arms of the four kingdoms of historical Armenia*” (Armenian Official Constitution), that means Mountain Ararat in the Eastern Anatolia of Turkey is identified as the “state symbol of Armenia”.

The Dashnak Party issued a declaration claiming 16 and half Turkish provinces as “Western Armenia” and was able to put a reference to this declaration into the Armenian constitution owing to the efforts of former President Robert Kocharian, also a Dashnak party member.

In this legal framework, it is worldwide known that demanding land from Turkey or Armenia or from any other “sovereign state” is a casus belli³⁸. But occasionally, it can happen in every society that some educated individuals make claims to Eastern Anatolian lands or that others claim Armenia to be an ancient Turkish Khanate and demand land from Armenia (Mazıc1 2008)

³⁸ Means “reason of war”

5.2.4.1 Turkey's Requirements to Rebuild Diplomatic Relations

In contrast to these demands, Turkey claimed three conditions in order to rebuild diplomatic relations with Armenia: (Hvhanissian,op.cit.,p.6)

a) To backdown from its allegations concerning the “so-called Armenian genocide”,

Turkey's relations with Armenia had been broken down when Armenia came up with captious arguments on the ‘so-called’ genocide which dates back to 1915-17, during the fluctuant period of Ottoman Empire. Since gained its independence from the former USSR in 1991, Armenia has been conducting world-wide campaigns to bring international recognition to the 1915 events. During the First President Ter Petrosian's period, the recognition of ‘so-called’ genocide was not imposed as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey ; however, during the period of Kocharian and Sarkisian governments, from 1998 up to present, the issue of recognition has been laid down as a compulsory condition in the peace discussions with Ankara.

The allegation concerning Armenians were subject to genocide can only have legal consequences once there it is adjudicated by a court of law. There is no doubt that the 1915 Relocation is not an “auspicious event” for the Ottoman Armenians, it is a big tragedy. But this tragedy has been mutual. (MAZICI 2008)

It means, instead of directing all accusations on one party, both sides should undertake the responsibility of 1915 events and try to understand the harsh conditions during the First World War. They might begin the observation by asking why did they start to revolt against each other after living hundreds of year together peacefully with a great tolerance.

b) To abandon territory demand from the eastern part of Turkey. Further, Armenia is requested to accept the principles of 1921 Kars Agreement where the frontiers between Turkey and Armenia were legally determined.

As written in Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence, approved in August 23, 1991 by the Armenian Parliament, “*The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.*”. (Armenian Declaration of Independence 1991) It is noteworthy that the Ottoman territory is mentioned as “Western Armenia” in the Armenian Declaration of Independence. The territory demands of Armenia date back to

old times, even before the Soviet period, by Russian provocations at that time; however they got a chance to express their illegitimate requests as soon as they achieved independence from the former USSR.

The Armenians get an amount of financial and moral strength from the Diaspora who strongly oppose to the normalization of relations with Turkey owing to the reason that Armenian foreign policy is based on two leading issues: the worldwide recognition of the so-called genocide and to claim territory from the eastern part of Turkey by refusing to recognize the border drawn precisely with Kars Agreement in 1921.

However, according to the protocols signed by two neighbour countries, Armenia will be obliged to recognise the demarcation. In fact, its somehow symbolic because Armenia is weaker than Turkey both in financial and military terms, meaning that it is not able to occupy the Eastern Anatolian Part, but should bear in mind that these territories are belonged to Turkey.

c) To withdraw from all the Azerbaijani territories that are still under Armenian occupation.

Due to the uncompromising attitude of Armenian political governance, it is unable to resolve the problem of the illegal occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. On top of that, Armenia does not accept using the term “occupation” in international arena. Furthermore, Turkey has guaranteed Azerbaijan to not opening the frontiers with Yerevan unless the Armenian troops terminate the illegal occupation. It is a delicate issue between Ankara and Baku as well as with Yerevan.

5.2.5 Turkish-Armenian Relations from the Armenian Perspective

The Preamble of Armenian Constitution adopted on 5 July 1995 refers,

Recognizing as a basis the fundamental principles of Armenian statehood and the national aspirations engraved in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, having fulfilled the sacred message of its freedom-loving ancestors for the restoration of the sovereign state, committed to the strengthening and prosperity of the fatherland. In order to ensure the freedom, general will being and civic harmony of future generations, Declaring their faithfulness to universal values, hereby adopts the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

(Eren and Aleskerli 2005, pp. 158-185)

Armenia emerged from the breakup of the USSR situating between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although the Armenians' attitudes toward Turkey have been driven negative by the so-called genocide of 1915-1916 and the desire to recover the lands of historical Armenia in Eastern Anatolia, a fundamental change has been occurred in Armenian policy with the Armenian National Movement in 1990s.³⁹ Under the leadership of Ter-Petrosyan, who expressed that Turkey had been transformed over the past 70 years and no longer constituted a threat to the Armenian people, Yerevan initiated to pursue improved relations with Ankara. (Hunter 1994, p.30)

For decades, the road to a rapprochement with Turkey has not been easy for Armenia. In principal, the nationalist Dashnak Party has been strongly against to establish closer relations with Turkey, expressing that Ankara must firstly declare a formal apology for the so-called genocide in 1915-16. Furthermore, due to Armenian view, Ankara's support of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also damaged their relations.⁴⁰ In this point, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the leading factor against the development of ties between Armenia-Turkey.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Turkey immediately recognized the independence of Armenia. Thus, Turkish-Armenian relations moved into a new period. However, recognition of independence was not the same as the establishment of diplomatic relations. When Turkey-Armenian relations first opened to public discussion, prior to 1992, according to Armenian perspective, Turkish diplomats insisted that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia would have to be expressed by a pledge taken by Armenia that the Armenian state would not raise the issue of the genocide recognition. The Armenian party argue that the Turkish diplomats, by playing the role of historians, demanded Armenian leaders to do the same, by eliminating history. The Armenian government expressed that it was not willing to give such

