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ESDP IN QUESTION

KOSOVO AND IRAQ CRISES

AS CASE STUDIES

M.A. Thesis

ERKAN SAĞNAK

ISTANBUL, 2009

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Thesis Advisor: PROF. DR. ESER KARAKAŞ

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ABSTRACT

ESDP IN QUESTION: KOSOVO AND IRAQ CRISES AS CASE STUDIES

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This thesis intends to analyze the development of ESDP before and after the Cold War and its implementation in Kosovo and post-September 11. Accordingly this thesis basically intends to analyze to what extent the EU can develop an autonomous EU force. This thesis consists of four main parts.

In the first part, within the context of European integration, integration theories are analyzed and aimed at understanding to what extent they explain ESDP's emergence and development. Here, it is emphasized that there is no general theory to explain European integration. Rather a combination of theories at different time periods and conditions is suggested as a better explanation for the development of ESDP.

In the second part, a historical perspective is adopted and the steps towards the formation of ESDP are our focus. Here, it is emphasized that there is a constant institutional and intergovernmental bargaining for performing security functions, be it by the EU or NATO. In this part, the difficulty of establishing a stable and peaceful Europe is assessed and concluded that ESDP is still premature to fulfill this function.

In the third part, the practical examination of ESDP in Kosovo and its after is discussed. In the end, the CFSP's and ESDP's failures without the support of NATO and the U.S. are analyzed and the lack of military capacity and lessons from Kosovo are discussed.

In the fourth and final part, it is argued that the September 11 events and the Afghan and Iraq Wars came as a "realist backlash". The CFSP's and its direct linkage ESDP's future is analyzed due to changing international security environment and their viability as security components of EU is discussed.

Key Words: European integration, EU force, CFSP, ESDP, International security

ÖZET

TARTIŞILAN ASGP: ÖRNEK OLAY OLARAK KOSOVA VE IRAK KRİZLERİ

Sağnak, Erkan

Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Eser Karakaş

Mayıs 2009, 98 Sayfa

Bu tez, Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının Soğuk Savaş öncesinde ve sonrasındaki gelişimini, 11 Eylül sonrasındaki ve Kosova'daki uygulamasını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak, bu tez temelde Avrupa Birliği'nin ne derece bağımsız bir Avrupa Birliği silahlı gücü oluşturabileceğini analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu tez dört ana başlıktan oluşmaktadır.

İlk bölümde, Avrupa entegrasyonu bağlamında, entegrasyon teorileri analiz edilmiş olup, bu teorilerin Avrupa Birliği Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının ortaya çıkışını ve gelişmesini ne derece açıklayabildiğinin anlaşılması amaçlanmıştır. Burada, Avrupa entegrasyonunu açıklayabilecek genel anlamda bir teorinin bulunmadığı vurgulanmıştır. Bundan ziyade, Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının gelişimini daha iyi açıklamak için farklı zaman aralıklarında ve şartlarında bu teorilerin bir birleşimi öne sürülmüştür.

İkinci bölümde, tarihsel bir bakış açısı benimsenmiş olup, Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının oluşumuna giden adımlar odak noktamızı oluşturmaktadır. Burada, ister NATO tarafından olsun ister BM tarafından olsun güvenlik işlevlerinin icra edilebilmesi için kurumsal ve hükümetler arası sürekli bir pazarlığın var olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bu bölümde, istikrarlı ve huzurlu bir Avrupa tesis etmenin zorluğu değerlendirilmiş ve Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının bu işlevi yerine getirebilmek için henüz daha yeterince olgunlaşmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır.

Üçüncü bölümde, Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının Kosova'da ve sonrasında yapılan denemesi ele alınmıştır. Nihayetinde, ABD'nin ve BM'nin desteği olmadan Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikası ile Ortak Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikasının elde ettiği başarısızlıkları analiz edilmiş olup, silahlı kuvvetler kapasitesinin yetersizliği ve Kosova'dan çıkarılan dersler ele alınmıştır.

Dördüncü ve son bölümde, 11 Eylül olayı ile Afganistan ve Irak savaşlarının "gerçekçi bir geri tepki" olarak göründüğü savunulmuştur. Ortak Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikasının ve onun doğrudan bağlantısı olan Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının geleceği, değişen uluslar arası güvenlik ortamı nedeniyle analiz edilmiş olup, bu politikaların AB'nin güvenlik unsuru olarak hayatını sürdürüp sürdüremeyecekleri ele alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa entegrasyonu, AB güvenlik gücü, ODGP, ASGP, Uluslar arası Güvenlik

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ABBREVIATIONS

Common Foreign and Security Policy	:	CFSP
Combined Joint Task Forces	:	CJTF
Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe	:	CSCE
Defense Capabilities Initiative	:	DCI
European Community	:	EC
European Coal and Steel Community	:	ECSC
European Defense Community	:	EDC
European Economic Community	:	EEC
European Monetary Union	:	EMU
European Political Cooperation	:	EPC
European Security and Defense Identity	:	ESDI
European Security and Defense Policy	:	ESDP
European Union	:	EU
Implementation Force	:	IFOR
Kosovo Force	:	KFOR
North Atlantic Cooperation Council	:	NACC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	:	NATO
Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe	:	OSCE
Partnership for Peace	:	PfP
Supreme Allied Commander Europe	:	SACEUR
Single European Act	:	SEA
Stabilization Force	:	SFOR
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	:	SHAPE
United Kingdom	:	UK
United Nations	:	UN
United States of America	:	USA

Western European Armaments Group	:	WEAG
Western European Union	:	WEU
Weapons of Mass Destruction	:	WMD

1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War changed the context in which the European Communities operated; most notably the dissolution of the distinction between west and east removed many of the difficulties previously encountered in various attempts to incorporate a security component into the integration process. The inclusion of a whole variety of challenges, ranging from the environment to nuclear proliferation to drug trafficking, all under the security rubric, has actually made it easier to agree upon the wisdom of a security dimension to the integration process. Historically, defense integration was attempted through the EDC and the associated EPC process. More recent attempts to knit together both the security and defense dimensions in the CFSP framework have again shown the limitations of this project as was demonstrated by the Kosovo case and the Iraq War where there were not many "Euro-options".

Three central chapters on European security guide the structure of this research; theory, history and practice. The first chapter is about theoretical background of European integration process and theories of European Integration that relate to security and defense. The emergence and development of the institutions of economic integration in Western Europe after the Second World War provided a valuable site for both the application of existing theories and the development of new perspectives. The focus of these theoretical accounts is to understand how closer cooperation in relatively narrow, technical, economic spheres of life could generate wider political integration among countries. For this aim, I have focused on mainly rationalist and social constructivist theories.

Although it is tempting to interpret the vicissitudes of the EU's collective diplomacy through a realist prism, other paradigms were also considered. The functionalist school of technocrats, led by Jean Monnet, found it desirable to embark upon economic integration using supranational institutions. As Ernst Haas commented, "converging practical goals provided the leaven out of which the bread of European unity was baked". Although security was implicitly included in the various theoretical approaches, many theories made an inadequate attempt to explain where security and defense belonged in the integration process and in this chapter I have attempted to show to what extent the same or different observations of these theories were applicable to defense sphere.

In the second chapter I have focused mainly on the historical origins of the security dimensions of European Integration. An examination of the various attempts to include an explicit or implicit security dimension into the post-war integration process would be helpful. The history of the EDC and its demise and later the history of ESDP offer many lessons for the contemporary observer.

Discussions of European defense has a long history, but its most recent phase can be traced to the reinvigoration of European Integration inaugurated by the Single European Act of 1986 and the subsequent framing of the 1982 (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union. The latter declared "a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is hereby established" and requested that the WEU "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implication" (Title 5, Articles J and J.4.2.). In this sense a number of flexible arrangements have been introduced in the 1990s in order to facilitate joint collaboration between the WEU, EU and NATO. However, whether the CFSP (the second pillar of the EU) and ESDP are, or can be, integrated is questioned. Special emphasis is placed on the Treaty of Amsterdam, which emerged from the 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference and NATO's historic Madrid Summit.

Finally third and fourth chapters will look at real life scenarios such as in Kosovo and post-September 11 and Iraq war to understand how in practice the EU's many institutionalist attempts gave results in the security and defense domain. The positions of the EU countries to these two cases should reveal us to what extent the ESDP can be realized.

When we look at the questions asked in the 1950s and the 1990s we see that there is a certain resonance. For example; the questions concerning the ambivalent role of the United States, the problem of military capabilities, the problems associated with the cautious approach of France toward European Security designs (particularly those not of its own making), the issue of Britain's Atlanticist orientation and its equivocation on its position vis-à-vis its role in Europe, and the question of which institution should incorporate these conflicting tendencies. However, the existence of a common will to overcome these differences in national foreign policy approaches is also outlined.

From a more pessimistic point of view, defense remains a guarded preserve against supranational incursion. In spite of the fact that none of the EU member states face a direct military threat, the idea of merging national forces (and, with them, national defense industries) into a general arrangement remains premature. Moreover, in spite of the progress

that has been made in other areas of European integration, such as monetary union, defense integration is colored by historical suspicions, resentments and misperceptions that have been held for fifty years or longer and this does not seem to change.

Yet, there is determination and hope. The past has already shown that the EU has unusual capacity to recover from such splits and humiliations because its shared commitments and interests are so uniquely wide and legally entrenched: or in more general terms, because the process of European integration after 50 years has become essentially irreversible.

Finally, to be on the safe side, it may appear somewhat foolhardy to peer into the future, especially concerning the snail's pace of CFSP development; however, The Treaty on European Union, Maastricht Treaty, The Berlin Ministerial, The Treaty of Amsterdam and St. Malo and "Berlin Plus" arrangement were cornerstones in that regard.

This research does not aim to provide prescriptions but it does highlight a number of barriers to progress that can be overcome by the genuine exercise of a common will. However, whether this will exists or not is a question remains to be answered. Identification and understanding of the problems or reservations is hopefully the first step on that road.

2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this introductory chapter, I will try to form a theoretical background to the study of European Union and its Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy. As we proceed we will see that there is not only one general theory to explain the developments in the EU in the security and defense sphere. Rather, a combination of theories at different time periods and places can best explain our subject. This lack of a grand theory to explain the security component of the EU is accompanied by a lack of real action despite the existence of legal means for military involvement in real life situations from Kosovo to the War in Iraq. However, in order to form our opinion on whether the EU will further integrate in the military sphere or remain as a strictly intergovernmental entity, European integration theories will be helpful. In this vein, I will be looking at contemporary European integration theories such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, liberal Intergovernmentalism and constructivism. In the next chapters I will try to apply these theories in terms of how they best apply to real life situations such as Iraq and Kosovo and how they best explain European integration in the security and defense sphere.

European Union, although exhibiting behavior as a state, as an international organization or as a unique international actor, is not directly analogous to any of them and exhibits behavior as a unique type. With respect to different issue areas, Europe, the EU or the EC may simply appear to be different entities. “Piening illustrates this by looking at different areas of external relations. With respect to the CFSP, this emerges very much as inter-state behavior with essentially the member states acting jointly” (White 2001, p.29). Trade policy, on the other hand, is made by the EC acting collectively, with member states “left with little more power than the individual states in the Federal Republic of Germany, say, or The United States”. Development policy presents a different picture again; “here the EU as entity acts in some ways like a distinct, sixteenth member, working with but alongside its member states” (Piening 1997, p.193). In a theoretical context, European integration is a process that encompasses all the different dimensions I have mentioned above; from economic to more political oriented issues; such as foreign policy, security and defense. My task here is to explain the different theories and approaches adopted by scholars, politicians and states-men using the most relevant theories of European integration.

In this chapter I will proceed by looking at contemporary international theory, noting that the most significant distinction is between the rationalist theories and reflectivist theories with social constructivist theory located between them. First, I will be looking at the rationalist tradition and then I will turn to social constructivists.

2.1 Rationalist Theories

As I noted above, European integration has never quite fitted into realist dominated international theory.

Indeed, the early classics of European integration constituted one of the most significant challenges to realism's dominance, since they offered a view of international politics that stressed precisely how anarchy might be transcended, and a notion of politics that focused on governance and consent rather than power relations between autonomous and atomized individual actors (Smith 2000, p.39).

They also pointed out the limitations of the distinction between domestic politics and international politics and the transformative potential of cooperation and learning.

All of this was a significant challenge to traditional international relations theory, one that resulted in the argument that integration was only about "the low politics" of a non-state actor; once either the European Community/Union became more like a state, or the politics became "high politics", then realism would be the better explanatory theory (Smith 2000, p.39).

In this sense, work on European integration was outside the mainstream of international relations theory. Contrary to these arguments, European integration was nowhere better illustrated than as a combination of neorealism and neoliberalism as an emerging overlap.

In recent years neorealists and neoliberals have sought to explain developments in European integration from the perspective of mainstream American cooperation theory. "A key issue here is the neoliberal claim that neoliberalism's emphasis on relative gains, and its neglect of the role played by international institutions, are seriously challenged by recent developments in the EU" (Smith 2000, p.40). For this reason recent contributions have been built on the

existing neorealist and neoliberal approaches to the EU. I will first attempt to outline the key differences between the neorealists and neoliberals and then turn to Andrew Moravcsik's "liberal Intergovernmentalism".

Although neorealists and neoliberals have both viewed the EU as a product of the Cold War, there are key differences in how they view the prospects for European cooperation and the future development of the EU. Given that the development of the EU was facilitated by the bipolar Cold War world order, some realists expect that the end of the Cold War will undermine the prospects for cooperation between the European states (Mearsheimer 1990a, pp. 46-47; 1990b, p.199)

These expectations are based on two key realist assumptions.

First, realists expect that the end of the bipolar world will increase relative gains concerns among European states. This view is related to the realist argument that states' fears about relative gains present barriers to cooperation even among allies or friendly states, such as the European partners (Grieco 1993a, p.306, 316, 323; see also Krasner 1991; Mastanduno 1991).

In other words states will always be considering relative gains as this is the structural effect of anarchy. As Grieco puts it, states' sensitivity to relative gains concerns "can be expected to vary" but will "always…be greater than zero". In other words, "states always care about relative gains concerns to some degree" (Grieco 1993a, p.323).

The second assumption of realists is that institutions could not overcome the barriers to cooperation. According to Mearsheimer, for example, "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world" (Mearsheimer 1995a, p.7). This is because "institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent effects on state behavior" (Mearsheimer 1995b, p.82). For Mearsheimer, neorealists have a grim picture of the world but it is accurate. Policies based on a faith in institution are bound to fail (Mearsheimer 1995b, p. 9, 49). Cooperation exists between states; however, it is limited by the relative gains problem. Institutions, themselves reflect the interests of the most powerful states, because it is the most powerful states that create the rules that create the institutions. Institutions are therefore bound to become arenas

for competition between states and they are “merely an intervening variable in the process” by which the balance of power mechanism leads to war (Mearsheimer 1995a, p.13).

On the other hand, Hoffman emphasized the importance of the international environment and the role nation states played within the global system. The role of national governments was to protect the interests of their peoples to the best of their abilities within an adversarial system. The implications of this for the study of regional organizations such as the European Union were significant. First, the importance of regional politics was for Hoffman (1996, p. 865) less important than “purely local or purely global” concerns. Within the global international system “regional subsystems have only a reduced autonomy” (Hoffman 1996, p.865). Second, Hoffman highlighted the contingent nature of any transnational organization. While “extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out”, there “would be no assurance against a sudden and disastrous reversal” (Hoffman 1996, p.865). For Hoffman, national governments were more obstinate “than obsolete” in the process of European integration. This was clearly a serious challenge to the snowball effect of cooperation proposed by the neofunctionalist approach. At this point it is necessary to look at some of the main tenets of functionalism and neofunctionalism in order to have a better understanding of what European integration is all about.

2.2 Functionalism

Perhaps the most influential theory that explains European integration is David Mitrany’s functionalism and its more recent version; neofunctionalism. Yet functionalism was not a theory of European integration. Indeed, Mitrany was directly opposed to the project of European regional integration. In his advocacy of a “Working Peace System” Mitrany (1966a, p.68) suggested a universal solution instead of a regional one towards the “problem of our generation: how to weld together the common interest of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each”.

A central tenet of Mitrany’s work was his opposition to nationalism and the territorial organization of power which he saw, like his contemporaries, a threat to world peace. Mitrany (1966a, p.68) was vehemently opposed to the divisive organization of states in the international system which he described as arbitrary “political amputations”. As his

contemporaries were working on European cooperative projects to the problem of world conflict, Mitrany (1966a, p.46) argued that "peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it". In the pursuit of a more peaceful world order, nationalism at the state level should not be replaced by nationalism at the European level according to Mitrany.

In his 1943 edition Mitrany deals specifically with what he calls the "perplexities of federalism". Mitrany had a number of problems with the most commonly proposed solution to the problem of conflict in Europe. First, he argued that the "problems which now divide the national states would almost all crop up again in any territorial realignment; their dimensions would be different, but not their evil nature" (Mitrany 1966a, p.46). Schemes of continental unification were castigated by Mitrany for their statism.

A key factor in understanding Mitrany's functionalist vision is his separation of political/constitutional cooperation from the more technical/functional cooperation in his advocacy of a new international society. For Mitrany (1966a, p.58), the task was clear: "our aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for cooperation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition". Mitrany advocated the development of technical international organizations, structured on the basis of functionalist principles, which would perform collective welfare tasks. An important point here is that "the function to be carried out would determine the type of organization best suited for its realization. This technical self-determination would, in turn, mean that there would be no need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power, prescribed in advance" (Mitrany 1966a, p.73).

For Mitrany, it was rules, experts and the principle of "technical self-determination" (1966a, p.72) rather than territorial structures or national politicians, which would facilitate the decline of ideological conflict, the demise of nationalism, and would allow peaceful cooperation to develop on a world-wide scale. In Mitrany's words: "It is no longer a question of defining relations between states but of merging them – the workday sense of the vague talk about the need to surrender some part of sovereignty" (Mitrany 1966a, p.42). If the needs of society were revealed quite starkly for what they are, it would be more difficult to make them into the household idols of "national interest" and "national honor" (Mitrany 1966a, p.99). Although somewhat vague on the ways on how an international society would be reached, Mitrany (Mitrany 1966a, p.58) argued that the growth of new habits and interests as a result of functional cooperation, would begin to dilute persisting or emergent ideological

divisions. With the “working peace system” up and running, nationalism could, at last, be replaced by allegiance to the world community.

Mitrany’s functionalism is also important in that it affected two of the key architects of the European Coal and Steel Community: Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. “Monnet and Schuman, in creating the ECSC, borrowed key aspects of what might be termed the functionalist method, without adapting Mitrany’s central goal: the dissolution of territorially based authorities” (Cram 1997, p.11). Thus Monnet and Schuman adopted Mitrany’s focus on technical and sector specific integration and at the same time avoiding issues of political division in order to facilitate the incremental establishment of a territorially based organization and a new authority structure. For Schuman, the pooling of resources in the European Steel and Coal Community was a first step towards a European federation. However, this was a very different end from that proposed by Mitrany.

