

**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN THE  
POST-1990S POPULAR TURKISH CINEMA**

**Master's Thesis**

**NİLÜFER EYİİŞLEYEN**

**İSTANBUL, 2010**



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
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**Thesis Supervisor: ASSOC. PROF. SAVAŞ ARSLAN**

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Nilüfer EYİİŞLEYEN

## **ABSTRACT**

### **REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN THE POST-1990S POPULAR TURKISH CINEMA**

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In each epoch of the history of Turkish cinema, the variable structure of social gender roles brought about diverse representations of masculinity. This diversity and variability have also made it possible to observe a hierarchical structure which influences the story and character traits of the masculinity representations in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema. This research, which studies the different aspects and sensitivities of masculinity through the hierarchical structure of its representations, also considered the socio-political and socio-cultural changes which the Turkish society witnessed and went through in recent decades. In this thesis, the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s Turkish cinema are analyzed within the framework of the masculinity and social gender studies which appeared and developed in the West, as well as with a consideration of differing perceptions and experiences of the values of the post-1990s Turkish society. By considering the divisions in the perception and shaping of the notion of hegemonic masculinity, it is also argued that the “ideal” conception of masculinity, through modernization and globalization, is not presented within a single body, and thus the notion of masculinity lost its integrity through divisions and presented different sensitivities at different situations. In the formation of such sensitivities and in the shaping and reshaping of representations, it is also argued that the notion of supra-hegemonic masculinity which is atop the hierarchical structure and which is a part of the male world is effective.

**Keywords:** Masculinity, gender, hegemonic masculinity, cinema, Turkey.

## ÖZET

### 1990 SONRASI POPÜLER TÜRK SİNEMASINDA ERKEKLİK TEMSİLLERİ

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Toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin deęişken yapısı, Türk Sineması'nın her döneminde çeşitli erkeklik temsillerinin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu çeşitlilik ve deęişkenlik, 1990 sonrası Popüler Türk Sineması'nda erkeklik temsilleri arasındaki, hikayeleri ve karakterlerin özelliklerini etkileyen, bir hiyerarşik yapının gözlemlenebilmesine olanak sağlamıştır. Erkeklik temsilleri arasındaki hiyerarşik yapıyı göz önünde bulundurarak erkekliğin farklı yüzlerini ve hassasiyetini inceleyen bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki toplumun şahit ve dahil olduęu sosyopolitik ve sosyokültürel deęişimleri de göz önünde bulundurmuştur. Bu tez, Batı'da ortaya çıkan ve gelişen erkeklik ve toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmaları çerçevesinde, Türkiye'de 1990 sonrası toplumunda oluşan değerlerin algılanış ve yaşanışındaki farklılıkları da dikkate alarak, 1990 sonrası Popüler Türk Sineması'ndaki erkeklik temsillerini incelemektedir. Bu inceleme sırasında ise hegemonik erkeklik kavramının algılanış ve şekillenişindeki bölünmeler göz önünde bulundurulmuş, "ideal" olarak sunulan erkeklik kavramının, modernleşme ve globalleşmeye paralel olarak, tek bir bedende sunulmadığı, dolayısıyla erkeklik kavramının bölünerek bütünlüğünü kaybettiği, çeşitli durumlarda çeşitli hassasiyetler sergilediği öne sürülmüştür. Bu hassasiyetlerin oluşmasında, erkeklik temsillerinin şekillenişinde ve yeniden şekillenişinde, erkek dünyasının bir parçası olan, hiyerarşik yapıya göre en tepede yer alan üst (supra)-hegemonik erkeklik konseptinin etkili olduęu kabul edilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Erkeklik, toplumsal cinsiyet, hegemonik erkeklik, sinema, Türkiye

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Gender is a social structure rather than a fixed term so that masculinity, as a gender role, should be thought in the context of a dynamic structure. The fluid construction of gender is shaped within socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-economical conditions. In this context masculinity in Turkish society and representations of masculinity in Turkish cinema should be considered as a dynamic concept, which have changed and are changing in the process.

Before investigating and analyzing representations of masculinity in popular Turkish cinema, the concept of masculinity and its dynamics should be researched in the context of psychoanalytical and sociological approaches. Masculinity is a gender role in the society and it is *learned* by people who are born as males. In the first step, the sex/gender – male/masculine dichotomy – should be clarified. In order to understand the development of the representation of masculinity, the sex and gender dichotomy is researched through a variety of approaches. For instance, psychoanalysis attempts to understand the sources of opposite sex attitudes, the father-son relations, and the position of the father in the family. Sigmund Freud indicates that the anatomical distinction between two sexes causes psychoanalytical consequences and he explains these consequences through the Oedipus complex. This theory explains the initialization of - especially the boys' - psychological and socialization processes. The child's first socialization area is commonly his/her family.

On the other hand, gender studies introduced various sociological inquiries. R.W. Connell, who is accepted as a pioneer in the area of masculinity research, provides new approaches for investigating masculinity in sociological terms. Connell demonstrates that gender is not just an individual trait that is connected by somatic differences but rather a domain of social practice. This helps understanding the features and mechanisms of masculinity and its perceptions. Masculinity studies show that there is not just one form of masculinity; but it varies among societies and cultures. In this context the most *dominant* masculinity form, hegemonic, which some writers view as an “ideal form” can be researched to understand the relations

among masculinity forms. Hegemonic masculinity is one of the masculinity models, which is accepted as “the centre of the system of gendered power” by Connell (2000, pp.216-217). Connell describes hegemonic masculinity as “transnational business masculinity” (Connell 2000, p.52) that includes an “elite group of socially dominant men” (Beasley 2009, p.59). Connell locates hegemonic masculinity as the “pinnacle of a pyramid.” However, Christine Beasley assesses Connell’s approach as unsatisfactory. She criticizes Connell’s study, as being unable to explain why transnational business masculinity is the “pinnacle of a pyramid.” She also thinks that hegemonic masculinity needs more than one term – transnational business masculinity – and she introduces two more terms – “sub-hegemonic and supra hegemonic” masculinity. Beasley puts up the argument that hegemonic masculinity can be divided into two main categories: sub-hegemony and supra-hegemony. Likewise, it is possible to summarize significant characteristics of sub-hegemonic masculinity as follows: national, local/domestic, powerful and ideal, real, against global/colonizer supra-hegemony, in fact sometimes an accomplice or supporter of it. Furthermore, she describes non-hegemonic forms, which are oppressed by hegemonic masculinity forms, as the “others.” Beasley explains these concepts through Australian cinema and this diversification for hegemonic masculinity is used here to analyze the representations of masculinity forms in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

On the other hand, the relations among hegemonic masculinities and the non-hegemonic masculinity invite a focus on the socialization processes of masculinity forms. Men’s socialization process among other men conducts the construction of particular male collectivities with specific features, norms, and hierarchies. The notion of homosociality borrowed from Bourdieu, can be used to describe these collectivities which are composed of a single gender and which legitimize their attitude. The typical male socialization models follow eight traits in these researches: “presence of an outside world, using of women, silence, loneliness, rationality, secular control position, violence, and physical distance.” In addition to the first function of homosocial men’s groups that exclude women from the outside world; the second function is the construction of sites that enable the repeated normalizing

and confirming processes of their attitudes on life and on the outside world (Onur and Koyuncu 2004 pp.39-40). Furthermore “the presence of outside world” effects especially the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

These socialization traits are also valid for understanding masculinity in Turkey. Furthermore, an investigation on Turkish men’s socialization processes shows some typical characteristics: physical power, responsibility – that means having a job, making money, and having a family – homophobia, sensitivity, socialization needs, hierarchy, and rivalry are the prominent features. In the men’s socialization process, hierarchy and rivalry are inevitable consequences as the investigation showed and these consequences require the de-masification of hegemonic masculinity.

Masculinity, as a dynamic gender form, has brought in a point of view to study the representation of masculinity in Turkish cinema. Different forms of masculinity in Turkish cinema are reshaped through socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-cultural conditions and processes. In the Yeşilçam period between the 1950s and 1980s, melodrama was the most popular genre. Masculinity forms in these films did not represent much diversification. Characters had distinguished features like honor, toughness, handsomeness, and bravery. But besides all, when exposed to any misunderstanding, for example, when they think they are deceived by their lovers, they turned into “losers” and they looked weaker. This sort of an appearance makes the characters “non-realistic” and thus fitting well with the simplistic narrative structure of Yeşilçam melodramas. However, in the 1980s, the forms of masculinity in Yeşilçam diversified and male characters started to be represented as passive characters. It may be said that masculinity is under threat in the 1980s films and some main moral values are lacking in these characters. For this reason, we come across more male characters with depressive, irritating, sensitive, and nervous traits especially in women films. Through these films, the changing face of hegemonic masculinity is observed.

Modernization, women’s increasing role in public life, and globalization may be considered as major factors in shaping the masculinity in Turkey, especially in the urban life and culture in recent decades. With the rise of industrialization and

modernization in the 1950s, private businesses, education, and new symbolic and material resources started to gain importance. Modernization provided a transition process but more than this, it may be regarded as a threat to masculinity. Besides modernization, working women were another factor that reshaped masculinity. Men were obliged to share their primary role, which is gaining money, with women, whereas, the “status” of man as the head of the family in his home depended on his capability of gaining money (Kandiyoti 2007, pp.192-193). This was an area for men where they could have reproduced masculinity but this had also changed later on. These circumstances, of course, came into the scene as a result of global dynamics that affected many countries, including Turkey. Especially, changing aspects of business life, capitalist culture, and the governments’ attitudes can be regarded as a kind of hegemonic “system,” which controls the members of the society. The hegemonic “world” system certainly bears male-dominant features. In this case, if Beasley’s approach is reiterated, this system can be described as “supra-hegemonic” masculinity, which is global and which regulates the socio-economic and socio-political conditions. This “de-massification” is necessary for investigating masculinity in Turkey because hegemonic masculinity cannot be solely thought as a “legal system” in the Turkish society. In the presence of the “supra-hegemonic” form of masculinity in a society, the existence of “sub-hegemonic masculinity” and “others” is at stake. The elements forming hegemonic masculinity appear in analysis of the forms of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

Popular Turkish cinema in the post-1990s provides an opportunity for de-massifying representations of hegemonic masculinity through Beasley’s approach. This approach helps understanding main features of masculinity in films, which are analyzed throughout this text. Masculinity is a dynamic concept in these films: It may change and transform the same body and among men. Furthermore, “supra-hegemonic” masculinity subordinates other forms of masculinities even though it is opposed by these masculinities. “Supra-hegemonic” masculinity is superior to “sub-hegemonic” and “non-hegemonic” masculinities and it is the main determining factor for shaping and transforming masculinity forms in these films. “Supra-hegemonic” masculinity, sometimes, makes the character a hero, sometimes a victim

and sometimes the other, and the hegemony of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity is effective on the story and characters who are subordinated by “*supra-hegemony*.” The existence of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity sometimes engenders men’s solidarity which corresponds to the vulnerability of masculinity as a threat against it. Furthermore, in the context of socialization processes, the masculinity forms’ attitudes and relations with each other are shaped through the “presence of outside world.” De-massification of hegemonic masculinity, men’s reactions to the realities and the socialization process, which may threaten their being and subsistence, are the principal elements that support this study.

This study dealt with the post-1990s popular Turkish films, which are among the top five in the box-office rankings in the years of their release. The reason behind this selection is that, in addition to their box-office successes, the stories and characters narrated in these films clearly represent the dynamic and de-massified structure of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema. These films are useful in observing the dynamics and diversification of hegemonic masculinity in the Turkish society. When masculinity representations in these films are analyzed within hegemonic masculinity, which could be de-massified, it is possible to think that the representations of masculinity in popular Turkish cinema are instances of de-massified masculinity. Expressing masculinity “in the process of re-shaping” and such a de-massification may be an instrument to understand the representations of masculinity. The research on gender and masculinity have so far shown that hegemonic masculinity is accepted as an “ideal” form of masculinity which dominates other masculinity forms. Most researchers accept that hegemonic masculinity has a massive structure and yet it can be de-massified as Beasley indicated. This de-massification and changing conditions of the world – globalization – shows that the hegemonic masculinity can be diversified and the form of hegemonic masculinity which has global features can subordinate other hegemonic masculinity forms with domestic features. While de-massification of masculinity is investigated in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema, this study displays that the hegemonic masculinity, which is accepted as most common and most powerful form of masculinity, cannot appear on the same body. The

representation of masculinity takes on three forms in popular Turkish Cinema: “*sub-hegemonic* masculinity and its heroes,” “*supra-hegemonic* masculinity and its victims,” and “non-hegemonic masculinity and the others.” These forms indicate that the representation of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema is subordinated by “*supra-hegemonic*” form of masculinity and the narrative structure of such films is constituted in accordance with “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity or “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, determining the characters’ attitudes.

## 2. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS ON GENDER AND MASCULINITY

This chapter aims to investigate “masculinity” in terms of main theoretical accounts that include psychoanalytical and sociological approaches. Furthermore, at the end of the chapter, representation of masculinity in cinema will be investigated in the context of main arguments. Masculinity is not a determination of a biological sexual identity, but rather it is accepted in terms of “gender.” In this case, at the beginning, sex and gender dichotomy needs to be clarified. Therefore psychoanalytical studies will be briefly reviewed to understand biological categorization’s affect on gender. Sigmund Freud’s studies indicate that anatomical distinction between two sexes causes psychoanalytical consequences and he explains these consequences in his main theory Oedipus complex. Therefore, I will try to explain Oedipus complex briefly to understand initialization of - especially the boys’ - psychological and socialization processes. The child’s first socialization area is commonly his/her family. In this case, Jacques Lacan’s triadic approach, which enriches Oedipus complex, that includes relation of father, mother, and child needs to be studied for a clear understanding of gender roles. However R.W. Connell, who is accepted as a pioneer in the area of masculinity researches, provides new approaches for investigating masculinity in sociological terms. Connell demonstrates that gender is not just an individual trait that connected with the somatic difference but rather a domain of social practice. At this point, I will review masculinity through sociological approaches. These depictions help to understand the features and mechanism of masculinity and how it is perceived. Masculinity studies show that there is not just one form of masculinity; but it varies among societies and cultures. In this context I will try to research the most *dominant* masculinity form, hegemonic, which some writers show as “ideal form.” Hegemonic masculinity is one of the masculinity models, which is accepted as “the centre of the system of gendered power” by Connell (2000, pp.216-217). In a homosocial constitution, which includes men? Male organizations like army or financial sector, there is a hegemonic structure. In this case, I will try to observe men’s socialization process in homosocial constitutions and it will be handled with typical socialization models. In this context

the concept, hegemonic masculinity and homosocial structure could be a guide for while analyzing the male characters in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

## **2.1 SEX / GENDER**

“The gender” and “the sex” concepts have started to differ from each other in twentieth century, especially by the influence of feminist studies. The term sex is a biological aspect whereas the gender, which refers to socio-cultural construction, is not biological but rather can be considered as a sociological aspect that emerged from a biological distinction. Thus the masculinity and femininity have been described within historical, cultural, and sociological contexts.

John Lyons indicates that the term ‘gender’ was first used by Greek Sophists in the fifth century BC to describe the threefold classification of the names of things as *masculine*, *feminine*, and *intermediate* (1968, pp.10-11). It is possible to understand that classification of ‘things’ coming long before and this distinction diffusing the social structure through language. Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet, describe language as a structured system of signs and they accept that gender is embedded in these signs thus gender can be the actual content of a linguistic sign (2003, p.60). In this context, gender can be thought as an important part of language system, which is cultivated by people. This aspect concludes that gender is not biological aspect humans were born with but it is a social aspect humans *learn* or *do*. Gender does not only include social categories such as race and class, it also includes the biological categorization, that of sex, and they can not be thought apart from each other as Andrew P. Lyons and Harriet D. Lyons describe: “It [sex] can be seen as the biological ‘counterpoint’ to socially constructed ‘gender’, in which event either category could be and has been viewed as dependent on the other” (2004, p.12). Beasley explains sex as a word that is used in everyday language to refer to one’s sexual identity and he indicates that the word sex is not revealing term to use in social aspects (2005, p.3). Michael S. Kimmel argues that gender difference is the



result of gender inequality, not its cause. Gender inequality produces differences, and the differences produced are then used to justify gender inequality:

Gender is not a simply a system of classification by which biological males and biological females are sorted, separated, and socialized into equivalent sex roles. Gender also expresses the universal inequality between women and men. When we speak about gender we also speak about hierarchy, power, and inequality, not simply difference (Kimmel 2000,p.1).

The common concept, concerning gender, is that individuals are born with a sex as female or male and they have to *learn* or *do* their gender that meaning of woman or man (Corrado 2009, p.356). Gender has social implications, which define the individual's roles in society, and its structure changes among different societies and in different time periods, and it defines how individuals should act according to their sexual orientations. Furthermore, Judith Butler points out that there is a crucial difference between gender and sexuality:

...biology-is-destiny formulation, the distinction between sex and gender serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the casual result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex. The unity of the subject is thus already potentially contested by the distinction that permits of gender as a multiple interpretation (Butler 1999, pp.9-10).

In this part, I will try to explain gender through sociological approaches, especially in terms of masculinity studies, which R.W. Connell started. Before understanding masculinity, which is a gender role, its position as a gender concept, should be explained. As Connell indicated, "in gender a process, the everyday conduct of life is ordered in relation to a reproductive arena... This arena includes...bodily sex difference and similarity. It is thus constituted by the materiality of bodies" (Connell 2000, p.58)." In this case, what initially should be done is that Freud's theory, Oedipus complex, and Lacan's "triadic structure" approach – child, mother, and father – which enriches Freud's, will be abstracted to understand two sexes' psychological behavior, gender roles and relationship of family members, especially the boy's with his mother and father. The boy's case is extremely obvious, as Freud

especially investigates the notion of sexuality among boys. This situation provokes feminist reaction, especially among the twentieth century feminist writers. They point out to the indifference of psychoanalysis approach for the girls. Postmodern approach also criticizes psychoanalysis; Michel Foucault indicates that psychoanalysis systematizes sexuality by standardizing it. Some Feminist thinkers used and enriched Foucault's approaches, like Judith Butler in her important research "Gender Trouble" (1999). I will briefly mention these criticisms too and then start explaining gender in terms of sociological approach that is included through masculinity studies.

### **2.1.1 Psychoanalytical treatments of gender**

Freud suggests that gender is caused by early childhood entanglements – unconsciously passionate, emotional, and sexual – within the context of cultural constraints that are symbolized by the father. Besides, Freud's preferred views about gender and the form of sexuality are ambivalent, defensive and over-influenced by cultural assumptions of his time. Although Freud spent his lifetime trying to discover how the traditional gender roles are identified, 'masculinity', and 'femininity' come into existence; he ended up concluding that since most children identify with both parents, the pure categories of gender and sexuality rarely exist. Even when they appear to be pure, that is culturally and firmly repressed into the unconscious, since children are influenced by both parents. They both fall in love and identify with both parents and, to different extents they both depend on family dynamics (Alsop et al. 2002 p.46).

The biological categorization that gender includes can be started to research with Freud's notes about psychological consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. The Oedipus complex theory is Freud's main argument which occurs with two hidden desires: Desire for the death of the parent who is of the same sex and sexual desire for the parent who is the opposite sex:

...we find that they are tenderly attached to the parent of the opposite sex, while their relation to the other parent is predominantly hostile. In the case of boys the explanation is simple. A boy's mother was his first love-object; she remains so,

and, as his feelings for her become more passionate and he understands more of the relation between father and mother, the former inevitably appears as a rival. With little girl, it is otherwise (Freud 1997, p.184).

Freud, while emphasizing psychological difference between male child and female child, differentiates the Oedipus complex attitude for boys and girls. He indicates that in boys the situation of the Oedipus complex is the first stage. At that stage a child retains the same object, opposite sex parent, which he previously “cathected” with his pregenital libido during the preceding period while he was being suckled and nursed (Freud 2002, p.15). In this situation, a boy regards his father, same sex parent, as a rival who is disturbing him and he would like to get rid of him and also takes father’s place. According to Freud, Oedipus attitude in little boys belongs to the phallic phase and he relates the fear of castration with narcissistic interest in their own genitals (2002, p.16). The Oedipus complex is seen in the “Phallic Phase” of infantile sexuality at the same time and infantile sexuality stands totally different from adult sexuality for both sexes (Homer 2005, p.53).

There is a crucial difference, however, between adult and infantile sexuality in that during infancy, for both sexes, ‘only one genital, namely the male one, comes into account. What is present, therefore, is not the primacy of the genitals, but the primacy of the phallus’ (Freud 1991e [1923]: 308) (Homer 2005, p.53).

Sean Homer also states that: “It is the sight of the presence or absence of the penis that forces the child to recognize that boys and girls are different” (Homer 2005, p.54).

For girls the Oedipus complex is a secondary formation and a problem surfaces in positioning the mother. Freud indicates in his article that, in both cases, for boy and girl, the mother is the original object and the boy retains that object in the Oedipus complex but the girl, Freud asks: How does she abandon the object and instead take her father as an object? Freud finds some conclusions light upon the prehistory of the Oedipus relation in girls (Freud Ibid, pp.15-16).

Every analyst has come across certain women who cling with especial intensity and tenacity to the bond with their father and to the wish in which it culminates of having a child by him. We have good reason to suppose that the same wishful

phantasy was also the motive force of their infantile masturbation, and it is easy to form an impression that at this point we have been brought up against an elementary and unanalysable fact of infantile sexual life. But a thorough analysis of these very cases brings something different to light, namely that here the Oedipus complex has a long prehistory and is in some respect a secondary formation (Freud Ibid, p.16).

Freud connects the loosening of the girl's relation with her mother as a love object to her sense of penis envy (2002, p.17). The boy's "narcissistic interest" and his castration anxiety in his own genitals can be considered opposite to the girls' penis envy that can be helpful to understand the difference between the sexes.

Freud notices and finds interesting such contrast between the behaviors of the two sexes. This difference is recognized with the first notice of each other's genital regions and he expresses girls' recognition of the contrast as such: "They [the girls] notice the penis of their brother or playmate, strikingly visible and of large proportions, at once recognize it as the counterpart of their own small organ... (Freud Ibid, p.16)," thus the girls can be considered as a victim for envy of the penis in Freudian sense. After that, Freud points out little boys' situation: When a little boy first catches sight of a girl's genital region, he demonstrates lack of interest; he sees nothing or disowns what he has seen, he softens it down or looks about for expedients for bringing it into line with his expectations. This process can be dangerous when a boy experiences a threat of castration if he recollects or repeats what he has seen; this forces him to believe in the reality of the threat (Freud Ibid, p.16). As for a little girl, she behaves differently: "She makes her judgment and her decision in a flash. She has seen it and she knows that she is without it and wants to have it" (Freud Ibid, p.17). Freud clearly says that in the relation between the Oedipus and castration complexes there is a fundamental contrast between two sexes:

Whereas in boys the Oedipus complex succumbs to the castration complex, in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration complex. This contradiction is cleared up if we reflect that the castration complex always operates in the sense dictated by its subject-matter: it inhibits and limits masculinity and encourages femininity (Freud 2002, p.19).

Castration complex is lived differently by each sex. The boys live this process with

castration anxiety and the girls live with complex of a lack.

Although Lacan follows Freud regarding the Oedipus complex as the central complex in the unconscious, he enriches the Oedipus complex by developing his own distinctive conception. In Lacan's view, "the subject always desires the mother, and the father is always the rival, irrespective of whether the subject is male or female" (Evans 1996, p.130), in this dual relation. The father, the third term, transforms the dual relation between mother and child into a triadic structure. The Oedipus complex is thus nothing less than the passage from the imaginary order to the symbolic order (Evans Ibid, p.130).