³⁹ Fuller, E., 1991. The Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement, *Soviet Analyst*, **Issue 4** (10)

⁴⁰ Croissant, M., 1998. *The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: causes and implications*, Praeger Publisher, p.71

commitments and it is not reasonable for Turkey to make such demands, then Turkey has dropped the demand.⁴¹

During the presidency of Ter-Petrossian in 1990s, after a while, the blockade of Armenia has damaged Armenia's prospects for economic development but it did not bring any change in Armenia's negotiating position. Also, the Armenian party argues that the Turkish antagonism towards Armenia was pushing Armenia closer to Russia. Due to Armenian pointview, both in Armenia and the Diaspora some criticisms of the Armenian government's policy toward Turkey mentioned that the Turkish rejection to normalize relations was an expression of Turkish hatred of Armenians, and that Karabakh was just an excuse to cover up the evil intentions of Turkey (Libaridian 2007, p. 274).

In fact, most Armenians demand for Turkey to recognize that it committed genocide, to apologize, and to pay some forms of reparations. Some even demand that Turkey returns Armenian territory. Many Armenians, however, recognize that Armenia's power and isolation could be greatly helped by Turkish trade and other assistances.⁴²

The former president Robert Kocharian believed that normalization of relations was for the benefit of Armenia. He approved the policy of Ter Petrossian's presidency concerning the Armenia's desire to establish diplomatic relations and normalize relations with Turkey without preconditions; however Kocharian specified that Armenia would raise the problem of genocide recognition with Turkey and would incorporate the international recognition of the genocide to its agenda concerning foreign policy. Not having received the concession he expected by promoting the genocide issue, Kocharian had to take a step of convincing Turkey about that Armenia had no legal basis for territorial demands from it.

⁴¹ Libaridian,G., 2007. *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey. pp.268-301.

⁴² MacDonald, D., 2007. *Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide, The Holocaust and Historical Representation*. Taylor & Francis e-Library, p.124.

Currently, the target of normalizing relations with Turkey has become the norm in Armenia without ever becoming a principal issue in any of the presidential or parliamentary elections. As every Armenian, principally the Diaspora, would like to see the recognition of the genocide, especially by Turkey, majority of the Armenian public also recognize the need to distinguish between general aims and requirements of independent statehood. However, according to Armenian perspective, the Turkish state and public opinion feel the need to defend themselves against any results, principally in terms of Armenian territorial demands, in case Turkey recognize the Genocide.

Regardless, Armenia's foreign policy has resulted in a form of self-imposed isolation, an isolation that is leading to economic, political and social burden. Armenia's neighbours, are enhancing their relations in every possible directions, which means its "enemies" are gaining advantage and promote their positions by gaining power and diversing policies, one of them is Turkey with its great effort to implement the reforms offered by the EU for the full membership. (Libaridian 2007, p.301)

5.2.5.1 The Armenian Security Strategy

The Armenian Security Strategy explains the Armenian-Turkish relations from Armenian point of view. The main character of Armenian National Security Strategy was clearly expressed in the previous chapter linked with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the subchapter of Strategy Report related to its relations with Turkey, it is specified that while Turkey is impeding the establishment of normal diplomatic relations by setting forth preconditions; Armenia, on the contrary, has long advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations without any precondition and will continue its efforts to overcome the obstacles and improve the bilateral relations. It is also stressed that the problems arise between the two contiguous countries have a direct impact on the regional security. In the strategy document, the factors which are in a determinative position between Turkish-Armenian relations follow as such:

Armenia aspires for the universal recognition and condemnation, including by Turkey, of the Armenian Genocide, and sees it both as a restoration of an historical justice and

as a way to improve the overall situation in the region, while also preventing similar crimes in the future.

The unnatural character of bilateral relations and the closed border by Turkey threaten the Armenian security and hamper its lasting development. The absence of normalized relations adversely affects the stability of the region as a whole and impedes the development of regional cooperation.

The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations would decrease the risk of new dividing lines emerging in the region and would help to create a more conducive environment for the final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Armenia stresses that the lifting of the Turkish blockade of Armenia, which has acquired special importance in view of Armenia's inclusion in the ENP, will be an important condition in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU.

Herein, it is significant to point out the historical reason of the closed border in order to evaluate the opportunities that it will bring in case of the opening or the demands of both parties regarding the opening conditions.

5.2.6 The Closed Border between Armenia and Turkey and the Advantages in Case of Opening the Border

During its presidency period in 2009, Sweden published a document concerning “the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and “the Protocol on Development of Relations” between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” which were signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009 to establish diplomatic relations. It raises hopes for the challenging problems in the Southern Caucasus that any resolution may soon be found in the advancing process. Both of the countries agreed in principle to open the border between them, which is closed since 1993 due to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan arised from the dispute over control of Nagorno-Karabakh; thus, Turkey decided to close the border. One of the conditions for reopening is a prospective agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan which would terminate the hatred and the illegal occupation .

In order to clarify the closure decision, it will be useful to give detailed information about the border gate. The total length of the border between Turkey and Armenia, which starts with border landmark No. 4 and ends with the border landmark No. 148, is 325 kilometers. There are two border crossings that are currently closed on this border: "Alican Highway Border Crossing" and "Akyaka Railway Border Crossing." Alican Highway Border Crossing is near the Alican village of Iğdır. Akyaka Railway Border Crossing is near the Akyaka district of Kars. The former name of Akyaka was Kızılçakçak. For this reason, the Akyaka Railway Border Crossing was formerly called "Kızılçakçak Gate." This border crossing, located 66 kilometers away from Kars, is known to the public as the "Eastern Gate," while Armenians tend to call it "Ahuryan Gate." In addition to the railway, there is a secondary country road that passes through this gate (Kanbolat, 2009).