The descendance of neofunctionalism directly from functionalism is a miscategorization. Functionalism met with many criticisms: “not least because of the rather naïve belief that a neat division between technical/functional issues and political/constitutional issues could be sustained” (Cram 1997, p.13). Increasingly political scientists argued that the division between non-controversial, technical economic issues could be separated from political issues is untenable: “economic integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets political consequences” (Haas 1958, p.12). Likewise Mitrany did not say quite how this functional transition would create a world community. “It relied on an organic process of expansion which was not consistently observable in practice” (Cram 1997, p.12). By the late 1950s Ernst Haas (1958, p.4), in the Uniting of Europe, described Western Europe as a “living laboratory” for the study of collective action between European states. A wide range of organizations, which required the collaboration of European governments, operated in Western Europe. Yet, detailed data on how these processes and cohesion is attained remained unknown. It was this process which Haas set out to investigate with the development of neofunctionalism.

2.3 Focus on the process of developing a new political community in Europe: Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism, in its early articulation focused on the integration project in Europe. It aimed to understand what was happening in Europe and provide a conceptual framework within which developments could be understood in Europe. For Haas, "it was not the background conditions or the end product of cooperation between the nation-states which were the focus of his study. Rather, the focus of study for neofunctionalists was the process of political integration itself" (Cram 1997, p.13).

Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states" (Haas 1958, p.16)

"In terms of the relationship between Mitrany's functionalism and the neofunctionalism developed by Haas, it is important to note that for neofunctionalists the basic unit of analysis remained the territorially based state system which was vehemently opposed by Mitrany" (Groom 1978, p.21). There was nothing inherent in neofunctionalism in terms of transcending the traditional division of states: these were simply to be replaced by new territorially based organizations at the European level.

The role of supranational institutions:

Haas viewed a central government as "essential institutionally", and a national (in this case European) consciousness as "essential socially" (Haas 1958, p.8). In Haas' approach the very propensity of organizations to maximize their powers is an important component of an emerging political community. Indeed, supranational institutions are allotted a key role as potential "agents of integration" (Haas 1958, p.29). "The supranational institutions were expected both to facilitate the transfer of elite loyalties to the European level and to play the role of "honest broker" facilitating decision-making between recalcitrant national governments" (Haas 1958, p.524).

Spill-over versus technical self-determination:

It is the process of political "spill-over" which represents the most effective contribution of Mitrany's functionalism by the neofunctionalist approach to the study of European integration. Political spill-over, in short, is the convergence of the expectations and interests of elites in response to supranational institutions. This in turn may result in a transfer of loyalties (authority-legitimacy transfers) or, at minimum, in a transformation in the political activities of national elites in favor of or opposed to new supranational activities. "Crucially, political spill-over could be positively or negatively inspired and was expected to increase as supranational policies were revealed to be of increasing relevance to national elites" (Cram 1997, p.16)

The concept of political spill-over was a major advance upon Mitrany's functionalist focus on the notion of technical self-determination and on his reliance on a rather organic idea that successful cooperation in one area would encourage cooperation in another area. Haas, however, continued to recognize the importance of functional or sectoral spill-over which he argued was based on a quite different logic from that which drove political spill-over: "sector integration…begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies" (Haas 1958, p.297). In neofunctionalist terms, the process of functional or sectoral spill-over referred to the situation in which the attempt to achieve a goal agreed upon at the outset of cooperation, such as the harmonization of steel and coal policy, becomes possible only if other (unanticipated) cooperative activities are also carried out, for example harmonization of transport policy or economic policy. "In this way cooperation in one sector would *spill-over* into cooperation in another, previously unrelated sector" (Cram 1997, p.16).

Haas increasingly sought to refine his understanding of the concept of sectoral spill-over and to move away from the automaticity inherent in the concept of technical self-determination. Haas (1960, p.376) argued that there was no dependable, cumulative process of precedent formation leading to ever more community-oriented organizational behavior unless the task assigned to the institutions is inherently expansive, thus capable of overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional contexts and of surviving changes in the policy aims of member states (Lindberg 1963, pp.10-11). With his focus on inherently expansive tasks Haas clearly distinguished his neofunctionalism from Mitrany's functionalism.

Far from focusing on the very separate demands of different functional tasks, Haas focused on the potential linkages between sectors. It was his focus on linkage politics which, in part,

contributed to the image of the political integration as an inexorable process: a snowball, constantly gathering momentum as the process of integration rolled on (Cram 1997, p.17).

It was also important to understand that some actors contained more spill-over potential than others.

Haas made it clear that while specific tasks had to be chosen to initiate the dynamism of integration, these tasks had to be economically significant. They had to connect to felt needs and expectations. It was on these areas of functional low politics which had a day-to-day impact upon people's lives that integrative seeds could be scattered, rather than on big issues such as culture and defense (Haas 1961).

Importantly, the snowball effect identified by neofunctionalism was not limited only to political, or to functional/sectoral spill-over, but also incorporated what Haas (1958, p.317) referred to as "geographical spill-over".

Hoffmann (1996, p.886) also drew attention to the "limits of the functional method" or as he referred to it, the "Monnet method" (Hoffmann 1996, p.885). Critically, Hoffmann criticized the logic of integration implicit in the "Monnet method", and which Haas had incorporated into his neofunctionalist approach. Hoffmann argued that in fact it was the "logic of diversity" which prevailed and which would set limits to the "spill-over" anticipated by the neofunctionalists (Hoffmann 1996, p.882). In areas of vital national interest governments were not satisfied with losses against gains in other areas. Instead, national governments would choose to minimize uncertainty and would maintain tight control over decision process in matters of vital interest.

Hoffmann's distinction between issues of "low politics" (economic and welfare policies) and matters of "high politics" (foreign policy, security and defense) was central to his critique of the neofunctionalist approach. "The ambiguity implicit in the neofunctionalist *logic of integration* might appear acceptable to national governments when they are dealing with issues such as tariffs or agriculture. When it came to the discussion of matters of "high politics", however, clear and consistent goals would be required" (Hoffmann 1996, p.883). National governments would not accept anything less.

2.4 Neoliberalism

So far I have tried to outline the rationalist/intergovernmentalist approach towards European integration and the realist critiques of institutionalism and functionalism at the European level. Now I will be looking at neoliberalism and its relevance to explaining European integration.

Neoliberals have argued that neorealist assumptions about anarchy and relative gains are seriously challenged by the nature of the cooperation in contemporary Western Europe. First, although neoliberals agree with neorealists on states' fears about relative gains, they argue that neorealist logic does not reflect the nature of relations among the Western European partner states. "Most important here is the absence of threats of force among the West European partner states. For neoliberals, the absence of force, or what Powell (1993a) has called the *specter of war*, facilitates the pursuit of cooperative relationships among states" (Smith 2000, p.41). For Powell:

States are concerned about relative gains when the possible use of force is at issue. Cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be in equilibrium in this system… If the use of force is no longer at issue, then a state's relative loss will not be turned against that state. Relative gains no longer matter, and cooperation now becomes feasible (Powell 1993a, p.229).

Thus, for Powell, difficult negotiations among friendly states or allies cannot be explained in terms of states' fears about relative gains if these states do not exert military threat on one another.

Indeed, when cooperative negotiations between states seem to suggest evidence of relative gains concerns, neoliberals argue that there is a difficulty in distinguishing states' fears about relative gains from what Keohane has called *tough bargaining* (1993, p.279; Smith, p.42). In order to distinguish relative gains calculations from *tough bargaining*, neoliberals argue that there must be evidence that a state can use the gains from collaboration to disadvantage its partners over the longer term (Keohane 1993, p.280). Where the gains from collaboration do elicit opportunities for a state to use such gains against its partners in the longer term, neoliberals maintained the position that such a "motivation" did not exist among the West European partner states.

"Finally, neoliberals such as Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin argue that the degree of institutionalization in contemporary Western Europe provides a means by which states can overcome the barriers to cooperation expected by realists" (Smith 2000, p.42). Moreover, institutions may come to play a role in shaping the interests and preferences held by these states. Although neoliberals characterize states as *rational egoists* driven primarily by their own self-interests, over time institutions may play a role in changing the ways in which states view their self-interests. As a result, in contrast to realist claims, neoliberals argue that "distributional conflict may render institutions more important" (Keohane and Martin 1995, p.45). This is because institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time.

According to neoliberals if there is a context in which such circumstances combine; Western Europe is likely to be it. As Keohane and Nye have argued, at the end of the Cold War, Western Europe "only distantly resembled the textbook portrayal of sovereign states pursuing self-help policies under conditions of anarchy" (1993, p.2).

With regard to the progress and future of European integration, liberals generally argue that, even if the origins of the EU can be attributed to the effects of bipolarity and American hegemony in the West, the future of the EU after the Cold War is unlikely to be as bleak as neorealists argue. "Simplifying a large literature, liberals argue that peace is likely to be maintained in post-Cold War Europe because of the rise of democratic governments in those countries (the so-called *democratic peace*) or because of the rise of interdependence among European countries which makes war unprofitable among the members of the EU" (Pollack 2001, p.225).

2.5 Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism

For our purposes, the most influential and important liberal theory of European integration is Andrew Moravcsik's *liberal Intergovernmentalism* (LI), as laid out in a series of articles during the first half of the 1990s (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995). "Moravcsik's work is specifically framed as a critique of theories such as neofunctionalism, which emphasized the supranational dimensions of European cooperation" (Moravcsik 1993a, p.476). In contrast to neofunctionalism's emphasis on supranational pressures, Moravcsik has sought to explain the

EU as “a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains” (Moravcsik 1993a, p.473). For example, Moravcsik has argued that the findings of his study of the Single European Act:

Challenge the prominent view that institutional reform resulted from an elite alliance between EC officials and pan-European business interest groups. The negotiating history is more consistent with the alternative explanation that EC reform rested on interstate bargains between Britain, France and Germany (Moravcsik 1991, pp.20-21).

Thus the Single European Act was not the result of spill-over or institutional momentum, or transnational business activity, or international political leadership. Instead, the outcome was due to the dominance of the three main aspects of intergovernmental institutionalism: “Intergovernmentalism, lowest common denominator bargaining, and the protection of sovereignty” (Moravcsik 1991, pp.48-49). His main conclusion is that “the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991, p.56). Indeed, one of Moravcsik’s central arguments is that the EU “strengthens the state”. In particular Moravcsik has argued that “EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity”. The EU, Moravcsik argues “enhances the autonomy and initiative of national political leaders” (Moravcsik 1993a, p.507).

Although often mischaracterized as neorealist by his critics, Moravcsik’s theory represents a twofold departure from neorealism, insofar as national preferences are assumed to be domestically generated and not derived from a state’s security concerns in the international system, and insofar as bargaining power is determined by the relative intensity of preferences and not by military or other material power capabilities (Pollack 2001, p.225).

In empirical terms, Moravcsik argues that major intergovernmental bargains, such as the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty, were not driven by supranational entrepreneurs, unintended spill-overs from earlier integration, or transnational coalitions of national business groups, but rather “by a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member states, which then struck central bargains amongst themselves and offered side-payments to smaller reluctant Member States” (Pollack 2001, p.226). The institutions adopted in such bargains, finally, do serve to provide Member States with information and reduce transactions costs, but they do not lead to the transfer of authority or loyalty from nation-states to a new centre, as neofunctionalists had predicted.

There are two main criticisms of Moravcsik's approach. "First, critics have argued that his understanding of the relationship between domestic politics and state interests is simplistic" (Smith 2000, p.46). According to Moravcsik, "international conflict and cooperation can be modeled as a process that takes place in two successive stages: governments define a set of interests, then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize those interests" (Moravcsik, 1993a, p.481). Wendt, however, has criticized the rationalist "two-step" model on which liberal intergovernmentalism is based: "first the interests are formed outside the interaction context and then the latter is treated as though only affected behavior. There is thus no attempt to consider how state interests may be shaped by interaction" (Wendt 1994, p.384).

Second, it has been argued that "the intergovernmental bias in Moravcsik's account obscures the importance of supranational pressures in the EU" (Wincott 1995, pp.602-603). A key problem here is Moravcsik's focus on interstate negotiations. In contrast, Wincott argues that the "pre-existing supranational character of the Community" provides the conditions in which the interstate bargains emphasized by Moravcsik take place. In other words, Moravcsik's intergovernmental model ignores the wider effects of supranationalism which determines what is possible in interstate negotiations.

Although Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism offers a dominant point of reference in the literature, its contribution to our understanding of the "new Europe" remains limited. As Marlene Wind has argued, by looking at Europe through

Intergovernmentalist glasses (neorealist or neoliberal) one will find that only very few changes have or can be expected to occur. Power and sovereignty is – it seems – eternally retained in the member states. The state is the most significant actor in the integration process and decides on the speed and depth of cooperation through "big bargains" in the European Council (Wind 1997, p.17).

In contrast to mainstream international relations' assumption of state-centrism, Wind argues that, "Whether the state is the most important actor and indeed capable of directing and the controlling the process is the crucial empirical question to be analyzed. So is the question of who is sovereign in contemporary Europe" (Wind 1997, p.17).

2.6 Constructivist Approaches

After outlining the main arguments of neorealists and neoliberals; the rationalist approaches, we now turn to constructivist approaches to understand more thoroughly the transformative developments in the EU.

"As Jeffrey Checkel (1998) has most lucidly pointed out, rational-choice institutionalists and constructivists generally agree that institutions matter, in the sense of exerting an independent casual influence (not reducible to other factors) in social life generally, and in international relations in particular" (Pollack 1998, p.234). However there are important differences in terms of how these approaches asses the importance of institutions. Oversimplifying slightly, rationalists asses the importance of institutions by arguing that they provide institutions with formal or informal rules of the game that gives incentives for rational actors to adopt certain strategies in pursuit of their (exogenously given) preferences. On the other hand,

"Constructivist scholars generally define institutions more broadly to include informal norms and intersubjective understandings as well as formal rules, and posit a more important and fundamental role for institutions, which constitute actors and shape not simply their incentives but their preferences and identities as well" (Pollack 1998, p.234).

In the view of such analysts rational-choice approaches may capture some part of the effect of institutions however incapable of grasping and theorizing about the more profound and important effects of institutions.

In the field of EU studies, numerous authors (Sandholtz 1993; Risse 1996; Jorgensen 1997; Wind 1997; Matlary 1997; Lewis 1998) have argued that EU institutions shape not only the behavior but also the preferences and identities of individuals and Member States within Europe. This argument has been put more forcefully by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener in their introduction to a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy on "The Social Construction of Europe":

A significant amount of evidence suggests that, as a process, European integration has a transformative impact on the European state system and its constituent units. European integration itself has changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agents' identity and subsequently their interests have equally changed. While this aspect of change can be theorized within constructivist perspectives, it will remain largely invisible in

approaches that neglect processes of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously (1999, p.529, 538).

The authors go on to argue that constructivist perspectives are based on a "broader and deeper ontology" than rationalist approaches, and can therefore offer a base for understanding a broader range of "social ontologies, i.e. identity, community, and collective intentionality" (Christiansen et al. 1999, p.533).

As a review of the constructivist literatures in international relations and EU studies, these quotations illustrate a tendency among constructivists to assume the existence of certain phenomena (or "ontologies") such as identity or preference change as the starting point of analysis, and consequently reject rationalist approaches for their inability to predict and explain these phenomena.

It can be argued that the rationalist perspective has become the dominant one in IR approaches to the EU, and that the rationalist/constructivist divide is the most salient theoretical cleavage in contemporary literature. For this reason, we can now turn to Moravcsik for his critique of the constructivist analysis.

Constructivist theorists according to Moravcsik (1999, p.670), pose an interesting and important set of questions about the effects of European integration on individuals and states, which are worthy of study. Yet, Moravcsik argues, constructivists have failed to make a significant contribution to our empirical understanding of European integration, because – despite their general acceptance of social science and the importance of empirical confirmation of theoretical claims – most constructivists have shown a "characteristic unwillingness…to place their claims at any real risk of empirical disconfirmation".

The problem, according to Moravcsik, is two-fold. First, constructivists typically fail to construct "distinctive testable hypotheses", opting instead for broad interpretive frameworks. Second, even if constructivists do posit hypotheses that are in principle falsifiable, they generally do not employ methods capable of distinguishing the predicted outcome from those predicted by other alternative (rationalist) hypotheses. In the absence of such methods, Moravcsik argues, constructivists cannot be certain that their "confirming" evidence is not in fact spurious, and that the observed phenomena might not be explained more parsimoniously by another (rationalist) theory (Moravcsik 1999, p.678).

In reverse, constructivists might argue that Moravcsik sets higher empirical and methodological standards for constructivist while the rationalists make no effort to explain whether preferences were exogenously given or shaped by institutions.

2.7 Theories directly relating to CFSP and ESDP; the theory/practice dilemma

Having reviewed some of the relevant theories of European integration and identified the key theories to explain the integration process of Europe, we may still be unclear about which theories do in fact apply to integration in security and defense sphere. One important thing to note here is that I will be using CFSP and ESDP interchangeably throughout this research because without a CFSP, ESDP could not exist. So, I refer to CFSP as the first step toward forming an ESDP.

Common foreign policy and political integration has been on the agenda since the foundation of the EC, however, studies directly relating to this field have been rare. The theory/practice dilemma has been effective and despite the many discussions and practices in the security and defense sphere in the history of the Union, theory has always been disregarded. In this context we can say that practice has affected the development of theory in the European case because in parallel with the achievements in economic integration, most studies have been conducted at this direction.

According to Weler and Wessel the underdevelopment of theory in political union and common foreign policy has three main reasons:

“The national state” in Europe which monopolized all the foreign policy issues relating to its national interests, second, the clarity in organizational structure and final aims of the EU does not exist in common foreign security and thirdly, there can be no consistent relevant theory that explains EU’s foreign policy since the Treaty of Rome because the practice of foreign policy has changed in terms of concept, actors, means and purpose in time and has become multi-dimensional. This is why we need to explain European integration by using different theories.

It is not until the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 that a common foreign and security policy has been initiated with its institutions and modalities in Europe, at least in a legal sense. Second,

the efforts for political union has for the most part carried an intergovernmental quality and its relation with the Community level has been weak before and even after the Treaty of Maastricht and this has affected theoretical developments in a negative sense.

EU's foreign policy practice has been explained through ad hoc hypotheses instead of generalized theories. The main one is the existence of NATO. "EU's lack of a common foreign and defense policy has been explained through the existence of NATO" (De Porte 1996, p.228).