Lacan analyses this passage from the imaginary to the symbolic by identifying three tenets of the Oedipus complex. Dylan Evans explains these three phrases clearly: First, Oedipus complex is characterized by the imaginary triangle of mother, child and phallus. Phallus is the imaginary object, which the mother desires beyond the child himself. Lacan hints that the presence of the imaginary phallus as a third term in the imaginary triangle indicates that the *symbolic* father is already functioning at this time. According to Lacan, in this process the child realizes that both he and the mother are marked by lack. Since the mother is seen to be incomplete, she is marked by lack otherwise she would not desire. Since the child does not completely satisfy the mother's desire, he is also marked by lack. The second time of Oedipus complex is characterized by the intervention of the *imaginary* father. Lacan often refers to this intervention as the castration of the mother because the father imposes the *law* on the mother's desire by denying her access to the phallic object and by forbidding the subject's, the child's, access to the mother. But the mother mediates this intervention by discoursing, namely, this *law* needs to be respected by the mother herself in her actions and her words too. Thus in this period, the child sees father as a rival for the mother's desire. The third time of the Oedipus complex is marked by the intervention of the *real* father. In this process, the real father castrates the child, in the sense of making it impossible for the child to persist in trying to be the phallus for the mother. There is no competition with father, because he always wins. The child, who has anxiety-provoking task of having to be the phallus, recognizes the father has it and this allows the child to identify with the father. Lacan follows Freud

argument that the superego is formed out of this Oedipal identification with the father (Evans 1996, pp.131-132). Lacan calls the Oedipal identification as secondary, symbolic identification.

I shall now say something about how I conceive of the dialectical relation with the function of the Oedipus complex. In its normal state, this complex is one of sublimation, which designates precisely an identificatory reshaping of the subject, and, as Freud wrote when he felt the need for a 'topographical' co-ordination of the psychical dynamisms, a *secondary identification* by introjection of the *imago*<sup>1</sup> of the parent of the same sex. The energy for that identification is provided by the first biological upsurge of genital libido (Lacan 2001, p.17).

The primary identification namely imaginary identification appears when the human infant sees its reflection in the mirror. Imaginary identification is a mechanism during which ego is created in the "Mirror Stage" (Homer 2005, p.53).

What I have called the *mirror stage* is interesting in that it manifests the affective dynamism by which the subject originally identifies himself with the visual *Gestalt* of his own body: in relation to the still very profound lack of co-ordination of his own motility, it represents an ideal unity, a salutary *imago*; it is invested with all the original distress resulting from the child's intra-organic and relational discordance during the first six months, when he bears the signs, neurological and humoral, of a physiological natal prematurity (Lacan 2001, p.15).

It can be clearly said, in Lacanian sense, that The Oedipal Complex is a symbolic structure. According to him real people are involved in the said processes and the symbolic structures organizing relationships between men and women must be distinguished. The primary structure that defines our symbolic and unconscious relation is the Oedipus complex (Homer Ibid, p.53).

Thus while Freud conceives of the castration complex and sexual difference in terms of the presence and absence of the penis, Lacan's approach is, on the other hand, non-biological, non-anatomical about presence or absence of the phallus and this has

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<sup>1</sup> "...Lacan began training as a psychoanalyst in the 1930s. The term is clearly related to the term 'image', but it is meant to emphasise the subjective determination of the image... Images are specifically images of other people... The term 'imago' occupies a central role in Lacan's pre-1950 writings, where it is closely related to the term COMPLEX. In 1938, Lacan links each of the three family complexes to a specific imago: the weaning complex is linked to the imago of the maternal breast, the intrusion complex to the imago of the counterpart, and the Oedipus complex to the imago of the father (Lacan, 1938)." (Evans 1996, 2006 p.85).

been a main attraction of Lacanian theory for gender studies. While for Freud there is no difference between the penis and the phallus, in Lacanian sense phallus is a signifier of sexual differentiation. “In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a phantasy, if by that we mean an imaginary effect” (Lacan 2001, p.218). Other distinction with Lacan and Freud is their perception about castration complex. While Freud associates the castration complex with having or not having the penis, according to Lacan the castration is symbolic process, recognition of lack. Freud explains the woman’s reaction as a masculinity complex when she recognizes that she does not have a penis and wants to have it. The hope of some day obtaining a penis can bring out difficulties of the regular development towards femininity. The little girl’s recognition of the anatomical distinction between the sexes forces her away from masculinity, even masculine masturbation, which is clitoral (2002, pp.17-18). According to Freud, that can be clearly seen: the lack of a penis is experienced in psychical process. In Lacanian sense masculinity and femininity are not gained through biological aspect, their relation is imaginary with the phallus; Homer clarifies that while masculinity involves the pretence of having the phallus, femininity involves “masquerade” of being the phallus (Homer 2005, p.95).

In Lacanian sense masculinity and femininity emerge as unequal and complimentary parts in language, prefiguring traditional gender categories. He sees a link between the bodily, sexual world of Oedipus complex and the cultural world of language. The meaning phallus is understood as the first sign of – sexual – difference, of exclusion -from our parents’ relationship – and of absence – our separation from the mother-, and humans start gradually perceiving the binary divisions of meanings in language also based on difference, exclusion, and absence. Thus, the phallus is a signifier leading into language, which is understood as a system, and also based on difference, exclusion, and absence. The feminine in language is what is absent and lacking because the desire for the mother is repressed and women lack the phallic sign. Women are alienated from the language because they represent the lack of meaning and subjectivity in culture. Women enter culture in a different way, as an absence or lack, who do not have the phallus and are therefore without an autonomous position as subject. Lacan describes this as women “being” as opposed

to “having” the phallus (Alsop et al. 2002, pp.51-53).

### **2.1.2 Criticisms of psychoanalysis**

Most feminist thinkers reacted to psychoanalytic approach’s positioning of female sexuality. According to feminist thinking, femininity is always described as defective – lacking of phallus – and waits upon for the authority of the phallus.

The feminist writer Judith Butler reads Lacan’s description of women ‘being’ as opposed to ‘having’ as follows:

‘Being’ the Phallus and ‘having’ the Phallus denote divergent sexual positions, or non-positions (impossible positions really) within language. To ‘be’ the phallus, is to be the ‘signifier’ of the desire of the Other...For women to ‘be’ the Phallus means, then, to reflect the power of the Phallus...to signify the phallus through ‘being’ its Other...its lack, the dialectical confirmation of its identity...Hence ‘being’ the Phallus is always a ‘being for’ a masculine subject who seeks to confirm and augment his identity through the recognition of that ‘being for’ (Butler 1999, p.56).

The other feminist writer Luce Irigaray “...uses psychoanalytical theory against itself to put forward a coherent explanation for theoretical bias...” (Whitford 1995, p.5) therefore, her thinking cannot be thought as a simple hostile approach. She defines Freud as an “ ‘honest scientist’ who went as far as he could but whose limitations need to be identified and not turned into dogma.” (Whitford Ibid, p.6). Margaret Whitford abstracts her criticisms about Freud and psychoanalysis as follows: it is patriarchal which reflects a social order that does not know what it owes to the mother. Furthermore, she states that psychoanalysis is blind to its own assumptions and criticizes the assumptions of male parameters in terms of a study which holds the development of the little boy similar to that of the little girl. Irigaray assumes that Freud takes female sexuality without regarding the women’s pathology and she points out that Freud’s reduction of women to the *law* of the father who forbids the child from realizing its unconscious wish to sleep with his mother, in Freudian sense (Whitford Ibid, p.6). Irigaray also points out Freud’s negligence about mother and daughter relation:



Freud says nothing about the entry of the little girl into language, except that it takes place earlier than for the little boy. He does not describe her first scene of gestural and verbal symbolization, in particular in relation to her mother. On the other hand, he does affirm that the girl will have to leave her mother, turn away from her, in order to enter into the desire and the order of the father, of man. A whole economy of gestural and verbal relations between mother and daughter, between women, is thus eliminated, abolished, forgotten in so-called normal language, which is neither asexual nor neuter (Irigaray p.292).

The feminist writer Nancy Chodorow reads psychoanalytic texts through the lens of clinical experience to see whether these texts and the experiences can yield insight into diversity and individuality, which bypasses normative or universalizing conceptions. She interprets psychoanalysis that has contrasted “the man” to “the woman,” “the boy” to “the girl” and reinterprets Freud’s approach:

By contrast, Freud’s understanding about male attitudes toward women and femininity do not seem at all fragmentary and incomplete. They are specific, informative, persuasive, precise; they cover, ingeniously, a variety of sexual; representational, and neurotic formations. They illuminate for us, with passion and empathy, masculine fantasies and conflicts. Rethinking Freud on women, then leaves us with a normative theory of female psychology and sexuality, a rich account of masculinity as it defines itself in relation to women, and several potential openings toward more plural conceptions of gender and sexuality (Chodorow 1994, pp.31-32).

Postmodernists, like Michel Foucault, also criticize the institutionalization of psychoanalysis. Foucault indicates that psychoanalysis systematizes sexuality by standardizing it and he describes sexuality as a modern invention rather than human essence:

In the space of a few centuries a certain inclination has led us to direct the question of what we are, to sex. Not so much to sex as representing nature, but to sex as history, as signification of discourse. We have placed ourselves under the sign of sex, but in the form of a Logic of Sex, rather than a Physics (Foucault 1990, p.113).

According to Foucault, sexuality is social construction, which is conducted through regulatory mechanism like *law*. In this case, the mechanism of law means as prohibition or censorship that includes marriage, motherhood, and compulsory heterosexuality (Foucault 2005, p.237). The existence of these institutions shows

that sexuality and gender roles appear in artificial ways. Judith Butler clearly explains Foucault's approach which examines historical construction of sexuality:

For Foucault, the body is not "sexed" in any significant sense prior to its determination within a discourse through which it becomes invested with an "idea" of natural or essential sex. The body gains meaning within discourse only in the context of power relations. Sexuality is a historically specific organization of power, discourse, bodies, and affectivity. As such, sexuality is understood by Foucault to produce "sex" as an artificial concept, which effectively extends and disguises the power relations responsible for its genesis (Butler 1999, p.117).

### **2.1.3 Sociological approaches**

Actually Foucault has no gender theory, though others have built gender analysis using some of his ideas that R.W. Connell indicates and adds: "The new sociology of the body, influenced by Foucault as well as by feminism, has developed a sophisticated account of the way bodies are drawn into social and historical process" (Connell 2000, p.57). Connell points out a "persistent difficulty in the new sociology of the body" (Connell 2000, p.58). This difficulty is partly attributed to the influence of Foucault and thus researchers have tended to see bodies as the passive bearers of cultural imprints. Connell emphasizes importance of this situation in relation with gender:

Gender is, fundamentally, a way in which social practice is ordered. In gender processes, the everyday conduct of life is ordered in relation to a reproductive arena... This arena includes sexual arousal and intercourse, childbirth and infant care, bodily sex difference and similarity. It is thus constituted by the materiality of bodies (Connell 2000, p.58).

Connell sees this "arena" in social practice and adds, "... it is not a 'biological base' prior to the social" (2000, p.59). Connell emphasizes a new resource, the social-scientific research- in grappling with problems about men, boys, and masculinity that has been building up over the past fifteen years or so. This recent research has a pre-history that has been tried to explain in previous parts. "...psychoanalytic research has shown how adult personality, including one's sexual orientation and sense of identity, is constructed via conflict-ridden processes of development in which the gender dynamics of families are central" (Connell 2000, p.7). Connell

interprets social-scientific studies of gender as a modern and Western invention. According to him, other civilizations have had their own ways of dealing with human sexuality and the relations between the sexes (1987, p.23). Connell demonstrates that gender is far more significant than an individual trait that is somehow connected with bodily differences like red hair or left-handedness. Connell sees gender as domain of social practice, which is complex and powerfully effective and he indicates that there are two theories, which define this “domain” but Connell thinks that theories are unsatisfactory (2000, p.18). The first theory is the theory of “sex roles.” Role theory explains gender patterns by appealing to the social expectations that define proper behavior for women and for men (Connell Ibid, p.18). But Connell finds this theory intellectually weak, according to him the theory is based on “expectations” or norms which gives no grasp on issues of power, violence, or material inequality (Connell Ibid, p.18). The second account, which he calls “categorical theory,” treats women and men as pre-formed categories. “Biological essentialism is one version of this...the focus in this approach to gender is on some relationship between the categories, which is external to their constitution as categories.” (Connell Ibid, p.18). Even though, “The categorical approach more readily addresses issue of power than sex role theory did.” (Connell Ibid, p.19). Categorical theory also has difficulty grasping the complexities of gender, for example gendered violence within either of the two main categories and Connell gives an example for such gendered violence with this sentence: “violence against gays” (2000, p.19). The problems these theories deal with make us understand the different dimensions or structures of gender, the relation between bodies and society, and the patterning or configuration of gender:

In relational approaches, gender is seen as a way in which social practice is organized, whether in personal life, inter-personal interaction, or on the larger scale. It is common to refer to the patterning in social relations as ‘structure’, so the relational approach is sometimes summarized by describing gender as a social structure (Connell 2000, p.24).

But it is clear that gender is not just one structure as Connell states and he notices three structures, as he mentioned in his previous book *Power and Gender* (1987).

These structures are “the division of labour,” “power relations,” and “relations of emotional attachment or cathexis” and he adds one more layer to this threefold model, that is symbolism. Finally, he suggests a four-fold model of the structure of gender relations (2000, p.24):

Power relations: The main axis of power in the contemporary European/Us gender order is the overall subordination of women and dominance of men-the structure that women’s liberation named ‘patriarchy’ ...

Production relations (division of labour): ...Equal attention should be paid to the economic consequences of gender divisions of labour, specifically the benefits accruing to men from unequal shares of the products of social labour. This may be called the patriarchal dividend...

Cathexis (emotional relations): When we consider desire in Freudian terms. As emotional energy being attached to an object, its gendered character is clear. This is true both for heterosexual and homosexual desire. The practices that shape and realize desire are thus an aspect of the gender order.

Symbolism: The symbolic structures called into play in communication-grammatical and syntactic rules, visual and sound vocabularies etc- are important sites of gender practice. ... The symbolic presentation of gender through dress, makeup, body culture, gesture, tone of voice etc. is an important part of the everyday experience of gender (Connell 2000, pp.24-26).

*Gender socialization* is the process by which individuals are taught the values and norms associated with women and men’s roles in society. Through the process of gender socialization, individuals develop their gender identity, or their definition of themselves within this dichotomy as either a woman or a man. Several different theoretical perspectives explain the process of learning and enacting gender identities. Psychoanalytic theory, namely “identification theory,” “social learning theory,” and “cognitive developmental theory” are important approaches and sociological “doing gender” perspective is the main theory of gender socialization and gender identity formation (Corrado Ibid, p.356). The two main theories, identification theory, and ‘doing gender’ perspective will be explained to understand the position of men and women in society that will be focused on in the following pages.

“Identification theory” can be expressed as a process that children make himself/herself suitable to gain admission by his/her parent. Thus, children identify with their same sex parent. Sigmund Freud’s researches, especially focused on unconscious *learning*, are considered important in the context of identification

theory. Freud notes about children's primary identification process and their exertion for being like their parents. He indicates that the parent is one of the authority figures for the little child in the early years. In these early years, the child only desires to be just like his/her same sex parent and become adult like his/her parent (Freud 2006, p.209). Additionally Freud did not distinguish between the penis as an actual bodily organ and the phallus as a signifier of biological sexual difference; he always mentioned that phallus as male sexual organ. In Lacanian theory the phallus is different from Freud, it is first and foremost a signifier, that should not be confused with genital organ, it signifies lack and sexual difference and that they are not actual objects but they are imaginary and operate in all Lacan's trilogy : the *imaginary*, the *symbolic* and the *real* (Homer 2005, p.54). From this point of view this conclusion can be seen clearly that the men and the women have imaginary relation with phallus in Lacanian sense and many scholars have used this cue to explain theories such as revision of identification theory; several theorists reinterpreted penis envy as *symbolic*. In this context some gender theories include that women are not jealous of men's actual phallus, but rather that they are jealous of the symbolic phallus; in other words, women are envious of what penis represents: power, status, and privilege (Corrado 2009, p.357).

Nancy Chodorow enriches this theory: In identification theory, while "children are thought to model themselves and their behavior after their same-sex parent" (Corrado Ibid, p.357), children develop their identities; so, "they must become psychologically separate from their parent" (Corrado Ibid, p.357). This means different things and has different consequences for formation of gender identities in boys and girls. In this sense, boys must psychologically separate themselves from their mothers and instead model themselves after their fathers. Chodorow points out this important fact that the fathers often spend a lot of their time away from home. Thus, boys develop their personalities that are more detached from others and are oriented inward.

A boy's masculine gender identification must come to replace his early primary identification with his mother. This masculine identification is usually based on identification with a boy's father or other salient adult males. However, a boy's

father is relatively more remote than his mother. He rarely plays a major caretaking role even at this period in his son's life. In most societies, his work and social life take place farther from the home than do those of his wife. He is, then, often relatively inaccessible to his son, and performs his male role activities away from where the son spends most of his life. As a result, a boy's male gender identification often becomes a "positional" identification, with aspects of his father's clearly or not-so-clearly defined male role, rather than a more generalized "personal" identification a diffuse identification with his father's personality, values, and behavioral traits that could grow out of a real relationship to his father (Chodorow 1989, p.50).

Chodorow's approach is important, because it provides a socially informed perspective by placing the creation of gender identities in the context of the gendered divisions of labor in the worlds of work and family. With this approach it is possible to understand different household structures and cultural traditions (Corrado Ibid, p.357).

The "doing gender" perspective emphasizes that gender is a social construction, as well as an act accomplished by men and women. In this perspective, gender is achieved through daily interactions with others and when analyzed, gender is seen as something that is created and recreated in everyday interactions with other people. Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman contend that:

... "doing" of gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production. Doing gender involves a complex of society guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expression of masculine and feminine "natures" (West and Zimmerman 2002, p.4).

While West and Zimmerman explain sex and gender difference, they explain sex as biological term, anatomy, hormones, and physiology and gender is an achieved status which is constructed through psychological, cultural, and social means (2002, p.3). West and Zimmerman explain gender as an activity, something one *does* rather than something one *is* (Hennen 2008, p.16).

With respect to "doing gender perspective;" gender is neither a role nor set of roles that people learn, nor any kind of personal characteristics. This determines the major difference between doing gender perspective and identification theory. If gender is not a role, it does not have fixed or constant features but rather have fluid ones.

Diversity can be observed in different social structures. Namely, there is more than one way to perform masculinity and femininity and men and women enact gender to varying degrees. Some people tightly conform to gender normative behaviors and display hypermasculine or hyperfeminine gender identities (Corrado 2009, p.358). In conclusion as Connell indicated “to understand the current pattern of masculinities we need to look back over the period in which it came into being” (Connell 2005, p.185) and he adds: “Since masculinity exist only in the context of a whole structure of gender relations, we need to locate it in the formation of the modern gender order as a whole-a process that has taken about four centuries” (Connell 2005, p.185).

## **2.2 KEY CONCEPTS ON MASCULINITY STUDIES**

Masculinity studies are accepted as new research areas of sociological enquiry that has started to develop in 1970s. The upheaval in sexual politics since mid-1960s has been discussed as a change in the social position of women and feminist studies have been intensively influential in the period. Furthermore a small “men’s liberation” movement developed in the 1970s among heterosexual men, as gay men became politicized while the new feminist movement was developing. Thus, several different directions have triggered the critiques and analyses of masculinity in the 1970s (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.99). Feminist practices can be thought as main motivation for masculinity studies, because feminist thinking has exposed power relations, highlighted the position of men, explicated the continuing inequalities between women and men. Actually the feminist researches could not be thought without masculinity studies. Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell, and John Lee in their article, cite the viewpoint of feminism about masculinity: “...feminism sees masculinity as more or less unrelieved villainy and all men as agents of the patriarchy in more or less the same degree” (2002, p.100). Accepting such a view leads men in particular into paralyzing politics of guilt and this gripped the “left wing” of men’s sexual politics since mid 1970s (Carrigan et al. Ibid, p.100).

Especially during the last decade many studies have appeared, for instance 500 books were published about men and masculinity, in the USA, there are at least fifty universities offering specialist programs in the subject (Whitehead and Barrett 2001, pp.1-3), 200 papers using the term “hegemonic masculinity” in the text, in the May 2005 a conference, “Hegemonic Masculinities and International Politics” was held at the University Of Manchester, England (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, p.830). And serious criticism from several directions has been attracted about masculinity. While Kimmel explains “the meaning of masculinity” he mentions four different factors. He points out that “The meaning of masculinity vary over four different dimension; thus four different disciplines are involved in understanding gender.” (Kimmel 2004, p.503). First, “masculinity varies across cultures.” (Kimmel 2004, p.503). The meaning of masculinity may change in different cultures, for example, “Some cultures encourage men to be stoic and to prove masculinity, especially by sexual conquest. Other cultures prescribe a more relaxed definition of masculinity, based on civic participation, emotional responsiveness, and collective provision for the community’s needs.” (Kimmel Ibid, p.503). Second, the definition of masculinity even undergoes a transformation in a certain country over time: “Historians have explored how these definitions have shifted, in response to changes in levels of industrialization and urbanization, position in the larger world’s geopolitical and economic context, and with the development of new technologies.” (Kimmel Ibid, p.503). Third, definition of masculinity changes in a person’s life during his lifetime: “Both chronological age and life-stage require different enactments of gender...A young, single man defines masculinity differently from a middle-aged father and an elderly grandfather.” (Kimmel Ibid, p.503). Fourth, the meanings of masculinity may change in any society, any time: “At any given moment, several meanings of masculinity coexist... Sociologists have explored the ways in which class, race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and region all shape gender identity. Each of these axes modifies the others.” (Kimmel Ibid, p.503). Kimmel indicates that it is not possible to confirm single masculinity. He points out that gender is an “ever-changing fluid assemblage of meanings and behaviors and we must speak of *masculinities*. By pluralizing the terms, we acknowledge that



masculinity means different things to different groups of people at different times.” (Kimmel 2004, p.504). Connell also points out same issue: “...there is no one pattern of masculinity that is found everywhere. We need to speak of ‘masculinities’, not masculinity. Different cultures, and different periods of history, construct gender differently.” (2000, p.10). Connell entitled this diversity as “multiple masculinities” and he explained the reasons behind this variety:

Different cultures and different periods of history construct gender differently. In multicultural societies there are likely to be multiple definitions of masculinity. Equally important, more than one kind of masculinity can be found within a given culture, even within a single institution such as a school or workplace (Connell 2000, p.216).

Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne also explained masculinity and the diversities of masculinity in their important research “Dislocating Masculinity:”

Masculinity draws and impinges on a number of different elements, domains, identities, behaviours and even objects, such as cars and clothing. The notion of masculinity and what are described as masculine attributes can be used to celebrate and enhance normative maleness. However, such ideas can also unseat any straightforward relation between masculinity and men (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 2005 p.12).

Cornwall and Lindisfarne indicate that the notion of masculinity has many different images and behaviors: “Masculinity has multiple and ambiguous meanings which alter according to context and over time. Meanings of masculinity also vary across cultures and admit to cultural borrowing; masculinities imported from elsewhere are conflated with local ideas to produce new configurations” (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 2005, p.12). In this context, there is no suspicion; masculinity varies among socio-cultural structures and among people in different time periods. This consequence even can be seen in everyday life, in the society. But how masculinity could be explained and is there a common feature among differing masculinities? First, masculinity can be reviewed within Connell’s approach.

Connell offers four main strategies to understand masculinity: One of Connell’s approach is essentialist approach that uses a feature to define the core of the

masculine, and hang an account of men's lives on that feature. Essentialism is based on categorization and generalization because in accordance with the notion of essentialism, things have invisible core properties and they give those things their identity or nature. Freud can be regarded as close to essentialist definition because he equated masculinity with activity in contrast to feminine passivity. Connell appoints a weakness in essentialist approach that definitions can be different from each other which were described based on essentialism, because there is no singular obligation on which different essentialists agree (2001, pp.30-31).