The Georgian-Russian war signalled the need for Armenia to resolve its disputes with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The lifting of isolation has become a pressing issue for the country's development, democratic consolidation and integration in the region. An opening of borders with Turkey would strengthen Foreign Direct Investments and trade capacity, and would also upgrade Armenia's role by providing it with an additional transport route from Central Asia to Turkey and then to Europe.

By the normalization of relations between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the ongoing conflicts in the region will considerably diminish in intensity; with the opening of the border and establishing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, a life-sustaining contribution will have been made for Armenia which is currently under an economic isolation. This situation will have a crucial importance for the West as well as Russia since Yerevan constitutes the obedient and dependent country to Russia as being the back-eye of Moscow in South Caucasus. From the Russian perspective, the opening of borders denotes transferring a certain part of Armenian economic burden to Turkey and other countries which are taking place in energy transmission projects and so far. Thus, the inclusion of Armenia into the energy projects implies economic acquisition for Yerevan and a lower financial burden for Moscow as the military support of Russia have constituted a long-lasting problem between two allies.

It is an inevitable fact that the Armenian lobby have initiated extensive propaganda activities by activating various media, press organ and civil society organisations within Turkey and worldwide regarding the opening of the border gate. The discussions of the border gate are so diversified that according to some positive arguments, opening the border for travel would end Armenia's isolation and will contribute financially to the trade activities of both sides. Moreover, if the border is opened, Armenia will probably attach to Turkey in financial means and Armenian economy and social life of citizens will be attached to Turkish economy as the trade increases, and thus Armenia might be obliged to draw its groundless demands back.

5.2.7 The Road Map between Turkey and Armenia

The most considerable development in the opening of Turkey-Armenian border has been conducted in April 22, 2009 by the official declaration from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey and Armenia agreed on "roadmap" in an attempt to normalize bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner and to develop "good neighbourhood and mutual respect" by the mediation of Switzerland (Özdamar 2009).

The Roadmap, which created a framework for bilateral cooperation, had covered the details concerning the establishment of peaceful diplomatic relations between two neighbours. For that purpose, it was decided to set up an "Intergovernmental Conference". By the subcommittees which have been established in the framework of Intergovernmental Conference, the details of mutual relations in terms of economic, diplomatic, customs and transportation were to be determined (Radikal 2009). The details were decided to contain firstly activation and then making customs arrangements in border gates, establishment of direct economic relations, preparation of agreements for the goods and passenger transition, regulation of the airplane and train services, opening of mutual diplomatic representation offices, etc. The diplomatic relations were decided to begin with 'accredited ambassadors' at first and then continue with a substructure which is decided to be established to provide opening mutual consulates in two years' time. Enhancing the diplomatic relations to the senior level will be provided when the normalization process is fully achieved.

Ankara stipulated conditions during normalization negotiation process to procure the establishment of 'Historical subcommission' for negotiating genocide arguments and also willing to enforce the process in parallel with the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to resolve the dispute over the events of 1915, Turkey proposed to foreign historians to opening the archives of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the intensive pressures applied by Armenian diaspora, Erivan approved the establishment of "Common Historical Commission" and left off the research of "history of the massacres that began in 1915" to the Armenian and Turkish historians by the road map signed by both parties. The Armenian Diaspora strongly refused the construction of a common commission which would enlighten the past, and described the situation as disgraceful by declaring *"to establish a Commission which would discuss whether there(if it was) was a genocide or not, is the ultimate back step for Armenia."*

The Diaspora has been lobbying western nations to back its claim that the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against its people during World War I. Turkey has denied that the killings are called as "genocide". However, Armenia approved the establishment of "historical subcommission". Analysing the Ottoman archives, the genuine results must be declared and known by the whole world public.

Regarding the Road Map, the Joint Statement declared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, did not refer to the "massacre", that have damaged the relations between the two neighbours but emphasized to reinforce "peace, security and stability" in the region. (Montlake 2009)

The interesting part is that, the Road Map was announced just two days before the 94th Anniversary of the so-called ethnic massacres of Armenians during the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. The publication of the agreement just before 24 April has strengthened the forecasting that the expression of "genocide" probably would not be articulated by the US. Although the President Obama was expected to give an annual White House statement on the killings, in recent years American presidents have abstained from pronouncing the term "genocide", which Turkey strongly declines.

Concerning the issue of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it has been determined that the negotiations conducted between Turkey and Armenia under the leadership of Minsk group had a positive impact upon the resolution of Karabakh conflict. Certain strategic topics have already been turned over such as the width of Latchin corridor that connects Karabakh to Armenia, and the return of five regions back to Azerbaijan, etc.

According to the draft, the Road Map has five principles. These are;

- a) Armenia will recognize the principles of Kars Agreement;
- b) The land border between two countries will be opened and the required agreements for trade will be completed;
- c) Both states will firstly mutually accreditate the ambassadors of Tbilisi and then open an embassy in Ankara and Yerevan;
- d) The agreements which require Turkish National Parliament's approval regarding the implementation of the Road Map, will come to the Parliament;
- e) The third countries can also participate to the "History Commission" where the so-called genocide assertions will be addressed.

However, the deficiency in mentioning the opening of borders without precondition, and the lack of procuring any concrete solution concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation in the Road Map have drawn a set of reactions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.

A) Recognition of Borders

According to the accord approved, Armenia would recognize Kars Agreement signed in 1921 and give up its territory demands from Turkey. The recognition of the agreement and the promise of not asserting any claim from Turkish territory do not mean that Armenia gives up its territorial demands. Armenia should take some specific steps to abandon its territorial demands. These specific steps contain significant arrangements such as making amendments in Armenian state arma and also in Preamble part of the Armenian Constitution which refers to Declaration of Independence where the territorial

demands have been directed toward Turkey. Recognition of borders should be considered prior than the “opening of border gate”.