Another ad hoc hypothesis focuses on the concept of "sovereignty". The integration countries keep the degree of cooperation in terms of foreign and security policy at an intergovernmental level. Because the transformation of sovereignty in the foreign and security sphere to a supranational authority as in the case of Communities would mean the loss of sovereignty as a whole.

The most difficult thing about a Common Foreign Policy is the difficulty in forming a theory. Some academicians who work specifically on this issue expressed the difficulty of forming a general theory about European integration which is inimical to itself (Pijpers, Alfred; Regelsberger, Elfriede, Wessel, Wolfgang, 1988, pp.259-277). For example according to Ifestos, federal theories are not strong enough to explain EU's foreign policy. Similarly, neofunctionalist theory is not enough by itself to explain foreign policy practice, because this theory is based on integration at the supranational level. However, EU foreign policy has an intergovernmentalist character. Because of this, European Foreign Policy can best be explained through theories that asses the intergovernmentalist and pluralistic nature of this process. Today, in Western European system, governments and their representatives are the main actors even outside the Communities dimension. Even the realist theory cannot explain all dimensions of European Foreign Policy. For these reasons, different aspects of European Common Foreign and Security Policy should be explained by adopting different theories.

In the next chapter we will look at the historical development of European Security and Defense Policy and see how this process actually occurred from the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty and then the Treaty of Amsterdam and asses the legalistic aspect of all these efforts including the NATO Summits and the pull towards an autonomous European defense force by the EU countries. Explanations regarding the actual lack of political will and real action in the military field and adaptability to global developments constitute the work of the third chapter as I will be focusing on Kosovo and Iraq as a case study.

3. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE DURING AND AFTER THE COLD WAR: NATO AND THE EC/EU SUMMITS

The previous chapter has outlined the major theoretical divisions regarding the formation of a European Security and Defense Policy and has noted the difficulties of formulating a general theory. Here, I have adopted an approach that suggested the utilization of different theories at different levels of integration and time periods. The real life situations; such as the failure of EU in Kosovo, demonstrate the stark contrast of theory with respect to practice. It is seen that behind the many legal statements and declarations of the EU, there exists only a limited political will which comes into question every time a crisis breaks out in Europe reminding the Europeans once again that they are not prepared to take military action.

From this point of view, in this chapter, I will be looking at the development of European Security and Defense Policy during the post-Cold War era and after, to explain the major changes in Security and Defense Policy of the EU by looking at the decisions taken at NATO and EU Summits. I will focus on European integration in the military sphere starting with the EDC signed by all six members of the European Coal and Steel Community and asses the institutional developments after the end of the Cold War starting with the Treaty of Maastricht (the original launch of CFSP) and finally proceed towards the 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU which institutionalized a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men capable of deployment within 6 weeks and sustainable up to one year. As we go along we will see that agreement is not reached very easily on the defense sphere because it is one area where national governments do not want to give up their sovereignty for their own interests and reasons. By this way I will attempt to show the differing approaches of EU member states, non-EU members of NATO, the preferences of big and small powers and finally that of the United States in the defense sphere. The reason why I focus on all these EU and NATO summits is that I want to show the institutionalist inertia toward the creation of CFSP and ESDP and conclude that the EU does not remain indifferent to the changes in the security environment that after each change in the balance of power considerations, Europeans develop new institutions and declare them operational as the original launch of ESDP coincides with the end of the Kosovo War.

However it is necessary at this point to clarify important definitional issues with significant political implications, focusing on the particular issues surrounding the changing notion of security.

The underlying definitional problem here is that the key terms "security" and "defense" have become increasingly differentiated over the last 30 years or so largely because security has been defined in ways that have transported the notion into a range of non-defense areas, denoted by the terms such as "economic security", "environmental security" and more generically, "common security" (Palme 1982). Security has come to mean a concern to reduce or eliminate threats, risks or merely uncertainties in a number of different areas of activity-political, economic, environmental, and so on – as well as dealing with threats of a strictly military nature (Buzan et al. 1990, pp.4-5; Stainer 1995, p.17). This usually contrasts sharply with an earlier period when references to security were usually implicit references at least to military security, and the terms "security" and "defense" were essentially linked and indeed often used interchangeably. Frequent U.S. references in the Cold War period to national security policy, for example, suggest a close interrelationship not only between security and defense but also, more broadly, between these terms and foreign policy as a whole. While defense, too, has undergone some conceptual revisions, its essential linkage to the use or threatened use of organized military force has remained unchallenged. Security, on the other hand, has become such an "essentially contested concept" that reference to it usually requires some further clarification that addresses the "what sort of security?" challenge (Buzan 1983, p.6).

Given this "contestation", one way of reconnecting the ideas of security and defense has been to refer to security in the defense domain as "hard security" and to other meanings of security as "soft security". While this distinction is useful analytically, despite the many "grey areas" in between, it is important to note here that this sort of language implicitly privileges defense over security. By implication at least, the adjective "soft" denotes a less significant area of activity than "hard" and suggests a hierarchy of security-related activities. While we are dealing with the use of language, it is also worth noting again the political use of language in a European context – something of a recurring theme in this research. In this context, maintaining a distinction between security and defense has been useful to national policy makers because of the relationship between defense and national sovereignty, which, if anything, is even closer in symbolic terms than the link between foreign policy and sovereignty. While it has been difficult for this reason to discuss defense in a European integration context, the same sort of political constraint has not related to security. Nevertheless, this linguistic convenience has helped over time to facilitate discussions about

defense proper that has gradually appeared on the agenda, although significant problems still confront the idea of a common European defense policy, to we now turn.

It is necessary to preface a historical survey by clarifying what is meant by the key terms "common defense policy" and "common defense" in an EU context, particularly as the terms have appeared in treaty form as an explicit objective of the Union since 1991. To quote again the relevant article of the Treaty on European Union: "the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense" (Treaty on European Union, 1991: Article J.4.1). We should note that there were two significant linguistic changes to this formulation in the more recent Treaty of Amsterdam. The first, replacement of the word "eventual" by "progressive", suggests a shortened time frame for the achievement of these objectives, at least in inspirational terms. But the second, the addition of a rider at the end of the sentence – "should the European Council so decide" – seems to give the whole process an even more conditional flavor (Article J.7, Treaty of Amsterdam 1997).

John Roper (1995) offers useful definitions of both "common defense policy" and "common defense" and suggests appropriate linkages between them. A common defense policy (CDP) is defined as "a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member states of the European Union". A CDP should also set out, he suggests, a "conceptual framework to provide some coherence for the development of a common defense", to include ways in which "human equipment and financial resources for military action will be developed", together with "operational aspects of the organization of armed forces, their training and the conduct of military operations". The "full" development of a CDP would also necessitate at some stage (as with national defense policies) a common assessment of possible threats and appropriate responses, identification of missions for the armed forces, agreement on budgetary issues and common armaments procurement policy. Roper goes on to offer two ways of defining "common defense": a stronger version, "the organization of the armed forces of the member states in common"; and a weaker version, "the organization of the activities of the armed forces of the member states in common". The stronger version "in its ultimate form", he suggests, would imply "common procurement, logistics, training…budget, communications, intelligence and command structures". Significantly, a common European defense is also likely "to mean very considerable restrictions on the scope for national defense policies". Finally, Roper draws parallels between the stronger version of a common defense

and the “ill-fated” European Defense Community (EDC), which provides a useful link to and starting point for our historical review (Roper 1995, pp.8-10).

3.1 From European Defense Community to the Single European Act

The idea of a common European Defense policy in an institutionalized form has its origins in the EDC treaty signed by all six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1952. As Anne Deighton notes, “the treaty had emerged out of a French proposal in October 1950 for a European arm, which was itself a response to the U.S. demand that West Germany should enter NATO” (Deighton 1997, p.14). As we noted earlier, it was envisaged that EDC would be followed by a more inclusive European Political Community that would have contained both a common European foreign and defense policy. After two years of intense negotiations over ratification, however, the EDC was rejected, ironically by the French National Assembly in August 1954, producing a major crisis in both European and transatlantic relations.

The crisis was resolved by some impressive and inventive bridge-building diplomacy by the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Eden managed to persuade all the parties to agree the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) within NATO by expanding first the membership of the 1948 Brussels Treaty and then the membership of NATO to include West Germany and Italy (Deighton 1997, pp.11-24).

This clever solution facilitated a rearmed West Germany (thus meeting American demands), provided a credible, institutionalized constraint on German military power (thereby alleviating French concerns), secured West German sovereignty which Chancellor Adenauer wanted, and strengthened the intergovernmental transatlantic alliance structure (the clear British preference).

While defense integration in Europe was not explicitly ruled out by the WEU-in-NATO solution, it was clear by the mid-1950s that a supranational defense option was simply not available for the foreseeable future and the Six turned their attention to integration in other fields. Here was no further progress towards a European defense policy until the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s.” Defense remained firmly barred from discussions within EPC, but it was soon found to be impossible to separate foreign policy

coordination from security concerns broadly conceived" (Hill 1992, p.136). Within an EPC context, it gradually became necessary and legitimate to discuss security issues and this was helped by the expanding conception of security that we have already noted. One important development here was the major contribution made by EPC to the "Helsinki process" in the first half of the 1970s, a multilateral set of negotiations concerned inter alia with enhancing the political and economic aspects of security, which eventually produced the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) in 1975.

By the early 1980s, security had formally become part of the EPC agenda. There were two "motors" driving this forward, one internal and the other external. The external factor was growing concern in Europe about the direction of U.S. Foreign Policy particularly after the election of Ronald Reagan and the renewal of East-West tensions, usually referred to as the "new" or the "second" cold war (Halliday 1983). "In this context the British government pushed for a distinction between defense and security and took a lead in securing agreement to what became the 1981 London Report" (Forster 1997, p.31). Significantly, this referred to continuing the "flexible and pragmatic approach that has made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security" (Hill 1992, p.137). This enabled discussions within EPC on issues such as arms control, confidence-building measures, armaments and terrorism.

The second internal factor, however, was the revived momentum of the European integration process through the first half of the 1980s, which in this context meant that there was continuing pressure after the London Report to extend the parameters of "allowable" areas of security in EPC (Hill 1992, p.137; Forster 1997, p.31). An important although ultimately abortive effort came from the West German and Italian Foreign ministers in what became as the Genscher-Colombo Plan, which explicitly sought to include defense issues in EPC. Resistance to this proposal from certain member states, however, eventually lead to a compromise agreement – the 1983 "Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart" – which added only a reference to economic as well as political aspects of security. But more substantial progress from an integrationist perspective was made in the negotiations which led to the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA not only underlined in treaty form the need to coordinate political and economic aspects of security and maintain what it called "the technological and industrial conditions of security", but it asserted that "closer cooperation on questions of

European Security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external matters" (Article 36, Single European Act, 1986).

Reference in SEA to developing an external European identity in a security context suggests a link to the reactivation of the WEU in 1983-1984, although any linkage between the WEU and the Community was only implicit at that stage. As we have noted, progress towards a European defense rather than a security identity in EPC had not proved possible but there was continuing pressure – from the French in particular – to move towards a European defense identity, preferably one that was independent of NATO (and U.S.) control. Although, as Forster comments, the British took the opposite view – that the WEU could provide an intergovernmental forum for discussing defense issues but without damaging the integrity and the primacy of NATO by introducing a separate defense organization – "British and French interests thus converged unto WEU, though for different reasons" (Forster 1997, p.32). This opened the way for the WEU Rome Declaration of October 1984, which identified a number of areas for defense cooperation and international mechanisms to support it. This was followed by the Hague Platform of October 1987, which acknowledged that "the construction of an integrated Europe will be incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense". But, while it was agreed that the WEU might play a useful role in coordinating "out of (NATO) area" operations, the limits of agreement about the future role of the WEU and the whole question of what was now being called a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) had been reached. There was effectively a stale mate between the "Europeanists" led by France and the "Atlanticists" led by Britain until the dramatic change in the external environment after 1989 (Forster 1997, pp.32-34) which brings us to the end of the Cold War.

3.2 The EU Maastricht Treaty in 1991

The supranational character of the European Community was reinforced in the Maastricht Treaty or in other words in the Treaty on European Union. The Treaty on European Union created a "three pillar" structure for the future of European cooperation. It combined three existing EC treaties including European Coal and Steel Community, European Community and EURATOM and then formed the first pillar, European Communities. Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs became the third pillar and the Common Foreign and Security policy was born as the second pillar with the objectives of;

Safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;

Strengthening the security of the Union and its member states in all ways;

Preserving peace and strengthening international security;

Promoting international cooperation, and;

Developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (European Union, Selected Instruments Taken from the Treaties, 1993, pp.35-43)

Despite attaining a concrete framework of goals and guidelines, giving the Common Foreign and Security policy more importance was a major focus of the EU. The CFSP has proved to be one of the sections of Maastricht Treaty, which has led to the greatest redeployment of political and administrative manpower (Morgen 1993, p.189, 198).

The Maastricht Treaty distinguished between the security of the member states, which fell within the EU framework and their defense, which was formally maintained by WEU and NATO. The Treaty did not promise a European defense immediately but opened the way for such developments in the future, with the much quoted formulations of "the eventual framing in the future of a common defense policy which might in turn lead to a common defense" (Article J.4.1.) (Sjursen 1998, pp.95-112).

Indeed, the concept of CFSP launched by the Maastricht Treaty seems as though it will also be accompanied by the familiar problems of European Political Cooperation of the past. For instance, despite the commitment of Article J.2(1) that member states shall consult one another on any matter of general interest, to ensure concerted action, it should never be forgotten that actions in Foreign Policy are often essential factor in the domestic politics of the Member States.

However, regarding the compromise represented in Title 5 (solidarity clause) of the Treaty on European Union, and the related declaration on WEU, it can be said that they do not meet totally the needs of the European Security structure. However, in comparison with the record of the past which shows that progress in organizing the external relations of the Community including economic and political issues, has always been slow and complicated, the achievements of Maastricht may be judged to be not so limited.

The EU Copenhagen Summit, eighteen months after the Maastricht Treaty, envisioned a quick enlargement of the Union, which Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Chirac hailed as the hour of Europe. These were the important statements claiming the priorities of Europe in handling its own affairs.

On the other hand, the move toward forming an ESDI is a manifestation of the Allies' recognition that significant elements of U.S. political leadership are hesitant about the use of American combat forces for (humanitarian intervention), and that Europeans must be prepared to act alone.

3.3 Petersberg Tasks in 1992

In June 1992, the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU met in Petersberg, Germany in order to define the role and tasks of the WEU. This resulted in Petersberg Declaration outlining the guidelines for WEU's operational responsibilities. "Moreover, WEU confirmed NATO's responsibility for collective self-defense and formally decided to confine its operations to peacemaking and peacekeeping, crisis management and protection for humanitarian operations defined as Petersberg tasks" (www.europa.eu.int). The Petersberg Declaration innovated in specifying the limited tasks for which military units of WEU member states could be deployed under WEU authority. This declaration also stated the concept of mutual defense among the member states.

In accordance with Petersberg Declaration, the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking can be considered in two main cases. In the first case, there would be a UN Security Council authorization for the use of force, or in the second case, WEU would act on its own or on behalf of the EU, on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter which covers the collective self-defense in order to support a state that was attacked, even if it did not belong to an alliance.

However, the arrival of the UN as an important actor in the European security had a constraining effect on West European autonomy in crisis management because of the provisions of the UN Charter and the decision-making procedures in relation to UN Security Council Resolutions (Vieruccui 1993; Chaillot Papers 13).

3.4 The NATO Brussels Summit in 1994 and the CJTF Concept

Although WEU member states agreed on developing WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and realizing this in a way that would complement the activity of NATO, problematic relations between both organizations were still on the agenda. There was also rivalry over which of the two organizations should support peacekeeping and crisis management activities of the UN and the CSCE (Joop 1997, p.159). The UK and the Netherlands were in favor of a NATO mission; on the other hand, other states especially France, favored the WEU.

In 1993, the WEU-NATO relations began to improve. The move of WEU's headquarters from London to Brussels was an important step for the establishment of working relations with each other. Moreover, the shift from competition to cooperation was influenced by the changes in governments in France and the U.S., because France became less persistent about WEU's role and more flexible and pragmatic toward NATO. In the case of U.S., Clinton Administration was much more relaxed than Bush administration toward the development of a European Defense Identity. As a result of the new conditions cooperation became more probable and possible.

The relations between NATO, WEU and EU were politically remarkable in January 1994 at a NATO summit in Brussels. This was the first time when relations became so close and opened up the way for the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Therefore, the 1994 Brussels Summit confirmed that the emergence of an ESDP would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, enabling the European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense while reinforcing the Atlantic link. The Allies have been engaged since the 1994 Summit in fulfilling these commitments in concrete terms.

The conclusions of the 1994 Summit are important in three aspects: NATO Allies, including the U.S., fully appreciated the formation of a European Defense Identity, which could put an end to the debate about the role of WEU and NATO in European security policies. "Second NATO agreed that collective assets of the Alliance could be used by WEU, and third, it decided to develop the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a means of strengthening cooperation between WEU and NATO and facilitating contingency operations" (Joop 1997, p.159).

A CJTF is a "multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operation not involving the defense of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. It provides a flexible and efficient means whereby the Alliance can generate rapidly deployable forces with appropriate command and control arrangements" (NATO website April 2000).

"The CJTF initiative was initially conceived as a means for NATO to generate an out-of-area military crisis response in circumstances of great uncertainty, but it was quickly recognized that it was also an instrumentality through which the Alliance could effectuate an ESDI" (Terriff 2003, p.39). The centrality of the CJTF concept means that it has served as a symbol that NATO knows where it is going and why, that it really does know what it is doing, that it does have a purpose.

"This was an answer to those who questioned whether the Alliance did have a role in the post-Cold War era or whether it was an anachronism whose day was done" (Bensahel 1999, pp.52-73).

ESDI, as understood by the Americans, served as an articulating mechanism for individual European States. Instead of dealing with each and every one of them separately, it is better to have a common EU position through its veto power regarding the use of NATO assets. This explains the attitude of the American administration concerning ESDI that as long as it did not develop an independent and distinct character, a common European position would be easier to manipulate.