The second approach is a positivist one that defines what men actually are. Positivist approach is the logical basis of masculinity/femininity binaries in psychology. Connell states three difficulties about this approach:

First, as modern epistemology recognizes, there is no description without a standpoint. The apparently neutral descriptions on which these definition rest are themselves underpinned by assumptions about gender (...) Second, to list what men and women do requires that people be already sorted into the categories 'men' and 'women' (...) Positivist procedure thus rests on the very typifications that are supposedly under investigation in gender research. Third, to define masculine as what-men-empirically-are is to rule out the usage in which we call some women 'masculine' and some men 'feminine', or some actions or attitudes 'masculine' and 'feminine' regardless of who display them (Connell 2001, p.32).

Connell acknowledges that the importance of the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine' and he indicates that if differences are just spoken between "men as a block and women as a block," there was no necessity for the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine' (Connell Ibid, p.32).

Normative definition is the third approach that Connell describes as what men ought to be. This definition, which offers a standard version to describe masculinity, allows that different men approach the standards differently and treat masculinity precisely as a social norm for the behavior of men (Connell Ibid, p.32). Nevertheless, there are paradoxes here, which were recognized in the early Men's Liberation writings. For instance few men display the toughness or independence that are considered the features of masculinity, acted by movie stars like Wayne, Bogart or Eastwood (Connell 2001, p.33). This approach imposes an ideal masculine

model and standardizes the term masculine by giving it some main properties as toughness, independence, and having no concern for femininity.

Although all three approaches are on the level of personality, the last semiotic definition abandons the level of personality that Connell notices and this approach has been very effective in cultural analysis of gender and widely used in Lacanian psychoanalysis and studies of symbolism (Connell Ibid, p.33). Semiotic approach defines the masculinity through a system of symbolic difference in which masculine and feminine places are contrasted and masculinity is defined as non-femininity (Connell Ibid, p.33). This approach provides an abstract contrast of masculinity and femininity, namely symbolic contrast. In this sense, “masculinity is...the place of symbolic authority. The phallus is the master-signifier, and femininity is symbolically defined by lack.” (Connell Ibid, p.33).

All approaches' common statement is that masculinity is posed as the opposite of femininity. According to Connell, masculinity does not exist except in contrast to 'femininity', it is inherently related to femininity and a culture needs to treat “women and men as bearers of polarized character types” in order to have a masculinity concept (Connell 2001, p.31). Kimmel also points out the validity of this statement: “the “antifemininity” component of masculinity is perhaps the single dominant and universal characteristic” (Kimmel 2004, p.504) and with Cornwall and Lindisfarne's words: “...masculinity and maleness are defined oppositionally as what is not feminine or female.” (2005, p.11). Connell indicates that what is not to be masculine by describing unmasculine person who would behave differently: “being peaceable rather than violent, conciliatory rather than dominating, ... uninterested in sexual conquest, and so forth” (2001, p.30). According to him, these features bring out the thought of “individual difference and personal agency” that developed in early-modern Europe with the growth of colonial empires and capitalist economic relations (Connell Ibid, p.31). Connell notices 'connection' between global empires, economic systems, and the notion of masculinity and he asserts that they interactively shape each other.

It is mainly ethnographic research that has made the scale of the issue, and the vital connections, clear: the unprecedented growth of European and North

American power, the creation of global empires and a global capitalist economy, and the unequal encounter of gender orders in the colonized world. I say 'connections' and not 'context', because the fundamental point is that masculinities are not only shaped by the process of imperial expansion, they are active in that process and help to shape it (Connell 2005, p.185).

Carrigan et al., in their important article, *Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity (1985)*, look over the "male role" literature that was influential before women's liberation movements. They mention "father absence:" "Through the 1950s and 1960s the post popular explanation of such social problems was "father absence," especially from poor or black families" (2002, p.103) and these writers connect this situation with capitalism that has separated home from workplace and they point out this imbalance as the focus of one of the first sociological discussions of the *conflicts* involved in the construction of masculinity (Carrigan et al. Ibid, p.103). During this time for instance sociologist David Riesman "proposed that in the modern male role, expressive functions had been added to the traditional instrumental ones" (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.104). The other sociologist Helen Hacker clarifies this opinion in an important article, *The New Burdens of Masculinity*, published in 1957: "...men are now expected to demonstrate the manipulative skill in interpersonal relations formerly reserved for women..." (Carrigan et al. Ibid, p.104). Hacker points out that though the husband was necessarily often absent from home, he was "increasingly reproached for his delinquencies as father" (Ibid, p.104), thus the three writer indicate that men were also under pressure to evoke a full sexual response on the part of women. The other problem can be considered on men's side through male homosexuality as this was further evidence that "all is not well with men" (Ibid, p.104). "The flight from masculinity" Hacker explains, in male homosexuality can be in part of reflection of role conflicts. Thus, heterosexual functioning can be considered an important component of the masculine role. Hacker always argues that masculinity exists as a power relation and this opinion led to the suggestion that "masculinity is more important to men than femininity is to women" (Ibid, p.104). 13 years later, American Feminist writer Patricia Sexton gives an answer of the question "what does it mean to be masculine?" in her book, *The Feminized Male (1969)* that Carrigan et al. quoted in their article:

What does it mean to be masculine? It means, obviously, holding male values and following male behavior norms....Male norms stress values such as courage, inner direction, certain forms of aggression, autonomy, mastery, technological skill, group solidarity, and a considerable amount of toughness in mind and body (Carrigan et al. Ibid, 104).

The other study of the same year, which Lionel Tiger published in Britain *Men in Groups*, was also a paradigmatic treatment of masculinity that Carrigan et al. indicates: “It (*Men in Groups*) extensively documented men’s control of war, politics, production, and sports, and argued that all this reflected a genetic pattern built into human beings at the time when the human ancestral stock took up cooperative hunting” (2002, p.105).

Carrigan et al. argue that all these discussions need to be organized and there was a complex discussion about masculinity going on before the main impact of feminism and they proceeded to explain the very idea of a “role” and its incompetence to analyze masculinity (2002, p.105). Society is organized around the pervasive differentiation between men’s and women’s roles, and these roles are internalized by all individuals but this does not actually describe real people’s lives because, for instance, not all men are responsible fathers, nor successful in their occupations (2002, p.106)<sup>1</sup>. The expectations made of people and what they do are, in fact not distinguished by sex-role literature. According to the three writers, sex role theory lacks a stable theoretical object, the sex-role framework is fundamentally static and cannot grasp change in a dialectic form arising within gender relations. Sex roles are constructed through generalizations about sexual norms, and then applied this description to men’s and women’s lives and finally by using the role framework gave a result that included *differences*, not *relations* between the sexes and their situations. This *distinction* between men and women conceives the *power* that men exercise over women. The liberation of women can be considered a meaning of a *loss* of power for most men. The sex role literature evades the facts of men’s *resistance* to change in the distribution of power and in masculinity itself (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.107). It is possible to understand that the three writers see the role

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<sup>1</sup> This reminds “normative approach” that Connell (2001, p.32) explains as main strategies to understand masculinity that has been explained in previous section.

framework neither a conceptually stable nor a practically adequate basis for the analysis of masculinity and they indicate that it is very difficult to put something else in its place but they suggest that the alternatives should be still asked and at the same time they have argued that the questions of role theory are real and important (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.108).

Connell's four approaches, the role framework or feminist approach may not be convincing but all of these have contributed to the term, masculinity in considerable accounts. The definitions tried to standardize the masculinity whereas there are variations in the concept, which arise from individual's experiences that produce a range of personalities (Carrigan et al. Ibid, 106).

### **2.3 HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY**

As the researches indicate there are different kinds of masculine forms within society that stand in complex relations of dominance and subordination to each other (Connell 2000, p.69). Connell accepts hegemonic masculinity as one of masculinity forms: "Different masculinities exist in definite relations with each other...hegemonic form of masculinity, the centre of the system of gendered power. The hegemonic form needs not to be the most common form of masculinity" (Connell 2000, pp.216-217). However, Beasley indicates that Connell's multiple masculinities are associated with "hegemonic masculinity" and come from Antonio Gramsci's coinage of the notion:

Connell's account of multiple masculinities is most strongly associated with the term 'hegemonic masculinity'. The term derives from Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's usage of 'hegemony', meaning a cultural/moral leadership role assumed by ruling elites to ensure popular or mass consent to their coercive rule and thus the continuance of the status quo (Milner and Browitt, 2002: 231; Ashcroft et al., 1998: 116-17) (Beasley 2005, p.229).

Thus, it is possible to see that "the Gramscian term "hegemony" " was transferred to problems about gender relations, which is "current at the time in attempts to

understand the stabilization of class relations (Connell 1977).” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, p.831). Gramsci describes society as two major superstructural “levels,” “civil society” which he called “private” and “political society” or “the State.” He noted that these two levels correspond to the functioning of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercises throughout society and they also correspond to “direct domination” which is exercised through “The State” and “juridical” government (1992, p.12). Beasley explains hegemony by giving reference Gramsci: “From the work of Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci, hegemony refers to the establishment, through gaining the consent of the masses, of the values and beliefs of an elite as a compulsory norm for all.” (Beasley 2005, p.251).

The hegemonic masculinity concept was first proposed in reports from a field study of social inequality in Australian high schools. The high school project provided empirical evidence of multiple hierarchies – in gender as well as in class terms – interwoven with active projects of gender construction. Carrigan et al. systematized these beginnings in their article “Toward a new sociology of masculinity” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, p.830).

...The ability to impose a particular definition on other kinds of masculinity is part of what we mean by “hegemony.” Hegemonic masculinity is far more complex than the accounts of essences in the masculinity books would suggest... It is, rather, a question of how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth, and how they legitimate and reproduce the social relationships that generate dominance (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.112).

Carrigan et al. note, “There is a distance, and a tension, between collective ideal and actual lives” (Carrigan et al. Ibid, 112). For instance most men cannot act like John Wayne or Humphrey Bogart, in fact when they do, that is likely to be thought trivial, but “very large numbers of men are complicit in sustaining the hegemonic model” (Carrigan et al. Ibid, 112). This situation has various reasons, and one of them is overwhelmingly important which is that “most men benefit from the subordination of women, and hegemonic masculinity is centrally connected with the institutionalization of men’s dominance over women.” (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.113). Rachel Alsop et al. denote that in western societies, hegemonic masculinity takes

place in a frame surrounded by heterosexuality, economic autonomy, taking care of family, rationality, mastering emotions, and having nothing feminine about them (Alsop et al., 2002, p.141). However, Peterson states that “man” is described as being emotionally repressive, putting himself forward and being rational; whereas, on the contrary, “woman” is described as being emotionally sensitive, lacking of “self” and being intuitive (Quoted from Cengiz et al. 2004, p.55). Besides, Seidler adds that, man as an identity, is constructed as the one who is aware of needs and wants, and able to hide anxieties and ambiguities. In this state, hegemonic masculinity connotes that it is a relation of superiority towards women, and women serve men who owned this status, and public world is men’s world (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.55). Carrigan et al., in a similar way, draws attention to masculinity norms’ significant features like: inner direction, forms of aggression, autonomy, mastery, technological skills, group solidarity, adventurism and mental and physical toughness (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.104). In such a case, it may be observed that; both man, woman, and other bodies are ordered and ruled by dominant discourses in society (Cengiz et al. 2004, Ibid). However, Kimmel indicates through hegemonic masculinity: “the all masculinities are not created equal” (Quoted from Beasley 2009, p.60). This inequality shows the “*authoritative* positioning” (Beasley 2009, p.60) of hegemonic masculinity over other masculinities (Beasley 2009, p.60) and that shows hegemonic masculinity is not only affective on women, in other words “hegemonic masculinity dominates all other gender.” (Howson 2006, p.60). These explanations of hegemonic masculinity can be diversified but as Beasley indicated the term hegemonic masculinity became “slippery” among all explanations. She quoted Michael Flood’s example of Connell’s own usage as “slides between several meanings.” (2009, p.60). In this context hegemonic masculinity concept needs to offer clearer theories in order to adopt the concept to cinema studies.

Current approaches, especially Connell’s, indicated that masculinity has multiple forms and hegemonic masculinity is considered as one of the forms of the masculinity which is accepted as “pinnacle of a pyramid” of masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, p.845) However, as Beasley indicated, some writers comprehend hegemonic masculinity notion as “singular monolith” (Beasley



2009,p.61). Moreover, Connell mentions hegemonic masculinity on a “world scale” through globalization. He describes this form of masculinity as “transnational business masculinity” (Connell 2000, p.52) that includes “elite group of socially dominant men.” (Beasley 2009, p.59).

The world gender order is patriarchal, in the sense that it privileges men over women. There is a ‘patriarchal dividend’ for men arising from unequal wages, unequal labour-force participation, and a highly unequal structure of ownership, as well as cultural and sexual privileging...The conditions thus exist for the production of a hegemonic masculinity on a world scale, that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity which embodies, organizes and legitimates men’s domination in the gender order as a whole (Connell 2000, p.46).

However, Beasley assesses Connell’s approach as unsatisfactory: “Yet it is not clear why Connell is so adamant that transnational business masculinity occupies world hegemonic status...Moreover, as Connell himself notes, many men who hold significant social power do not embody hegemonic masculinity” (2009, pp.60-61). Beasley criticizes Connell’s study, as it is unable to explain why transnational business masculinity is the “pinnacle of a pyramid.” She also thinks that hegemonic masculinity needs more than one term – transnational business masculinity – and she adds two terms – “sub-hegemonic and supra hegemonic” –. Beasley investigates these terms through representation of masculinities in Australian cinema. She considers that “the term ‘hegemonic’ does not require an indivisible mono-type.” (Beasley 2009, p.62). Beasley follows Judith Halberstam’s “taxonomical impulse” and accepts hegemonic masculinity as hierarchical and plural as “taxonomic expansion” suggested (2000, p.62). At this point these two terms, which pluralize hegemonic masculinity term, need to be explained.

Beasley thinks “*sub-hegemonic*” as “every-bloke”<sup>1</sup> which presents “local *sub-hegemonic*” masculinity, is “working-class-inflected,” and it is “invoking as it does masculine solidarity and complicity even though it lacks institutional power.” (Beasley 2009, p.62). What Beasley means by working-class-inflected is “manual workers, bushmen and ordinary soldiers” (Ibid, 62). She indicates that “working

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<sup>1</sup> Bloke: A boy or man, an informal word in Australian and British English.

class 'blokes' may not actually wield power, but they can provide the means to legitimate it." (Beasley 2009, p.61). While Beasley researches Australian "every-bloke" in Australian films, and she explains this term as "local sub-hegemonic masculinity," and she points out that "this representation offers a powerful Australian ideal" (2009, p.63). Beasley emphasizes that these features – being powerful and ideal – are similar to other "working-class-inflected" manifestations in other countries (Ibid, 63). She also indicates representations of these forms as "emerging from national cinemas ambiguously located in relation to the global metropolis" (2009, p.62). In this case these two arguments may constitute and represent an offer to research representation of masculinity in Turkish cinema regarding the similarities the *sub*-hegemonic masculinity provides.

Beasley thinks, "*supra*-hegemonic" masculinity symbolizes globalized men who belong to metropolis (2009, p.64). She explains "*supra*-hegemonic" term with representation of this form in Australian films: "...globalised *supra*-hegemonic masculinities are frequently presented as simultaneously more powerful but lesser, less masculine...." Beasley clearly separates *supra* and *sub* hegemonic masculinities as "globalised *supra* hegemonic" and "national/domestic *sub* hegemonic" (2009, p.64). Beasley's "*supra*-hegemonic" masculinity may be corresponded to Connell's "transnational business man." Beasley defines "overlords" as the "the 'hyper'- or *supra*-hegemonic" in Australia. Moreover, "*supra*-hegemonic" masculinity is also defined as *colonizer*, which has the authority, power, and capital (2009. p.63). However, in Connell's approach, capitalism is merely significant for the functioning of "transnational business man." These hegemonic masculinity forms, "transnational business man" or "*supra*-hegemonic," can be thought through power that is provided through money. Therefore, capitalist system provides legitimacy to "*supra*-hegemonic" masculinities.

Beasley especially emphasizes "*sub*-hegemonic" masculinity in her study. She explains "*sub*-hegemonic" masculinity's situation as "in-between." She thinks "every-bloke" men's – she considers them as "*sub*-hegemonic"– location as "ambiguous" (2009. p.63) and indicates that they stand between local natives/colonised – Indigenous – and "*supra*-hegemonic" masculinity – coloniser –

that has the authority in global context (2009. p.63). Beasley indicates that, in Australian films, sub-hegemonic masculine's location is more real than the supra hegemon of the (external) metropolis (2009, p.64). In this location Australian every-bloke is "situated *against* the colonizing authority of more powerful models of masculinity from outside Australia...but also as *complicit* with/culturally aligned with such colonizing supra hegemonic masculinities..." (2009, p.64). Beasley reiterates her arguments as follows:

My intention is to indicate that masculinities are not only 'relational' in term of hegemonic masculinity subordinating multiple non-hegemonic masculinities and femininities, but additionally that hegemonic masculinity itself may be demassified as pertaining to a relational hierarchy of hegemonic masculinities – some of which are associated with a more global reach, while others are more national/regional/cultural specific (Beasley 2009, p.64).

In Beasley's approach Australian every-bloke consists of idealized working-class-inflected masculinity located between the colonized and the colonizer; in other words, "between the global centre and the utterly peripheral 'other' and as such may be considered as a sub-hegemonic model of manhood." (Beasley, p.74). Her analysis on Australian films supports her assertion that "the notion of hegemonic masculinity should be de-massified to allow analysis of a range of hegemonic masculinities." (Beasley, p.74). The discussion of Australian male bodies on film indicates how a de-massified account of hegemonic masculinity may be understood. It enables an understanding of relations between hierarchically organised hegemonic masculinities. In particular, the analysis of male bodies in Australian films indicates the ways in which the Australian 'every-bloke' occupies an embodied location in-between the global metropolis and the utterly peripheral (Aboriginal) 'other', and hence placed as a sub-hegemon (Beasley 2009, p.75).

To sum up, Beasley puts up the argument that masculinity can be divided into two main categories: sub-hegemony and supra-hegemony. Likewise, it is possible to summarize significant characteristics of sub-hegemonic masculinity as follows: national, local/domestic, powerful and ideal, real, against global/colonizer supra-hegemony, in fact sometimes an accomplice or supporter of it. Beasley notices

‘every-bloke’ inside this form of masculinity and asserts that every-bloke is comprised of ‘working-class-inflected’, which included manual workers, bushmen, and ordinary soldiers. More importantly, when sub-hegemonic masculinity is thought in terms of hierarchical masculinity, its place in society is positioned as in-between – others; supra-hegemonic and marginal –. According to Beasley, supra-hegemonic masculinity – which is one of the reasons behind the in-between positioning of sub-hegemonic masculinity – is characterized as global. With reference to this statement, I may say that, if globalization and capitalism are prevailing concepts across the world; than, this form is dominant in many countries – including Turkey – in the world. Besides, it is a form which we got used to its presence, accepted, which passed itself as non-questioning, ruling, and “already” existing. Similar to Gramsci’s definition of ‘hegemony’: “it has the consent of masses.”

With respect to this point, I may conclude that; sub-hegemonic form inevitably exists in the presence of supra-hegemonic masculinity. In this case, if we mention the presence of supra-hegemonic form in Turkey, it is possible to think of the inherence of sub-hegemonic structure. In this context, for the sake of this study, characteristic features’ – of sub-hegemonic structure mentioned above, being in common with sub-hegemonic form in Turkey and may in fact enrich the meaning with additional features – may be observed via representations in Turkish cinema.

Hence, masculinity representations in Turkish popular cinema will be analyzed in the context of hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, while analyzing masculinity representations in the post-1990s Turkish cinema, investigation of ‘every-bloke’ and its participants in Turkey, searching for existence of characteristic features that Beasley mentioned, will be contributory instruments in the analysis of masculinity representations. Other determinative tools of the study are homosocial structure and homophobia. Actually, we may say that homosocial structure is a consequence or an outcome of hegemonic masculinity. However, homophobia is the requirement of masculinity... Homophobia and homosocial structure are concepts, which are inclusive of hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, we may represent that in the study of

examining masculinity representations in popular Turkish cinema, hegemonic masculinity will stand for main axis of this study.

In conclusion, de-massification of hegemonic masculinity that Beasley mentions in her studies - men's reactions to facts and elements which threaten their being and subsistence, as gays – and this form's socialization period are the principal elements that support this study.

### **2.3.1 Homosocial structure**

As it is observed above, hegemonic masculinity is not valid just for the hegemony directed towards women and it is not merely thought as inequality between men and women. The dual suppression can be observed in societies, for both men and women, which Pierre Bourdieu called this, “the libido domination.” According to him, while a man actually wants to dominate the other men, he still struggles to dominate women as only secondarily (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.33). In this case, men's socialization process among other men conducts the construction of particular male collectivities, which have particular features, norms and, hierarchies. The homosocial notion can be used to describe these collectivities – which are composed of a single gender – that legitimize their attitude. This term has been borrowed from Bourdieu. Here, the homosocial collectivities refer to for instance army, financial sector, sports, and police organization (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.32). These constitutions include hegemonic structure that dominates same sex people, and which generate subject constitutions. Furthermore, components can be seen among men in these constructions but at first glance homosocial structures refer to “solidarity” among same sex people: “Homosociality is the mutual orientation to members of the same sex and “the seeking, enjoyment, and/or preference for the company of the same sex” (Lipman-Blumen 1976, p.16), which connects gender-based ties and solidarity” (Meuser 2004, p.396). For example “...when the dominance of men is more and more questioned, male homosociality helps to reinforce male hegemony.” (Meuser 2004, p.397). Here, a consequence appears that there is a male bond in any homosocial group against the outside world.

Even if many homosocial groups may have features of an “iron cage,” the homosocial association finds habitual security in several ways. It supplies men, according to Gerson and Peiss (1985), “with resources, skills, solidarity and power” (321). Thus, homosociality reinforces the boundaries between the genders and contributes to the “symbolic power” (Bourdieu 1990) of men. The homosocial group is to be seen as a “collective actor” in the construction of difference and of hegemonic masculinity (Meuser 2004, p.397).

If homosocial structures are accepted as an area in which masculinity reproduces itself (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.38), then the typical socialization models should be investigated. These models follow eight traits in the researches, which emphasize the importance of socialization through reproduction of masculinity (Onur and Koyuncu Ibid, p.38). Eight points stress that importance of socialization for the constitution of masculinity and these eight phases are legitimized in homosocial associations that men constituted. The first phase is “presence of outside world.” This world includes male models<sup>1</sup>, which are powerful, feel no pain, do not cry, and rationally sound men. Women do housekeeping chores and are responsible for child bearing and men do not merge in this area, this is the second phase that can be called “using of women.” The third phase is “silence” that men do not speak about themselves and their emotions, afterwards “loneliness” appears as the fourth phase, that seems a positive feature in this context, because men are anticipated to solve their problems on their own. If expression of emotions is described as negative attitude, this situation is considered as “rational” which is the fifth phase. The result of rationality is considered as, sixth phase, “secular control position” which indicates demand of domination of men in every case. This domination drive causes “violence,” that seventh phase, which is preferred to solve social problems and last one is the “physical distance” among men. Homosocial structure does not accept women and it is reserved just for men that can be described as classic men area. This can be considered as the function of homosocial structure, the other function is the legitimizing of men’s attitudes. This legitimizing ensures men’s position, which is obtained in a men’s world (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, pp.38-39). In this case, men practice masculinity to always regenerate the masculinity in legitimizing the

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<sup>1</sup> This again reminds “normative approach” that Connell (2001, p.32) explains as main strategies to understand masculinity that has been explained in previous section.

domination cases and daily life routines. These eight traits can be thought in the context of *gender socialization* approaches, “identification theory” and “doing gender perspective” which is investigated in previous part. Especially the “doing gender” perspective overlaps these eight traits. Furthermore, these eight phases, which are determinant on constitution of masculinity, become legitimized in homosocial structures that include only men.