B) The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Mountainous Karabakh and its occupation issues are not considered as a precondition in the accord.

C) The Historical Commission

A new commission will be formed concerning the Armenian claims. The third countries are allowed to participate into the Commission. The commission’s features (its creation, configuration, statue etc) are not determined yet. The significant part is that, even though the Commission will take a decision in the direction of ‘no genocide had been carried out in the past’, apparently it will not affect the ‘genocide assertions’ of Armenians which have been engraved in their subconscious since the foundation of the Armenian Republic. This issue has become a national issue, thus Armenian officials declared that they will never abandon their case of ‘the recognition of genocide.’

D) The opening of the Border Gate:

The border gate is decided to be opened incrementally. In the first instance, a transit pass will be provided, afterwards the passage for bilateral trade will be permitted, then the passages with an official passport will be allowed. In the final stage, the people with all kind of passports will be authorized to pass from the frontier.

Hereby, the statement of “the phased policy pursued in opening the border gate” does not comply with Turkey’s current interests.

5.2.8 The Protocols Between Turkey and Armenia

31 August 2009 is an extremely important day regarding the Armenian issue. The contributions of Turkey-Armenian relations to the stability and balance of the South Caucasus and Turkish foreign policy’s initiative in the presence of the EU, US, UN and OSCE. In 31 August 2009, a public statement was concurrently published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia and by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and declared that “Protocol on the

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and “Protocol on Development of Relations” have been paraphrased and thus, the six-week domestic political consultation process initiated. (Çelikpala 2009) Then, the protocols were signed on 10 October 2009 by both parties.

In order to carry the Protocols into effect, they have to be ratified in the national parliaments of Turkey and Armenia for restructuring the bilateral diplomatic relations. Until so far, the protocols have brought to Turkish Parliament on October 19, but still awaiting to be approved. However, in Armenia, no further step has been taken except the endorsement of the protocols by the Armenian Constitutional Court.

The ratification of the Protocols will create not only regional but also a wide-scale effect to the Peace Process within Caucas region and around. First of all, the ratification would accelerate the negotiations on generating a solution for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, by opening up the borders, the burden of Russia, which financially contribute to Armenia, will also get decreased.

It will definitely activate the opposition groups within Armenia such as nationalist and irredentist Dashnak party (Saideman, Ayres, p.98). Additionally, as long as any solution is reached on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, Azerbaijan will continue its reluctant attitude through the peace process between Turkey and Armenia.

For this reason, Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Turkish former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu have paid a visit to Baku a couple of times since 2008 in order to relieve Aliyev. The plot thickens as the Armenian lobbies and organizations living abroad have still been stipulating the recognition of 1915 events by Turkey as a condition and unless doing so, they will unlikely be in favor of any progress between Turkish-Armenian relations which makes negative effect on the settlement of the problematic Karabakh issue.

In addition to these constructive effects on the political rapprochement, providing a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would also have considerable impact upon the economic benefits by construction of pipeline routes transporting natural gas and oil from Azerbaijan and Russia to other Southern Caucasus countries and Turkey.

In this context, this situation will strengthen Turkey's position on the way to eventually become a regional power by enforcing its foreign policy doctrines "zero-problem policy with the neighbours" and "proactive peace diplomacy". It will also enhance Ankara's credibility as an effective mediator in bilateral conflict solving.

5.2.8.1 The Process Concerning the Declaration of Protocols

In the wake of the peace negotiations that have been enforcing since April 22, with the protocols that paraphrased between Turkey and Armenia on August 31, 2009, the relations between two countries gained a momentum. It is an extremely important date concerning not only the Turkey-Armenian relations and its impacts on the actual situation in South Caucasus but also concerning Turkey-EU relations. In this point, Bronwen Maddox, who is the chief foreign commentator in the Times, mentioned in her writing which was published in the Times on September 2, 2009, " *...Even in the European Union it will have an impact greater than this week's tentative moves suggest. It will ease Turkey's relations with the EU after several years of friction.*" (Maddox 2009)

Herein, it can be asked what was discussed during four months since the signature of Road Map on April 22 until paraphing two protocols between Turkey and Armenia on August 31. During these months, it was negotiated by the diplomats of both countries that how the protocol text should be written and be declared (Yetkin 2009) . In fact, the reason of this long process was the reactions oriented at the "Road Map" on April 22, 2009.

At the end of six-week domestic political consultation process which envisaged at the protocols on August 31, the protocols were signed on October 10, 2009. Depending on that development, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian came to Turkey on October 14 for the football match played between Turkish and Armenian national teams in Bursa in the framework of the elimination match through 2010 Worldcup.

By the signature, the provision concerning that Sarkisian would come to Turkey for the national match only in case of "the opening of the border or being on the brink of opening", have been granted (Ankara News Agency 2009).

To remember the former developments, it was adopted in the “Road Map” that Armenia should recognize the principles of Kars Agreement signed in 1921; give up considering the Karabakh conflict as a precondition; the establishment of a Joint Historical Commission to scrutinize genocide assertions; and the opening of the long-closed borders. However, during the signature process of the protocols on October 10, 2009, a harsh crisis had been occurred between two neighbour countries which was resulted with 3,5 hours of delay in signing the protocols. The reasons of the crisis were the delicate terms of “Nagorno-Karabakh” in Turkish text and “genocide” in Armenian text.