In reality, it is difficult to foresee how any CJTF mission could be undertaken without American backing. Naturally NATO was to have first call on NATO resources if NATO wanted to undertake some action. If for some reason it did not want to do this and the WEU were then to act using NATO resources, the necessary decision would have to be taken by the NATO Council and the NATO chain of command had to be respected. Of course the U.S. had full control over its national resources, such as transport aircraft. "Since all this clearly meant many different forms of U.S. approval, it was difficult to see how the Europeans could really act alone" (Lundestad 1998, p.121). With this in mind, many in NATO think that WEU is merely a sub-organization of the Alliance, and U.S. analysts have already characterized WEU's role as a "gap-filler" for Western crisis management in all those cases where the United States and NATO, as such, do not wish to become engaged (Larrabbee 1994, p.31). Therefore some NATO countries, particularly the U.S., underline that the ESDI within NATO

and the development of an EU security and defense dimension are two separate issues and that there is no automatic link between the WEU's relations with the EU and its interaction with NATO. The French decision-makers are much worried about this approach launched by U.S. authorities. The reason for this anxiety is that the French authorities see a direct link between the development of a defense and security dimension for the EU and the efforts to establish a European pillar within NATO. They especially see the CJTF concept as one that will allow the WEU, under the political authority of the European Council, to undertake crisis management or peacekeeping missions with the use of NATO assets.

3.5 Berlin Ministerial and the 1997 Amsterdam Summit

Nevertheless, an apparent breakthrough in this long-standing discussion (since the failure of the multinational-force European Defense Community in 1954) was supposedly reached at the NATO Berlin Ministerial. There, the allies, as noted, endorsed the development of the European Security and Defense Identity "within the Alliance". This would include preparations through CJTFs for WEU-led operations and identification of "separable but not separate capabilities" and appropriate European command positions within NATO, such as "double-hatting" the deputy SACEUR for both NATO and WEU-led operations, or returning to a three-regional command structure with one commanded by a EU/WEU-dedicated focus (although this could prove an obstacle if a NATO and WEU operation occurred simultaneously.

The 1997 EU Amsterdam Summit:

The European response to this arrangement was to fine-tune the original Maastricht Title 5 in the 1997 Amsterdam Summit to clear the way for the absorption of WEU into the institutional framework of EU. The Article J.3 (1) (Article 13 of the revised Treaty on European Union) reads as follows:

"The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security policy, including for matters with defense implications."

The link between the WEU and EU Council is defined in Article J.7 (Article 17 in revised TEU) paragraph 3:

The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications. The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article J.3 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU. When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all members of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangement to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on equal footing in the planning and decision-making in the WEU (www.weu.int).

In the protocol on Article J.7, it states: "In elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the EU for which the Union avails itself of the WEU, WEU will act consistently with guidelines established by the European Council." (ibid, Protocol on Article J.7, par.5.)

The protocol also called for increased cooperation of the relevant bodies of WEU and EU. Two aspects of this cooperation were of special importance:

> Arrangements to allow relevant bodies of EU, including its Policy Planning, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre;
> Recognition of WEAG as the European forum for armaments cooperation for the realization of the European armaments market and the establishment of a European Armaments Agency. (ibid, par.7.)

These arrangements combined the two organizations in an organic fashion whereby the 1991 plan of EU members to incorporate the WEU as EU's defense arm has become a reality.

In the EU Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997, the EU members, including non-aligned nations of Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland agreed to consider contributing to the WEU 1992 Petersberg tasks concerning missions other than collective defense: humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. This decision took the EU a step closer.

This WEU-EU interface was suggested in April 1996 by Swedish Foreign Minister Lena-Hjelm-Wallen and Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen. It and the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty fell far short, however, of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's suggestion earlier that

year that a “solidarity clause” akin to Article 5 of the NATO and WEU treaties be added to the EU acquis, arguing that “It cannot be the case that within the EU, which we understand to be a community based on solidarity, there are those who are responsible for security and defense on the one hand and those who are responsible for trade on the other hand.” (Bonn Bulletin no.15, 1996).

3.6 The St. Malo Summit and EU Cologne Council

Thereafter, a joint Franco-British declaration emerged in December 1998 in St. Malo, France, so that the EU is able to take decisions and military action where NATO as a whole is not engaged, requiring European capabilities “pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national European means outside the NATO framework” (Young 2001, p.36). This was now quite the same as the Brussels Ministerial language concerning development of ESDI “within the Alliance,” but presumably the leaders were taking into account the possibility that the United States, or any non-EU NATO member, could always block the release of NATO assets and CJTF HQs.

A few months later, this formula was adopted at the EU Cologne Council on June 3, 1999:

“The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO” (EU Cologne Council Declarations: 1999). Further work was ordered on an EU Presidency Report which stated that the EU will have to determine whether it will conduct EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or EU-led operations without recourse to NATO capabilities using national or multinational European means pre-identified by Member States. The EU will consider “facilitating the participation of Russia when the EU avails itself of the WEU for missions within the range of Petersberg Tasks” and will ensure that arrangements exist for non-EU NATO nations to participate. A military committee and a military staff would be considered. Further progress would be sought in “the harmonization of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms as Member States consider appropriate.” The EU would also “foster the restructuring of the European defense industries…towards closer and more efficient defense industry collaboration” (defense industries had traditionally been excluded

from EU treaties). Eventually, the moribund WEU, which proved unable to act in Albania in 1997 reportedly because of British and German objections, would merge with the EU.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott then spoke of "apprehensions" which St. Malo and Cologne had generated:

It is in our interest for Europe to be able to deal effectively with challenges to European Security well before they reach the threshold of triggering U.S. combat involvement… (But) We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO. That's a long term concern, obviously, but NATO, after all, is about the long term (Address to the conference "The Future of NATO," 1999).

3.7 The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and the DCI

The Washington Summit Communiqué reaffirmed "commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible" (Young 2001, p.37). But reflecting the uncertainty about the nuances of language used in NATO and EU statements, the Washington Summit Communiqué could only record "the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for the use in EU-led operation" with the "necessary arrangements" still being finalized.

Most importantly, there was an agreement in Washington to ensure the full involvement of the non-EU European allies in the process to strengthen the security and defense dimension of the EU, building on arrangements developed by the WEU and NATO. Furthermore, all European allies were to be able to participate fully on an equal basis in EU-led crisis response operations involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities as well as in other EU-led operations to which they committed their own means. In conclusion, the NATO Summit in Washington opened a new phase in European security and defense including not only EU member allies but also non-EU European allies.

There was a new concept called Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was also launched in Washington Summit, to equip NATO for the defense and security challenges of the 21st century. The fundamental transformation since the early 1990s, with significant changes in its force and command structure as well as accepting new tasks, including a developing crisis response capability as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, was already experienced before the birth of the Defense Capabilities Initiative concept.

Because of the change in the security environment in the aftermath of the collapse of the Cold War, the NATO's Strategic Concept also had to be modified. Therefore the new Strategic Concept called Defense Capabilities Initiative was declared to respond the necessities of the new strategic era at the Washington Summit. According to this strategy, NATO will continue to maintain capabilities to deal with large-scale aggression against one or more of its members as explained in Article 5. Although such a threat is unlikely in the foreseeable future and it would probably necessitate a relatively long warning time, NATO will be ready to respond these problems. Potential threats to the security of NATO are more likely to arise from regional conflicts, ethnic conflicts or other crises, especially on the Alliance's periphery or beyond. These factors require continued Alliance solidarity and the maintenance of an effective military capability to minimize risks and prevent crises from threatening the NATO itself.

To sum up, the Defense Capabilities Initiative was originally intended as a measure to address the growing technology gap between the United States and its NATO allies. Since its birth date in April 1999, this initiative has been deepened to be able to deploy mobile and sustainable forces. At the time of the initiative, the success of DCI was crucial for strengthening the European pillar of NATO and maintaining the political and military viability of the Alliance.

3.8 The Helsinki European Council Meeting in 1999

At the EU Summit in Helsinki on December 10, 1999, these carefully-phrased guidelines were agreed flowing from the Cologne directives:

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army… (Young 2001, p.37).

At their summit in Helsinki in December 1999, EU members took further steps to establish a rapid-reaction, power projection force up to sixty thousand troops capable of implementing the Petersberg tasks by 2003. They noted that this force, deployable within sixty days for at least one year for crisis-management missions, should not be regarded as a "European army" in their view and would not require a UN Security Council mandate to act, although it would operate "in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter" (Norman 1999, p.2) Decisions to use this force would be based on a recommendation of a political and security committee that would be modeled along the lines of the NATO North Atlantic Council and constituted at the ministerial level. This body would exercise political control and provide strategic direction over operational decision-making as well as operations themselves.

The Helsinki European Council Meeting marked a further step in the construction of European Identity in terms of security and defense. The acceptance of the principle of an autonomous capacity to launch and conduct military operations under the direction of the European Union was an important step forward in asserting Europe's political role. The Helsinki Summit also drew the conclusions of the Union's political resolve to take on autonomous capacity for European action within the Alliance.

Javier Solana, the NATO's former Secretary General and the EU's current High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy is determined to play the leading role from the Helsinki Summit and works towards the full realization of a European Security and Defense Identity. In a December 17, 1999 speech in Berlin, he announced;

In an age of increasing global globalization, many are insecure, feeling threatened by events over which they consider they have little if any control. We cannot respond to this by pretending these problems do not exist. Transnational problems require transnational solutions. The development of an effective European Security and Defense Identity is an important contribution. It will give us the ability, where appropriate and whenever necessary, to show that the Union is not prepared to stand idly by in the face of crises. Nor always to let others shoulder responsibility. It will be sign that the European integration dreamed by Europe's founding fathers has come to age. (Speech of Javier Solana in Berlin, 1999)

These European summits have also made clear Europe's intention to undertake preventive diplomatic initiatives and crisis management operations on its own. According to the EU foreign ministers' report in preparation for the 1999 Helsinki Summit, "NATO remains the foundation of Europe's collective defense and will continue to have an important role in crisis management" (Joint Declaration on European Defense 1999, p.78). This clearly implies the need to establish between the two institutions a specific division of labor and more importantly, a means of consultation, cooperation, and transparency with respect to prospective operations.

Even if the EU's capacity for crisis management and power projection remains tied for practical reasons to those of the Alliance, the EU has the potential to coordinate European national perspectives and to develop a common policy position before NATO engages in debate on specific concerns. Toward that end, the EU's institutional evolution holds great promise, but it could also be the basis for new problems if the result becomes a de facto EU position that inhibits the U.S. from developing a coalition with individual members, and especially if the EU is unable to reach agreement on a specific contingency in and the U.S. seeks to elicit support of the other NATO members.

With its Helsinki decisions, the EU not only goes beyond previous statements on European security and defense, it also moves significantly beyond the model of transatlantic partnership agreed at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin. "The purpose of the Berlin decisions was to develop a separable but not separate European Security and Defense Identity within NATO. The WEU was to serve as a bridge between the EU and NATO keeping these two institutions at arm's length of each other" (Schmidt 2000). This process was very important because Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are EU Member States but they are not signatories to the NATO. Nevertheless, all other members of the WEU belong also to NATO.

The Helsinki Summit did little to accommodate a comprehensive participation arrangement for the NATO members that are not in the EU. The main problem arises from the integration of the WEU into the EU. As the EU's ability to function requires it to maintain a clear distinction between members and non-members, the WEU's differentiated system may no longer apply. As a result, the rights of non-EU members to participate in EU decision-making are likely to be limited. Therefore, the NATO members that are not in the EU will suffer a net loss in relation to the status quo.

Apart from the progress report on the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense adopted at the Helsinki Summit, the message announced at the end of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 15 December 1999 emphasized that the contribution of the non-EU European allies to the process, in which European headline goals will be set and collective capability targets developed, is and will remain important (Orhun 2000).

The importance of finding solutions acceptable to all the allies for the involvement of non-EU European allies was also underlined unlike the decisions taken in the Helsinki Summit. The structures to be established included the assurance of the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation among the allies. As a result, the participation of non-EU European allies would enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and contribute effectively to the European pillar of NATO. Therefore the involvement of non-EU European allies in a convenient manner would surely facilitate efforts in reaching an agreement on the means for cooperation among NATO, EU and the WEU. These three institutions would have to work close to each other in order to handle especially the regional crises. Within such a framework, Schmidt's argument in NATO Review is as follows:

We need to find ways to make sure that the necessary strategic dialogue on regional high-risk areas takes place smoothly and rapidly. There is scope for direct EU-NATO dialogue here: the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana being also the WEU Secretary General and, when appropriate the EU commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten should consult regularly with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Schmidt 2000, pp.12-16).

There is one other factor that is of vital importance for the formulation of an EU force and that is its relationship to the U.S.. Without American support or agreement, it is very unlikely that these efforts for an autonomous EU force will bear fruit. Because U.S. has the capabilities that EU does not possess and the issue gets more complicated because of the risks of duplication.

3.9 ESDP, the United States and NATO

Along with budgetary, planning and military capability challenges, EU members have faced the crucial task of arranging a constructive, complementary and transparent relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, and especially the United States.

When the European Council Conclusions at Cologne in June 1999 accepted and elaborated the Anglo-French plans on the Union's role in defense, there was at least one phrase that caused an American reaction:

The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 1999, par.1.)

The Clinton administration argued that the phrase "without prejudice to actions by NATO" was unacceptable for it left the impression that crisis management would be the prerogative of the Union and thus by implication boxed NATO into "Article V" operations only (Cogan 2000). The St. Malo Declaration between France and Britain had defined the need for a capacity for autonomous European action as follows: "In order for the EU to take decisions and approve military action where the alliance as a whole is not engaged" (Franco-British Summit, St. Malo, 1998, par.3.). "From Washington's point of view, the Cologne Summit had strayed from this wording, which had been carefully repeated in Washington Summit Communiqué in April 1999" (An Alliance for the 21st century, Washington Summit Communiqué, 1999, par.9a.).

On the eve of the Helsinki European Council Summit, the Americans intervened "at the highest level" by calling on Prime Minister Blair to persuade President Chirac to put "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged" into the EU Council Conclusions. With some difficulty, the British were able to persuade the French to include the phrase. Given that the French had already agreed to it at St. Malo, there was no convincing reason to keep it out (Moens 2003, p.30).

This is not a debate about semantics as the phrase cuts to the core of what is meant by "autonomy". Strictly speaking, the question is whether "autonomy" includes EU political will to launch military action in cases when the United States explicitly disagrees with such action.

The British do not want the concept of autonomy to mean that, and thus strongly favor the phrase “where NATO as a whole is not engaged” because that would mean, in practice, that the United States has already given its agreement.

The Helsinki Conclusions also implied that there was preparing for at least two types of capabilities and operations without the use of NATO assets and capabilities, and EU-led operations with NATO assets and capabilities. The apparent dual purpose of this EU capacity put into question the agreement the Alliance had affirmed in Washington, that is “our commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance…” (Washington Summit Communiqué 1999, par.5.)

ESDP thus moves beyond ESDI as it has been defined and used since 1994. In the arrangements between the WEU and NATO on CJTFs, the Alliance not only decides on what assets the WEU can borrow, but will also monitor these assets and can technically recall them. The ESDP definition of “autonomous action” includes a much greater degree of its own mission and control over decision-making and NATO assets once they have been assigned to the EU operation by the Alliance. Therefore, as the European Council Conclusions in Fiera in June 2000 acknowledge, NATO and the EU modalities may not be the same as WEU and NATO modalities. It is not possible, for example, for NATO simply to replace the references to the WEU with EU.

Logically, American and other NATO members have been probing the terms used in the new ESDP terminology, such as “autonomous action” (rather than “separable but not separate forces”) and “unnecessary duplication” (rather than “no duplication”) in the months after the Helsinki Conclusions. As the Union is not simply going to take over the WEU crisis management functions, which had been defined in the ESDI-in-NATO construct, all the arrangements as well as the overall political relationship have to be renegotiated.

The Europeans have tried to calm the waters but without diminishing or slowing down the momentum for a genuine EU military capacity. Lord Robertson argued that the new European initiative would maintain the “indivisibility” of the transatlantic link, would “improve” European capabilities, and would be inclusive of all the allies. “German defense Minister Rudolf Scharping wrote that the problem with NATO was not too much America but too little Europe (Scharping 1999). The British further clarified that they had no intention of creating an independent European army, or a standing force, and they did not seek strategic independence from Europe” (Moens 2003, p.32). However, the first half of 2000 has seen a

good deal of negotiation inside the EU and NATO to define the new relation between ESDP and NATO.

NATO foreign ministers in Florence in May 2000 called for "means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU European Allies; as well as practical arrangements for assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities on a case-by-case basis and consensus" (Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Florence 2000, par.27.). Capping the need for modalities for NATO-EU consultation and cooperation, and practical arrangements for assured EU access to NATO planning and ready access to NATO assets, is the overall need for a "Political Arrangement" (Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Florence 2000, par.29.).

It may be tempting to downplay the political side of ESDP as most EU members are also NATO allies and as the Western democracies have been through thick and thin together and essentially share the same values and interests. However, in light of the experience in the 1990s, it should be clear that the political relationship between NATO and the EU requires careful thought and management. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Marc Grossman, stated before the Senate in March 2000:

Our goal is simple: we want to get the ESDI right. That's because we want ESDI to succeed…More European military capacity will make the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden we now have to act in every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship more of a partnership (Grossman 2000).

Despite this overall impasse, NATO and ESDP member states have made a great deal of progress toward cooperation. Acting on a Dutch initiative, NATO's NAC and EU's COPSB are now meeting in joint session at least six times a year. Several non-EU states, including the United States and Norway (and soon Canada) have liaison staff at the new European Military Staff (EMS) to make planning and cooperation more transparent.

Lord Robertson of NATO and Javier Solana on behalf of the EU often meet informally to coordinate the activities of the two organizations. EU-NATO management of the Macedonia crisis has successfully proceeded and built on "lessons learned" from the various crises in the former Yugoslavia. Their cooperation has given NATO an early and critical crisis

management capacity and has produced remarkable EU-NATO cooperation and thus allowing the United States and the European allies to work together constructively, easing some of the early tension between the Bush administration and European states.

The idea proposed by then Secretary of Defense William Cohen in October of 2000 to merge the decision-making and defense planning process of NATO and the ESDP may not be on the table for a long time. However, in practice NATO members and double-hatted ESDP members are making the planning process as complementary as possible.

Though there is no unified European position on the future EU-NATO security relationship, most EU members want more EU decision-making power, planning capacity and operational capability for military crisis management in Europe. A common military ability will help define stronger shared national priorities in security and defense. ESDP in this view fortifies NATO while strengthening the EU. For most Europeans, these two goals are not contradictory. What is contradictory is the meager amount of money that the Europeans are willing to spend to make their pledges come true. “As a result, Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office now predicts that a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) will not be able to undertake combat operations until, at the earliest, 2012” (Kitfield 2002).

“Unlike the Clinton administration, most advisers in the Bush administration share this win-win view of ESDP” (Moens 2003, p.35). European security is no longer seen as a potential threat to the integrity of NATO. In the age of global terrorism, any capacity is welcome. The Bush administration is holding its nose on the strong ESDP rhetoric and is not getting distracted by institutional tinkering in the EU or even wrangling between the EU and NATO because it is ultimately looking at military capability. There is more concern in the Bush administration with declining European defense budgets than with the potential of an ERRF competing with NATO.