In addition to the first function of homosocial men’s groups that exclude women from outside world; the second function is the construction of sites that enable the repeated normalizing and confirming processes of their attitudes on life and on the outside world (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, pp.39-40).

### **2.3.2 Homophobia**

While Michael S. Kimmel lists the “constituent elements of hegemonic masculinity” he notes three elements: sexism, racism, and homophobia (2005, p.7). One of the reasons behind male bonding can be considered as being against homosexuality in homosocial structures. As Ayşe Gül Altınay indicates, “An essential component of hegemonic masculinity is almost everywhere the acceptance of heterosexuality as a norm. This norm closely defines the ideal, or indeed the acceptable, soldier” (Altınay Ibid, p.80). In Turkey, as in many countries, “gays in the military” represent a big problem. Turkish military’s solution to prevent gays joining the army is to give them a health report, which is an approval of their homosexuality, or being “unfit due to psycho-sexual problems” (Altınay Ibid, p.80). Gay men may also disguise themselves in business life, where the hegemonic rules of masculinity are valid, to be able to avoid negative opinions about gay people especially among heterosexual men.

Why the general opinion is negative about gay men and what is homophobia? “Homosexuality, the sexual and affectional attraction between members of the same sex, has been and continues to be part of every culture and society in the world.” (DeMarco 2004, p.392). The eight phases of men’ socialization process has been reviewed in the previous part and one of the traits defined is “physical distance.” These traits have been emphasized in the context of their essentiality to construct

and reproduce masculinity. Besides “physical distance,” toughness is another important value for masculinity. The first phase – presence of outside world – of the eight phases mentioned in men’s socialization process, describes how masculinity should be: man feels no pain or man does not cry; the descriptions which both result in one common feature: toughness. Connell indicates that toughness is considered as a masculinity feature in the context of normative definition of masculinity. However, gay men are already in physical relation with men and most of them are not considered as tough. In this case it can be concluded that, gay men are perceived as a threat for heterosexual men in their homosocial structures, because they interrupt the mechanism, which reproduces masculinity in homosocial groups such as army, police organization or football team. This may result in nasty and strong feelings of aversion for gay men and the disapproval of homosexuality in these homosocial structures. This situation can be considered as homophobia. Homophobia is commonly described as “a fear or hatred of homosexuals” (Plummer 2004, p.389). This fear may also be thought as “being thought homosexual” (Connell, Dawis, and Dowsett 2000, p.102). Moreover, these writers define homophobia as “an important mechanism of hegemony in gender relations.” (Connell et al. 2000, p.102) and they explain the prevalence of homophobia with two cultural supports:

This widespread homophobia has two key cultural supports. One is the traditional ideology of the family already mentioned, with a clear gender division of labour and strong links between generations. The other is an ideology of masculinity in which physical prowess and social power are fused with aggressive heterosexuality. ‘Poofters’ are culturally supposed to be contemptibly inadequate, feminized men (Connell et al. 2000,p.109).

David Plummer diversifies the targets of homophobia; he points out to the categories of boys that system excludes: “...boys...who are slow to develop physically; who are not peer-group oriented; whose appearance differs from peer-group standards; who conform too much to the authority of adults at the expense of peer-group loyalty...” (2004, p.391). These categories of gay men represent a lower stage in the hegemonic order. Homophobia may be considered as one of the instruments in the reproduction of masculinity. That can be accepted as a necessary attitude in



homosocial groups, which are composed of only heterosexual men. While Plummer explains homophobia he finally notes: “In modern Western culture, homophobia plays a fundamental role in bullying, the male “pecking order,” and ultimately in policing the attainment of manhood...” (2004, p.392). In summary, the homosocial structure, which includes hegemony and solidarity, does not approve any disordering factor such as femininity, powerlessness, or homosexuality. This disapproval may manifest itself in the forms such as violence, aversion, insulting actions or exclusion of gay men, which all underlie homophobia. Two other phases of men’s socialization process are “rationality” and “loneliness.” With respect to this argument, “gayness” which also means “joy” is far away from masculinity and the dynamics that construct and reproduce it. In conclusion, the phobic situation is rooted in the perception of “gayness” as a threat to the reproduction or construction of masculinity, which results in violence, aversion and exclusion of gays from homosocial groups and society.

## **2.4 MASCULINITY STUDIES IN CINEMA**

Sociological discussions of gender, femininity, and masculinity almost synchronously made the discussions about their representations in cinema a current issue in 1970s. These discussions have tended overwhelmingly to center on the representation of women and to derive many of its basic tenets from Laura Mulvey’s article, *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema*. The discussions concerning the representations of men have not appeared for a long time outside the scope of gay movement discussions. Steve Neale who writes his influential article by using Mulvey’s article in 1983, is aware of the fact that there is an important sense in which the images and functions of heterosexual masculinity within mainstream cinema have been left indiscussed.

Film criticism in the wake of Mulvey’s important article has expanded upon her thesis about visual pleasure while retaining the binary concepts of masculine activity

versus feminine passivity that motivates her reading of cinema as a representational system (Cohan and Hark 2002, pp.2-3).

Mulvey tries to destroy pleasure by using the dominant-patriarchal system's weapon through the analysis of this weapon. Here, her article will be summarized to understand Neale's approach: Mulvey says that there is a common belief that analyzing pleasure or beauty destroys pleasure and beauty. If the ego is satisfied by different ways of seeing, the highpoint of film industry must be attacked. Since the film industry is a part of patriarchal language, the patriarchal language makes use of the image of woman as a tool of getting pleasure of what people see. She tries to explain that if beauty and the pleasure got by the gaze are attacked, the patriarchal dominance over the pleasure of looking will equally be attacked. Thus, psychoanalytic theory provides feminists with an explanation about the frustration that they experience under the phallogocentric order. She says that an alternative language cannot be produced because in order to be able to do this, there has to be a fight against the language of the unconscious but this language is already within the limits of the language of the patriarchy. According to Mulvey, the idea of woman is related to the lack of phallus and this lack underlines the presence of phallus in men. Thus, the presence of phallus in men becomes a "symbol." In producing the patriarchal unconscious, the woman functions in two ways: first she symbolizes the castration threat because she does not have a penis and secondly she raises her child in a certain way that she reproduces the same symbol. The woman cannot find her presence in law and language. She can only exist as a memory and this memory has two extremes: the memory of maternal plenitude and the memory of lack of penis. So the woman's image is the bearer of the bleeding wound and this image makes her exist only in relation to castration and she cannot exist except for the feeling of castration. Woman becomes a bearer of meaning instead of being a maker of meaning and thus woman here is a silent image. The woman in the film stands as an icon that is the object of the gaze and pleasure of man. However, that icon as the object of pleasure and object of gaze also threatens the male figure with the anxiety of castration. There are two ways for the male figure to escape that anxiety of castration. The first way can be identified with voyeurism and the second way with

the fetishistic scopophilia. In the first avenue, which is voyeurism, the male figure in the film investigates the woman and defines her as a guilty object. Once the woman is defined as a guilty object then she is either forgiven or punished. The first way of escaping the castration anxiety, which is voyeurism, is directly related to sadism. The pleasure the male figure takes derives from the senses of guilt and control on the woman. The second way to escape the castration anxiety is the fetishistic scopophilia. In fetishistic scopophilia the male figure transforms the female figure into an object of beauty and desire so the woman becomes a fetish for the man. In this way she is transformed into something satisfying in itself and she influences the story as a silent image. Whereas the woman is the bearer of meaning, man is the maker of meaning. Thus, the active/passive heterosexual division similarly controls the narrative structure. There is a distinction between the man's and the woman's roles in the film. Man's role in the film is that man controls the story and makes things happen, however woman only helps the flow of the story. She does not make things happen but helps things while they are happening. The man controls the film fantasy and he is the bearer of the gaze of the spectator so tension between the spectator and the object of desire on the screen is naturalized. The male figure in the film is a character with whom the spectator can identify himself. A male movie star is the image in the "mirror." It is "more complete, more powerful, and perfect" so it is the ideal ego of the spectator. It is not an object of desire or it is not an object of gaze (Mulvey 1975, pp.6-18).

This way of thinking, "has turned the screen's representation of masculinity into an easy target of attack..." (Cohan and Hark Ibid, p.2). Steve Neale "[attempts] to put Mulvey's arguments in the context of the films that obviously represent a spectacular form of masculinity, particularly through elaborately staged rituals of conflict between men..." (Cohan and Hark Ibid, p.3). Neale indicates that according to Mulvey the images of women can and should be considered in relation to images of men (Cohan and Hark Ibid, pp.2-3). Neale is intended to "look in particular at identification, looking and spectacle as she [Mulvey] discussed them and to pose some questions as to how her remarks apply directly or indirectly to images of men..." (Neale 1983, p.4).

Steve Neale especially emphasizes “identification” by using John Ellis’ study, which is written in the light of Mulvey’s article (1983, p.4). Ellis indicates about identifications that they are multiple, fluid and there are different forms of identification. She points out to two such forms, one associated with narcissism, the other with phantasies and dreams (2001, p.43).

Cinematic identification involves two different tendencies. First, there is that of dreaming and phantasy that involve the multiple and contradictory tendencies within the construction of the individual. Second, there is the experience of narcissistic identification with the image of a human figure perceived as other. Both these processes are invoked in the conditions of entertainment cinema. The spectator does not therefore ‘identify’ with the hero or heroine: an identification that would, if put in its conventional sense, involve socially constructed males identifying with male heroes, and socially constructed females identifying with women heroines. The situation is more complex than this, as identification involves both the recognition of self in the image on the screen, a narcissistic identification, and the identification of self with the various positions that are involved in the fictional narration: those of hero and heroine, villain, bitpart player, active and passive character. It involves the identification of the public, external phantasies of the fiction with personal phantasies. Identification is therefore multiple and fractured, a sense of seeing the constituent parts of the spectator’s own psyche paraded before her or him; a sense also of experiencing desire for the perfected images of individuals that are presented over and above their particular phantasy roles (Ellis Ibid, p.43).

According to Neale, “there is constant work to channel and regulate identification in relation to sexual division, in relation to the others of gender, sexuality and social identity and authority marking patriarchal society” (1983, p.5) and every film renews those orders, thus “Every film tends to specify identification in accordance with the socially defined and constructed categories of male and female.” (Neale Ibid, p.5). In this context Neale points out to narcissistic identification. According to him, narcissism and narcissistic identification both involve fantasies of power, omnipotence, mastery, and control (1983, p.5).

As the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, he projects his look on to that of his like, his screen surrogate, so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic look, both giving a satisfying sense of omnipotence. A male movie star's glamorous characteristics are thus not those of the erotic object of his gaze, but those of the more perfect, more complete, more powerful ideal ego conceived in the original moment of recognition in front of the mirror (Mulvey 1975, p.12).

Neale and Mulvey draw the portrait of “ideal ego” in which the male hero is powerful and omnipotent to an extraordinary degree such as Clint Eastwood characters or Charlton Heston; even though these characters are tested during the story, they always powerful (Neale Ibid, p.5). The fantasies of power and omnipotence or control are identified with masculinity and Chris Holmlund in an article on *Lock Up* (John Flynn 1989) and *Tango and Cash* (Andrei Konchalovsky 1989), stresses the extent to which in these films heterosexual masculinity is presented as “masquerade.” She indicates that masculinity may only be a fantasy (Neale 2005, p.46).

As Lacan has shown, masquerade is inherently nostalgic, an appearance which gestures toward a lack perceived as originary. It is not coincidental, then, that Stallone’s fans are so often conservatives: his mask of healthy, happy, heterosexual, white masculinity is eminently reassuring to the Right....Masculinity may be only a fantasy, but as the success of Sylvester Stallone’s films, including their invocation by right-wing politicians like Reagan and Bush, so amply demonstrates, masquerades of masculinity are eminently popular, and undeniably potent (Holmlund 2002, p.225).

All the above studies are valid for mainstream cinema that can be accepted as a system, which systematizes the “pleasure.” Mulvey observes this system as a dominant-patriarchal structure and she tries to destroy pleasure by using this system’s weapon through the analysis of this weapon. According to Mulvey, the women in the films are represented as icons that serve to the gaze and pleasure of men. She also considers this icon threatening for the male figure concerned with the anxiety of castration. However, Steve Neale tries to position men in the context of Mulvey’s approach and he investigates how her remarks are applied to the images of men. Neale accepts that every film tends to specify identification categorized as male and female and he also points out that the fantasies of power and omnipotence or control are identified with masculinity. Thus, the mainstream cinema has idealized characters for identification of the spectator and these images are far from the reality. In this case, the representation of masculinity can be thought as fantasies with which the spectator identifies but knows that he will never be like those characters on the screen.

In this chapter, I tried to look into “masculinity” in the light of psychoanalytic and sociological approaches, gender studies, and masculinity studies. At the end of the chapter I reviewed the main arguments about representation of masculinity in cinema. In order to explore masculinity I first reviewed sex/gender dichotomy. Gender is geared to biological categorization but this is not a simple biological classification that includes male and female. As Kimmel indicated, gender expresses an inequality between men and women in universal forms and if gender is discussed; hierarchy, power, and inequality should also be discussed (Kimmel 2000, p.1). Consequently, I noted that gender is not a biological concept but it is a result of individual’s biological features.

Individuals born with a sex, female or male, and they *learn* or *do* their gender; they become a woman or a man in the society. Thus, it is concluded that; gender has social implications that define individual’s roles in society and it can change among cultures or societies. In this case, first of all I reviewed gender in the context of the psychoanalytical studies to have an understanding of the process how individuals perceive their sexuality; how people act when they recognize their own sexuality and that of the opposite sex. This can be defined as the “first socialization process” for the individual and this has been reviewed in the context of Freud’s Oedipus complex and Lacan’s approach which enriched Freud’s theories and brought in new perceptions. The little boy’s first recognition coincides with the period when he is nursed and suckled. He recognizes the same and opposite sex parents and he positions his mother as a love object and regards his father as a rival. Freud emphasizes the contrast between the behaviors of the two sexes. This difference is first recognized with the notice of each sex’s genital region. On the other hand, Lacan enriches the child’s “love affair” period and he points out a triad relation in the family, which is the “originally dual relation” between mother and child. According to Lacan, father is in an external position in this triad relation. All these cognitions are regarded as an individual's first socialization process. In this case, I noted that the child learns in the length of the time, he cannot fall in love with his mother; he cannot race against his father but he can identify with and learns from his

father how he should behave. As I mentioned above this can be called the child's first socialization and *learning* process.

Whereas in sociological approach, Connell, who is one of the pioneers in masculinity studies, indicates that gender is a social practice domain. In the light of this thinking, I reviewed *gender socialization*. *Gender socialization* is the process by which individuals are taught and *learn* the values and norms associated with women and men's roles in society. In this chapter, I reviewed gender socialization in the context of two approaches: 'identification theory' and 'doing gender' perspectives. Firstly, identification theory is a process that children make himself/herself suitable to gain admission by their parent. Freud notes about children's primary identification process and their exertion for being like their parents. In these early years, the child only desires to be just like his/her same sex parent and become adult like his/her parent (Freud 2006, p.209). Whereas Chodorow (1989, p.50) develops this theory: Boys must psychologically separate themselves from attachment to their mothers and instead take their father as a role model. And fathers often spend a lot of time away from home. Thus, boys develop more detached and introverted personalities. Secondly, the "doing gender" perspective emphasizes that gender is a social construction, as well as men and women accomplish an act. Gender is achieved through daily interactions with others and is analyzed as something that is created and recreated in everyday interactions with other people.

Before exploring the key concepts of masculinity, I looked over gender relations and this was helpful to understand the basic patterns of masculinities as Connell also indicated. I tried to look into masculinity in the light of several approaches such as those of Connell, Kimmel, Carrigan, and I saw that all these approaches meet in one common statement: masculinity is the opposite of femininity and there is not just one form of masculinity. Namely, masculinity may differ with regard to social, psychological, and historical conditions.

A feminine person, be it a woman or a man, is seen physically powerless at first glance and this brings out a perception that feminine people can be peaceable, vulnerable, or ruled. This means that a person who bears the masculine features has

the opposite features of a feminine person. In such a case what does happen among masculine people? I tried to find the answer for this question exploring the “hegemonic structure” which regulates the relations between individuals in a society. I thought that physical power per se cannot be a determinative factor alone. Gramsci’s usage of the concept of hegemony, which Connell also mentioned, was helpful to understand the dynamics of masculinity. The meaning of the term “hegemony” in terms of Gramscian approach is as follows: “a cultural/moral leadership role assumed by ruling elites to ensure popular or mass consent to their coercive rule and thus the continuance of the status quo” (Milner and Browitt, 2002: 231; Ashcroft et al., 1998: 116–17) (Beasley 2005, p.229). In the homosocial structures that are composed of men, such as army, police organization, mafia, there is a hierarchical relation between men. The head of the hierarchy is the father, boss, or commander in the homosocial structures. On the other hand I noticed that the members of the homosocial structures act with solidarity in the face of external threats such as women or homosexuals. Consequently that can be said that the hierarchy does not just exist between men and women but also among men. The domination struggle among men extends to father-son relation, which will be investigated in the next chapter concerning the Turkish family structure.

At the end of this chapter I looked into Steve Neale’s study in the context of representation of masculinity in cinema. Neale’s starting point is Laura Mulvey’s important article titled “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1983). According to Mulvey, the film industry is a part of patriarchal language and the patriarchal language makes use of the image of woman as a tool of getting pleasure from what people see. However, Neale uses Mulvey’s argument in the context of the representation of the spectacular form of masculinity and he investigates the case of identification in accordance with John Ellis’ study, in which she emphasizes various forms of identification, especially narcissism and fantasies. These approaches will especially be helpful for exploring the identification of spectator with Yeşilçam melodramas’ *jeunes* and other periods of Turkish cinema.



### 3. GENDER ROLES AND MASCULINITY IN TURKEY

In this chapter, I will try to investigate gender roles in Turkish family structure and masculinity in Turkey. Afterwards, I will explore representations of masculinity in Yeşilçam melodramas – the 1960s and the 1970s – and in women films – the 1980s. There are many feminist researches on gender roles in Turkey but these researches generally include women’ roles in the society. At this point I will try to look into Hale Bolak’s research, which investigates the rivalry in father-son relation in Freudian terms and externality of father in Lacanian terms. Moreover, Bolak’s research includes working women and reactions of men to this situation. In addition to Bolak’s research, to improve this part – which includes gender roles in Turkish family structure – I will review some reports studies, which researched gender roles in Turkey. As a result of these investigations, I expect to come across the factors that shape the roles of men. These factors reveal the features of hegemonic masculinity and I will investigate these through a field study, which evaluates some interviews with Turkish men. After a general investigation of the perception of masculinity in Turkish society, I will try to review the representation of masculinity in Turkish cinema in Yeşilçam melodramas and *woman* films. I will try to display the “non-realistic” representation of masculine characters in Yeşilçam by investigating their attitudes and also the changes in the forms of masculinity due to the loss of those values in *women films*. I will try to show how men behave in the face of a threat such as free woman or economic conditions.

#### 3.1 GENDER ROLES IN TURKISH FAMILY STRUCTURE

This part aims at investigating the gender roles in Turkish family structure. The studies about gender in Turkey were developed in a way they are only supplemented by Turkish Feminists’ approaches. On the other hand, despite Turkish society and family structure is shaped being based on men’ position; masculinity studies are still not that sufficient in Turkey.

Deniz Kandiyoti's words evoke self-criticism; she offers to investigate men's group, homosocial structures, which masculinity is reproduced in; like army, rather than investigating women in law or women in mass media (Kandiyoti 2007, p.187). Still, feminist researches widely investigated gender roles and the effects of masculine perception in Turkey. The studies pointed out that women are generally perceived as passive identities in the society and belonged to home; men are generally perceived as active and they are the ones that must earn money and provide family's living in Turkish society. Besides, Turkish family structure has obvious patriarchal features even though women have started to be more visible. These facts gave rise to several studies for an understanding of the father phenomenon in Turkey: fathers being rivals for sons, fathers being jealous of women's interest, fathers as sons, fathers as husbands... These studies served to the purpose of understanding how gender roles come out in Turkish society, and how they are shaped. In this context, Hale Bolak's (1995) research on Turkish family structure may be regarded as an explanatory investigation, especially for understanding men's relation with his family in the context of earning money and child – especially son – care. Before reviewing Hale Bolak's research, Oedipus complex and son's identification with his father in Lacanian terms should be briefly reminded to understand father's attitudes in Turkish family structure. This reminding may help to understand any single man's manners in his personal life, which will constitute a base for Bolak's study when generalized for the whole. In the case of sociological research, I will try to understand fathers' attitude in the light of Hale Bolak's study and through identification process and rivalry in psychoanalytical studies. I will also try to investigate gender roles and masculinity in Turkey on the sociological level by indicating some examples from schoolbooks – from a sociological research – to emphasize gender roles as indicators of femininity and masculinity.

To sum up, in this part, initially the attitudes of father and father-son relations will be investigated to reveal where masculinity starts for Turkish men. Following this, the determination of gender roles during and after childhood period will be studied.

Freud's Oedipus complex theory, furthermore, points out to the child's perception of his/her father and mother. As it has been indicated in the previous chapter, Freud

points out to the father's position for the little boy as a rival and to the fact that the boy wants to take his father's place. Freud defines this case as a "straightforward consequence of the actual state of affairs" with complete clarity and he points out that "We know that that period includes an identification of an affectionate sort with the boy's father, an identification which is still free from any sense of rivalry in regard to his mother." (Freud Ibid, p.15). Plainly, the little boy, after identifying with the father, regards him as a rival, while he does not regard his mother as such. Freud's approach – clarifying the son's position in his family – thought with its opposite, can be helpful to understand the father's situation in the Turkish family structure. Lacan names the identification of the son with his father as *secondary identification*. Secondary identification is Oedipal identification in Lacanian approach; the boy feels his father as a rival after he identifies with him as it has been indicated in the previous chapter (Evans 1996, 2006, p.131). But this is not clearly seen as Lacan indicated: "...the structural effect of identification with the rival is not self-evident, except at the fable, and can only be conceived of if the way is prepared for it by a primary identification that structures the subject as a rival with himself..." (Lacan 2001, pp.17-18). In this context the men in Bolak's research, when they are their father's son and they identify with their father - *secondary identification* - could learn "a father attitude" which they will exert on their sons when they become a father. Nevertheless, here, there could be another inference: A man could be disappointed during his *secondary identification* with his father because his father was careless while he was identified with him. As Bolak's research has shown, most of the men do not want to be interested in their son and this is an experience, which they have never had through their lifetime. Bolak's study also shows that in the half of the Turkish families, which she researched, the wives feels that their husbands are deficient for fatherhood. However, fathers, in spite of their willingness to become better fathers, establish relations with their sons similar to their own stressful relations with their father. Besides, they may enter into *rivalry* with their son especially for the limited financial resources and the mother's interest (Bolak 1995,

p.244). Deniz Kandiyoti quotes Bolak's research<sup>1</sup>: The expenses for better clothes, books or private lessons for supporting their son's education are seen unnecessary by the fathers. Some fathers resent their son, because their son has the luxury and protection that the fathers never had in their own lifetime (Kandiyoti 2007, p.214). On the other hand, as it has been indicated in the previous chapter, in Lacanian sense the relation of the child to the mother, which can be thought as a dual relation, has a priority since the child always desires his/her mother (Evans 1996, 2006, p.130). The father's position, thus, can be regarded as external. This relation comes up later than the mother-child relation and gives a third angle to this dual relation making the structure triad (Ibid, 130). Lacan's concept of "father's externality," may support Bolak's research that investigates Turkish family structure: The men actually are jealous of the women's – the mother and the wife – interest. The reason of father's attitude can be considered as a reflection of their rivalry, as he perceives his son as a thief who has stolen the love and interest, which he desires (Kandiyoti 2007, p.214). In an example, when a mother buys new shoes for their son, the father reacts as "nobody bought *me* shoes like this"<sup>2</sup>. Besides father's jealousy and rivalrous attitude (Kandiyoti, Ibid, p.214), he feels his *externality* as if he is sidelined in this triad relation and this makes him stressful, angry, or aloof. Another example in Bolak's research can support this inference: Many men in the Bolak's research actually cannot control the priority of their wife's expenses and they need to prove their masculinity. For this reason they tend to spend lots of money outside in their social life or lend money to their friends even when they do not have enough money. On the other hand, when it comes to do something for their son they hold back. They could dispute for doing anything, for example, a father does not want to take his son to school when it snows and he says, "my father never had taken to me to the school. He should take care of his own affairs himself." (Kandiyoti 2007, p.215). Actually,

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<sup>1</sup> H.Bolak, "Women Breadwinners and the Construction of Gender: a Study of Urban Working Class Households in Turkey," unprinted Ph. Thesis (Santa Cruz: University of California, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> The example belongs to Bolak's research that Kandiyoti quoted: Bolak, H. "Women Breadwinners and the Construction of Gender: a Study of Urban Working Class Households in Turkey," unprinted Ph. Thesis (Santa Cruz: University of California, 1990).

the fathers in this research, who are “external” in the triad relation in Lacanian approach, behave suitable for their externality. Bolak’s study shows that fathers are generally distant from their son due to his jealousy for his wife’s interest – he thinks the interest that he needs is subjected to his son – and especially for that reason he perceives his son as a rival. This consequence is frequently observed in Bolak’s research through her interviews with fathers. I tried to re-interpret her study by using the psychoanalytical approach. However, for the purpose of improving this part, which includes gender roles in Turkish family structure, I will review some data, which includes reports about gender roles. Furthermore, before reviewing reports I will briefly look over Turkish Civil Law to observe how Turkish government localized femininity and masculinity. Reports also give an idea about this positioning and a general picture concerning the gender perception in Turkey.