5.2.8.2 The Analysis of the Protocols

The protocols that paraphrased by Turkey and Armenia on August 31, 2009 with the mediation of Switzerland, were signed on October 10, 2009 in Zurich. The first protocol contains the title “**The protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia**” while the other “Protocol on Development of Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Armenia.” The latter protocol determines in which fields will the cooperation be fostered bilaterally between the parties. A list of timetable and elements for the implementation of “the Protocol for Development of Bilateral Relations” have been annexed to the end of second protocol. (Turkish Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) These protocols have been signed depending on the recent keypoint principles of Turkish foreign policy, which are “zero-problem policy with neighbours” and “proactive peace diplomacy” (Özdal 2009).

In the first paragraph regarding the “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”, it has been addressed to “the Protocol on Development of Relations” signed on the same day, stressing these two protocols are complementary texts of each other. Additionally, the similar emphasis has been made in the 11th paragraph of the same text, indicating the two protocols shall enter into force on the same day following the ratification process.

The second paragraph of the protocol refers the obligations in the scope of international law such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

In the third paragraph, it is expressed that the contracting states reconfirmed their commitment in their bilateral and international relations to respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers. In respect of principles especially regarding the commitment to the territorial integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of other states, it seems that Armenia accepts the existing frontiers with its neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Putting signature to the end of the protocol does not only mean Armenia recognizes the current land border drawn with the Kars Agreement in 1921 but also implies that it approves the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in an implicit way.

The principles taking part in the fourth paragraph principally mention to refrain from the threat or the use of force, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The parties agreed on solving the problems among each other and throughout the region, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and frontier problems, in a peaceful manner as defined in the sixth Chapter of the Charter of the UN, which refers to not applying to the illegal war act.

Beyond any doubt, the preparations that take place in the fifth paragraph are considerably important since in this principle, the contracting states confirmed the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries according to the relevant treaties of international law. The parties once again declared in an obvious manner that they recognized the existing borders which is a great achievement for Turkey. However, it has been problematic not to pronounce the name of the Kars Agreement in the protocol, where the land borders had been drawn in. The feasible reason is the anxiety to impede the reactions that might possibly come from Armenian nationalist opposition parties (the revolutionary Hinchak and the extreme nationalist Dashnaktsutiune Party in particular) and the Armenian Diaspora worldwide.

The sixth paragraph emphasizes the decision of the contracting states to open the common border. It is a great achievement for Armenia; however, as long as the opening of the common border is binded to a specific or a certain time requirement, it will neither disturb Turkish nor Azerbaijan's demands. Thus, the timetable is defined in the annexed document of the second protocol where the contracting states agreed upon to open the common border within 2 months after "the Protocol on the Development of Relations" is entered into force. In order to enter into force, the protocols are required to be approved in the national parliaments of the two countries.

The principle defined in the seventh paragraph is considered with the commitment to the spirit of good neighbourly relations while refraining from pursuing any incompatible policy against this peaceful spirit.

In the eighth and ninth paragraphs, the similar principles have been stressed as all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism are condemned while mentioning the need for cooperation in combating against them. Undoubtedly, as well as being a good-will wish, it is also the basis of common interests in pursuit of peace, mutual understanding and harmony. In this scope, the expectation of Ankara from Armenia is, not to support the recognition of the so-called genocide assertions in the international arena. Armenia might defer that only if the bilateral relations will be normalized in a short time (Kasım 2009).

In the tenth and the last paragraph of the "Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations", it is referred to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 concerning opening of the border and they agreed upon establishment of diplomatic relations as of the date of this Protocol is entered into force in accordance with the Convention as mentioned and to exchange Diplomatic Missions as well. Herein, the decision to establish the Diplomatic Missions means that both of the countries approve the existing border line and the opening the common border, because otherwise the Diplomatic Missions are not able to function properly unless the free circulation of people are allowed.

The second protocol, which is “**Protocol on Development of Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia**”, is composed of three pages with the annexed document attached at the end of the protocol. Since its principles are so similar with the first protocol where the explanatory information about the properties of the process as well as the determinative functioning hallmark are incorporated, in this part, only the facts in which the parties agreed upon will be mentioned.

In the first place, Armenia and Turkey agreed upon opening the common border within 2 months after the 2nd Protocol is entered into force. The second fact is to determine the fields in order to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence where they will be in cooperation with each other. Within this context, they agreed on conducting regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries, implementing a dialogue on the historical dimension, making the possible use of existing transport, communications, energy infrastructure and networks and undertaking measures in this regard; to develop bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between parties; to cooperate in the fields of science and education and to initiate common cultural projects by promoting the exchange of specialists and students; to establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to protect the citizens; to take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation; to engage in dialogues and reinforce the cooperation on environmental issues.

The third point that the parties agreed upon is the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission and separate sub-commissions. In order to prepare the working methods of the commissions, a working group headed by two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the protocol is entered into force. The working modalities would be approved at ministerial level within 3 months after the protocol is entered into force. The intergovernmental commission shall meet immediately for the first time after the adoption of the modalities and the subcommission shall start their work at the latest one month thereafter and it is decided that, when appropriate, international experts shall take part in the sub-commissions.

The most important sub-commission is surely the sub-commission on the “historical dimension” to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an objective scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems. In the said Commission in which Turkish, Armenian as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part, the historical dimension of their relations shall be discussed.

The decision which paved the way for the establishment of the sub-commission on the “historical dimension” is clearly a great achievement for Turkey. As far as it is known, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan sent a letter to the Armenian President Kocharian in April 14, 2005 suggesting a group of historians and other experts should gather together to declare the development and events regarding the period of 1915 to the international public not only by researching the archives of Turkey and Armenia but also including all the archives located in third countries.

This suggestion was brought to agenda as the “Joint Historical Commission”. In this sense, Turkey declared that it would approve all potential determinations of the joint commission. However, Armenian President Kocharian did not respond the Turkish proposal and called for an intergovernmental commission with an aim to address all the problems which are suspended and to reach an agreement in final stage.