These developments have taken the EU a step closer toward the fulfillment of its Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy, however, with declining defense budgets and EU’s performance with its lack of capacity make it really unlikely that Europe will have an autonomous security force in the near future. We can add the differing interests of European big powers to this. It seems for the foreseeable future that the United States is not against an autonomous ESDI due to the changing circumstances after the September 11 terrorist attacks and as stated by George W. Bush “welcomes any capacity”. Kosovo is a test in case to demonstrate the difficulties of the EU in formulating common policies, before September 11,

in terms of both capacity and political will emphasizing the civilian power role for the EU despite its many efforts to establish its own force and become a global power. There is no better place to discuss this issue than the Kosovo War and the War in Iraq as examples of the transatlantic tension. It is to these cases that we shall now focus.

4. A TEST IN CASE: KOSOVO

The last chapter attempted to demonstrate the institutional background of the ESDP project and underlined the key summits to understand the institutionalist inertia toward both the CFSP and ESDP of the EU. This chapter will argue that the signs of institutionalism are existent in the Kosovo case as well as realist factors. Kosovo, I argue, was only a catalyst for this institutional inertia although it is certainly a test of realist theories. I will first give some background information about the emergence of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and then we will see more in detail, the case of Kosovo as a cornerstone in the development of ESDP.

In the aftermath of Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia was ruled for the next decade by a committee composed of the presidents of the six republics and two autonomous regions, with members taking turns as federal president. Although ethnic tensions had been overcome by socialist internationalism, in reality national groups had long been opposed to each other by the regime.

The dissolution of federal Yugoslavia was accelerated by the rise of power of Slobodan Milosevic as president of the Serbian Republic. His extremely nationalist agenda foresaw to unite all the Serbs under a single state by creating a Greater Serbia. In 1990, Slobodan Milosevic issued decrees abolishing the autonomous status of all the Serbian Republic's minority regions. By the end of 1980s, communism as an ideology and state system lost its significance throughout the entire region. Nationalism replaced communism and filled the ideological gap. Thus each of Yugoslavia's member republics sought to make its own way. The collapse of Soviet-led Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War also announced the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed republic of former Yugoslavia. On 5 April 1992, Bosnia's parliament declared independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This development initiated the beginning of a bloody war in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the Bosnian Serbs highly desired to create an autonomous Bosnian Serb territory. But since there were almost no areas except Banja Kuka where Serbs were numerically dominant, this had to be realized through ethnic cleansing.

Due to the lack of common will in European Union, the first symptoms of the EU's inoperativeness came to surface during the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The case of

humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrated the imbalance between political intentions and the considerable difficulties in the efficient implementation of decisions by the EU institutions. The time period for intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was relatively wrong however the realized policy was a source of embarrassment for the EU.

By reason of EU's ineffectiveness to solve the crisis in former Yugoslavia, NATO had to lead the international arena in order to intervene in this humanitarian disaster. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO's humanitarian intervention was justified by the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

The European Union worked hard in Bosnia with little success, mainly because it underestimated the level of the crisis, the resources and the effort needed to bring the conflict under control. More than a hundred British, French, and other European soldiers died in the tragic failure to stabilize the region after the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Peace could only come to Sarajevo when the overpowering military force and prestige of NATO entered the scene after 1995 Dayton peace talks.

At this point we can make a quick interface to explain the situation in Yugoslavia in parallel with the development of ESDP of the EU. The European incoherence regarding a European Security and Defense Policy was best displayed during the Yugoslav Wars of dissolution. The month Maastricht was signed Germany declared that she was to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia without consulting the other members of the EU. "In the event, the remaining members (especially France and Britain) went along recognition for the sake of promoting agreement on other issues in Maastricht, despite their uneasiness about Germany being back in the old game of power politics" (Pond 1999, p.44).

The premature recognition of Croatian independence despite the Badinter Commission Report that only Macedonia and Slovenia satisfied the recognition criteria, clearly showed how far the Europeans lacked the stated aim of "common positions". As Misha Gleny puts it, "Not only did the German decision seal the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it made a mockery of the consensual foreign policy which the EU was striving to build on its way towards economic and political integration (Gleny 1996, p.164). The principal U.S. decision to leave the essentially European problems to the hands of Europeans went only as far as the success of Vance-Owen Plan. At the end, the plan, which was the heart of the European effort, was doomed to failure by none other than the Americans (Osmancavusoglu 2000, p.126-131).

German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gives two reasons in explaining why the European Union was unable to end the conflict in former Yugoslavia. According to him;

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a new form of crisis that had not been encountered since the World War 2 and for which the EU was totally unprepared. Moreover, European unity was not yet far enough advanced to allow the EU to appear as a united and efficient power vis-à-vis the outside world. He also confesses that the progress made towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy firstly in the Maastricht Treaty and lately in the Treaty of Amsterdam is unable to handle all the issues (Schröder 1997, pp.71-79).

International Involvement in the Kosovo Conflict:

The Kosovo region was of great historical importance to the Serbs, while it is at the same time inhabited by Albanians, which form the majority group as well as Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks and other minorities. Before the rise of power of Milosevic, Yugoslavia tried to solve the ethnic tensions there, by increasing the autonomy of Kosovo, although the region was never made constitutionally equal to other Yugoslav states. The Albanians could not hope to secede from Serbia peacefully, given the importance of Kosovo for the Serbian national interests. However, after the failure of the "peaceful resistance" which consisted of forming the Albanians' own parallel government by holding elections, providing education and medical care to Albanians which were denied by the Yugoslav government, some Kosovo Albanians took up arms and organized themselves into what became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

The KLA was a direct product of Serb repression. But the emergence of an armed Kosovo Albanian force was used by the Yugoslav authorities to justify yet more violence and further radicalizing the population. As the situation in Kosovo worsened, the international community became increasingly concerned about the human rights situation and its potential to spread instability to neighboring countries in the Balkans.

Pressures of the international community on Belgrade to cease its oppression and to end the ethnic cleansing and violence directed against the Kosovo Albanians increased sharply. The terrible situation in Kosovo was the evidence showing that WEU, OSCE and UN were not well-prepared to handle the humanitarian issues. The EU and WEU Coalition, being unable to speak "within a single voice" in international politics was inadequate to find a useful solution to cope with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. As a result, with the growing humanitarian

crisis, NATO engaged in military action to end the conflict, as it was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was due to the failure of the EU in the Yugoslav Wars of dissolution that made the Kosovo case more vulnerable. “The sense of shame over past inaction in the first four years of atrocious wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) remains the main explanation for the European Union and its member states’ engagement in the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo” (Muguruza 2003, p.237). This delay and reluctance to intervene militarily relates to the idea of Europe as a civilian power. Therefore the EU preferred non-military means such as effective diplomacy and cohesion in foreign policy. Despite tensions within the EU, supportive diplomatic initiatives were forthcoming and EU cohesion was retained. However, this was only the diplomatic side of the crisis.

The Kosovo case is a good example to start explaining EU’s lack of capacity, political will and empirical power in terms of forming both a common foreign policy and common defense in the form of an autonomous force. In this chapter I will try to show the progression of this conflict and explain why despite the many legalistic attempts and institutionalist inertia, the EU still needs to further mature and prepare for a common security and defense policy for future scenarios.

The war in Iraq and the transatlantic tensions between the EU and the USA will be our second test for the possibility of a future autonomous EU force. In the case of Yugoslavia, our starting point is Germany’s premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia which led to the beginning of war. This recognition was realized despite the Badinter Report of the EU which stressed that these states did not qualify recognition criteria. This was a realist move on the basis of Germany’s national interests. So, realism seems to emerge as the dominant paradigm however, this is truer for the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as demonstrated in the example of Germany. Before and after the Kosovo war there has been an ongoing institutional inertia toward the fulfillment of a common security and defense policy for the EU and the launching of ESDP coincides with the end of the Kosovo war. So, let us see the lessons drawn for the EU from this conflict and whether they will pave the way for a more realistic security agenda and whether the progression of events confirms our arguments in favor of institutionalism which evolves as the dominant paradigm to explain the impact of Kosovo on EU’s Security and Defense Policy.

The lessons of the wars following the disintegration of Former Republic of Yugoslavia are manifold from the perspective of the EU. These lessons manifest themselves mainly in the form of the Common European Security and Defense Policy which forms the second pillar of the EU since its inception into Maastricht Treaty in 1991. These lessons stem from the approach of the European Union toward these atrocities and the way they were handled at the time of the conflict. “The Kosovo crisis served both as a catalyst and as a wakeup call for the EU to accept finally its international responsibilities” (Muguruza 2003, p.242).

The NATO air strikes yet formed another dimension of the conflict. “The Kosovo air strikes also revealed deeper tensions between Europe’s two leading international institutions. These tensions relate to the process of role definition and reinvigoration that has been continuing in both NATO and the EU since the end of the Cold War” (Deighton 2001, p.58). In this chapter I will show how Kosovo acted as a catalyst for the formulation of a European military force despite these initiations predate the air strikes.

The main lesson that we can drive from this conflict is that the Kosovo war showed the weaknesses of European NATO Allies in terms of military capability. “The conflict exposed the inadequacies of the European majority within the alliance with regard to readily deployable military hardware” (Weymouth 2001, p.195). There were also longer term defense proposals to develop an autonomous EU force before and during the conflict such as the St. Malo Summit between Britain and France. “Here, we find that these European defense proposals have taken the EU right up to the *glass ceiling*, as traditionally the EU’s competences did not extend to the military sphere” (Deighton 2001, p.58). So, there is institutionalist inertia in the inclusion of military aspects of security into the EU’s institutional framework.

4.1 Lessons of Kosovo

“Kosovo has raised broad lessons about both Europe´s capability to play an independent role on its own defense and military capabilities. It has led Europe to speed up the absorption of the West European Union´s defense structure into the European Community, and a new emphasis on European security initiatives” (Cordesman 2001, p.312). These range from the

creation of a crisis-managing military capability to a truly independent autonomous war fighting capability.

Kosovo has also emphasized on the debate “Europe as a civilian power or a global one” by demonstrating the fact that there might be occasions, and even in Europe’s own backyard, where the requirement of force may be necessary for the political and security reasons.

However, the most important lessons in the Kosovo conflict with regard to EU came in the form of military capabilities. Kosovo has led to an examination of Europe’s role and capabilities in every military mission from air wars to emergency relief.

It has raised major questions about the quality of Europe’s level of training and technology, and many other areas of war fighting. At a July 19-20 summit meeting in Britain, the British and Italian Prime ministers called for a “road map” for more effective European defense procurement, including the harmonization of military requirements, collaboration in arms procurement, and the restructuring of the defense industry (Cordesman 2001, p.312).

The conflict exposed embarrassingly the inadequacies of the European majority within the alliance with regard to readily deployable military hardware. Most of the air strikes were carried out by American air crews or missile crews, and the Europeans were greatly dependent on them for airlift capabilities and intelligence.

While there have been statements of intent to do something about this deficiency since the end of the conflict, there seems little reason to doubt that, as in the past, the Europeans will not be prepared to risk damaging electorally significant domestic policy programs by redirecting the full amount of necessary resources into their military budgets (Weymouth 2001, p.195).

However, some argue that European citizens would be more willing to fund defense requirements if they were going into a European pot rather than a NATO one. This needs to be tested but the time when it will be may be far away.

Second, the Alliance’s intervention over the conflict in Kosovo demonstrated some of the likely factors that would limit the effectiveness of even a well resourced future military unit, operating even within the overall context of NATO as a European defense identity, or as an EU force. The difficulties several European governments had with the idea of combat ground force in the Kosovo context demonstrate that increasing the roles and capabilities of European

states (in addition to their existing access to U.S. capabilities) within NATO would not itself guarantee that that alliance would be able to agree to deploy ground forces in future situations where the American government refused to cooperate. This has constituted as another reason in the formation of a European Task force.

Another aspect that significantly paralyzed the European countries to solve the crisis in Kosovo was the American reluctance or more specifically, the refusal of the Clinton administration to intervene with ground troops involved. This was a result of the USA's post Somalia doctrine: "that American forces will only engage in ground operations in Europe, or indeed, anywhere, prior to the conclusion of hostilities, in contexts where vital goals of U.S. foreign, defense or economic policy are perceived to be threatened" (Weymouth 2001, p.194). This doctrine might have reduced significantly NATO's chances of achieving success in future military operations given the reluctance of the European powers to improve their capabilities. However, there have been initiatives after the Kosovo War in terms of declarations by the military powers to enhance their capabilities and effectiveness within the context of both NATO and the EU.

Another aspect of Kosovo's demonstration of the necessity of the existence of Europe's own readily deployable troops is the relationship between the actors of the USA and the European powers:

Overall, the Kosovo conflict was something of a shock to the system for several of the leading European NATO governments. For example, Prime Minister Blair discovered that his much-vaunted personal and political links with the Clinton Administration were not strong enough to change the president's unwillingness to authorize ground troops prior to a peace agreement. This has shown Europe that they need capabilities rather than reliance on American power (Weymouth 2001, p.195).

All of the European allies discovered that the small proportion of their overall forces and capabilities that were readily deployable in Kosovo meant that whether individual governments wanted to strengthen the air war with a ground campaign or not, the option was not feasible without the Clinton administration agreeing to participate.

Furthermore, reliance on American air power also emphasized that it was difficult for European governments to act at all in such a context without the USA at least agreeing to prosecute an air war. This vividly demonstrated that they were as unequal to the U.S. in the

post-Cold War era as they had been during the Cold War. The Secretary General, Lord Robertson stated, as he was taking office, that:

…the Kosovo campaign has…taught us that to remain effective in the future, NATO's Allies must make efforts to improve their cooperation and their contributions. They can only be sure to be able to defend their interests if they acquire the right capabilities: interdependence means accepting responsibilities not relying on the overwhelming might of a single ally (NATO website 1999b).

It was in part as a reaction to this kind of sentiment that progress towards a European Defense Identity gathered pace during 1999 with the added element of the strong and cooperative participation of the Blair government. By the end of the year the drive toward expanding the capacity of European States to act more effectively had resulted in the solidification of the commitment to produce an EU military identity as well as a "European" NATO One. However, given the fact that the person in charge of producing this new EU military identity was NATO's ex-secretary General, it is not surprising that he is more suggestive of strong complementarity rather than forming a challenge to NATO. He stated for example that:

Helsinki…makes clear that the Union has its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This will remain a guiding principle…Most importantly; we have made clear that ESDP is not about collective defense. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defense of its members…Nor does ESDP attempt to undermine the right of member states to retain their own specific security and defense policy… (European Union 1999).

This meant that the EU's military role would be restricted to the tasks first set out in the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. These include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and crisis management military operation, including peacemaking.

4.2 Kosovo as a Catalyst and EU's Military Capacity

In the second part of this chapter I will attempt to show how Kosovo has been a catalyst for change within the EU itself, although the initiation of these changes predates the strikes and this is in line with our institutionalist inertia argument. Here we find that European defense

proposals have taken the EU right up to the "glass-ceiling" as traditionally the EU's competences did not extend to the military sphere.

Kosovo has also brought a new dimension to the EU-NATO relationship. This is because of the proposal for an autonomous EU force that was refined during the air war between March and June 1999. To understand the impact of the use of force on the institutional balance that Kosovo caused we need a little history. In this regard the St. Malo Summit can be seen as a cornerstone not least because it made references to Bosnia but also because it came from the most militarily powerful country in Europe; Britain. This was also a reaction toward the impotence of the WEU.

The willingness of the U.S. to carry out air strikes was not profound. The air strikes came less than 4 months later. "American planes carried out more than 80 percent of the air raids. Although the Europeans had over 6,000 fast jets. When it came to putting together the peace-keeping force, Europe struggled to provide 40,000 troops, even though this figure was roughly one-fiftieth of its armed forces" (Deighton 2001, p.64). The European partners of the Alliance found no commensurate role in comparison with the U.S.. As the then British defense Minister George Robertson put it: "You had to sweat and strain all your resources to get a deployable 2 percent of the totality. That will not be tolerable in the future […] we clearly need more of these paper troops to be deployable, flexible, survivable, sustainable" (Deighton 2001, p.64). This situation was more alarming given that since the Strategic Concept of 1991, NATO had recognized that the nature of the conflict envisaged during the Cold War was out of date and, but that it was only with great difficulty that NATO could actually deploy the range of forces and hardware that it did. "As an ally in force, the NATO European partners who were members of the EU were tested and found wanting" (Deighton 2001, p.64).

In order to understand the full consequence of Europe's lack of capacity, there have been two important meetings during the air strikes which show the direction of change in EU-NATO relations and the possibility of a European army. The first of this was the NATO Washington Summit, held in April 1999, and the second was the Cologne European Summit of the heads of state of the EU, held even as the air strikes ended, in June 1999.

No European standing army was proposed; but rather a force numbering around 50,000, which could be raised and deployed for Petersberg-Article 5-Tasks, was agreed to. Such a force would act on the instructions of the EU's supreme body, the European Council, and

these tasks would be performed with the agreement of NATO and if necessary, with the use of NATO assets (Deighton 2001, p.64).

At the same time the Defense Capabilities Initiative proposed adaptations to conform to the new Strategic Concept (also launched in Washington), looking particularly at command and control, information systems, interoperability and standardization, deploy ability, and the military capability of European Allies (NATO Summit, Washington, 1999, "Defense Capabilities Initiative", Final Communiqué).

On the back of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, it was thus possible to repackage the earlier European Initiative in the context of capabilities rather than a European Defense Identity. So, the contrasting approaches of NATO and EU are apparent here.

The Cologne meeting on the other hand, had confirmed the folding of WEU into the EU and that a new, autonomous, rapid reaction force should be introduced that confirmed the thrust of the Amsterdam Treaty. "A new decision-making structure was now proposed that would include the involvement of ministers of defense within the Union to take forward the Anglo-French project proposed at St. Malo" (Deighton 2001, p.65). Also a new post was created to coordinate the work of then Common Foreign and Security Policy. The appointment of Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO, as the first holder of this post was to confirm the NATO orientation of the Project.

Washington and Cologne have built upon earlier proposals, the fulfillment of which was speeded up because of the Kosovo air strikes. It has also shown the weaknesses of military structure and military capacity for the European Allies. During the Cold War NATO was the "glass-ceiling" through which European defense efforts were not to go. Since the end of the Cold war, the so-called ratchet of European defense has been tightening, as the changes in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have shown.