Gender roles in Turkish family structure roughly consist of particular roles, in spite of the changing economic conditions after 1980s. Actually on the practical level, roles are subject to change and if gender roles are *fluid* then they do not stay stable. The women in Turkey work in both villages and cities (Ecevit 1995, p.117). But in the context of the gender roles, ‘working woman’ is not a determinative factor in Turkish family structure. The actual work of women seems to be within the home. First, she is a mother and a woman belongs to her home<sup>1</sup>. If she works, her effort is considered as a supplement for family budget (Bolak 1995, p.237). Woman also regards her working as secondary. She works to save money to buy a house or gain her pension right (Bolak Ibid, p.237). Therefore, the husbands may say their wives: “if you cannot combine your work with the household, quit your job.” (Bolak Ibid, p.237).

Meaning of the family may differ among societies and there may be different perceptions regarding family members in various societies and in different areas of law which ordainates society legally. “In different areas of law, however, ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ might have different meanings in different contexts.” (Collier Ibid, p.70). Family can be considered as an area where

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<sup>1</sup> A woman belongs to her home: “Evinin kadını olmak,” this expression is common and used in everyday life in Turkey.

individuals learn and practice how to be a man and woman. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet point out that gender is “embedded in the family, the neighborhood, ...the media, eating in a restaurant...” (Eckert et al. Ibid, p.33). Turkey’s social structure also implies diversity but main associations like law and education define a specific family structure and specify gender roles. Despite the effect of family’s social status on description of gender roles, in Turkey, social authorities still portray recognized gender roles, which are conceived to be the ideal.

Turkish Constitution Law defines the importance of the family in society and describes its basic features. Third part of Turkish Constitution is titled “Social and Economical Rights and Duties” and the first subtitle is “The Protection of the Family.” This part includes this sharp expression: “The family is the foundation of Turkish society. It is based on the equality within the couple – this sentence was added in 2001 –. The state shall take the necessary measures and establish the necessary organization to ensure the peace and welfare of the family, especially the protection of the mother and children and for family planning education and application.” (Turkish Constitution, 41<sup>st</sup> provision). Although the term “family head” has been removed from the Turkish Constitution, the expression “...especially the protection of the mother and children...” maintains this mentality. This constitutional provision excludes men while assigning duties to protect women and child. From this point of view it can be inferred that actually the constitutional provisions are written by the government, it gives a role to itself for the protection of women and child while assigning the same duties to men. 50<sup>th</sup> provision in the same part of the constitution women and children are put together with mentally or physically disabled people: “children, women and persons with physical or mental disabilities shall enjoy special protection with regard to working conditions.” (Turkish Constitution, 50<sup>th</sup> provision). Although Turkish Civil Law was revised in the direction of equality between men and women, the law determines where women, children, and men should stand. The concerning reports of Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği – TÜSİAD) and Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler Derneği – KAGİDER) shows that these revisions are the

consequences of European Union membership process and Woman's Movement in Turkey (TÜSİAD and KAGİDER 2008, p.349). In the context of these revisions, the term "family head" was cancelled and equality for family administration was added. The age for marriage was rearranged as 17 both for men and women, the requirement for husband's permission for women's right to work was cancelled; parental rights were equalized for both mother and father (TÜSİAD and KAGİDER Ibid, p.349). The legal instruments and orders that manage the social structure clearly show that men, women, and children have their place in the society even in the case of equality endeavors. The Civil Law can be considered as the main indicator of these consequences.

"In social life, behavior is governed by informal norms and rules, as well as formal laws" (Pilcher et al. 2004, p.34). Educational materials can be thought as important supportive elements for these norms, rules, and formal laws to govern people's behaviour. Report of The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW - Kadınlara Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi Sözleşmesi) indicates that Directorate General on the Women's Status of Woman (KSGM - Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü) investigated the schoolbooks and several educational materials in 2000-2001. The report points out that this investigation considers human rights and CEDAW and investigates the gender roles, the mission of father and mother, equality of rights in the schoolbooks (TÜSİAD and KAGİDER Ibid, p.72). Furthermore UNESCO's last report, Global Monitoring Report 2007, found deficiencies of the schoolbooks in terms of gender sensitivity in Turkey (Ibid, p.72). These researches show that texts and pictures of these books represent man as active and woman as passive in social life. Schoolbooks include such examples: Woman sews and helps family budget; the quantity of apples, which *Atilla* and *Hasan*<sup>1</sup> pick off, is compared to washed clothes, which *Oya* and *Ayşe*<sup>2</sup> hang out; a picture shows a child who helps his mother to lay a place saying: "my mother cooks, my father works." Another popular schoolbook includes a text that says to boys: "You are coeval with Fatih when he conquered

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<sup>1</sup> "Atilla" and "Hasan" are Turkish male names that are used for giving example in a schoolbook.

<sup>2</sup> "Oya" and "Ayşe" are Turkish female names that are used for giving example in a schoolbook.

Istanbul” and to girls: “You are of the age to bear a child like Fatih.” Moreover, “while woman becomes a teacher, man becomes school director in these schoolbook texts...” (Ibid, p.72). Although such expressions were revised several times these efforts are still not adequate in the eyes of international organizations (TÜSİAD and KAGİDER 2008, p.73).

Kandiyoti indicates that even though Turkish government revised the Civil Law; there are still discriminatory applications in employment, educational, and social security areas (2007 p.187). Fatma Gök, in her research “Education and Women in Turkey” (“Türkiye’de Eğitim ve Kadınlar”), points out that primary education is obligatory for everyone in Turkey so this could be a chance for equality between genders but the schoolbooks which are prepared by the patriarchal system pose an obstacle to this chance of equality (1995, p.186). Gök’s examples from schoolbooks resemble TÜSİAD’s and KAGİDER’s examples, although there are approximately 20 years of period between Gök’s and TÜSİAD and KAGİDER’s investigations and their materials – schoolbooks. However, in vocational education organizations, girls are destined to have an education according to their gender roles and then work in compliance with motherhood, housewife identity or sister roles. Furthermore, men are destined for production-oriented jobs like turnery, cabinetry, or electrician (Gök 1995, p.188). According to a research carried out among working women since 1950, working for salaries is not of primary significance. Working is believed to be something temporary and mandatory. Staying at home is primarily desired and the preferred role is housekeeping and motherhood (Ecevit 1995, p.119). Here, it is worth saying that men and women have different conceptions concerning the work and family sustaining (Bolak 1995 p.239).

Most men are not reconciled with women’s working and sustaining the family, which is one of the fundamental differences between male and female. Kiray noted that women can adapt to unexpected and hard conditions – for instance being a stranger in urban life – more easily than men (Bolak 1995, p.239). In the same way, Kandiyoti highlighted that manhood is continuously being tested and men are faced with the anxiety of losing masculinity (Bolak 1995, p.240). Rejecting the need for women’ salary, exaggerating their own contributions to family budget, and applying



ideological ways of status quo in weakness are noted examples of reactionary manner (Bolak Ibid, p.240). With respect to this, women need not to be taken care of but rather they tend to request men' contribution to household budget (Bolak Ibid, p.240).

In addition to all suggestions and orders, as Chodorow already indicated (Chodorow 1989, p.50), the 'expected roles' given by the system are operative in Turkey too: applied researches have shown that man works, gains money for all the household, does almost nothing at home to help his wife, does not establish a close relationship with his children. However, a woman's actual mission is considered to be childcare and housework, and supporting the family budget follows these. Men' gender role, or "expected action" that suits masculinity, sometimes puts them under pressure. Besides – their tasks to go to work, to gain money – while acting, they should also think what the society and his social environment expects him to do. These are generally accepted roles, women, or men do not question them. The constitution, schoolbooks, and common sense suggest that to exert these roles are required for being accepted in society.

In the following part these questions will be briefly explored: what kind of tasks these regulative instruments – constitution, schoolbooks and common sense – expect men to do and which roles are expected to reproduce masculinity.

### **3.2 MASCULINITY IN TURKEY**

Modernization and women's increasing roles in business life may be considered as two major factors in shaping the masculinity in Turkey, especially in urban life. With industrialization in 1950s; modernization, capital, education, political bases, new symbolic and material resources began gaining importance. Modernization provided a transition process but more than this, it may be regarded as a threat for masculinity. The routines, behavioral patterns that had never been questioned by society, now has started to face the threat of disappearance (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.36). Modernity, which was ambiguous, produced an atmosphere of mistrust.

Traditions, which were supportive for masculinity, were not operative anymore in that atmosphere and capital was the primary decisive element in the modern society. Besides modernization, working women were another effect or factor that reshapes masculinity. Men were obliged to share their primary role, which is gaining money, with women whereas, the “status” of the men as the head of the family in his home was depended on his capability of gaining money (Kandiyoti 2007, pp.192-193). This was an area for men that they could reproduce masculinity but this situation had also started to change. These circumstances of course came into the scene as a result of global dynamics that affected many countries, including Turkey. Especially changing business life, capitalism, and the governments’ attitudes, which supported this system, can be regarded as a kind of hegemonic “system,” which controls the members of the society. The hegemonic system “world” certainly bears male-dominant feature. In this case, if Beasley’s approach<sup>1</sup> is reminded, this system can be described as “supra-hegemonic” masculinity, which is global and regulates the socio-economic and socio-politic conditions. This “de-massification” is necessary for investigating masculinity in Turkey because hegemonic masculinity cannot be solely thought as a “legal system” in Turkish society. As I indicated before, in the presence of “supra-hegemonic” form of masculinity in a society, one should accept the existence of “sub-hegemonic masculinity” and “others.” The elements forming hegemonic masculinity will be seen in the analysis of the forms of masculinity in the post -1990 popular Turkish cinema.

In this part, I will try to examine the characteristics of the masculinity in Turkey in general terms by using the research of Kurtuluş Cengiz et al. (2004) on Turkish men in the context of hegemonic masculinity. This research includes interviews with men and evaluation of these interviews. The results of the research concerning the hegemonic masculinity depict the structure of the hegemonic masculinity in Turkey; how it is experienced and how it is reproduced.

In Turkish language, some expressions and cliché sentences that are used in every day life can give some clues about the perception of masculinity in the society:

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter I, Hegemonic Masculinity

[“karı gibi gülme/konuşma/ağlama, muhallebi çocuğu, kılıbık, ana kuzusu...”]. These expressions are directed to “other” men who are considered to be weak. Non-femininity is the permanent and major rule of being masculine as Connell indicated and these Turkish expressions can be regarded as a warning: “do not be feminine.” Alsop et al. also denote that in western societies, hegemonic masculinity takes place in a frame surrounded by heterosexuality, economic autonomy, taking care of family, rationality, mastering emotions, and except all these, having nothing feminine (Quoted Cengiz et al. 2004, p.55). Having non-feminine features are also necessary for men who are members of western societies too. Turkey is passing through the endless westernization and modernization processes. While modernization and westernization change the conception of masculinity; traditions, cultural habits/perceptions still maintain their effects on social implement of masculinity. The field study of Cengiz et al. can be helpful to understand how masculinity is reshaped under these conditions. Turkish men’ perception of masculinity and how they “do” masculinity can be investigated within this study.

*Physical power* can be regarded as one of the features of hegemonic masculinity because it is still determinant for masculinity, especially in the third world countries. Cengiz et al. indicate that the physical adequacy is important especially for adolescents. The school is the place where they can compare their physical traits in terms of being strong and athletic. If a boy is not strong enough, he can be defined as “like a girl.” The researchers quote an interview with a boy who is 18 years old and a high school graduate and the boy indicates that one of his friends is described as “gay”<sup>1</sup>, because of his physical inadequacy and having more girl friends than boys (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.58).

Another determinant feature of masculinity is *responsibility*. Cengiz et al. indicate that the main thing for all the men interviewed is “standing on their own feet.” In another interview, a boy tells his father’s expectations of him: “my father expects me to become responsible for my life. He expects me not to need someone else and he thinks girls may work but it is not necessary.” (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.59). This

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<sup>1</sup> The boy uses a slang word in Turkish “top” that means a gay.

instance overlaps the common sense in Turkey indicated in the previous part. Despite women should stay at home, a man must work outside.

Another feature of hegemonic masculinity is being *constructed by the “absent others.”* “Absent others” include usually gays and women. When men get together, they insult the “others” through jokes and in their talks. Thus, they homogenize their masculinity (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.59). Insulting gays gives some clues about *homophobia*, and it is even transformed into hatred against homosexuals.

Another observation about the masculinity of Turkish men is their *sensitivity* when they stay alone. This situation of sensitivity may scare them and they may not want to face with their own sensitivity.

Moreover, for the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity, men need *socializing* and particular places serve to their needs. In Turkey these places can be listed as coffeehouse (kahvehane), beerhouse, stadium, body building centers, fight courses, cheap casinos (pavyon) and so forth. These places provide socialization among men and leads to the emergence of men groups. Men, in these places, have to properly behave according to the rules of hegemonic masculinity. Besides, group rituals can be oppressive. If a man does not behave in accordance with hegemonic masculinity, he can be defined as henpecked or gay (“yumuşaklık, ibnelik”) (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.59).

Another feature of hegemonic masculinity is the existence of *hierarchy* and *rivalry* among men. It is reinforced with cliché determinants: youthfulness [delikanlılık], honesty [harbilik], outspokenness [dobraılık], swagger [racon] and so forth. But the case is not that simple; all these components, which construct “youthfulness expression,” imply a hierarchy (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.61). Especially *racon*, which is the accepted and expected way of doing masculinity, is influential in the construction of the hierarchy among the men in groups. Cengiz et al. indicate that “hierarchical regime” works through power relations (2004, p.62). While functioning of this regime is provided via brute force in the sub-income and sub-age groups, it is provided via money and status in mid-class, mid-age and above. In addition to the relationship between the founder codes of this hierarchical regime; their relations with nationalists and conservatives are also remarkable. The mentioned hierarchical

power relations impede the construction of horizontal relations between men (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.62).

Regarding the existence of hierarchy and rivalry among Turkish men, they perceive each other as threatening. It is possible to observe independent, success-oriented and aggressive men to avoid expressing their feelings and establishing intimate relationships not to seem as weak. Cengiz et al. mention, Gough and Edwards (1998, p.2) stated that men, especially in homosocial environments, regard the others as an element of threat and rival, hence this feeling obstruct the establishment and development of genuine relations among them (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.62).

On the other hand, existence of a hierarchical regime does not necessarily correspond to the impossibility of horizontal relationships between men. In fact, there are fairly close relationships between men such as soldiers' friendship, demand friendship, and blood brotherhood (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.63). However, relations between men, in general, are established in the form of formal and distant relationships. The state of hegemonic masculinity prevents to carry on emotional relationships between men, hence men feel annoyed in such close relations (Cengiz et al. 2004, p.64).

In this part, I tried to investigate hegemonic masculinity in the light of a field study. The features of hegemonic masculinity, which this investigation has explored, involve explanation of the hegemonic masculinity structure in Turkey. Physical power, responsibility – that means having a job, gaining money, having a family – , homophobia, sensitivity, socialization needs, hierarchy, and rivalry are the prominent features. In the men's socialization process, hierarchy and rivalry are the inevitable consequences as the investigation showed. And these consequences require de-masification of hegemonic masculinity, which will be used in the analysis of the representation of the masculinity in the last chapter.

### 3.3 REPRESENTATIONS OF MEN BETWEEN 1960 AND 1990 IN TURKISH CINEMA

Due to the evolving social dynamics, especially after 1990, discrepancy and diversity of the notion of masculinity became apparent. Cinema has been one of the most effective instruments to reflect the discrepancy for the last twenty years. Before analyzing the representation of Turkish Men in the post-1990s we should look over pre-1990s Turkish cinema. This period will be investigated in two parts for the purpose of this study: “Yeşilçam melodramas” and “women films” periods. Yeşilçam’s golden era starts in 1960s and ends in the middle of the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s, till the middle of the 1990s, usually “women films” were seen as “so-called extremely popular” as Yusuf Kaplan indicates (Kaplan 1996, p.661). On the other hand, in 1960s’ examples of social realism stream, which is pioneered by Metin Erksan and Halit Refiğ, can be seen in Turkish cinema. While the sense of “easy vertical mobility” among social classes is strengthened via Yeşilçam melodramas (Kirel 2005, p.23), films like *Acı Hayat [Bitter Life]* (Metin Erksan 1962), takes its place among films that propels the spectator to question the social structure. However, the late 1970s have witnessed a crisis in Turkish cinema. The main reason was television coming to the Turkish people’s homes. Thus, the cinema has started to lose its family spectator and these spectators disappeared after wave of pornographic Turkish films in those years. Furthermore, in the 1970s, political films have given a new perspective to Turkish cinema, especially Yılmaz Güney’s and his follower Zeki Ökten’s films have been effective to create New Wave Turkish cinema (Kaplan 1996, p.660).

There are two main reasons to start with 1960s for this investigation: First one is May 27, 1960 military coup, which has brought about many social changes: “After the 1960 military coup, the cultural, political, and social map of Turkey changed considerably...During the 1960s Turkish society witnessed unprecedented cultural and political conflicts, leading to a civil war that lasted into the late 1970s” (Kaplan 1996, p.658). Second reason is that 1960s was the initial years of golden era of Turkish cinema with Yeşilçam melodramas. From the middle of 1960s to the middle

of 1970s, there took place “film inflation” as Nijat Özön indicates (Quoted from Suner 2005, p.30). In 1972, 298 films were produced and this was a record (Quoted from Suner 2005, p.30).

Throughout 1980s and at the beginning of 1990s; due to the socio-economical evolutions, it is observed that, themes as woman’s rights movement, woman’s economic freedom, lonely and urban woman, women’ “desires of their own” (Erdoğan and Göktürk 2001, p.538), were reflected to the cinema. At this point, pacified men have brought diversified representations of masculinities into the scene in 1980s compared to the previous two decades. Before analyzing the forms of masculinity in 1990s and after, reviewing these periods and the representations of the masculinity will prepare a background for the 1990s and the post-1990s in popular Turkish cinema.

### **3.3.1 Men in Yeşilçam melodramas: 1960s and 1970s**

The 1960s started with the military coup. Fundamental reasons behind the May 27, 1960 military coup are pointed out as the inactivation of Menderes’s Democratic Party government’s reforms, stagnancy of economic development and the lack of social justice (Daldal 2005, p.73). Aslı Daldal states that there are many reasons behind the coup and these could be gathered under the concept of “modernization” (Daldal 2005, p.73). After 1960 military coup, two groups emerged: First one was formed of students and intellectuals, who believed that the military coup developed a national economical strategy and they represented an anti-capitalist aspect. The other class was industrial bourgeoisie, which argued for their long-term benefits (Daldal 2005, p.76). After the coup, liberal democratic system did not evolve something other than a socio-democratic constitution, which was in favor of the industrial bourgeoisie (Daldal 2005, p.76). Despite the constitution contributed democratic and political aspects of the social life, political instabilities were observed by the end of 1960s. 1960s and 1970s, which Erik J. Zürcher named as Second Republic (2004, p.241), began in a socio-politically changing environment and was affected by military coups, new constitution, internal immigration, labor migration to Germany, cosmopolitanization of urban population, apartment life, and shantytowns. As Savaş

Arslan indicated: “Both population and industrial growth in Turkey were very high during this period” (Arslan 2005, p.99). Furthermore, Arslan noted “a new way of life and Americanization came to be a reality of Turkish culture in the 1950s, particularly in urban centers among the upper middle-class.” (Arslan 2005, p.100). Collaborating with NATO, Coca-Cola’s entrance to the market, start of television broadcast in 1968 can be considered as signs of Americanization and modernization (Arslan 2005, p.100).

In this period, listening to radio, reading pictured magazines and novels and most importantly going to cinema were main activities of everyday life. Furthermore, in 1970s television broadcast had significance in Turkish people’s everyday lives.

With increasing urbanization and modernization of the Second Republic, cinema became one of the main avenues of entertainment for families. As an entertainment industry, film’s dominance persisted during the 1960s and 1970s, only waning as a result of the competition from television in the late 1970s (Arslan, 2005, p.100).

Besides all these, Turkish urban population had increased by the effect of internal migration and apartment life had become prominent. Co-operative trading system and bank loans were other formations of this period. On the other hand it is quite noticeable that women – which worked in the field of agriculture in 1950s to 1965 started to work for wages outside their houses. But still work of women was not regarded as a primary scope, but a temporary and mandatory situation (Kırel 2005, p.15).

1970s began with another military intervention. It was the Military Ultimatum of 12 March 1971. Demirel’s cabinet was getting weak in this time:

“Demirel’s government, weakened by defections, seemed to have become paralysed. It was powerless to act to curb the violence on the campuses and in the streets and it could not hope to get any serious legislation on social or financial reform passed in the assembly (Zürcher 2004 p.258).

Same year, 1971, “coincided with Yeşilçam’s peak years, it also cut through Turkey’s political and social life yet again” (Arslan 2005, p.99). After this military intervention, the politicians could not make up a cabinet immediately. There was a



squabble among political parties. This period of political crisis lasted long. The political crisis caused a civil war between the Left and the Right. These hard times brought about an economic crisis and “more than the social unrest or even the violence in the streets, it was the growing economic crisis that derailed the governments of the later 1970s.” (Zürcher 2004, p.267). In this period, Turkish citizens were affected by the street fights and the civil war. The other factors influencing them were “growing wealth in the 1960s and early 1970s, shortages and price rises thereafter, and industrialization and large scale migration throughout the period.” (Zürcher 2004, p.269). By the end of the 1970s Turkey’s changing portrait was not pleasing. Zürcher summarized this process from 1950s:

Turkey’s rapid population growth, a lack of opportunities in agriculture, and the attraction of the new industries combined to increase the flow of people from the countryside to the big cities, which had started in the 1950s. Huge numbers of people migrated to Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Adana. There, the squatter towns of *gecekondu* (built at night) dwellings...soon assumed gigantic proportions and their growth has continued. Today over half of the built-up surface of Ankara, the capital, consists of *gecekondu*s, and over half its inhabitants live in them (Zürcher 2004, p.269).