On the other hand, Armenian public opinion and Diaspora strongly opposed Turkey’s proposal by claiming that it opened up the genocide reality for discussion. On the contrary of the improvements achieved during the period of the current President Sarkisian, there was no concrete result achieved in the period of the previous President Kocharian, since the former accepted the historical documents and archives to be investigated in a joint commission despite the criticisms that are directed at him. However, depending on the pressures of Diaspora and the opposition parties in Armenia, President Sarkisian accepted 1915 events as genocide and highlighted it on all occasions.

In this context, evaluating the achievements in the protocols, Turkey's foreign policy should establish the balance in respect to the normalization of relations with Armenia as well as transferring sufficient information to Azerbaijan concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the resolution process between Turkey and Armenia and if required, the third parties which are able to contribute the resolution process might involve.⁴³

5.2.8.3 Reactions to the Protocols

By all means, the domestic opposition powers in Armenia apply a tight pressure on the President Sarkisian, leaving him in a difficult position by lobbying and making propagandas as a reaction toward his positive attitudes on the border issue. The reactions have accelerated after signing the protocols, mainly during the approval process, mostly came from the extreme nationalist Armenian Dashnaksutiune Party and the Armenian Diaspora. Following the signature, the Dashnaksutiune Party declared that they will do their best so as to restrain the protocols to be approved in the parliament. Kiro Manoyan, one of the leaders of the party, told that it is the only possible way to defend Armenia from the real threat. He also mentioned that they will make use of all the political and legal ways to reach their aims. Similarly, the latter, namely the Armenian Diaspora, reacted too strongly to the protocols concerning the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia.

As a result of this anger, the Diaspora proclaimed October 10 as the "Mourning Day". The Jerusalem Delegate of the "Hay Dat" Association, which is one of the extreme nationalist Armenian institutions, Georgette Avagian showed his anger with the words *"From now onward, April 24 and October 10 will be "Mourning Day" for us, because we lost our historical territories on these days, and the recognition of the genocide issue has been cleared out."*(PanArmenian 2009) As Avagian similarly mentioned, *"the Diaspora will not keep silent"*. As soon as the protocols have been signed, The

⁴³ For the whole version of the protocols, see http://eafjd.eu/IMG/pdf/Armenia__Turkey_protocols_and_timetable_eng.pdf

Armenian Diaspora in the US, which has an influential power in decisions of American management, mobilized against the peace decisions.

5.2.8.4 The Process in the Aftermath of Signatures

The protocols that envisage the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia which were paraphrased on August 31, 2009 were signed by the foreign ministers of both countries on October 10, 2009. In the next process, the protocols were decided to send to the national parliaments for ratification. However, so far, in more than eight months since October, only Turkish part sent them to their own national parliament on October 19, but not ratified yet.

The expectations of Turkey and Armenia are different while Turkey is prospecting to have progress in reaching a concrete settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Armenia, on the other hand, concerns with the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of the land border for its economic wealth. Turkey and Armenia have officially signed a bilateral agreement after long decades. However, the approval process seems to be a challenging period as the discussions and criticisms concerning the contents of the protocols have been still maintaining. Principally, the Armenian Diaspora and the antagonist and nationalist circles of both countries have been sharply criticising the process since they consider the protocols as making concessions to the other party. It's the first time in South Caucasus that the dominant powers in the region (Russia, the US and the EU) have put their attention on the solution of the problems since each of them has different expectations and interests oriented at the peace process.

In the forthcoming process, the protocols signed by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and his Armenian fellow Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian, need to put to a vote in the respective parliaments of Turkey and Armenia. However, the decision concerning the protocol which was sent to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish Parliament, depends on the progress in the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

As Turkey and Armenia have found an opportunity to reach a deal through the normalization of relations after such a long time, the decision-makers of the foreign policy of both countries should act according to guarding the security and stability of the whole region.

5.2.8.5 Endorsement of the Protocols by Armenian Constitutional Court

As a recent development, in its session on January 12, 2010, Armenian Constitutional Court negotiated whether the protocols addressing the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of the borders between Turkey and Armenia are in conformity with the Constitution or not. The President of the Armenian Constitutional Court Gagik Arutunyan stated that the Constitutional Court endorsed the protocols that were signed in Zurich, Switzerland on November 10, 2009.

In the justified decision taken by the Constitutional Court of Armenia, it is mentioned that the articles of the protocols signed in Zurich on October 10 would be effective only in case of “the establishment of diplomatic relations” and “the opening of the border”. Additionally, the Constitutional Court notified that the border agreements signed before the Declaration of Armenian independence would not be effective.

The Court added “*Joint Historical Commission should not hinder the efforts of 1915 events to be recognized as ‘genocide’ in the international arena*”. (Armenian Constitutional Court Decision, January 2010) It means the events that passed in 1915 would not be handled by Joint Commission.

In the aftermath of the publication of the justified decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia regarding the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey published a declaration on 18 January 2010,

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia has declared its decision of constitutional conformity on the Protocols between Turkey and Armenia signed on 10 October 2009 with a short statement on 12 January 2010. The Constitutional Court has recently published its grounds of decision. It has been observed that this decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols. The said decision undermines the very reason for negotiating these Protocols as

well as their fundamental objective. This approach cannot be accepted on our part. Turkey, in line with its accustomed allegiance to its international commitments, maintains its adherence to the primary provisions of these Protocols. We expect the same allegiance from the Armenian Government.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2010)

Therefore, Ahmet Davutoğlu told that “*Armenian government should clarify the subject and display a certain manner.*”⁴⁴ In this context, as soon as the protocols have signed, the briefing process for the public has been started and then, the tools of the process were submitted to the National Parliament of Turkey. So that, it is groundless to charge the Turkish part by postponing the peace process. Accordingly, Prime Minister Erdogan told “ *We have not changed the protocols; however Armenia has been trying to make modifications on them. The situation has to be corrected, otherwise the process will be undermined.*”(BYEGM 2010)⁴⁵