Another aspect Kosovo revealed was the link between war and the long term institutional relationship between the EU and NATO that the possibility of an autonomous reaction force had raised but which could not now be ignored. "The U.S. had long been arguing that the Europeans did not carry their share of defense burden and defense expenditure" (Deighton 2001, p.66). Given the weaknesses exposed during the Kosovo War these had to be addressed. However, there is a deeper question that needs to be addressed as the world`s only superpower and this is its relationship with NATO, unilateralism, its post-Cold War interests,

its relation to the United Nations, and how far it should continue to act as a European power. ”United States reactions to the European Initiatives since St. Malo have not been unreservedly enthusiastic about a European-inspired change, which might alter the institutional balance between the EU and NATO” (Deighton 2001, p.67). Madeline Albright’s stern letter to the Financial Times, the day after the St. Malo declaration, in which she warned of duplication (of resources), discrimination (against non-EU members of NATO) and decoupling (between the EU and the United States) was the first reaction. A revealing article at the same time of the NATO Summit said that the references to the European Initiative were marked by attempts to put an American stamp on St. Malo, alluding to a determination “to make sure that things evolved along the right lines” for example, using the American Planning System – and that “they were not interested in a separate European defense” (Deighton 2001, p.67). There are also passages in the NATO Communiqué that suggest that the European initiative should not go too far:

The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. Our respective efforts in building peace in the former Yugoslavia are complementary. Both the organizations make decisive contributions to peace and stability on the European Continent. Cooperation between two organizations on topics of common concern, to be decided on a case by case basis, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU (Deighton 2001, p.67).

Thus the Balkan conflict, and Bosnia and Kosovo in particular, have brought to the surface a longer term ambiguity about the roles of the EU and NATO in the post-Cold War world, and about whether their relationship and their different roles still constitute a partnership, or a forced one. “But the effect of this initiative must, over time alter the structural relationship between the EU and NATO” (Defense Capabilities Initiative; Final Communiqué, NATO Washington Summit 1999).

If ESDP succeeds, it could open the way to new perspectives about the EU’s international role. If it fails, the relationship between the two institutions will still require recalibration, because the question had been laid on the table.

4.3 Political Will for ESDP

The Maastricht Treaty gave the EU instruments to develop, for the first time, global foreign policy strategies, combining Community and CFSP measures, towards central and Eastern Europe and Mediterranean neighbors. “These strategies showed the EU’s capability to develop a common foreign policy, namely to formulate policy objectives and the instruments to implement them” (Muguruza 2003, p.240).

However, the EU failed to reach quick decisions to international crisis. The record of the last years shows that, the EU has not been able to develop a coherent and effective foreign policy to help prevent or resolve conflict. The experience of the EU’s policy towards Yugoslavia made it amply clear that it is the dose of the political will, and not much the perfection of instruments that determined the course of action.

However, the willingness to act depends on the existence of a common interest for the EU countries. It is the existence and intensity of the common interest that determines the political will. It is also the common interest and political will that gives rise to the institutionalist inertia that we observe since the Treaty of Maastricht and as an example in the Kosovo case. “The common interest also arises from the existence of common values, which the EU wants to promote and defended in the international scene. The EU’s foreign policy has, as its first objective, to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union” (Muguruza 2003, p.241). It was not until the Kosovo crisis exploded that the EU finally manifested a willingness to act.

“The detonator of the international community’s intervention in Kosovo was the massacres of Kosovo Albanians in February-March 1998. The brutal repression against the civilian population reminded the Union of the experience of its former inaction in Bosnia” (the “General Report on the European Union” Luxembourg: OPOCE 2000, no 751).

The Kosovo crisis would alarm the EU countries about their responsibilities in the realm of its standing values. “The debate on the need to develop a European autonomous defense capacity for crisis management opened in October 1998 at Pörtschach European Council symbolized the new attitude of the Union” (Muguruza 2003, p.242).

The EU at first tried to solve the conflict through diplomatic and political means in line with the Common Security and Foreign Policy. Early in 1999, the EU threw its weight behind the

search for a peaceful solution of the conflict via the Rambouillet (February) and Paris (March) negotiations, supported by several parliament resolutions and council conclusions. After the failure of the last mediation effort the European Council meeting in Berlin on 24-25 March issued a statement suggesting its determination to intervene:

The international Community has done its utmost to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict…On the threshold of the twenty-first century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behavior and violence, which became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999, are not repeated. We have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and the displaced persons. Aggression must not be awarded (Presidency Conclusions, "2. Statement on Kosovo", Berlin European Council 1999).

In this statement, the EU puts emphasis on "moral obligations" and "duty". This can be treated as an extension of Europe's role as a civilian power which confirms its attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. In this context, Kosovo can be treated as a cornerstone for the EU because, for the first time the EU has accepted that military power can be utilized against human rights abuses. At this point the acquiring of military power is necessary and the question at the table is whether the EU will continue to rely on American power every time a crisis breaks out on European soil or will handle it on its own.

The crisis in Kosovo essentially sped up the European Initiative. Consensus built quickly that Europe must prepare to undertake such crisis response actions without complete military dependence on the U.S.. "Some have suggested that Britain felt that Europe had to develop a real military capacity to keep the U.S. interested in NATO" (Howorth 2000, p.33).

In other words, the British move was not so much an attempt to shift security and defense to Europe for the sake of creating European rather than NATO defense capability as a move to preempt the loss of American interest in the Alliance given the more pressing areas of military concern for the U.S. in Asia or the Middle East. We cannot assume at this point that there will be no divergence in the British and French approach. It is also clear that defense, in

contrast to economic or monetary policy is the key area in Europe where Britain can lead, and where its leadership is a win-win situation.

The challenge of developing these capabilities such as command and control, interoperability, a reliable logistics chain, air and sea lift and intelligence is complicated by declining defense budgets and a great deal of divergence among European capabilities. EU member governments spend approximately half the amount of money on defense and a third of the amount on military R&D as the Americans (Moens 2003, p.27).

Moreover, as David Yost states, the Europeans get relatively little military and security value for the money they spend.

By and large, European militaries are still overstaffed and underequipped for modern operations, though the British and French, who are leading the initiative, are the most advanced. EU members depend on NATO command and control and American assistance in sophisticated intelligence, air transportation, logistics and power projection capability to undertake crisis response operations, including the more demanding possibilities of peace enforcement. European militaries must rationalize, restructure and specialize, using both the capacity of the larger states and value-added of smaller states to prepare a common military crisis management capacity. Arguably, this will be the most difficult tasks the Union has undertaken. European governments briefly considered but then rejected so-called "convergence criteria" in defense spending and common priorities similar to what was used during the formation of the Euro. Instead individual governments at various conferences are to pledge resources, guided loosely by a sense of peer review and common commitment.

4.4 Defense Reform in the EU and the DCI

The new initiative will put pressure on rationalizing the defense industry in the EU. EU leaders have expressed their determination "to foster the restructuring of the European defense industries," and "seek further progress in harmonization of military requirements" (Cologne European Council, June 3 and 4, 1999). The globalization of the armaments market is pushing the European members toward consolidating their arms industry and pooling their military resources.

Europe's defense industry reform will no doubt be complicated by the "dawning realization" on the part of the Americans that Europe is likely to buy fewer American weapons in the future and may sell more arms as a result of consolidation of its industry (Moens 2003, p.27). In terms of specialization and cost savings, transatlantic mergers may be more rational than some intra-European mergers. However, given that American companies will be in a position to dominate such partnerships, political sensitivities will slow down the process. One of the barriers to "industrial bridge-building across the Atlantic" is the continuation of rigid export controls on defense industry products by the U.S.. (Adams 2000). Realizing that such controls will increasingly hinder American companies in their attempt to supply European militaries with new equipment proposed both in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in NATO and in the HG requirements in the Union, Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Florence in May 2000 a package of seventeen specific steps to reduce these controls. These steps aim "to streamline the U.S. Defense export control licensing process and forge closer industrial linkages between U.S. and allied defense suppliers" (State Department Press Release on Defense Trade Initiative 2000).

4.5 ESDP and Kosovo

The civil war in former Yugoslavia proved the fact that it was too early to talk about EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy defined and shaped by EU instead of NATO's ESDI alternative. On the other hand, it is observed that the speed at which the European Union has formed its military ambitions has been surprising for this slow organization and it does not seem about to stop.

Regarding the European perspective, an autonomous European crisis management capacity placing an equal priority on both a capable military structure and non-military capacities would provide a crisis management structure that would not only be a valuable alternative to NATO, but also a valuable supplement. However, the catastrophe occurred at the centre of Europe has already verified that a European crisis management capacity focusing particularly on military structures would have little chance, considering that the emphasis given on EU crisis management on military instruments would not do more than duplicating NATO. Furthermore, the duplication of NATO's military capacities would especially jeopardize the future of European security architecture.

It should not be forgotten that the European Union, which has never been a military organization historically, is poorly equipped in the realization of effective and constructive mechanism. The big European powers are determined to develop an autonomous European military capacity that can operate independently of NATO and intervene in conflicts where NATO is not interested in intervening. It is sure that this determination does not make the Alliance's main important actor, the U.S. particularly happy. According to the U.S., Europe is wasting time and money, as a strong military capacity is already available under NATO.

The U.S. criticized the European powers for failing to intervene in convenient manner to Kosovo. It is certain that the big European partners failed to pull their weight in NATO's military operation. Therefore the growing consensus on the need for a European defense capability is a direct consequence of the Kosovo crisis. According to NATO's Military Chief, Gen. Wesley Clark, the Alliance's solidarity was challenged during the Kosovo War because the concept of burden sharing was not being met. Despite the existence of some problems in Kosovo, it cannot be denied that the NATO led by the U.S. carried far too heavy a burden and acted as a driving force in all fields including intelligence. "Thus a de facto division of labor was instituted with the U.S. military shouldering much of the burden of fighting the campaign with the Europeans expected to pick up the financial tab for the reconstruction effort in its aftermath" (Marcus 2000, pp.79-94).

It is clear that the Europeans would go nowhere on their own. The high percentage of air strikes, which were carried out by the U.S. at the centre of Europe demonstrates the high thrust on U.S.'s role in Europe. Furthermore, it seems quite impossible for Europeans to handle most of the peacekeeping and rebuilding without obtaining the guarantee of American cash, guns or troops.

4.6 An American Perspective and Lessons Drawn

According to Kupchan;

The United States believe that Europe should concentrate on becoming more effective partners within the Alliance, spending more for the Alliance, instead of concentrating on what they recognize to be the developments of structures that are direct competition to NATO. The U.S. also expects that the European members of the Alliance are required to spend on

capabilities controlled by NATO, but not on capabilities controlled by them. On the other hand, in accordance with the emerging European consensus, the European Union aims to control these future strategic capabilities in order to develop a bargaining mean whenever Europe has to negotiate the strategies for future military crisis management with the American partners (Kupchan 2000).

Briefly, the simple lesson learned expensively for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is that diplomatic credibility requires military capability in accordance with realistic perspective. Furthermore, if diplomacy is to be successful in stopping trouble spots from becoming crises, then credible military resources have to be able to back it up. That is the reason why NATO's strategies fared better relative to the EU and WEU coalition.

The breakthrough in the development of European defense policy came at the 1998 Anglo-French summit in St. Malo. Britain's agreement to put hard military security and defense squarely inside the EU and to create with other Union members a robust intervention capacity was a substantial change from the post-Cold War British position of posing the WEU as the bridge between the Union and the Alliance. So, in this sense St. Malo and the Kosovo conflict thereafter are crucial points for the urge toward an autonomous EU force.

Although progress is slow these demonstrate that Europe is embarking on a different course in terms of its defense and "security" rather than keeping NATO as the most important organization for Europe's security. However, when it comes to doing the actual act of fighting, the European Security and Defense policy of the EU takes us nowhere. So, we are left with legalistic summits, declarations and statements without the actual capacity and political determination.

Before looking further at the root causes of change in the quest for ESDP, we can say that Kosovo crisis was an important turning point in the sense of highlighting both NATO's primary role and showing the lack of military capacity on the part of EU. Moreover, it highlighted the lack of political will to get to the point of more capacity and unwillingness to do the actual fact of fighting. It once again proved the premature state of the ESDP however; it would be fair to say that EU took lessons from this war and showed the existence of some institutionalist inertia to get to the point of more capacity and autonomy away from NATO. The next chapter will be another test case of ESDP; September 11 and its aftermath.

5. PROSPECTS FOR AN EU FORCE: POST SEPTEMBER 11

In the last chapter we have discussed how Kosovo worked both as a catalyst and as a real test case for the Common European Security and Defense Policy. The many legalistic attempts and the diplomatic struggle at Rambuillet showed that the one thing crucial for the Europeans was “capabilities”. Without the law backed by force Europe could only receive little and the only institution capable of dealing with humanitarian issues was NATO. There was also the existence of an institutionalist inertia added to the “catalyst impact” which brought about some important changes in security thinking such as in the St. Malo and Cologne Summits underlining Europe´s efforts to form its separate EU force. However, the September 11 attacks and the Afghan and Iraq Wars came as a realist backlash.

In this chapter I will focus on September 11 events, Afghan War and the Iraq War in order to have a full understanding of the development of ESDP. In doing so, I will consider whether the most recent phase of European foreign policy making, since the atrocity of September 11, has exposed fatal flaws in the EU`s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or whether there is still hope. This chapter asks to what extent Member States have fallen back on their own resources in foreign and security terms, and to what extent there are signs of regrouping, so as to take the CFSP and ESDP on to the next stage.

As we follow the progression of events after September 11, we will see that these terrorist events would not only bring about solidarity between the Americans and Europeans but among the Europeans as well. But the emergence of the Iraq War would split this solidarity once again which shows that Europe cannot bring about an effective Common Foreign Policy, let alone a common defense.

The Iraq War had led to the disintegration of EU`s CFSP as the EU countries were divided in terms of their approach to this crisis. It has shown that no amount of institutional tinkering would take away the right of sovereignty from the EU countries to create a common defense. Failure to integrate in the foreign policies, security and defense did not seem possible at all, as this war clearly showed that realist forces were still at work. When their vital interests were at stake, European countries showed that they would not give up their monopoly use of defense, and foreign policy power.

As the EU has concerns beyond its borders, it will always struggle with the challenges of an uncertain and difficult external environment. If it has been constantly criticized over the last decade, since the end of the Cold War and the high sounding language of the Treaty of Maastricht, 11 September 2001 seemed to be a particularly brutal expose of its weaknesses, re-emphasizing the importance of the very instrument the EU does not command, that of organized violence." (Hill 2004)

The EU is also going through an era hardly suitable for the operation of a civilian power, which is seen to best advantage in times of order and stability. In this sense I will be giving special emphasis to Tervuren Summit to understand, to what extent the divisions between the European countries are salient and likely to lead to more incoherence.

5.1 September 11 and CFSP

The September 11 events brought ESDP even more prominently into the spotlight and made the quest for ESDP more conspicuous. However, have the Member States which comprise the sinews of European Foreign Policy fallen back definitively on their own resources and separate strategies, in a form of renationalization, or is the shock of the Al Qaeda attacks and the Iraq crisis leading to "regrouping", by which is meant a renewed determination to address the gaps and weaknesses of the collective system?

Are those countries with relatively short histories of statehood, like Italy or some of the group of ten new entrants, as reluctant to give up national freedom of maneuver as are the old powers of Britain and France, or is there a commitment to further integration extending out from the achievements of commercial diplomacy and of the Euro? (Hill 1983, 1996, 1998; Manners and Whitman 2000)

The major challenge to EU foreign policy of recent years has been the attack to the U.S. by Al Qaeda. The EU reacted to the images from New York and Washington with emotional and practical solidarity.

By the end of 12 September, apparently acting on a British suggestion, NATO members had already invoked Article 5 of the Treaty to declare their full support for the U.S., if and when it

could be shown that attacks had been directed from abroad. (By 2 October this was thought proven and commitment declared operational) (Deighton 2002, pp.119-120)

"These were essentially political commitments, designed to prove Washington that the Alliance was intact and that there would be *no safe haven for terrorists and their sponsors* in Europe" (Declaration by the European Union, General Affairs Council 2001). Since then the commitment has not weakened, but matters have become more complicated as the U.S. has embarked on a range of increasingly controversial counter-measures. In the early days of the crisis, however, ideological tensions with the Bush administration, and particularly differences over the environment and international law were set aside. However, this would not last long.

Inside the EU, the initial reaction after the shock was nationalization of the armed forces of the EU countries however, rational thinking brought the EU countries more together and most EU countries agreed that, in the longer term, September 11, made the case for ESDP even more compelling. "Beyond the probe of the cameras, significant elements of integration emerged. ESDP institutional turf wars were set aside and the complex EU nexus of agencies and actors worked seamlessly together to develop a coherent political approach to the crisis" (Howorth and Keeler 2003, p.15). These were efforts on the part of the EU to follow a common foreign policy with respect to the crisis. Within 10 days the main outlines were agreed on and were articulated at the extra ordinary meeting of the European Council on September 21, 2001. Despite this initial solidarity and high symbolism (the invoking of Article 5 of NATO), there were already hints of divergence of approaches by the U.S. and the EU. Soon, the only ominous signs for European Foreign policy unity arose from the evident wish of the big three states, Britain under Tony Blair, to exert leadership and not to stand in line waiting for the Belgian presidency to act for them. Thus Blair, Chirac and Schröder held their own meeting before the Ghent Council on 20 October and planned to repeat the exercise despite the previous protests from the excluded, in London on 4 November. "This time, because of the pressures of the collective diplomacy system, the prime ministers of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the Belgian presidency, together with the High Representative, forced their way almost literally to the table" (Better Late than Never, Economist 2002). This was a humiliating public demonstration of the tensions between national and collective criteria, and between the stronger and weaker members of the European foreign policy system.

However, beyond the expression of the total support for the American people and recognition that the UN Security Council resolution 1368 made a U.S. military riposte "legitimate," a relatively distinct EU political agenda suggested a longer term approach to the global crisis. The first of these was the creation of the broadest possible goal coalition against terrorism under "United Nations umbrella". "Second major emphasis on reactivating the Middle East peace process on the basis of the Mitchell and Tenet reports" (Former State Senator George Mitchell 2000). Third, as an extension of the notion of Europe as a "civilian power" the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development was expressed.

Humanitarian help for Afghanistan and its neighbors became a number one priority. "Europe's ESDP leaders, in various combinations, embarked on an unprecedented round of shuttle diplomacy, repeatedly visiting most countries of Central and South Asia and the Middle East in a relentless quest for dialogue. The EU despite its shortcomings, was emerging as an international actor" to become a global player (Howorth and Keeler 2003, p.15). This meant that EU was following a common foreign policy after the failure in Kosovo. Europe's aspirations – especially by France and Germany – to become a global power commensurate with its economic activity were becoming real.

5.2 The War in Afghanistan

It was no accident that the first cracks started to appear at this time, for U.S. bombers had begun to attack Afghanistan on 7 October. "Concerns over military action are never far below the surface in EU countries, particularly in Germany, Italy, Ireland and Scandinavia, and this was no exception" (Hill 2004). In the event military success was not long forthcoming, as Kabul fell on 13 November and a month later the remnants of Al Qaeda disappeared. The latest Afghan war was effectively over.