The period’s popular films were melodramas as it was indicated before. Investigating Yeşilçam cinema, Savaş Arslan observes a relationship between Yeşilçam and “Turkification, *hayal*<sup>1</sup>, melodramatic modality, and *özenti*.” Arslan indicates that Yeşilçam’s filmmaking language is “limited to an inferior and anti-realistic” language (Arslan 2005, p.147). This argument is supported by “Turkification” which helped to examine “cultural synthesis:” “...like the early adaptations of melodramas and infringement of series of high drama, or cinema’s location in-between real and magical, Turkification was a process of coexistence between the West and the East” (Arslan 2005, p.147).

In 1960s and 1970s there were large numbers of spectators who loved Yeşilçam melodramas and accordingly many melodramas were shot. The world in Yeşilçam melodramas includes obstacles, struggles, breaking away, and suffering bodies. Suffering bodies may appear as breaking away from the lover or child; blindness;

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<sup>1</sup> “*Hayal* is image, imaginary, dream, mirror, specter, shadow or *wayang*” (Arslan 2005, p.95).

becoming incapacitated; or misunderstandings within the context of economic conditions, social norms, honor, or virtue. One of the characteristic features of these narrations was the fact that they are all “anti-realistic” as Arslan indicated. Especially fulsome coincidences or misunderstandings, which were spectator’s choice, rendered these films anti-realistic. The spectator needs to forget the obstacles in their daily life, which was not cheering in those days as explained above. It was a “dream world” that cannot come true in daily life. And as Dilek Mutlu Kaya indicated it was a medium of *catharsis*, which comes true “identification, binary oppositions, obstacles, and suffering bodies.” Yeşilçam melodramas have a story developing around two heterosexual main characters that stand in the middle of all the struggles and together with some supporting characters. The information about these characters is given in the first moment they appear. Whether they are good or bad, rich or poor, sophisticated or not is affirmed at the beginning of the film. Besides, even though the economic, social, and cultural position changes; character’s kindness or evil is kept steady throughout the film. Therefore, any confusion on the mind of the spectator regarding the character is prevented (Mutlu 2001 p.112). One of the criticisms on Yeşilçam melodramas is about the fact that they are far from rationality. In other words, what happens in these films does not comply with the natural logic of the daily life. Chance, casual events, coincidences, last minute rescues, and miracle endings are indispensable items of melodramatic narrations (Quoted from Mutlu 2001, p.118, Neale 1986 p.6-7). These characteristics are also operative for Yeşilçam melodramas.

“Anti-realistic” narrative structure of Yeşilçam provides characters, who also have anti-realistic features<sup>2</sup>. Here, I will try to briefly investigate the above-mentioned features of male characters in Yeşilçam melodramas, which is the most popular genre in that period. The melodrama’s “anti-realistic” language is in a sense has required characters that has anti-realistic features. These features do not overlap with Hollywood stars who are represented to be “more complete, more powerful, and perfect” (Mulvey 1975, pp.6-18). Hollywood characters may be perceived at the

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<sup>2</sup> Social realist films can be thought as excepted

fantastic level. However, Yeşilçam's male characters, as Arslan has indicated for Yeşilçam cinema, are "Turkified" and they are in-between the modern and the traditional. What does make them anti-realistic? In order to find the answer of this question, main male characters should be explored.

In Yeşilçam period there were both female and male film stars, who were the most significant factor behind the box-office success. Male stars were also called *jeune*. *Jeunes*, who attracted much attention, were involved in such a system that the subject of the film may be identified with star's name or it may cause an expectation on the spectator about the film (Kırel 2005, p.198). Ellis's note for stars also overlaps with Yeşilçam stars: "they [Stars] provide a foreknowledge of the fiction, an invitation to cinema." (2001, p.91). The prominent actors of those years usually fought with someone as Cüneyt Arkın or were known for his romantic and poetic features as Göksel Arsoy (Kırel 2005, p.198). Thus, the spectator knows that if he/she watches Göksel Arsoy's film, he/she will witness romantic scenes. First male star Ayhan Işık is still remembered with his role of "the modest, honest, handsome young man, well-liked by neighbors, and sporting a Clark Gable moustache." Fatih Özgüven describes the characters that Ayhan Işık has played, as always respecting law, order, and social morality, despite some obstacles, which makes him a "victim of society" (Özgüven 1989, p.35). Işık's characters most commonly are modern looking men but personal traits of these characters indicate that they carry on the characteristics of "ideal Turkish men." Eşref Kolçak is another similar type of actor "whose films were particularly popular in the provinces with his moustache and richly brilliantined, carefully combed hair" (Özgüven 1989, p.36). Another portrait of male characters was "the iron fist" - "tough guy" acted by Cüneyt Arkın, Kadir İnanır and Fikret Hakan. Fatih Özgüven states that "Although the iron fist, the 'tough guy' mannerisms had to bow to social consciousness, the 'tough guy' ethic persisted as a style" (Özgüven 1989, p.36). These characters have common features. All of them are accepted as handsome, brave, smart, and clever – they don't have to be rich but they are smart; what they do, they do best – and they are devoted to their loved ones. The other side of the coin is very different. Besides these features which make them ideal, due to the melodrama's narration style, they generally become

“victim of misunderstandings.” Because of an “unfortunate coincidence” they usually think that their lovers are cheating on them with another man. After this point, instead of the clever, brave, and smart man, we are faced with a “loser.” Because of his pain he may seem very angry, he hates women, drinks much, and even becomes blind or crippled because of an accident. They become aggressive, cruel, and painful but always remain honored. When the truth is revealed in the story, usually male character offers his apologies to his lover. All of these features are represented by the same characters and these changes happen very fast. This incoherence can be interpreted as the existence of “anti-realistic” characteristic features and manners especially when they are all together observed on the same character. As Mutlu emphasized, being non-confusing and non-surprising are true for both melodramas and characters. These are the expected roles and manners of the characters and thus, the characters do not surprise the spectator. This situation prevents the diversification of the male characters. The masculinity forms do not show much variance.

*Jeunes* in Yeşilçam melodramas cannot be naturally considered as “perfect and complete.” The spectators sometimes see them while suffering, blind or drunk. On the other hand they are always proud, decent, young, handsome, “poor, but proud,” protecting woman’s virtue, behaving manly in the way society expects them. This was the main feature of stars, *jeunes*. In conclusion, all the characteristic features and reactions, which male characters had and showed in one story throughout the film, make them, end up with “non-realistic” characteristics.

### **3.3.2 Men in “women films”: the 1980s**

During the 1980s Turkish cinema was unsuccessful at the box-office. This period corresponded to the post sex films era. In this period enterprises were passive and directors tried to shot films with their own resources and thus low production budgets. This situation has brought a kind of independence to directors and “auteur” cinema started to appear (Erdoğan 2001 p.224). These films contain two patterns in narrative: First one is director’s pains and search for his/her creativity. Second is women’s world. However Savaş Arslan stated about the existence of three

genrifications in the 1980s: “individualist *auteur* films, films about women, and social realist films.” (2005, p.250). I will try to investigate men in women films because the changing face of masculinity is clearly seen in these films. Other two genres may be less efficient for the investigation in representation of masculinity. “Auteur” films includes, as Arslan indicated, individual patterns and regarding “social realist” films, Nezhir Erdoğan states that, in this period directors created sophisticated and hidden methods because of the pressure of “12 Eylül”<sup>1</sup> which also started a military coup – September 12, military coup –.

Before investigation of men in women films, a brief review about hard conditions of the era is needed. The intervention in 1980 was a traumatic experience for the period’s people. Being different from the other two coups, September 12 military coup was very restrictive and 1982 Turkish Constitution was aloof from the previous. Eric Zürcher calls this period The Third Republic, and he considers that it continues (2004, p.278). This intervention changed social and economic conditions as the former coups of 1960 and 1971 did.

Zürcher indicates that the coup had been planned a year before and military had a list, which included the names of the people to be arrested. Some numerical data can be helpful to show how unnerving these times were:

In the first six weeks after the coup 11,500 people were arrested; by the end of 1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests had been made. By September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still in prison, 30,000 of them awaiting trial. The positive effect of this policy was that the number of politically motivated terrorist attacks diminished by over 90 per cent...The negative side was that it was achieved at great human and social cost. It was not only suspected terrorists who were hunted down and arrested. Respectable trade unionists, legal politicians, university professors, teachers, journalists and lawyers, in short anyone who had expressed even vaguely leftist (or in some cases Islamist) views before September 1980, was liable to get into trouble (Zürcher 2004, pp.279-280).

These difficult times of arrests, tortures, censorships, and executions lasted for the following three years. In these three years, freedom and rights of people were limited. After this period Anavatan Party, which was under the leadership of Özal,

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<sup>1</sup> 12 Eylül: 12<sup>th</sup> September. Date of the military coup in 1980.

won the election. With Özal government, economic conditions started to change and free market economy affected people's daily lives. This meant a kind of competition in the market. There were always winners and losers in the competitions and the free market economy had "led to a growth in the gap between the lower and upper-classes....in the cultural gap between the lower and upper-classes that paralleled growing economic inequality" (Arslan 2005, pp.240-241). It may be interpreted that economic conditions and changing social structure, unemployment of men who are expected to earn a living for his family, military coups, and the resulting traumas had affected men in a different manner compared to women. Besides, men, who spent a lot of time outside, earned money for their living, socializing and reproducing masculinity; especially after 1980 military coup, turned them and even the ones who supported the coup into people that feared to go outside, lived in horror and anxiety, feeling hegemonic oppression. It may also be stated that in addition to this oppression and trauma, fast development of free market economy had an additional collision on masculinity, because changing social and economic environment was not capable of providing the promised wealth and peace. Phrases like price increase, inflation, rising taxes took its place in everyday language and daily newspapers. In that period; women, who get tired of oppression both started to work to earn their living and started to fight for their rights. When it came to 1990s, despite the disapproval of husbands, fathers, or brothers, there were many women from different socio-economic levels working in several sectors.

Turkish cinema in 1980s witnessed these conditions and was shaped being affected by them. In that period, predominantly, "serious" films were shot (Arslan 2005, p.250). Hard circumstances of the period and the existence of "serious" films led to a need to move away or escape from political reality and to an increased use of fantasy within cinema." (Arslan, p.250). In this context, according to Arslan, the notion "hayal" gains another meaning:

...the *hayal* aspect of Yeşilçam was carried to a new dimension, where various characters of the 1980s cinema, through their dreams, escaped from the realities of daily life that offered a harsh and violent past and helplessness in the present. Thus films dealing with the military intervention were characterized by themes

including depression and insomnia, as well as with daydreaming and fantasy  
(Arslan 2005, p.250)

Here Arslan points out to the films that deal with military intervention but at the same time he attracts the attention to the “various characters of the 1980s cinema.” Regarding this, I will concentrate on “various characters of the 1980s cinema,” who are the male characters in women films and who escape from realities of daily life through their dreams. I will also work on the depression and insomnia of male characters in women films, as Arslan noted, which are dealing with military intervention.

The male characters, in 1980s women films are far more different than Yeşilçam *jeunes*. Male actors such as Yılmaz Zafer, Macit Koper, Aytaç Arman, Halil Ergün, and Cihan Ünal are leading male actors but they are not regarded as stars. The characters in these films generally have inner problems. Despite the language used and the portrait of characters are realistic, they do not reflect daily problems of life but rather these films stress the inner problems of the characters. “Depression,” “insomnia” or their “daydreaming” are often observed among the male characters. For instance, in *Med Cezir Manzaraları / Scenes of the Ebb Tide* (Mahinur Ergun, 1989), the male character Erol (Kadir İnanır) portrayed a problematic man who is alone, helpless, and having a big problem with sleeping. The psychiatrist, who is a friend of Erol’s lover, Zeynep (Zuhal Olcay) diagnoses him as manic-depressive. The psychiatrist takes the following notes for Erol in the film: “Erol Aksoy: Senior executive in a bank. He is successful and ambitious. In his attitudes and eyes there is something as if he is the owner of everything and besides there is a huge fear. He tries to cover his fear with his scary attitudes.” Nejat Ulusay indicates that masculinity widely loses its power in 1980s’ Turkish cinema (2004, p.144). Especially in women films, we observe problematic of men as Ulusay indicated. Women’s changing role in the society and changing perception of women were reflected in the films of the period. The masculinity was under a threat in those films. The dialog between Erol and Zeynep, after Erol slaps Zeynep, is worth to note:

Zeynep: You are a jerk! Slapping when troubled. You have no respect for anything!

Erol: Why do you enforce me to do it? You are not Zeynep anymore.

Zeynep seems to be talking within hegemonic masculinity, pressure of which women remained under for a long time. However, Erol helplessly accuses her for no more being herself; because Zeynep/woman is not an approval mechanism for masculinity anymore, and she is a modern, free, working woman who owns an identity as opposed to the expectations of masculinity. Erol brings a solution to his helplessness, – which is brute force – that is considered as incompatible with modern/urban life.

In the study of male characters, changing moral attitudes are observed. Male characters, in order to prove hegemonic masculinity, want to show their “sexual power” to both the women and themselves. In the same film titled *Med Cezir Manzaranları* Erol is described as a “sexomaniac.” In *Adı Vasfiye / Her name is Vasfiye* (Atıf Yılmaz, 1985), the “real” and the “imagined” are intertwined, and Vasfiye’s (Müjde Ar) first husband Emin (Aytaç Arman) is transformed into a bully man after challenging his father and elder brother to protect his wife’s decency. He sleeps with another woman, they divorce and Vasfiye marries another man but Emin continues to sleep with her ex-wife - Vasfiye. At the end of the film, we see Emin as a “fancy man” who sells Vasfiye but Vasfiye is not the woman whose story we have seen; she is a singer in a cheap casino and the character Emin embodies the changing values clearly.

However, *Ahh Belinda / Ahh Belinda* (Atıf Yılmaz, 1986) shows us a “nightmare” version of a woman. The “real” and the “imagined” are intertwined in this film, too. Serap (Müjde Ar) is an actress and she has a lover who is also an actor (Yılmaz Zafer). During the shooting of an advertising film in a bath – which is a set – she finds herself in a bath that is in a house belonging to Naciye (Müjde Ar). In that house, she is a woman who has two children and a husband; and her nightmare starts here. She is exactly sure that she does not belong to that house and her husband Selçuk (Macit Koper), who always tries to assure her that she belongs to that home and she is his wife. Besides Naciye’s boring life, her husband Selçuk is a very



irritating character. He expects Naciye to become a woman that belongs to her home, caring her children, respecting and serving to her mother/father-in-law. Furthermore, Naciye works as an officer in a bank and at the same time Selçuk expects her to do the housework. The husband regards this situation as normal because he comes from a world where hegemonic masculinity commands and this character is obviously portrayed as a nightmare for a free, modern woman. Thus, it is clearly seen that the woman who used to be an approval mechanism for hegemonic masculinity, is now transformed into a new kind of threat on the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity. These male characters' features reflect the hegemonic masculinity attitudes but, as Ulusay indicates, masculinity is getting weaker, characters experience difficulties and can not adapt to the changing dynamics.

In addition to these characters, in this period there are also characters bearing the features of non-hegemonic masculinity. For instance in *Mine* (Atıf Yılmaz, 1982) the male character İlhan (Cihan Ünal) is a writer, an intellectual and a sentimental man or in *Hayallerim Aşkım ve Sen / My Dreams, My Love, and You* (Atıf Yılmaz, 1987) Coşkun (Oğuz Tunç), the male character, loves a famous actress Derya Aytınay (Türkan Şoray) and devotes himself to this love. He lives this love in his *dreams* with two women, both of whom Derya Altınay plays in her films. Furthermore, he aims to write a scenario that includes a role for Derya Altınay, who acts and behaves according to his expectations. He tries to reach her through the scenario. These attitudes can be interpreted as passiveness, which do not coincide with hegemonic masculinity attitudes.

Representation of hegemonic masculinity seems to be under a threat in women films. This period is affected by main social processes, which are feminist movement, changing economic conditions, 1980 military coup, and polarizations in society on the political level. All of these processes affected gender roles and reshaped them. By the effect of these processes, in the society a fragmentation occurred, especially changing gender role dynamics brought a diversification of masculinity. These masculinities were represented in Turkish cinema and we see various men characters as being different from those of Yeşilçam cinema. We see

depressive, irritating, non-hegemonic, nervous, sensitive types of men who lack moral values in 1980s Turkish cinema.

In this chapter, I tried to investigate gender roles in Turkish family structure and masculinity in Turkey. Afterwards, I tried to research the representation of masculinity in Turkish cinema in Yeşilçam melodramas – 1960s and 1970s – and in women films –1980s.

For the exploration of the gender roles in the family, I used Hale Bolak's study on Turkish family structure, which also shows the attitudes of the father in the family and points out father-son relations briefly. I tried to analyze her research in the context of psychoanalysis that investigates rivalry in father-son relation in Freudian terms and externality of father in Lacanian terms. This method helped me to evaluate father's attitudes – jealousy, competition with son for the interest of mother (his wife), distance with son, and carelessness for his son and so forth – and also to understand how he behaves in his family life being a member of the system of masculinity. Moreover, Bolak's research includes working women and reactions of men to this situation. In addition to Bolak's research, to improve this part – which includes gender roles in Turkish family structure – I reviewed some data, which includes reports and studies the gender roles in Turkey. Throughout these studies, the shaping of gender roles presented in schoolbooks is observed. As a result of these investigations, one can come across that the men roles are shaped in accordance with breadwinning, having hands-off-attitudes, perceiving the income of working women as a supporter to the family budget and being conditioned to reproduce masculinity. Thus, the reproduction of masculinity depends on and is enforced by the accomplishment of some criterions of masculinity, which can be listed as physical power, responsibility, breadwinning, homophobia, hierarchy, and rivalry. These criterions that took from a field study – evaluating interviews with Turkish men – (Cengiz et al. 2004) describe the features of hegemonic masculinity. Resources about masculinity are restricted in Turkey and this investigation has contributed to understand the general portrait of the masculinity, which we roughly know from feminist studies.

The general portrait of masculinity is brought in a point of view to study the representation of masculinity in Turkish cinema. Turkey witnessed different forms of masculinity in Turkish cinema. These forms are reshaped through socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-cultural conditions. In Yeşilçam period, the melodrama was the most popular genre. Masculinity forms in these films did not represent much diversification. Characters had distinguished features like honor, toughness, handsomeness, and bravery. But besides all, when exposed to any misunderstanding, for example when they think they are deceived by their lover, they become “loser”s and they seem weak, as opposed to the fact noted above. This appearance makes the characters “non-realistic” being compatible with the narrative structure of Yeşilçam melodramas. However, in 1980s’ films, forms of masculinity diversify and male characters are represented as passive characters. It may be said that masculinity is under threat in these films and some main moral values are lacking in these characters. For this reason we come across depressive, irritating, sensitive, and nervous men characters in women films. Through these films, changing face of the hegemonic masculinity is clearly observed. Here I tried to prepare a kind of background for the post-1990s Turkish cinema and the analysis of the representation of the masculinity in that period’s popular films. But, prior to that, I will introduce the socio-cultural background of the post-1990s.

#### 4. REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN THE POST-1990S POPULAR TURKISH CINEMA

In this chapter, my aim is to analyze different representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema in the context of hegemonic masculinity. For this purpose, I tried to investigate the concept of hegemonic masculinity in terms of the explanations mentioned in the first chapter. The common view about hegemonic masculinity is that it subordinates women and other forms of sub-masculinity categories (*for multiple masculinities, see Chapter I, Key Studies on Masculinity*). Connell, who may be considered as a pioneer in masculinity studies, indicates hegemonic masculinity as one of the masculinity forms and he positions it as the “pinnacle of a pyramid” (Connell and Messerschidt 2005, p.845). Furthermore, Connell describes hegemonic masculinity as “world scale” in terms of globalization (Connell 2000, p.52). He names this form of masculinity as “transnational business masculinity,” and considers hegemonic masculinity as a “singular monolith” (Beasley 2009, p.61). This perception is another common view among researchers which views the hegemonic masculinity as a massified concept. However, Beasley “de-massifies” hegemonic masculinity with three categories; “supra-hegemonic” relates to money, state, business life on a global level, whereas “sub-hegemonic” is on the national/local level and relates to being in-between the others which are categorized as non-hegemonic and “supra-hegemonic”.

I will try to analyze the post-1990s popular Turkish films according to Beasley’s approach. I will “de-massify” films in three categories as “sub hegemonic masculinity and its heroes, supra hegemonic masculinity and its victims, non hegemonic masculinity and its others.” Films in each category represent hegemonic masculinity forms and I will try to analyze the relations among these forms through Beasley’s approach; how they influence each other and how they re-produce these forms. After this analysis, I will take a look at the concepts of homosociality, male solidarity or competition and homophobia in these films. Finally, I will try to show that even though the hegemonic masculinity structure still persists, it has some

breaking points. In some cases it has already been broken, in some we witness it breaking.

Before analyzing these films, the socio-cultural background of the post-1990s in Turkey should be explained briefly and after that, the short information about “new Turkish cinema” should be investigated to emphasize which films are left out of this thesis and which films are the starting point of this study and why.

#### **4.1 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACETS OF THE POST-1990s TURKEY**

The military coup in 1980 terminated many things, matters and means together with the sex boom of the 70s. Right after mid-1980s, with the second sex wave the media began to present the whole culture with a pornographic understanding. This second boom was different in many respects. First of all, it was more common and spread; it was not only offered to men who entered low and dark cinema halls, but also presented to the gaze of the whole family. Secondly, it acquired a more “cultured” quality through the language provided by media, advertisement, and entertainment industry. The sex boom supplied itself as the “culture itself” rather than a sub-culture of prohibition, ban, secrecy, guilt, or a humorous remark intended to provoke laughter and expected to alleviate all. Perhaps above all, there was a promise of freedom behind (Gürbilek 2001, p.22). Turkish society, after the military coup, in the face of an unfair political power, once again found itself in the position of a child in 1980s. It loved not only children faces bathed in tears and child singers screaming and singing with pain; but also the whole scene that the big city once again identified with pain and pain identified with childishness (Gürbilek 2001, pp.42, 43). Nurdan Gürbilek displays Turkish society’s changing perception of pain in the 1990s: the faces of children are no more represented with the images of suffering. She mentions that these children have grown up and they changed. The image of justice-dispensing with vulnerable children, being defeated at an early age in an unjust world; left its place to a dangerous and devastating image which is a threat standing against urban life and always ready to commit a crime (Gürbilek 2001,

p.45). The post-1990s popular Turkish cinema supplied its subject matter absent from these conditions. The suffering children in the environment of a big city were left homeless, fatherless and abused. Here children should be considered as grown up men, as Gürbilek mentions. Precisely for that reason, they were both the offender and the victim, vulnerable and robust; children and adults (Gürbilek 2001, pp.43, 44) and we see them as such on the screen.

We should not forget that the image took its main power from the injustice that took place in the country. The child's orphaned state is stemmed from being deprived of a fair father rather than lacking of a biological father. This deprivation reinforced its credibility by the images of unfair father who is harsh to his children and images of innocent children who are penalized; and the images of an unfair state which is harsh to the people (Gürbilek 2001, p.44). Therefore, today's popular imagination feeds itself through "third page news" and "reality shows" which dominate almost entire media and they talk about transformation of the "suffering poor" to a dangerous mass.

#### **4.2 TURKISH CINEMA IN THE POST-1990s**

The post-1990s Turkish cinema is generally named as "new Turkish cinema." As Asuman Suner indicates, the crisis of Turkish cinema that deepened over the years came to an end in the 1990s (2005, p.33). However, the reason was not an increase on the number of films produced as it was in the 1970s. The reasons behind this relief were international recognition and awards as well as the peace made between the spectators and cinema (Suner 2005, p.33.)