5.2.8.6 The Developments Regarding the Ratification Process

After the approval of Armenian Constitutional Court, Armenia now should bring the protocols to its Parliament for the Parliamentary approval. In the same manner, the protocols had already been reviewed in the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in Turkey; however it needs to ratify in the National Parliament since it is potentially committed to the implementation of the protocols. However, some doubts have been still growing around about Ankara’s ambition to adhere by the commitments concerning the protocols, because Armenia has not spent sufficient efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. Hence, the main point is that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution does not take part in the official texts of the protocols although since Prime Minister Erdogan visited Baku in May, just a couple of months before the signature of the protocols, requesting Armenia’s withdrawal from some of the 13 per cent of Azerbaijan territory it occupies before opening of the border. This issue has

⁴⁴ To have more detailed speech, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-14_-18-ocak-2010_-ermenistan-anayasa-mahkemesi_nin-turkiye-ermenistan-protokollerine-iliskin-gerekceli-karari-hk_.tr.mfa

⁴⁵ Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, 22 January 2010, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinicerikarsiv.aspx?Id=2&Tarih=20100122>

grown, as Azerbaijan has threatened to reduce its relationship with Turkey if any possibility occurs related to open the border before the Karabakh conflict is settled.

In addition to that, Turkey expected that by moving forward with the protocols, it could motivate the dominant powers in the region, the US, the EU and Russia, to engage in the conflict resolution by taking constructive steps in reconciling the parties in the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia within the framework of ongoing negotiations mediated by the Minsk Group of the OSCE. It is a fact that there have been a set of senior-level meetings done in 2009, and under these convenient conditions, Erdogan has decided to call for Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's direct involvement in mediation during his visit to Moscow in 12-13 January. The Turkish government regards that it is time for Russia to pressure Armenia into compromises and start the withdrawal process from occupied Azeri territories. It is rather preferable that Armenia draws back its troops from occupied zones and the Russian troops settle there instead.

In November 2008, when Russia put pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign an agreement, the only thing they agreed on was the four-pointed Moscow Declaration. This document, as mentioned before, committed both parties to seek a political settlement and non-use of force, has actually done nothing to improve the situation, and cease fire violations have likely to be continued. In the same manner, now it seems difficult to reach an agreement on the comprehensive Document on Basic Principles being promoted for years by the OSCE.

Turkish government is willing to take part in conflict resolution by "Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform" offered by Prime Minister Erdogan in 2007 for the establishment of security and stability in Caucasus region. If this pact will be succeeded, it may probably replace with the OSCE which failed to bring harmony to the region since the collapse of the USSR.

Regarding the last developments, Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Nalbandian told that the dialogue process between Armenia and Turkey can be soon intercepted as Turkey postpones the ratification process by making up artificial excuses. He added that, *“We cannot ignore any probability. We hope that Turkey will abide by the soul and the content of the protocols, endure the liabilities and adopt the protocols without any precondition.”* (NTV 2010)

Armenia approved the law which grants Serge Sarkisian the authorisation to cancel the international agreements, principally the right to withdraw his signature from the protocols signed with Turkey. In that case, even though the Armenian and Turkish parliaments approve the protocols, Armenian President Sarkisian will be able to cancel the agreement in the last minute. It means, President Sarkisian will have a right to cancel the agreements approved by the parliament afore. In this context, Vigen Sarkisian, the deputy chief of staff for the Armenian president, declared that *“We enter in the process where the things become much more harder. In case of missing the opportunity taken for the approval of the protocols, the favourable developments in the region will retrogress.”* (BYEGM 2010)

In the recent period, the basis of normalization of the relations is based on the settlement of Karabakh conflict in order not to lose Turkey’s brother country Azerbaijan. While Turkey insists on not to opening the borders before any concrete resolution is found on Karabakh conflict, Armenia is willing to benefit from border trade and free passage by opening the border as soon as possible. In the same manner, it has been stated by the Turkish senior officials that the settlement of Karabakh conflict and thus, termination of Armenian occupation which lasted for almost two decades are perceived as required instruments for the ratification of the protocols by the Turkish Parliament.

Launching diplomatic relations with Armenia and the opening of border will definitely have positive effect on accelerating Turkey’s membership negotiations to the EU. In this context, Olli Rehn, the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated his support to the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. Olli Rehn mentioned that the negotiations would create a positive situation to the ongoing EU membership

process. In relation to the protocols, after their signature for the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia on October 10 and Armenian President Sarkisian's visit to Turkey for the soccer match held in Bursa on October 13 in terms of football diplomacy, the Turkish-Armenian relations have entered in the détente process and thus, a new era has begun in their relations.

Finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict depends on the positive attitudes of Yerevan and Baku, together with their respective societies, who should admit a compromise which is challenging but fairly profitable. In addition to that, according to Turkish officials, the public opinion in Turkey is yearning for Armenian withdrawal before the opening of the land border. Having the majority in the parliament, the ruling party in Ankara can guarantee protocols passage.

However, things will be rather easier if a deal is reached on Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In the issues of Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ankara is trying to further progress and make advances toward both countries, now Turkey should put the protocols into law as soon as possible and then bring the issue to its Parliament. Otherwise, Turkey's efforts to become a regional foreign policy actor by providing "peace , security and stability" within the region will be imperiled.