Even if things had proved more difficult, it is unlikely that the support of European governments for the U.S.-led campaign would have seriously wavered. As William Wallace points out, both France and Germany chose explicitly to "bandwagon rather than to balance: to declare their active support for the American response, and to offer military contributions towards it" (Wallace 2002, p.113). The attack on Afghanistan was not a matter of revenge.

For all the complaints, it was only in Iraq that Washington embarked upon actions which the EU found difficult to accept.

Once victory was achieved in Afghanistan, European capabilities came more directly into play. Although on occasions the kind of work the EU does was reduced to "clearing up" or "foreign policy as social work" (Mandelbaum 1996), it is an indispensable part of modern international relations, and requires the commitment of resources, political capital and long term thinking. "It is also almost inherently multilateralist and open to cooperation with civil society, through both local and international NGOs. The civilian power approach which the EU has pioneered is ideally suited to such scenarios as that of helping reduce chaos in post-war Afghanistan, and it was no surprise that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created after the Bonn record of 5 December which legitimized a new government in Kabul, should have been composed largely of Europeans" (Hill 2004).

The ISAF has had contributions from at least 10 countries, of which 12 are EU members. Five more are EU candidates, with only Norway and New Zealand falling outside the circle. Nine of these 10 have sent combat troops, all but one (Turkey) form the EU. Crucially for the EU, the ISAF is UN mandated. It has been commanded in turn by the UK, Turkey and then Germany with the Netherlands. These last two states decided to seek NATO's assistance in 2002, and by August 2003 NATO had taken the leadership of ISAF in its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The Europeans could not, either collectively or in sub-groups, handle the "high end Petersberg Task" represented by Afghanistan. ISAF's role was modest, being limited to 5,500 troops in the Kabul region. However, EU's contribution was in the form of long-term aid with reconstruction.

The EU also had other attempts such as intensified diplomatic efforts toward its neighbors, with heightened diplomatic activity toward Russia, the Mediterranean and Turkey. These were coordinated efforts on the part of Europe. Russia became an increasingly qualitative partner, not only on trade (the move toward a Common European Economic area) but also in the field of security. Monthly meetings began between Russia and EU's COPS. A Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign ministers (5-6 November) highlighted a commonality of purpose in the fields of economic development, anti-terrorism cultural exchanges and security. Above all an apparent breakthrough was finally announced (early December) in the long standing impasse over Turkey's refusal to agree with ESDP (The so-called "Istanbul Document" 2001).

5.3 The need for Capabilities – Once Again

As Europe engaged in these diplomatic efforts, military capacity once again remained as the most important and crucial factor in order to follow both a common foreign policy and common defense. There were still voices in favor of "a civilian power Europe" who argued that war against terrorism may well be more effectively conducted through civilian, police and intelligence instruments than through smart bombs. "Checkbook diplomacy and a concentration on development aid and the reconstruction of civil society are appropriate foreign and security priorities for an EU not seeking to become a military superpower" (Howorth and Keeler 2003, p.16).

At the Capabilities Improvement Conference on November 19, 2001, the EU began to make headway toward rectifying the considerable deficiencies in its military Force Capabilities. But progress was minimal. The EU leaders wanted to announce at the Laeken summit that the ESDP - and its keystone, the planned rapid reaction force - was operational. Europe has long wished to match its economic muscle with political and military weight – as it was unable to do in Kosovo – and this was perceived as the moment of truth. "German Chancellor Gerard Schröder has suggested that the force should be "visible" in post-Taliban Afghanistan along with the military contributions made by individual member states, even though it is not intended to be fully formed until 2003" (BBC News, 12 December 2001). Despite an optimistically worded report, and despite the controversial declaration of ESDP "operationality" at the December 2001 Laeken European Council meeting, most analysts concur with London's International Institute for Strategic Studies that the EU has still failed to grasp the severity of the looming crisis and that "final operating capability"is unlikely to be met before 2012 (IISS, The Military Balance 2001-2002, p.291).

The EU's military inadequacy, compounded by the likely unavailability of U.S. assets, thus remains the Achilles heel of the ESDP project. There was only a limited amount this force could do. When we say ESDP is operational, we mean that it has the basic framework to fulfill basic tasks such as humanitarian rescue missions, not that it has the ability to engage in peace enforcement operations. This was the limitation of the ESDP because the force was intended ultimately to carry out the Petersberg Tasks. However, in the light of the September

11 attacks there has been “talk of either redefining it, possibly to include something like the bombing campaign in Afghanistan” (BBC News, 12 December 2001).

What is clear is that after September 11, ESDP has made no significant adjustments toward engaging in the “war against terrorism” and capabilities remained as the number one problem. In July, 2002 NATO’s former Secretary General Lord Robertson said: “Unless the European countries are capable of investing in the capabilities which will allow them to work alongside the U.S., then the U.S. will simply take decisions on its own” (BBC News, 31 July 2002). It is from this perspective that we can look at the Iraq War; without enough capabilities on the part of EU, U.S. will embark on unilateral action.

Some in the EU did argue in the wake of September 11 attacks that the Union should pay more attention to the protection of its own territory, rather than to an ESDP geared to conflict management outside its borders (Jospin, Reply to the Annual Report of the Council 2001, p.8). However, this was not the agreed or even the dominant position. In the words of Solana, ESDP and the ERRF remained earmarked for “peacekeeping and peacemaking” and not for military contributions toward “the fight against terrorism” (Jospin, Reply to the Annual Report of the Council 2001, p.8). Hence after September 11, there was no adjustment to the Headline Goal or the Petersberg Tasks. This shows that capabilities and adaptability to real life scenarios is still lacking in the EU.

The EU does possess instruments for preventive measures against terrorism (through Justice and Home Affairs activities in the third pillar) but the EU has not developed the means to take retaliatory military action.

Despite this rigid approach toward adjustments in the Headline Goal or lack of capacity after September 11, just like the Kosovo case, there was a momentum towards more autonomy in European Security and Defense Policy.

Another impact of September 11 was that strategic thinking has given some credence to the notion of a more autonomous and robust ESDP. This is because of debates over EU territorial defense and because the case has been strengthened for a U.S. disengagement in the Balkans in favor of global contingencies – something that will require a further devolution of Balkan responsibilities from the U.S. to the European powers (Hill 2004).

Only two weeks after the Prague Summit of NATO where new military capabilities to meet the strategic challenges of the 21st century was decided, transatlantic relations was mounting over Iraq and the EU countries had found themselves in a state of crisis because of "the EU's faltering attempts to get its own act together" (Black 2002).

The main intention is to narrow the gap between the U.S. and Europe in big transport planes, modern ships, precision guided weapons, hi-tech surveillance equipment and secure communications. So, the decision by Germany to cut down its defense budget was a blow to these already slow-moving efforts. The capacity figures show just how stark the contrast is:

Germany spent 1.5 per cent of its GDP on defense in 2001, compared with an average of European NATO members of about 2.1 per cent. Britain and France spent 2.5 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively while U.S. spent 3.2 per cent. And after September 11 U.S. spending increased by a staggering $48bn dollar for 2003, more than any European annual defense budget (Black 2002).

These figures tell us that the EU did what it does best: created new institutional structures and then declared its force operational. It wanted to take over the NATO mission in Macedonia however, in the end NATO renewed its mandate. One Whitehall official argued that "nothing can happen in the area of ESDP unless we want it to happen" (Black 2002).

5.4 The Realist Backlash; the Iraq War and ESDP

After September 11 and the Afghan War, there was a period of solidarity in the transatlantic relations and some institutionalist attempts were taken by the EU in the area of ESDP however, the emergence of the Iraq War came as a realist backlash. On the one hand, there is a security and defense integration in the EU (going on). At the same time, the Iraq experience has made it absolutely clear that the EU does not have a common policy; individual member states dominated the stage.

Before the Iraq War, Europeans were of the view that a combination of containment via air strikes, and the possibility of relaxation of sanctions, was keeping Saddam Hussein in line. However, the Bush government was determined to strike at rogue states it saw as promoting terrorism and Iraq was a realistic target for military action. From the late spring of 2002 the

west embroiled in a damaging debate whether to make an unprovoked attack on a sovereign state in the interests of regime change. Before September 11 most European governments were skeptical even about the policy of sanctions and limited air strikes.

Throughout the Iraq crisis the CFSP was almost wholly silent. The EU collectively has had the capacity neither to support the U.S. position nor to stand up to it despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of European opinion increasingly showed itself to be opposed to an attack on Iraq. “All things considered the attack against Iraq was a manufactured crisis, based on insufficient initial consensus and with deep uncertainty over ultimate strategy” (Hill 2004). Whatever the truth of this, it is clear that the EU has been prevented from speaking with a single voice, and has lacked the utility even for candidate states which in theory would take side with France and Germany, but in practice found American arguments more compelling for their own reasons. This was a game of realpolitik and Americans thought even France in the end would go by the winners.

Somewhat to the surprise of the Americans themselves, who had assumed that the French predilection for realpolitik would lead them back the winners in the end, President Chirac and Foreign Minister De Villepin picked up the gauntlet in public opposition to the Anglo-American lead. In so doing they made common cause with Germany and Russia, but split both NATO and the EU (Hill 2004).

All states, whether EU members or not, are subject to the structural forces which inhibit the CFSP from playing a serious role in a crisis. The pro-Americanism of the accession countries showed up the weaknesses of the EU’s power of attraction once entry has been conceded.

“In the eyes of many Europeans, the casualties of the war in Iraq include not only the soldiers and civilians who have died during the military campaign and its messy aftermath, but also international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union” (Coughan 2003). The EU has appeared split down the middle, with the leaders of France, Germany and their supporters on one side, and those of Britain, Spain, Italy and East Europeans on the other. It is true that EU member states genuinely vary in their views on Iraq crisis, with Italy and Spain showing more sympathy for the Bush approach, and Greece and the neutrals on the other end of the spectrum. Each side is blamed for shattering the ideal of a common European foreign policy by not taking the other’s position over war in Iraq.

The ESDP was born in 1998 and has now reached the end of its developmental stage, although the "headline goal" of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 men due in 2003 was obscured by this crisis. Because of the Iraq War, in 2003, European defense returned to the top of EU governments' agendas, with these divisions making it a highly sensitive subject. To a degree the European Security and Defense Policy proceeded according to play in 2003.

Early in the year the EU took over the UN police-training mission in Bosnia; in the spring the EU took responsibility for its first military mission, in Macedonia – mission for which the EU depends on NATO support; and in the summer it embarked on its first "autonomous" military operation, with the dispatch of a few hundred peacekeepers to Bunia in the Congo (Grant, Center for European Reform 2003).

Meanwhile in 2003, the EU's defense ministries continued to work on the "European Capabilities Action Plan", which, like the parallel work going on in NATO, intended to plug the principle deficiencies in Europe's military capabilities. The EU's draft constitution includes a reference to the establishment of a "European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency", with the brief of defining Europe's capability requirements and how to meet them, encouraging governments to fulfill their promises, promoting more common procurement policies, and boosting the European defense industrial base.

The true picture, however, was more fraught. A dangerous combination of circumstances threatened the very existence of the ESDP: the impact of the Iraq conflict, which split the EU states into pro- and anti-U.S. factions; the desire of the anti-U.S. faction to push ahead with a core European defense grouping; the adverse U.S. reaction to plans for a core Europe in defense; and the reflection of these arguments in the constitutional convention.

ESDP only makes sense as an instrument at the service of European foreign policy. The point of having an EU military capability is to reinforce EU foreign policy: declarations that are not backed by the threat of force carry little weight. When serious divisions disable European foreign policy, as was the case over Iraq, an EU military capability serves little purpose.

At the beginning of the military conflict, the EU leaders declared an "EU statement on Iraq", asserting European leaders' commitment to full and effective disarmament and the provision of humanitarian aid. However, the UN was called as the institution to deal with the crisis. In the international field, the EU emphasized "the fundamental role of the UN in the international system and to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the

maintenance of international peace and stability". It was also stressed that the EU was "determined to strengthen the capacity of the EU in the context of the CFSP and the ESDP" (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 21 March 2003).

5.5 Tervuren Summit

Meeting in Brussels on April 29th, the prime ministers of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to cooperate more closely on defense matters in seven ways. Six of these were not particularly controversial. But the seventh was the Belgian idea for the establishment of an EU operational planning staff at Tervuren. "The argument for this initiative is that if the EU should be able to conduct autonomous operations, it will need its own operational planners (it already has strategic planners, charged with advising EU ministers, inside the Council of Ministers)" (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 21 March 2003).

The argument put by those governments excluded from Tervuren Summit, is that the EU can rely on NATO planners at SHAPE, for an operation (like that in Macedonia), when it decides to work with NATO; or the EU can use a national headquarters, as it did for Bosnia, when a French HQ was in charge. The counterargument is that, only the larger EU countries have suitable national headquarters and that many smaller members would like to participate in an EU planning group, rather than second staffs to headquarters run by a big country.

These technical arguments, however, are not the issue. The Belgian proposal, strongly backed by Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac – against the advice of foreign and defense ministries – has proven to be of crucial political importance. The four governments involved were the same four which had blocked NATO aid for Turkey in January and February.

That the ring leaders of the EU's anti-war camp should try to set up a core European defense organization, with its own operational planning staff, had an obvious message to Americans, British, Spanish, Italians and the East Europeans. This was an initiative designed to undermine NATO and exclude the British from the one area where they are able to play a leading role in European integration (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 12 March 2003).

Moreover, this initiative was not just about defense: the French and German governments had for years dropped hints that they wished to establish some sort of core Europe, which would

provide leadership to an enlarged EU. They hinted that such a core Europe should exclude those who were not committed to putting Europe first, a category which certainly included the British and the East Europeans.

The four Tervuren governments denied that their initiative was intended to bring about these consequences. “But they did see it as historically significant, in the way that earlier initiatives on the single currency had been. They reckoned that defense was the next big area for European integration and they were not prepared to let Anglo-Saxon hostility deflect their purpose” (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 12 March 2003).

The concept of an EU staff of operational planners is, in itself, not a big deal. It is probably desirable, if in the long term the EU is to engage in medium-sized autonomous operations. “But given the context in which the initiative was launched – with Europe split into two hostile camps – the timing was unbelievably foolish. Tervuren jiggled the knife in the wound between new Europe and old Europe. It made everyone mistrust everyone else’s motives” (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 12 March 2003).

In Washington senior figures in the administration viewed the Tervuren proposal – however misguidedly – as an attempt to create an alternative to NATO, and thus to weaken the Alliance. They particularly disliked two things. One was the manner in which the EU embarked on the Bunia mission: EU ministers did not discuss the operation with NATO, to work out which organization was better suited to send the troops but unilaterally decided to dispatch peacekeepers. Another annoyance was the constitutional convention, which drew up a mutual assistance clause which seemed to be a threat to NATO’s own Article 5 mutual assistance clause. Furthermore, the draft constitution’s provisions for “structured cooperation” seemed to a way of formalizing the results of the April 29th summit.

“The proposals made at Tervuren Summit have indeed the potential to provoke disquiet in Washington and London” (NATO website, 30 April 2003). There was in particular, talk of a new “European Security and Defense Union” (ESDU) and this provoked suspicion in other EU capitals. A joint statement issued by the four leaders said that the ESDU would “gather those member states that are ready to go faster and further in strengthening their defense cooperation” (EU statement on Iraq, BBC News, 12 March 2003). “Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt joined Chancellor Schröder in insisting that the four countries’ initiative was open to the rest of the EU after criticism of the summit by Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands” (NATO website, 30 April 2003).

Tony Blair insisted after the Tervuren Summit in Brussels that "NATO remained the cornerstone of European Security. But Britain does want the union to undertake more missions like the recent one in the Congo and generally share more of the defense burden. However, the government agrees with U.S. in opposing a call from Germany, France and Belgium for a new military HQ at Tervuren" (Black 2003).

The Summit reflected the worst fears of U.S. hardliners about the dangers of ESDP going off in a NATO-incompatible direction. In short, during the course of 2003 opinion in Washington shifted strongly against the ESDP. This hostility also has implications for EU plans to take over the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In the words of one of the most senior State Department officials, "We will never be able to take over the NATO mission in Bosnia if some Europeans push ahead with Tervuren" (www.cer.org.uk).

Still more interesting is the behavior of EU member states themselves. Taking the case of Italy: "When the U.S. escalated the Iraq crisis, the Italian government clearly backed the war against Iraq. However, as of July 1, Italy took over the presidency of the European Union and supports in its working program strongly the development of a Research and Armament Agency as part of ESDP" (Raab 2003). This strategy makes perfect sense. In international relations U.S. is the leading power. It calls "the shots". So for most U.S. allies it makes sense not to oppose too openly U.S. policy when they disagree. Action within a European context however, follows different rules and comes with certain legitimacy. It is something that outside actors respect. Hence, Italy can very well be a U.S. ally in Iraq War, because – for lack of European strategy – that may simply have been its best option in that moment. At the same time Italy can favor European integration in the area of defense.

Whenever member states of the EU pooled parts of their sovereignty, they became stronger on the international scene. However, integration in foreign policy and military sphere has not been so easy. The spill-over effects as argued by Mitrany has not been realized yet. There are two dimensions to this increase of power. The combined weight of all the participants makes them a strong military actor. It is striking how much the EU can act in agriculture against the interests of third actors and nobody intervenes openly in the decision-making process. When acting in a field that is a clear part of European integration, the so-called "acquis communautaire", the EU has a lot of power. So far, this power does not spread into security and defense for several reasons. The member states do not see the clear necessity to pool sovereignty in this policy field. And in a second step,

An established EU policy has to prove that it is ready to stay. If it lacks the credibility, third actors will simply disregard it. Along the same token, it is rational for the U.S. to treat the member states of the EU as separate actors, as was demonstrated during the Iraq crisis. The CFSP and most definitely ESDP are not a part of the acquis in that sense: Third actors intervene openly in the EU decision-making process (Raab 2003).

5.6 ESDP and the Way Forward

The brief in chapter 2 shows that U.S. and its European allies were at last finding ways both to promote NATO's transformation and to encourage the development of ESDP. "There were, certainly, some indications in late 2002 of mounting disagreement over the scope of the European Convention" ("EU defense crossfire", Financial Times, December 2, 2002). But a measured assessment of the achievements of 2002 and up to as late as mid-March 2003 would be that these two ambitious projects were at last developing in tandem.