Suner indicates that there are two major genres in new Turkish cinema: "popular" and "art." Attributes of popular film can be defined as big budgets, star players or directors, advertising campaigns, and wide distribution possibilities. However, "art" films have smaller budgets, no advertising campaigns, no stars but winning awards on the international level. These films are considered as prestigious products (Suner 2005, p.33). The starting point of the popular genre of new Turkish cinema is

considered *Eşkîya / The Bandit* (Yavuz Turgul, 1996). In the narrative structure of *Eşkîya / The Bandit* there are main oppositions such as love/money, personal morality/financial success. Furthermore, *Eşkîya / The Bandit* has a flashy film language like Hollywood films. Thus, this film may be considered as a synthesis of the West and the local norms. This feature of the film, in addition, bears a special meaning for being the starting point of film analysis in this thesis. The film narrates a *local* man's story in the new world's order. *Eşkîya*'s box-office success was impressive: approximately two million and five hundred spectators watched the film in the movie theaters (Suner 2005, p.34). This success showed a narration formula which catches spectator's attention; hence, *Eşkîya / The Bandit* can be accepted as a milestone for new (popular) Turkish cinema. The last decade witnessed commercial success of popular Turkish films reducing the share of Hollywood films in the Turkish movie market. *Vizontele / [The Television]* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2000) accessed over three million spectators and *G.O.R.A. / G.O.R.A.* (Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2004) gathered over four million spectators (Suner, 2005, p.35). In 1996, when *Eşkîya / The Bandit* was released, another film, *Tabutta Rövaşata / Somersault in a Coffin* (Derviş Zaim, 1996), which can be described as an "art" film, was also shown in the movie theaters. This film silently marked its importance in this period through its awards. It won 22 prizes from international festivals (Suner, 2005, p.37). Other "art" films were also gaining success by winning prizes and gaining recognition with awards. According to Asuman Suner *Tabutta Rövaşata / Somersault in a Coffin* was especially significant, since it was simple and yet highly impressive. In the following years, similar films – *Masumiyet / Innocence* (Zeki Demirkubuz, 1997), *Kasaba / The Town* (Nuri Bilge Ceylan, 1997), *Mayıs Sıkıntısı / Clouds of May* (Nuri Bilge Ceylan, 1999), *Güneşe Yolculuk / Journey to the Sun* (Yeşim Ustaoglu, 1999) – were released and they won several prizes in film festivals and garnered international recognition (Suner 2005, p.37).

The main differences between popular and art films are their box-office success and the awards they receive. Even an art film winning awards in Cannes Festival did not mean that it would draw an audience like popular films, and popular films did not win many international awards.

I will analyze the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish films, which took place among the top three films in each year at the box office. I will consider popular Turkish films according to Asuman Suner's approach; they are successful at the box office and their narrative structure is different from "art" films, they have a showy film language like Hollywood as aforementioned. The first example of this genre is *Eşkiya / The Bandit*; therefore, I will start to analyze representation of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema with this film.

#### **4.3 REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN THE POST-1990s POPULAR TURKISH CINEMA**

In this part, I will try to analyze the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema through "hegemonic masculinity" and its instruments and its rules; "homosocial structure" and "homophobia." In the previous part, I indicated that the period of new Turkish cinema has started in 1996. *Eşkiya / The Bandit* (Yavuz Turgul, 1996) was the representative for its own genre – popular – in 1996 and it was the most successful film at the box office in that year with two million and five hundred spectators. Besides their same narration structure, these popular films have another common feature: they are male-centered films.

In my analysis, hegemonic masculinity, by following Beasley's approach, is differentiated as *supra* and *sub* hegemonic forms, contrary to Connell's (Connell talks about hegemonic masculinity as a global construct). However, Beasley gives a new dimension to hegemonic masculinity, which allows the analysis of local hegemonic masculinity forms. Beasley suggests that the concept of hegemonic masculinity can be "de-massified" as "*supra*-hegemonic" – on the global level, it relates to money, state, and business life – and "*sub*-hegemonic" – on the national/local level, it relates to being in-between "*supra*-hegemonic" and others – non-hegemonic. According to her, "*sub*-hegemonic" masculinity includes "every-bloke" and it bears local features. Here, "local "*sub*-hegemonic" masculinity" can be



explained as being “ideal.” These men who are on the “*sub-hegemonic*” level can be thought as “working-class-inflected,” such as ordinary soldiers or manual workers. Briefly, “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity bears these main features: It includes “every-bloke,” in other words “working-class-inflected,” it has local and national features; the men, who are on the “local *sub-hegemonic*” level, are represented as powerful and ideal; they are in-between “*supra-hegemonic*” and “others” and they are generally “situated *against* the...authority of more powerful models of masculinity...but also as *complicit* with/culturally aligned with...*supra* hegemonic masculinities” (Beasley 2009, p.64).

“*Supra-hegemonic*” masculinity symbolizes globalized men/power, which belong to the metropolises. Despite, globalized “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinities represent being more powerful, they seem less masculine. “*Supra-hegemonic*” masculinity has the authority and capital. Here, *supra-hegemonic* masculinity may correspond to what Connell terms as the “transnational business men.” They may be considered through power which comes with money or capital. Therefore, capitalist system allows for the legitimization of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. In Beasley’s investigations she mentions the “other” as the marginalized “others” or masculinities (2009, p.64). She explains them as “comparatively emasculated, as lacking the power to diminish the imperial master by seducing or otherwise thwarting the master’s authority” (2009, p.74). Beasley also adds a feature to the “other” as being “oppressed” by the *sub-hegemonic* or the *supra-hegemonic* (2009, p.73). This form which is “non-hegemonic,” as Beasley indicates, involves the “de-massification of hegemonic masculinity” in Australian cinema; and I will try to use her approach as a tool while analyzing the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema. This de-massification allows for an analysis of a “range of hegemonic masculinities.” It enables the understanding of the relations between hierarchically organized and hegemonic masculinities.

In this context, the post-1990s box-office hits that are mentioned below represent forms of hegemonic masculinities. I will try to analyze the main characters’ attitudes and their positioning by layering hegemonic masculinity through Beasley’s approach. I will classify these films in three groups: sub hegemonic masculinity and

its heroes, supra hegemonic masculinity and its victims, and non-hegemonic masculinity and the others. If they are explained briefly in order: first, “*sub-hegemonic* masculinity and its heroes” films include male characters who act against “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and sometimes sustain “others” as Beasley indicated. Despite “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity’s power, these films bear less masculine features and utilize illegal or catchy methods. Thus, they illustrate the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity as a damaging factor for masculinity and in them, “*sub-hegemonic*” heroes punish the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. Second, “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity appears as a symbol in the films displaying their victims and this symbolic form represents the state. The films, in which “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity shape narration and influence the male characters’ behaviors, comprise the “*supra-hegemonic*” notion as the omissions of state services or impositions. The effect of “*supra-hegemony*” appears on male characters as an injury. Such films start with male characters who are members of sub-hegemonic masculinity but because of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, they become victims and sometimes choose being the “other” instead of staying “in-between.” Thirdly, we see “non-hegemonic masculinity and the others” in some other films. The characters in these films do not have hegemonic features and are not members of hegemonic masculinity that generally oppresses them. Thus, sometimes they try to integrate to the system; in general, they try to have power and money. These characters always have a dream or a goal and – as Beasley indicates – for this purpose, sometimes they “thwart the master’s authority.” Their non-hegemonic features make them the “other.” In these films which are separated in three groups the breaking points of hegemonic masculinity can be seen when the male characters are de-masified. This allows one to analyze these films through homosocial structure, too.

Men’s socialization process among other men leads to the construction of particular male collectivities, which has particular features, norms, and hierarchies. The homosocial notion can be used to describe these collectivities – which are composed of a single gender – that legitimize their attitude. Here, the homosocial collectivities refer to, for instance, the army, the financial sector, sports, and the police

organization (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.32), or small men groups which can be found in some male places such as clubs and coffee houses [kahvehane] in Turkey. These constitutions include the hegemonic structure which are dominant over the same sex people and which generate various subject constitutions. Hierarchical relations among men may reveal male solidarity and rivalry. In the socialization process, men's attitudes depend on the homosocial structure's necessities. These can be named as typical socialization models and they emphasize the importance of socialization through the reproduction of masculinity. In these discussions, there are eight points which stress the importance of socialization for the constitution of masculinity and these are legitimized in homosocial associations that men constitute. The first trait is *presence of outside world*. This world includes models, who are powerful, feel no pain, do not cry, and are rational. Other traits are "*using women*" – in housekeeping chores and child caring – "*silence,*" "*loneliness,*" "*rationality,*" "*control position*" which indicates the demands of domination made by men, "*violence,*" and "*physical distance.*" Homosocial structure provides an area, classic male area, in which (hegemonic) masculinity can be reproduced and where there is no place for women or femininity in it. This non-feminine condition brings about homophobia. While Kimmel indicates the constitutive elements of hegemonic masculinity, he notes three elements: sexism, racism, and homophobia. Any feminine situation is the threat for the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity. The homosocial structure, as an area providing the reproduction of masculinity, requires some rules that I indicated above as eight traits. These traits have been emphasized through their necessity to construct and reproduce masculinity. The presence of any feminine attitude can cause a threat for the reproduction of masculinity and because of that, homophobic attitudes can appear in homosocial structures. These attitudes may lead to aggressivity, aversion or *violence*. The homosocial structure's conditions and homophobia are the main instruments of the construction and reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity and they can be considered as criteria for hegemonic masculinity. In this context, the forms of masculinity, which seem or try to be in hegemonic masculine form, actually have breaking points that are represented in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

While analyzing representations of masculinity in the post-1990s Turkish cinema, the de-massification of hegemonic masculinity, the investigation of ‘every-bloke’ and its participants in Turkey, the search for the existence of characteristics that Beasley mentions, contribute to the analysis of masculinity representations. Other determinative tools of this study are the homosocial structure and homophobia. Actually, we may say that homosocial structure is a consequence or an outcome of hegemonic masculinity. However, homophobia is a condition or result of masculinity. Homophobia and homosocial structure are concepts which are inclusive of hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, it is possible to argue that in an examination of the representations of masculinity in popular Turkish cinema, hegemonic masculinity will stand as the main axis of this study. In conclusion, in Beasley’s approach, the de-massification of hegemonic masculinity, as well as with men’s socialization process and its rules, men’s reactions to the facts and elements which threaten their being and subsistence – like gays – in their socialization period, may be thought as the principal elements that support this study. Through these tools it will be possible to see the breaking points of hegemonic masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema.

#### **4.3.1 Sub-hegemonic masculinity and its heroes**

The films introducing “sub-hegemonic masculinity and its heroes” feature male characters who act against “supra-hegemonic” masculinity and sometimes sustain “others” as Beasley indicated too. Despite “supra-hegemonic” masculinity has a great power, it bears less masculine features and uses illegal or catchy methods. Thus, these films show the “supra-hegemonic” masculinity as a damaging factor for masculinity and “sub-hegemonic” heroes punish the “supra-hegemonic” masculinity.

##### **4.3.1.1 Drama**

This section includes films, *Eşkiya / The Bandit* (Yavuz Turgul, 1996) and *Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* (Ömer Vargı, 2007), which represent the male character as punishing the “supra-hegemonic” masculinity. The characters, in these films, are veteran in their profession – bandit (*Eşkiya*) and bully (*Kabadayı*). Both films

include heroes who save “others” and act against the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity in their in-between space. They are portrayed in an “ideal” masculine form and they serve as exemplars of what makes a “real” man.

*Eşkîya / The Bandit's* (Yavuz Turgul, 1996) main character Baran (Şener Şen) is an old bandit. He gets out of the prison after 35 years and the story starts at the present day (in 1996). Baran has unchanged and strong values, which he maintained even in prison. He is a man of few words, he is a naïve, brave, cool, merciful, fearless, honorable, reliable and honest man who protects his own friends and who stays loyal to his lover until he dies. He is represented as the “ideal” male with local features of a “*sub*-hegemonic” man. Despite of his strong character, we see Baran in the metropolis – Istanbul – like a “child” who does not know anything about urban life (Suner, 2005, p.85) and needs protection in the “modern” urban world. Cumali (Uğur Yücel), who met Baran on a train going to Istanbul, seems to be the opposite of Baran. He is a drug dealer, liar, unreliable, fearful, young man, who acts with exaggerated masculine gestures and speaks a lot. As though, Cumali is corrupted by today’s world’s conditions. Despite all of these, Cumali is warm hearted; he is represented as a victim of the system. He helps Baran in the big city; finds him a place to stay and watches for him, but only “for a while.” When the conditions are reversed – Cumali gets into trouble – Baran takes the initiative and we witness his powerful and legendary side. We see solidarity of two men; and in it, there is no hegemonic structure. However, this closeness between two men, which is not acceptable in hegemonic masculinity world, is justified as a father-son relation:

Baran: If I had a son, he would have been the same age with you.

Cumali: If my father had lived, he would have been the same age with you.

Furthermore, both characters’ fathers were victims and both characters have traumatic incidents in their past. While Baran tells his own story shortly, he says that the landlord [ağa]<sup>1</sup> in their village was very hard on his father and he – Baran – rebelled and escaped to the mountains where he joined the bandits. But the sharpshooter Baran got arrested when his best friend Berfo (Kamuran Usluer)

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<sup>1</sup> Chief, belonging to a class of land owners and administrates people who live in the village.

betrayed him and informed the gendarmes where he hides. Moreover, Berfo steals Baran's money and pays the bridal money to be able to marry with Baran's lover. Baran's prison life and his best friend's betrayal are very traumatic incidents for him. On the other hand, Cumali's stepmother cheated her husband, Cumali's father shot her and got arrested. Junior Cumali had to stay with his aunt whose husband harasses Cumali sexually. So he starts living in the streets – Baran describes the Istanbul streets “like a prison.” These past incidents make them feel closer to each other. This relation can be considered through homosociality, as a male bonding – in homosociality rivalry is also seen. For instance, a friend of Cumali, in their male friend group, competes with him. Baran and Cumali's solidarity is never spoken, as Lipman-Blumen indicated, “homosociality is the mutual orientation” (Lipman-Blumen 1976, p.16). Baran needs Cumali in the big city's chaos to find Berfo and his lover Keje (Sermin Hürmeriç) and Cumali needs him because of his own troubles with mafia for steadling their drugs and the police because he kills his girlfriend and the guy with whom she starts to date.

Here, especially Baran gains a “symbolic power” through their solidarity that homosociality offers. “The presence of outside world” (Onur and Koyuncu 2004, p.38)<sup>1</sup>, which is one of the requirements of homosociality, pushes Baran to construct his own homosocial structure for retrieving his masculinity. In other words, Baran's masculinity symbolizes the “masculinity myth” that was “battered” for a while (Ulusay 2004, p.149) which can be seen in *women* films. However Cumali also symbolizes a form of battered masculinity. Thus the conditions are suitable to reconstruct the “masculinity myth” on Baran's body. Baran, by saving Cumali, discards his lover despite his love for Keje consents his decision. Thus, the women return to her old mission after being free of it in the 1980s and beginning of 1990s: a mechanism of consent for masculinity. Thereby, Baran tries to save Cumali against the mafia and police, but he cannot protect him because the cheque that he took from Berfo is worthless. Finally, Baran shoots everyman who damaged the masculinity (Ulusay 2004, p.150). Furthermore Cumali also dies, thereby all masculinity forms

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<sup>1</sup> See also Chapter I, Homosocial Structure

which were not “ideal” are destroyed. Baran escapes for a while, but in the end of the film, we see a much coveted scene of suicide. The police shoot him repeatedly while he walks bravely and he rises to the sky, as the fireworks explode. As a result, the police are baffled and stand up as if it is a kind of homage to *Eşkiya / The Bandit*. Through this ceremony, the salvation of masculinity is celebrated.

In *Eşkiya / The Bandit*, as I indicated above there are hegemonic masculinity forms. By following Beasley, the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form can be considered for Baran’s friend Berfo. He changes his name as Mahmut Şahoğlu and he is one of the richest businessmen in Turkey. Mahmut Şahoğlu also uses police and law for his own purposes and engages in illegal affairs. In this case, he coincides with Beasley’s “*supra*-hegemonic” description. He has power and money, which are considered enough for hegemonic masculinity in a global scale. In this case “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity can be thought for Baran who symbolizes the “ideal” masculinity that “every-bloke” should have, whereas mafia can be accepted as an extension of *supra* hegemony. Beasley positioned the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity as being in-between the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity and others. On the other hand, Baran is in-between *supra*-hegemony and others, too. Others may be considered as Cumali and his friends – the other form of masculinity. Although Baran falls into the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity form, which describes, men as “ideal,” breaking points are also present. He falters in the big city; sometimes he gets lost in the streets of Istanbul; in fact, when Cumali is killed, he was not able to protect him for he was lost. In other words, he could not save Cumali and himself in the new world order. The money cheque can be considered as a symbol of the new world order where the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity is dominant. But Baran, who is a “*sub*-hegemonic” masculine character, cannot make sense of it and this leads to his death. Theoretically, “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity acts against the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity as Beasley indicates. But if these “*sub*-hegemonic” masculine men are ideal, then, they should not be defeated by the “*supra*-hegemonic” system. Here, the breaking point of the hegemonic masculinity can be seen again; Baran fails in this world, he is cheated one more time. Moreover, he lives on the buildings’ roof when he tries to escape from the police but these roofs are not like the mountains, which

he lived 35 year ago and thus he finally dies. Here, we can see again the breaking point of hegemonic masculinity even when he “ascends to the skies.” Furthermore, “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity shows itself as uncanny in the new world and this can be considered its breaking point, too.

*Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* (Ömer Vargı, 2007) again narrates the acting of “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity against the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. The old bully Ali Osman (Şener Şen) protects his son Murat (İsmail Hacıoğlu) who displays non-hegemonic masculinity traits and his girlfriend from a psychopath drug dealer. While Ali Osman saves his son, he is forced to struggle with the mafia, which has international connections. Ali Osman’s son Murat grows up without a father. When he is a child, his mother introduces her gay friend Sürmeli (Rasim Öztekin) as his father and when Murat finds out about it, he leaves them. He grows up by himself, he works at a bar and Murat talks about himself to Sürmeli as follows: “I learned to live as nothing.” However, Sürmeli is not the “other” in the film even though he is gay, but Murat is the “other” who does not belong to anywhere. Sürmeli is subordinated in the film instead of being put as the other and this action is an element of hegemonic masculinity: subordination to each other (Connell 2000, p.69). Sürmeli is not a threat for masculinity, besides he bears an ideal masculine feature, which a real man has to bear in men’s world: reliability. On the other hand, the “real” man in the film is “Kabadayı” [The Bully], Ali Osman. He is represented as a legend for his time, but now he has a disability that suppresses his ideal hegemonic masculine form; it leaves him unguarded with amnesia for a few minutes. In *Kabadayı / For Love and Honor*, we also witness a homosocial structure, which includes several old bullies – Ali Osman is one of them – who decide to die a natural death and choose an easy life. This homosocial group comes together in homosocial places like *meyhane* [drinking houses] or *kahvehane* [coffee houses] and they talk about their memories and they reproduce their masculinity. In this homosocial group strong relations seem to be established between faithful men. Strong male bonding is observed among these friends but they deceive Ali Osman who is also a member of this group. Ali Osman ends his relationship with those men by saying “*racon bitmiştir*” [The street credo is over.]. Furthermore, he indicates his



disappointment saying: “courage, bravery, and friendship until the day we die were just a tale!” On the other hand, Ali Osman says to his friends “One Sürmeli is better than all four of you.” This sentence includes a homophobic implication, indeed. Sürmeli does not reveal where Ali Osman hides and as a result he is killed, but these friends of Ali Osman tell where he is. None of Ali Osman’s friends are like Sürmeli and Ali Osman uses Sürmeli’s bravery as an insult to his friends. Thus, this expression comes from a homophobic perception. Furthermore, this sentence shows that how Sürmeli is subordinated and how he himself acts in accordance with *racon*, i.e., hegemonic masculinity.

*Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* and *Eşkîya / The Bandit* include heroes who save “others” and act against the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity in their in-between space. They are portrayed in an “ideal” masculine form and they give lectures about how a “real” man should be. Here, one can think that “others are not suitable for masculinity.” But there is a father-son relationship with the “others” and “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity” in both films, namely the hegemonic model accepts them. Furthermore, the “others” bear masculine features such as wild youth, which finds acceptance in hegemonic masculinity world. However, “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity is punished in both films and after that “*sub-hegemonic*” characters die as heroes.

#### **4.3.1.2 Comedy**

In this section, I will deal with a number of recent comedies. In one such film, *Kahpe Bizans / Harlot Byzantium* (Gani Müjde, 2000), masculinity appears in “*sub-hegemonic*” and “*supra-hegemonic*” forms and we witness how “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity turns victorious and punishes the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity.

*Kahpe Bizans / Harlot Byzantium* (Gani Müjde, 2000) to some extent follows the narration templates of historical Yeşilçam films. In the film, the triplet brothers are in concert with Beasley’s approach which de-massifies hegemonic masculinity. The triplets are the sons of Süper Gazi (Sümer Tilmaç) who is the head of an independent principality, *Nacar*, in Anatolia. Despite the principality’s name is not in Turkish or Ottoman, it definitely bears Ottoman-Turkish features. *Nacars* can be considered as a Turkish principality which bears local characteristics. While the

Byzantine soldiers attack *Nacars*, triplet babies get separated: one of them, Yetiş Bey (Cem Davran), stays in the *Nacar* principality and is grown up as a *Nacar*. Yetiş Bey symbolizes the physical power and fearlessness: He is brave, virile, and he rescues his father from a Byzantine prison.

The second baby, Gavur<sup>1</sup> Bey (Cem Davran), is found by the Byzantine Queen and introduced to the Emperor İletyus (Mehmet Ali Erbil) as his son – she is pregnant and İletyus threatens her with death if she cannot give birth to a son. She finds baby Gavur Bey while she is giving birth to her daughter and then she introduces Gavur Bey as the twin brother of their daughter. Despite Gavur Bey (his name is Markus Antonyus in Byzantine) is raised as a Byzantine, his father İletyus thinks that his son is not behaving as a ‘real’ Byzantine. Although Gavur Bey symbolizes calmness and vulnerability in the Byzantine Palace, when he is kidnapped and taken to the *Nacar* principality, he proves his masculinity with his virility since after all he is actually a *Nacar*. The “other” baby, Gider Bey, is not an extensive part of the narrative. We see him growing up in a tiny boat on the river. He is a passive character in the story and even his name is not mentioned by other characters.

In *Kahpe Bizans / Harlot Byzantium*, we can observe a “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form as Byzantine and “*sub*-hegemonic” form as *Nacar* principality and these hegemonic masculinity forms are embodied by Yetiş Bey and also by Gavur Bey (Markus Antonyus) for a while. Markus Antonyus (Gavur Bey) is the successor of the empire. He has a global power actually, but he is introduced in a less masculine form. This character overlaps Beasley’s “*supra*-hegemonic” approach; she points out this form saying “globalised *supra*-hegemonic masculinities are frequently presented as simultaneously more powerful but lesser, less masculine” (2009, p.64). Markus Antonyus (Gavur Bey) exactly seems to be less masculine and he also symbolizes the West. Despite his less masculine features, when he is taken to *Nacar* principality he falls in love with a *Nacar* girl and he shows his masculinity through his virility. Actually we see less masculine features for İletyus even though he is the emperor. The small principality *Nacar* and its prince Yetiş Bey have

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<sup>1</sup> Gavur means in Turkish, “infidel” or “non-Muslim”

traditional and local features. As Beasley indicated this form of hegemonic masculinity – “*sub-hegemonic*” – can be described as “national/domestic.” He is “situated *against* the colonizing authority” (2009, p.64). Yetiş Bey acts against the empire, which symbolizes “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and he rescues his father from captivity. The three men in the film, Yetiş Bey, Gavur Bey, and Gider Bey, obviously symbolize the de-massification and we can see that all the hegemonic features are not embodied by one man but the features are shared among brothers. In the end of the film, we are informed about what the characters will do in the rest of their life: Yetiş Bey becomes head of *Nacar* principality. He chooses fighting, physical power, being local as a “*sub-hegemon*.” Gavur Bey becomes a merchant. He does not want to make war, he chooses to become powerful with money as a “*supra-hegemon*” and Gider Bey finds a girl just like himself and they have babies. There is no place for them in the world as “others;” they continue to live on the river. *Kahpe Bizans / Harlot Byzantium* clearly shows us the “de-massified” hegemonic masculinity; one of them is “associated with a more global rich, while others are more national/regional/cultural specific” (Beasley 2009, p.64). In this comedy film, the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity again acts against “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and this masculine form again punishes supra-hegemony. On the other hand, the homosocial structure shows itself as a proof of the physical power – this overlaps with *violence*, which is one of the elements of homosociality. In *Nacar* principality, a man should prove his physical power, so that he can be with a woman and gain respect in his social environment.