6. CONCLUSION

Turkey is examined attentively not only in its political actions but also in relation to law, human rights, minority rights etc. in Progress Reports published each year regularly by European Commission. Due to the Cyprus problem, since Turkey does not allow to open its airports and seaports to the Southern Cyprus although it is forced strongly to do so, eight chapters are blocked. In the Progress Reports, it is stressed that the functioning of reforms have been slowing down depending on various reasons. So, the approachment between Armenia and Turkey will more or less have a constructive effect on EU accession negotiations since the world is globalising and all the countries are in a mutual interaction with each other.

There has been a long-lasting status quo in South Caucasus; therefore, it is difficult to make radical modifications. The status quo has been once broken down with the war erupted between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. So, the Armenian border issue will be the second attempt to change the status-quo which brings neither harmony nor peace to the region. However, the decision-makers and initiators of the process should be provided against the reactions from the status-quo supporters.

The two main conflicts related with Turkey in the region are comprehensively analysed in the thesis. The first one is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which is a long-lasting problem whose roots are date back to very old times. Although it constitutes a problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia in reality, it also serves like a principal source of conflict between Turkey and Armenia. The relations between Ankara and Yerevan have deteriorated with the illegal occupation of Kalbajar Rayon by the Armenians in 1993. So, the relations between them should be regarded separately than the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to proceed, first of all Armenia should withdraw its forces from all of the Azerbaijani territories, or at least from particular parts that are occupied during Azerbaijan-Armenian war. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be solved due to the dates stuck on a calendar and the negotiations could be launched under the supervision of Minsk group, the UN and the EU. In fact, these organizations have taken steps in the direction of peaceful solution, however no concrete solution has ever been reached up to the present. So, the work must be firstly launched out with the inclusion

of non-governmental organizations (NGO) into the process in order to persuade and gain the support of public opinion in Turkey and Armenia.

It is the first time after 94 years that Turkey and Armenia put signature to an official document to catch the opportunity of normalizing relations. After a long term of status-quo, they reached to the point of conciliation. This attempt should be considered intimately by both parties.⁴⁶ The protocols are decided to be sent to the Turkish and Armenian Parliaments for approval. The considerable public support behind the ruling parties both in Turkey and Armenia and the advantage of having majority in parliament as a leading party do not mean the protocols will be accepted easily. Beside the considerable public support, also huge opposition groups are located in both countries, who are definitely striving hard to undermine the process. Furthermore, it should not be ignored that unless Armenia gives up its genocide assertions, the reaction of the Turkish public as well as the government will increase in number and create more problems in terms of diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia.

Stating “good-neighbourhood relations”, the protocol draws the framework of Armenian limitations within their scope. Armenia has been still referring the Eastern Anatolian Region of Turkey as “Western Armenia”. In addition, bringing the issue of genocide assertions to the national parliaments of other countries, Armenia proceeds in charging Turkey with ‘genocide’ crime without taking the decision of an international court or a Joint Historical Commission which would function as a decision-maker; applies pressure upon all the Armenian citizens by not determining the boundaries of ‘Diaspora’ term ; occupies 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory illegally and refuses to recognize the Kars Agreement where Turkey’s eastern borders have been precisely determined. These are the actions which do not compromise with “good-neighbourhood” principles. Despite its reluctance to draw a step backward in any of these issues, Armenia has been constantly insisting in exerting pressure on Turkey to open the border. Turkey is criticized for slowing down the process, as it lays down the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh issue as a precondition for opening of borders.

⁴⁶For more information, see

http://www.setav.org/document/SETA_Analiz_Turkiye_ve_Ermenistan_Bulent_Aras_Fatih_Ozbay.pdf

However, Armenia is unwilling to comply with any precondition; yet it prefers to establish diplomatic relations in the first instance and then open the problematic issues into discussion.

In order to open the border gate, as well as establishing diplomatic relations, Turkey has to guarantee the recognition of its territorial integrity, persuade Armenia to take a step backward from its groundless assertions about 1915 events, establish the connection of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and mainly Ankara needs to take a clear compromise from Yerevan to reach a concrete settlement in Karabakh conflict in favour of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Concerning the latter issue, the Nagorno-Karabakh region has a vital national importance for Azerbaijan which is beyond the geopolitical significance. In the current situation and in a close future, it does not seem possible that Armenian occupation will be over in Karabakh, however maybe the Armenians could leave the occupied lands to Russian governance.

Since “sustainable peace, stability, security and wealth” are the strategic keywords of the EU for the region, the peace process in the South Caucasus requires more EU involvement in the fields where the EU has remained incapable. Principally, the EU should enhance its capacity to develop its position to establish a security circle with the aim of perpetual peace around its surrounding. Since the only element which could achieve that target is the ENP, its structure should be improved and enlarged to bring harmony to the region. Its obvious that the EU strives hard for the South Caucasus countries to have a stable political management which emanates them from the Russian influence zone and show tendency toward the west. In this sense, the EU is rather willing a stable Caucasian Region which is not on the verge of a close combat because of competing interests and conflictual structure of the region. Similarly, Turkey shall produce efficient policies which are appropriate with the requirements of region countries. In order to have a voice in the region, each party should undertake more mission with the aim of bringing prosperity, democratization, good-governance, supremacy of law and protecting the right of minorities and ethnic communities in such a manner that does not harm the unique mosaic configuration of the region.

In conclusion, it is essential for Turkey and the EU, which call for the establishment of peace and stability in South Caucasus, to implement efficient policies intended for the region while maintaining them regularly and also to raise experts who have considerable knowledge about the region. In this context, Turkey and the EU has launched a couple of initiatives starting from 1990s, not only in terms of politics but also in energy issues which are considered as quite effective for restructuring the stability in the region. Such remarkable attempts are referred to as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, BSEC and BTK Railroad Project, and BTC Oil Pipeline Project, the Nabucco Project, the ENP. In addition to these, by realizing those projects, which were put into effect by Turkey with the support of the US and the EU, the cooperation within the region could be reinforced.

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