Yet for all these achievements, by early 2003 neither "new NATO" (after the Prague Summit) nor ESDP had been tested politically or militarily. In the early stages of the Iraq war, both institutions (along with the UN Security Council and the U.S.-Russia relationship) appeared to have failed these tests and to be in disarray. By the late March 2003, divisions between and among U.S. and European Allies were so deep that "Berlin Plus", which allows the EU some access to NATO capabilities, appeared irrelevant and the bases for future political-military cooperation in either NATO or ESDP hard to identify. Talk of the EU gradually acquiring a "strategic culture" now appeared something of an escape from reality, (Cornish and Edwards 2001) and the prospect of meaningful EU common defense commitment merely wishful thinking. As far as the dynamics and institutions of U.S.-European security cooperation are concerned, when the Iraq conflict does come to an end three broad policy options will be open to U.S. and European governments:

> Reconstructed Multilateralism: business as usual, with "New NATO", ESDP and "Berlin Plus" all being re-energized;
>
> Separated Multilateralism: governments choosing strategically between Atlanticism and Europeanism in defense and security matters, and between adapted versions of NRF and ERRF operationally;

Arrested Multilateralism: the collapse of NATO as a political-military alliance, and the failure of ESDP to meet strategic or operational expectations (Cornish and Edwards 2001).

The European Commission is already providing at least 100 million Euros in humanitarian aid to Iraq. However, unlike in Afghanistan, where the EU makes the largest contribution to reconstruction and the international stabilization force, some member states which were opposed to military action seem reluctant to bear a bigger share of the burden. On the other hand, they might calculate that they have more to lose by not being involved.

The Way Forward:

When Blair, Chirac and Schröder met in Berlin prior to Tervuren Summit they worked hard to make sure that these sensitive issues were not insolvable. “Chirac appears to have understood that there is not much point in creating a European defense that excludes the UK. For his part, Blair has over-ridden the advice of his officials and accepted the concept of an EU planning staff so long as it can be established in ways that are NATO-friendly” (Centre for European Reform 2003).

The compromise among the big three appears to be along the following lines. “The intergovernmental conference on European Constitution should amend the treaty articles on structured cooperation, so that unanimity is required before any avant-garde group is established for European defense” (Grant 2003). As currently worded the constitution allows a group to proceed without the consent of all EU members. This principle of allowing the more capable members to do things is sensible. The larger countries may not want some of the smaller or neutral countries to be involved in every piece of military business. However, even if the big three agree on this, some of the smaller countries are likely to raise difficulties in the IGC. They are unhappy about any scheme which allows larger states to leave them behind. The final wording will probably make clear that the threshold for qualifying for membership of an avant-garde group not be set too high.

“The treaty article on mutual military assistance will also be amended, to emphasize that NATO is the means through which countries will come to each other’s aid. Only NATO members will fully subscribe to this clause” (Grant 2003). This need not be a controversial issue. The Western European Union treaty which ten members signed and is still in force contains a mutual military assistance clause. It is not too important if EU members promise to

defend each other, so long as it is clear that NATO is the organization which is responsible for collective defense.

As for Tervuren initiative, its four backers have agreed that nothing should happen in Brussels suburb of Tervuren itself. “They and the British agree that the EU should boost its planning capability, as part of the Military Staff inside the Council of Ministers” (Grant 2003). The EU should be able to take on more of the preparatory work for its own military operations. What is still undecided is whether the EU should be able to manage the conduct of missions, once they are underway; the British and the overwhelming majority of the Member States still oppose that step. The view in Berlin if not Paris, is that – in a spirit of compromise – the Tervuren four should not push for the EU to be able to conduct its missions any time soon.

The European Security Strategy announced in Brussels on 12 December 2003 suggested that “as a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player” and that “the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003). So, the development of ESDP is a function of Europe’s willingness to become a global actor in the world. The impetus for the ESDP develops along this line and despite its failures and shortcomings; it is on the agenda of the EU.

5.7 The U.S. – EU Relationship regarding ESDP

There is another dimension of Europe’s bid for a CFSP and ESDP which is related to U.S. foreign policy and its projection of power unilaterally on the global scene.

“In particular the doctrines introduced in the U.S.’s 2002 national security strategy document about maintaining the U.S.’s present strategic superiority for as long as possible at all costs, and about the legitimacy of preemptive attack where necessary on opponents who might threaten this, are goals which most modern states not only lack the strength to aim at but would think it improper to express in these terms” (European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003).

This is another impetus for progression in ESDP. It can be argued that Iraq war was considered as aggression in military terms by some of the EU powers such as France, Germany and their allies and the reaction came to this in the form of more autonomy from the U.S..

In the European Security Strategy, it is expressed that:

The point of the Common Foreign and Security and Defense Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries (European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003).

Acting on the lines, the EU wants a more balanced relationship with the U.S..

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the U.S. can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence (European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003).

The preemption doctrine in particular is one for which there is clearly no cover in the normal reading of international law. This can be explained as U.S.'s being a unique country which has never experienced invasion, has never experienced peaceful multinational integration with equal partners as the European have, and which therefore tends to see the preservation of its frontiers against either physical or legal intrusion as an absolute value: combined with the extraordinary shock and still lasting trauma of the events of 11/09/01.

Another point is that the U.S. does not at present feel any compulsion or sees any reason to operate through international institutions – be it the UN, G8 or NATO – except to the extent that these can bring the practical benefits it is looking for at any given time. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld put it soon after 9/11, for the moment "the mission makes the coalition" (European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003). The final observation in this category is that there is no other single pole of power at the moment able to block U.S. actions or to compel policy changes against the U.S.'s will. On the contrary, since 9/11 the prevailing

tendency has been for Europe, Russia, China and the leading powers of other regions to show how considerable prudence in the face of U.S. power.

On the other hand EU was particularly criticized during the various phrases of the crisis for failing either to maintain its own unity, or to come up with any coherent alternative to U.S. policy on terrorism, Iraq or Afghanistan. This can be attributed to the EU's lack of a coherent philosophy and mechanisms of its own for tackling problems outside the wider Europe, as well as to rivalries among its own members.

Alyson J.K. Bailes argued that, "at least in the short term, the rapid rise to primacy of this new security agenda after 9/11 seems to have done more to split than to unite the world's leading powers" (Bailes 2003, pp.1-2). There have been deep divisions between Europeans, between the U.S. and Europe as a whole, and between the U.S. and other important nations. These disagreements, moreover, are not limited to specific aspects of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation policy or to specific cases for action like Afghanistan and Iraq.

"They also extend to other important dimensions of global governance such as the rule of law, the legitimacy of military action, equal answerability (e.g. for war crimes), the meaning of strategic stability and associated restraints, as well as issues more indirectly related to security such as international trade and competition, the protection of the environment and climate change" (Bailes 2003, p.2).

The results of this turbulence in the last 18 months included serious challenges to the authority and effectiveness of the UN, and aggravated the problems which the EU and NATO face in handling their already very tough challenges of adaptation combined with their biggest ever enlargement.

5.8 NATO-EU Berlin Plus Arrangement and Hope for the Future?

The greatest hope and opportunity of all is that the "Berlin Plus" arrangement, by which the EU can in certain circumstances have access to NATO planning and military assets, is now ready to be exploited. The arrangement was used for the first time in March 2003 when NATO's Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia was taken over by the EU, and renamed Operation Concordia. Berlin Plus should also provide the framework for the much more

ambitious proposal for the EU to take over NATO's military operation in Bosnia (SFOR) in 2004. The full potential of "Berlin Plus" will never be realized, however, if officials and commentators in Washington and London continue to argue for a clear choice to be made between either a transformed NATO or an EU defense capability, and remain unable to accept minor concessions to the European Defense project, such as those made by the British government during the EU foreign ministers' meeting in Naples in late November 2003. These concessions give substance to the Blair government's claim that EU military operations must be taken seriously, provided they do not challenge NATO's primacy; it is difficult to see how the Bush administration could argue against this position, just as it is difficult to see how any European government could offer a substantial alternative to it. So, the Berlin Plus is a compromise and it can also be argued that institutionalist inertia still exists.

There is still hope for ESDP and its future because certain aspects of the Iraq crisis and its follow up underlined beyond doubt that there are security values and priorities which all Europeans share, in contrast and potentially in opposition to the U.S.. Even those Europeans who operated most closely with the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq continued to take steps during and after the crisis designed to make sure that they would have other operations and capacities to operate in pursuit of distinctly European interests. At the same time, as noted in the earlier comparison with Russia, Europe feels the same pressure as all strategic actors do at present to avoid seriously antagonizing, or throwing away, its remaining hopes of influencing the U.S. superpower. The more serious the EU becomes as a power-player, the more its practical understanding of power will grow and the closer its own practical judgments on how specific security challenges should be handled may draw to those of the U.S.. There is a hint of a future paradigm in this sense to be found in the converging tactics the EU and U.S. have used to try to force a change in the nuclear development policies of Iran. In terms of the EU's own political dynamics, the events around Iraq showed that it is even harder to unite the whole EU (notably its larger powers) on an extreme anti-U.S. platform than on a pro-U.S. one.

Added to these developments is the dynamic of action and reaction over time which clearly started to assert itself, with conscious efforts being made to restore a modus Vivendi between the U.S. and Europe. The Europeans are doing their best to pull back together, institutions are looking for therapeutic and diversionary activities, and individual nations are drawing back to reflect on their mistakes. "In the political life of the Western nations, the summer of 2003 has been a time for inquest and recriminations on a grand scale. It is, of course, too soon to say

whether this phase of reaction will prove more lasting and authoritative than the positive creations or the scars of the original crisis" (Bailes 2003, pp.1-2). But it is also too soon to judge whether the lessons of action or those of subsequent reflection will have the greater impact on key nations' thinking about the handling of international security in the longer run.

The EU had its limitations as exposed in this crisis, in the dimension of political unity as well as strategic vision and practical power. One may note that apart from these divisions in Iraq, the EU was not able during this time to compel real progress on older Middle East conflict – where its policy was entirely united – unless and until the U.S. was ready for its own reasons to exert new pressure. "However, the past has already shown that the EU has unusual capacity to recover from such splits and humiliations because its shared commitments and interests are so uniquely wide and legally entrenched: or in more general terms, because the process of European integration after 50 years has become essentially irreversible" (Bailes 2003, p.13). Indeed, the European dynamic seems to be of a sort that compels an unending series of forward surges both in the EU's geographical frontiers and in its competence, a culture of "running ahead" partly to leave shaming memories behind. As to the supposed old/new European division, one should never underestimate the EU's capacity to alter the general security culture as well as specific policies of countries that join it as the constructivists also argue. Far more important in practice are the divisions between EU members who are inward-looking and conservative, and outward-looking and interventionist: and this line cuts right across the categories of small and big, Western and Eastern, Allied and non-Allied EU members.

What is important to watch now is whether the shocks and disappointments of the Iraq crisis will force a serious attempt to rise above these divisions and forge a lasting improvement in the EU's security and defense performance, rather as the Kosovo crisis was followed by the original launch of the CESDP.

There are more than a few hints of this in the consensus that is developing around a group of proposals for strengthening ESDP – and the EU's "single voice" in external affairs generally – that have come up in the European Convention; in the recent adoption by EU governments of a specific strategy and action plan against WMD proliferation and their approval of a general European strategy drafted by Solana, both of which contemplate the use of force in the last resort; in the fact already mentioned that the EU is launching or taking over an

increasing number of operations in South-Eastern Europe, and its rapid and more than a little risky decision to mount an autonomous operation in Congo (Bailes 2003, p.15).

The weak point, as ever, remains the level of European defense spending and quality of defense planning, and the general sluggishness of the Euro zone economy at present will not help this although the latest German plans for structural reform in the general economy as well as in defense are a striking sign of resolve to address the underlying problems more frankly and boldly than before. The key issue to remember here is that in order to be taken more seriously Europe needs more military capacity. If security can be domesticated at the European level and when efforts at more capacity go into a common European pot rather than into national polls, we may then begin to see the hints of a more stable and sustainable strategic culture in the EU. With more capacity, determination and political will comes less U.S. dominance and manipulation and more coherence within and even with the U.S..

6. CONCLUSION

In this research I have tried to draw together the many arguments in favor or against the progress of a Common European Security and Defense Policy and after looking at its implementation in Kosovo and Iraq wars and concluded that the EU remains essentially a civilian power although it plays a significant security role in Europe and beyond. While ambitious plans are being developed and institutions are being created, defense proper remains, in Hill's phrase only a "theoretical addition" to the EU's capacity to act and is likely to remain so for some time. Indeed, from an integrationist perspective, the pessimistic view continues to be that no amount of "institutional tinkering" will take responsibility for Europe's defense away from national capitals unless or until the EU becomes a sovereign state. At the very least, commentators argue, a credible "common defense" must await a coherent "common foreign policy" (Sjursen 1998, p.111; Martin and Roper 1995, p.1). However, the Kosovo case and the Iraq crisis have shown that EU lacks even a Common Foreign Policy.

The main reason behind Europe's Security and Defense Policy's faltering is the lack of capabilities. While the EU has taken over peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and could also supplant S-FOR in Bosnia, there are no signs of increased defense expenditures, or serious rationalization, which will be necessary reserves, state of the art weaponry, transport systems and intelligence. The Belgian declaration at the Laeken Council in December 2001 that ESDP was "operational" was visibly premature, and even such operational capability as has been reached is only at the "low end" of Petersberg Tasks of policing or dealing with refugee problems.

The EC/EU policy in the former Yugoslavia was not very effective. Clearly, there was a dangerous gap developing between capabilities and expectations. The Kosovo case revealed that the EU was far below expectations in terms of military capacity and the Kosovo case served as a catalyst for further integration in defense sphere. However, more so than that, Kosovo revealed the strengths and weaknesses of CFSP. Not surprisingly, the strengths emerge from the less dramatic civil rather than military area of activity. The EU was able to play a significant role in civil reconstruction where and when peace could be achieved. Kosovo in particular underlines the limitations as well as the strengths of military force in producing a lasting political settlement in the Balkans (and elsewhere) and in that sense; it

puts the EU's lack of military capability into context. Conflict resolution requires a range of different instruments and the EU clearly has a contribution to make on the basis of existing "civilian power" capabilities. In this sense the use of military force in Kosovo required the use of NATO and the prospects for the EU to handle this crisis through its own military means seemed grim.

Is there, then, a broad trend among the foreign and security policies of the EU Member States towards either nationalizing or regrouping? The events of September 11 and the Iraq war revealed elements of both at work. There was some striking solidarity on view in the rapid responses to the September 11 events, and in the linking up between foreign policy, anti-terrorist measures and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. This has been sustained in the period since, although there will almost certainly be further tests to come.

After each crisis there is an element of both cooperation and fragmentation however, as the realists would maintain, most states have no intention of relinquishing their own diplomacy, but equally it would not occur to them to opt out of the CFSP. France and Britain will not even conceive of the notion that they should give up their separate seats on the UN Security Council, or place their nuclear projection of serious military force beyond their own theater. At the same time, since the Bosnian crisis they have been cooperating more between themselves, for example, militarily in West Africa, and they have become more relaxed about such innovations as the High Representative.

Thus a dialectical relationship exists between the national instinct and the perceived need for solidarity. It is evident partly when a foreign policy failure leads to renewed efforts at cooperation, but it occurs more subtly in the way that Member States diverge from each other within broad limits set by the acceptance of common interests and outlooks. If at times hard choices mean that the concrete national need will always be put ahead of the more theoretical collective benefit, then this tends to be presented as an exceptional matter and not something to be gloried in. However, there is also an acute awareness also of the benefits of hard-won gains through decades of quiet cooperation. In terms of ESDP, cooperation is hard to realize, however, in economic issues this is much more evident.

September 11 sharpened the existing contradictions in European foreign policy making, and made them more visible but it did not render solidarity unworkable. The secondary crisis over Iraq, which split the big five European states into two camps, however, did not lead them to

conclude that CFSP is useless. So, there is hope. Yet, in terms of ESDP the prospects are grimmer through divisions over defense and in particular defense spending.

Yet, Berlin Plus offers a good way of cooperation for both sides. For their part, European governments can no longer make the mistake of pursuing the aspiration of a European defense capability at the expense of what is currently on offer, in the form of a transforming and increasingly accessible NATO. Just as Atlanticists must accept that "Berlin Plus" if implemented intelligently and flexibly offers the only means to secure NATO's future at the heart of the U.S.-European security debate, so Europeanists and integrationists must accept that the vision of a strategic-level European security and defense policy and capability can begin to acquire substance only through the NATO-EU arrangement. In time it might be reasonable to talk meaningfully of a choice between NATO and the EU as providers of security and defense in and for Europe. But at present, the notion that the EU offers an alternative strategic vision and military capability has no basis in reality. The EU is not yet a credible strategic alternative to NATO, and the only means by which it could become such an alternative is, paradoxically, by exploiting the "Berlin Plus" arrangement to the full. In order to do that, EU governments must take steps to improve Europe's deployable military capability. By doing so, not only will the U.S.-European security relationship receive a much needed vote of confidence, but non-NATO EU military operations will become more credible. In the longer term, "Berlin Plus" could work against itself, as European governments move closer to having a real debate between strategic alternatives (NATO, a military credible EU, or some more formalized relationship between the two). But that would be an interesting and useful debate and preferable to one driven by fantasies.

Yet, ESDP may falter. It is only one of four projects aimed at the generation of order in Europe, the others being EU enlargement, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the reform of EU institutions. The EU, in other words has an ambitious agenda. It is mutually reinforcing in the sense that it is increasingly led by a vision of European Stabilization, but its various parts do not always come comfortably together. EMU, for instance, places limits on European defense spending that inhibits the development of capabilities both within NATO and for ESDP. ESDP may also be simply incapable of breaking free from the military and security primacy of NATO and thus it may be another chapter in the frustrating story of European Defense autonomy that stretches back as far as the European Defense Community of the 1950s.

NATO enlargement also plays a critical role for the future of ESDP. NATO enlargement has the potential to contribute to NATO's continuing relevance and its ongoing transformation, and to sustain American engagement in Europe. A NATO of this sort will be one that will conduct military operations such that ESDP does not need to. If enlargement dilutes the Alliance's political and military effectiveness then it may well render the EU-NATO interface increasingly unworkable and access to NATO assets much more problematic. In a crisis situation this could well present the Europeans with a stark choice: to act alone or not to act at all.

As long as the big three, France, Germany and Britain maintain a constructive approach ESDP has a future. However, as the realists would maintain, they have so many diverging interests and it is very unlikely that these differences will be resolved in the future. The spill-over effects as expected by Haas has not been realized in the defense sphere however, if CFSP becomes part of the EU acquis there is more hope for progression towards a common army.

"France and Germany must make sure that ESDP develops in a way that does not deepen the New/Old Europe division. Britain for its part must show that it is committed to a greater EU role in defense. British ministers also need to continue with the difficult and time consuming work of convincing the Americans to back ESDP" (Grant 2003).

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