#### **4.3.1.3 Action-Adventure**

The two films gained success at the box-office in this genre are *Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell* (Osman Sınav, 2001) and *Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq* (Serdar Akar, 2006). These two films feature heroes who remind us the characters in Yeşilçam’s male action-adventures and historical action-adventures. The reason for that is, “these films produced sites of identification mainly for adolescents who assumed a national

identity by imagining fights against the enemy” (Erdoğan and Göktürk 2001, p.537). Both *Deli Yürek* and *Kurtlar Vadisi* are based on TV series which received high ratings and they attracted their adolescent or young male spectators through nationalist motives. The theme of fighting in the name of one’s country is a common trope of Yeşilçam’s historical action-adventures featuring “superhero-like” characters such as Tarkan, Karaoğlan, Malkaçoğlu, Kara Murat, and Battal Gazi. While the older films are similar to the recent ones because of their nationalism, this also bears a main difference between them. The historical action-adventures “often center on a woman. When the hero is caught and put in the dungeon, the enemy’s woman (having fallen for the hero) comes to his rescue, risking / sacrificing her own life” (Erdoğan and Göktürk 2001, p.537). In today’s action-adventures, for instance in *Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell* we see an elder, experienced and charismatic man who helps the hero. However, in *Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*, there is a woman who helps him. These heroes do not rescue women but often themselves as they punish the enemy. On the other hand, in the action-adventures of Yeşilçam such as the cop series *Cemil* (Melih Gülgen, 1975) and *Cemil Dönüyor [Cemil Returns]* (Melih Gülgen, 1977), again there are superhero-like characters and the heroes’ “actions are justified by the enemy’s initial move (massacre, torture, breaking an oath and so on)” (Erdoğan and Göktürk 2001, p.537). In *Deli Yürek* and *Kurtlar Vadisi*, we also see that the “enemy’s initial moves” justify the heroes’ actions. The enemy’s actions hurt the two heroes’ friends who are not female and thus these films introduce the motive of male solidarity. The reason for this may be that the *presence of outside world* is more prevalent with global power (“supra-hegemonic” masculinity) in the contemporary world. This situation requires male solidarity through the male socialization – homosociality – process.

*Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell* (Osman Sınav, 2001) starts with an external voice that says: “Here is the Middle East, the place of global games.” The “global games” are played among super states and big mafia organizations, which are the enemy of the hero (*outside world*). They have great power and use the Middle East and Turkey for drug trafficking and they present

a danger for the east of Turkey. Furthermore, they murder those who recognize their conspiracies on Turkey. This international organization obviously symbolizes the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity with its transnational powers and they bear less masculine features as is the case in the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. The hero of the film is Yusuf Miroğlu (Kenan İmirzalıoğlu) who is named with his full name throughout the film as if it is a brand name, similar to Kara Murat or Battal Gazi. He is a tough, handsome man who speaks very little. At the beginning of the film, he displays his difference from any other men: when his girlfriend asks, “Why don’t you tell me about your memories as a soldier?” he answers, “I am not one of the men that you know.” We know he is not the man that we see in the new Turkish cinema until this film. He is idealized as a non-realistic hero. Besides his toughness and good looks, he acts bravely and goes onto a one man fight against the global power houses. He has special superhero-like abilities to fight against the enemy as a perfect and intelligent hero. Furthermore, he keeps a certain distance from women because he belongs to the male world where there are a lot of injustices to be straightened out. Yusuf Miroğlu introduces the features of hegemonic masculinity: He dominates his lover, she waits for him to marry, and all decisions are made by him; he does not bear traits of emotionality. Yusuf Miroğlu is represented as a legendary man challenging international crime networks which leaked into the state. Furthermore, Yusuf Miroğlu has local features: he loves his country; acts as an “ideal” masculine Turkish character. After his best friend is killed by the “*supra*-hegemonic” system, he fights against them, namely his “actions are justified by the enemy’s initial move.” All of these features make him a member of the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity.

Although Yusuf is represented as “more perfect, more powerful,” there are times and situations that he is in need of help. In such circumstances, his ex-commander Bozo (Selçuk Yöntem) shows up for help, which is a presentation of male bonding. One of the traits of homosociality “*presence of outside world*” brings them together and makes them to act together. The ties between them have not been broken, and his ex-commander has helped him in times of difficulties. But eventually, at the end of the film Yusuf Miroğlu alone destroys all the “bad guys” who belong to the “*supra*-

hegemonic” system. Yusuf clearly articulates the absence and negligence of the father-state and when Bozo says, “our fathers did not show their smiling faces to their children,” Yusuf says “just like the father-state. People of this land have not seen the smiling face of the State. There must be a way to put an end to this conspiracy.” Basically, Yusuf acknowledges the impossibility of stopping the big game of the superpowers because it is a state matter. This shows us that he is a local hero of the sub-hegemonic masculinity. Yusuf is idealized, he criticizes the government, and he is against the “*supra*-hegemonic” world, which violently suppresses the poor. As long as he questions the mission of the State, he represents the hero, who is a constitutive enemy of the evil, rather than a muscular and armed hero.

*Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq* (Serdar Akar, 2005) narrates the story of the US’s occupation of Iraq. The hero, Polat Alemdar (Necati Şaşmaz) fights against the US army, which represents “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, and he punishes the “*supra*-hegemony” as a hero of “sub-hegemonic” masculinity. Polat Alemdar is represents an “idealized” Turk with local features, and we see him in-between “*supra*-hegemony” and “others.” Polat helps “others” – Iraqi, Kurdish, and Turcomen people – who are “oppressed” by the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. When Polat describes himself, he emphasizes that he does not belong to any “*supra*-hegemonic” system. He says, “I am not a politician, nor a diplomat and a soldier. I am a Turk.” Despite Polat does not have an official link with the Turkish government, he claims to serve the state. A soldier narrates his story saying that Polat put an end to the Turkish mafia alone. Thus, he can be described as an independent, powerful, and invincible man. Polat is represented as suitable to Beasley’s description of the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity. Despite this idealized representation, Polat’s hegemonic masculinity has vulnerable points similar to the heroes in *Eşkîya / The Bandit*, *Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* or *Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell*. However, in *Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*, Polat wants to cover an US agent’s head with a bag in return for the same thing that the US soldiers in Iraq did to the Turkish Special Forces there. After this incident, Polat’s friend in the Special Forces writes a

letter to him telling this story before committing suicide. Nevertheless, Polat is not able to avenge the US because the US agent Sam (Billy Zane) threatens him with killing a group of children. Sam emphasizes, “I know this is your vulnerable point,” which is Polat’s humane side. Moreover, as he hides, the US soldiers attack the civilians and he cannot protect “the others.” Then, he punishes the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity by killing Sam.

These films, which I put under the title, “*Sub-hegemonic masculinity and its heroes*,” represent the heroes acting against “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity which is always punished at the end of the films. The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity is represented by the mafia organizations or foreign states in these films. In *Eşkıya / The Bandit*, friend of Baran (Şener Şen) who has illegal transnational power represents the “*supra-hegemony*,” in *Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* the big international mafia organization represents the “*supra-hegemony*,” and in *Kahpe Bizans / Harlot Byzantium, Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemini / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell*, and *Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*, we see the foreign states representing the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. “*Sub-hegemonic*” heroes always have personal problems with the “*supra-hegemony*” (“*enemy’s initial move*” which justifies the hero’s action); sometimes their children or fathers are in danger, sometimes their friends need help and thus they start to fight against the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. Even though the hero dies at the end, the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity is punished by the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity and the heroes are represented as the “*real*” and “*tough*” men who stand as ideal role models for men, in Beasley’s terms. Although they are “*ideal*” heroes of the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity, they also have some vulnerable sides which prevent them from being “*supra-hegemonic*” or “*more perfect and more powerful*.”

#### **4.3.2 *Supra-hegemonic masculinity films and their victims***

“*Supra-hegemonic*” masculinity appears as a symbol in these films as it coincides with the Turkish state. The films’ narration is shaped by the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity in which it determines the male characters’ behaviors or life patterns through the state’s omissions, service or impositions. The effect of “*supra-hegemony*” appears on the male characters as a defect at the beginning of these films

and thus the male characters start as the members of the sub-hegemonic masculinity. But through the the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, they become victims and sometimes choose being the “other” instead of staying “in-between.”

#### **4.3.2.1 Drama**

The genre of drama in this respect is exemplified by *Gönül Yarası / Love Lorn* (Yavuz Turgul, 2004), *Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath* (Levent Semerci, 2009), and *Güneşi Gördüm / I Saw the Sun* (Mahsun Kırmızıgül, 2009). These films include the characters who are victimized by “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. In three films, we witness the character’s tragic story.

*Gönül Yarası / Love Lorn* (Yavuz Turgul, 2004) narrates a man’s story who was a primary school teacher, Nazım (Şener Şen), in Eastern Turkey for 15 years. After retirement, he returns to Istanbul where his children and friends live. He is an idealist and a leftist, and an honest and a helpful teacher. Furthermore, in the past Nazım is tortured because of being a leftist and is exiled to the Eastern Turkey. Nazım does not complain about being in the east. He loves his students but his love for his mission and desire to help the children hurts his family because they think that he neglects them. Moreover, at the end of the film, he realizes that he has turned into a lonely man. His heart-broken children are not with him anymore and his wife has divorced him years ago. The state, as representing the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, tortures and exiles the male character of the film and although we do not see it as a character, we see its effects and its absence in the film. The male character’s life is shaped by the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity’s impositions. The state victimizes Nazım, after his mission ends he recognizes that he is a lonely man and complains about it. Moreover, he makes mistakes, which cannot be corrected. For instance, Nazım’s daughter cannot have a baby because when she was a little girl, she gets sick and due to her father’s disinterest to her, she loses a chance to be a mother. Nazım acknowledges his mistakes and suffers from them. But in reality, the film offers that he is not guilty but he is a victim of the state.

*Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath* (Levent Semerci, 2009) represents the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity as the state again through its absence and effects. This film



indirectly criticizes the state. Mete Yüzbaşı (Mete Horozoğlu) and his soldiers guard a border station in Eastern Turkey under the threat of the Kurdish PKK supporters. As the young soldiers serve their country through obligatory draft, Mete Yüzbaşı (a captain) is a professional soldier. A group of young soldiers under his command try to fulfill a very difficult and dangerous mission even though they do not have any experience. There, since they are in active combat, they may get injured or killed anytime. Captain Mete, even though this profession is his choice, especially after his best friend is killed by the terrorists, turns more aggressive and disturbed. *Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath* narrates how these soldiers and their commander Captain Mete are left alone and helpless in a border station. While Mete makes a speech and tells if they die, they will be heroes for 30 seconds and thus he emphasizes how cheap their life is. In *Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath* we see the state as a “supra-hegemonic” masculinity form which has power and which impose dangerous tasks to people. We do not see any character that represents the “supra-hegemonic” masculinity but we see the Turkish flag and the bust of Atatürk or his pictures several times in the film as the representations of “supra-hegemonic” masculinity. The bust or the picture symbolizes the absence instead of being a reminder of the nationalistic sensations. At the end of the film almost all soldiers including Mete are killed by the terrorists. The terrorists can be considered as responsible for the soldiers’ death but the terrorists are also the product of the state’s omission. Being the terrorists or soldiers, they are represented as victims of the state again.

*Güneşi Gördüm / I Saw the Sun* (Mahsun Kırmızıgül, 2009) also represents the state as a “supra-hegemonic” masculinity form. This time terrorism and the state victimize the people who live in a village in Eastern Turkey. The state forces the people to leave their village but it does not provide any other opportunity for these victimized people. Thus, they face with various tragic situations. Here, we again see the state’s presence in its absence. The interesting point in this film is that the state is represented as both the father-state and the mother-state. The father-state is described as oppressive and the mother-state – the female doctor and the female teacher in the film, who help the male character of the film – is described as

compassionate. The father-state, which has the real power and control mechanism, again victimizes the people in its absence and through its sanctions. The state as a “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity can be considered as one of the reasons of terrorism in Turkey (with its political attitudes) and this persistent problem negatively affects the lives of the people. Moreover, the state’s services are not satisfactory and it is placed separate from the people similar to the relationship between the “*supra-hegemonic*” and the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity.

#### **4.3.2.2 Comedy-Drama**

In this category, there are films which display the dramatic stories through the vocabulary of comedy. Among these grim comedies are *Propaganda* (Sinan Çetin, 1999), *Komser Şekspir / Commissar Shakespeare* (Sinan Çetin, 2001), *Vizontele* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2001), and *Vizontele Tuuba* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2004). These films narrate the state’s omissions through satirical plotlines. The father-state’s attitude and the victimized government officers due to governmental policies are at the core of these films. The hegemonic masculinity of the characters changes and is reshaped through the state’s oppression or negligence. The father-state is considered as a “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity form which has power and is represented as the most powerful hegemonic form.

*Propaganda* (Sinan Çetin, 1999) is about a customs officer in the 1950s’ Turkey. Mehdi (Kemal Sunal) is a civil servant and he is assigned in his village as a customs officer. The state prescribes new regulations and institutes a new borderline between Syria and Turkey. However some of the houses in the village – especially Mehdi’s best friend’s (Rahim) house – are left outside the border and thus some problems emerge. No one is authorized to pass the border without a passport, which is a symbol of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. Here, Mehdi applies the regulations of the government blindly. He is “in-between” the government, which can be considered as a “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity form, and the “others.” In the film, the state and its rules are repeatedly mentioned and actually Mehdi does not represent the government. Instead of him, Mahmut (Ali Sunal) – an idealist government officer, who has no emotional bonding – represents the government despite the fact that he is the “sub” officer of Mehdi. We see that he adheres to the

rules more strictly than Mehdi. The house of Rahim (Metin Akpınar), who is a sanitarian and who is not bound to the government as a legal officer, is excluded from the map of Turkey, being left on the other side of the border and thus he is the “other” in the film.

We see Mehdi as “every-bloke” which has local and national features, being in-between the government and Rahim as “others” – who is his best friend. At the end of the film, Mehdi loses his family because of the problems emerged due to the border; he takes off his uniform and takes refuge with Rahim. He explains his in-between situation to Rahim exactly with the following words: “my grand father, my father, and I, all of us became a government officer. I do not know anything else. I have stayed in-between. Please take me along.” Thus, Mehdi prefers to be on the other side of the border and he becomes the “other.” In the film this decision – to become the other – is represented as a heroic attitude. This heroic attitude is shown through the countering *supra* hegemony (which neglects the society) as a “*sub*-hegemonic” form. During the film Mehdi is a victim of the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, which neglects people again.

*Komser Şekspir / Commissar Shakespeare* (Sinan Çetin, 2001) deals with the negative effects of “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity on an official, police commissair Cemil (Kadir İnanır). Here again, the state is represented as “bad,” and victimizes its official. We witness Cemil’s helplessness because his daughter is extremely sick and he is very lonely. We see Cemil crying in front of a bust of Atatürk and saying “I am so lonely my forefather!” Similar to *Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun*, the bust is used symbolically. Cemil tries to fulfill her daughter’s last wish which is to join a theatre competition and for this reason Cemil organizes a drama group which includes arrested people in the police station. They join the competition with their theatrical performance, but Cemil gets arrested and his daughter dies. This film narrates the dramatic story of a commissair working for the state. Cemil is in-between the arrested people and the state. At the end of the film, he comes out and chooses being the “other:” he joins the group who stages a play for Cemil’s daughter when they are in jail. Although he is recalled to his mission by the state due to the fact that the European Union Commission gives an award to his police station for the theater play

he organized, he chooses his “friends.” Here we can clearly see the hierarchy of hegemonic masculinity and its dynamic structure. The state which has a great power on people could be considered as “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity but when a more effective “power” exists, we see that it can be subordinated and “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity is relocated. The European Union appears as a “*supra*-hegemonic” form which effects the decisions of the Turkish state and in this position the Turkish state is transformed into a “*sub*-hegemonic” form, which is in-between the “*supra*-hegemonic” (now The European Union) and the “other” (now Cemil).

*Vizontele* [The Television] (Yılmaz Erdoğan, Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2001) narrates a similar story about the state reminiscent of *Propaganda*. In *Propaganda* the government forms a boundary but it does not instruct people who are left beyond and near the boundary about the new requirements, that of having a passport. However, in *Vizontele*, the government sends a television set to Van in Eastern Turkey, but the officials leave the town without making the system work. The mayor, Nazmi (Altan Erkekli), with his own means, tries to run it. For this he asks for help from a repairman who fixes radios and known as Deli [Mad] Emin (Yılmaz Erdoğan). Deli Emin, who lives alone, does not have any family or kin. The people make fun of him but he is happy in his own world. Deli Emin, Nazmi and his men try to get the TV set to broadcast the official channel but they cannot make it come through initially and the town dwellers tease them. On the other hand, Nazmi’s wife Siti Ana (Demet Akbağ) does not approve this television and believes that it would bring bad luck and death. Finally the television starts to broadcast and Nazmi, while watching the news program, learns that his son is martyred when the Turkish army landed to Cyprus in 1974. We may again observe the one-sided relation between the state and the people. The state, while not even building up a television broadcast system, leads to the death of a citizen. Thus, his family starts to question this sacrifice. As in *Propaganda*, here, it is solely the name of the state, which keeps its presence. However, in the narration, Nazmi is in-between the government and the “other,” i.e., Deli Emin. Nevertheless, Nazmi accepts the “fatality” that is caused by the state, which is a representative of the *supra*-hegemony.

*Vizontele Tuuba* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2004) narrates a similar story, in which the state sends a librarian to a town which has no library. The librarian, Güner (Tarık Akan), is actually exiled by the state because of his leftist ideology. In this story, the town's people try to solve their problems on their own and the librarian builds a library with Deli Emin's (the other) efforts again. In this film we witness the state's effects on the characters again. Güner has experienced several exiles in his lifetime and during one such move from one city to another, his daughter became disabled in a car accident. Moreover, his forced travels bring out problems with his wife. At the end of the film, the 1980 military coup takes place and the soldiers arrest Güner and the young people in the town because they are leftists. The state shows itself again as a “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form, which subordinates and victimizes the male characters.

In these films, we observe father-state's attitude and the government officers who become victims because of the state's policies. Furthermore, in these films, women are not the supporters of men, who are oppressed and helpless because of the tasks given to them by the state. Despite the lack of a logical explanation, we observe that women instinctively interfere with the regulations of the state which damage their families. The male characters, in “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity form, are represented as officer, customs officer, commissar, mayor, librarian, teacher, and soldier. These characters' hegemonic masculinity form changes and are reshaped by the effect of the state's oppressions or negligence. The father-state is considered in “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form which has power and which is represented as the most powerful hegemonic form in these films.

#### **4.3.3 Non-hegemonic masculinity films and the others**

Beasley de-masculinizes the hegemonic masculinity as “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity and “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity and she describes the male characters that stands out of this classification as “others.” Others have the significant features like “*sub*-hegemonic” and “*supra*-hegemonic.” Beasley mentions the “other” as marginalized “other” masculinities (2009, p.64). She defines them as “comparatively emasculated, as lacking the power to diminish the imperial master by seducing or otherwise thwarting the master's authority” (2009, p.71). Beasley also thinks that the

others or the non hegemonic forms are “oppressed” by *sub*-hegemonic or *supra*-hegemonic forms (2009, p.73). The “others” can be considered as a product of the hegemonic masculinity. In the films which feature “non-hegemonic” characters, the members of hegemonic masculinity generally oppress them. Thus, sometimes they try to be a part of the system to have power and money. These characters always have a dream or a goal and they sometimes try to “thwart the master’s authority” toward this end. While their non-hegemonic features make them to count as the “others,” they already start out as the “others” in these films.

#### **4.3.3.1 Drama**

This section includes the films, *Ağır Roman / Cholera Street* (Mustafa Altıoklar, 1997), *Babam ve Oğlum / My Father and My Son* (Çağan Irmak, 2005), and *Issız Adam / Alone* (Çağan Irmak, 2008). Here we witness the characters who have “marginal” features as “others.” Furthermore, their struggle with masculinity forms set off their otherness.

*Ağır Roman / Cholera Street* (Mustafa Altıoklar, 1997) narrates people of a slum quarter – *Kolera* [Cholera] – in Istanbul. *Kolera* is a kind of ghetto where gypsies, thieves, prostitutes, small mafia, and bullies live. Salih (Okan Bayülgen) is the man who narrates his story. He is a brave youngster who desires to be a bully like Arap Sado (Burak Sergen). Arap Sado is a typical representation of the masculinity of the bullies, with his black vest, knife, and chaplet. He is responsible for the protection of the neighborhood. People, who live in *Kolera*, trust and respect Arap Sado more than they do to law or police. Salih aspires to be like Arap Sado. As Kimmel indicates, the form of masculinity may vary through a man’s lifetime and we can observe this process of transformation in the example of Salih clearly. At the beginning of the film, Salih is a non-hegemonic young man and we witness his struggles and desires to become a hegemonic masculine man. First, he catches the thieves while they stole Tina’s (Müjde Ar) carpet – Salih loves Tina but nobody is aware of it at that moment in the film. Salih’s success is approved by his father Berber Ali (Savaş Dinçel) and Arap Sado. They go out with him to drink in a homosocial space where masculinity is produced and reproduced continuously – and all the people in the *meyhane* drink to the honour of Salih. Thus, Salih gets his first

approval in his efforts to become a “real men.” Secondly, he saves his blood brother Orhan (Küçük İskender) from a fire. The entire neighborhood applauds him and Tina takes him to her house which is another indicator of him becoming a man. Finally, when Arap Sado is shot by Reis’s men, before he dies; he gives his knife and chaplet to Salih. Thus, these objects symbolizes his initiation and he starts wearing a black suit without tie – just like Arap Sado – and combs his brilliantined hair.

Nevertheless, Salih cannot become the “ideal” man for both *Kolera* people and for himself, as he imagines because, actually, he does not comply with the hegemonic masculinity rules completely and he cannot stand as a tough guy due to his defects. First, he has no homophobia which is one of the important elements of hegemonic masculinity. When his blood brother Orhan reveals his gay identity, after a moment of anger and dispute, they ignore this and drug themselves merrily as they listen to the *arabesk* singer Orhan Gencebay’s song “Hatasız Kul Olmaz” [Nobody is perfect]. Thus, Salih’s acceptance of his friend’s homosexuality is not suitable for *racon*. Second, he falls in love with Tina who is a prostitute and he does not want her to work but he cannot do anything about it. When she does not work, they are out of money. Salih tries to solve this problem by getting help from his father, which is another “deficiency” for hegemonic masculinity. He cannot get the responsibility and he does not have enough money. In this context, we see a change in his masculinity and in the socialization process, he cannot be “successful” and at the end of the film he commits suicide. This may be regarded as a sign of weakness rather than as an honored death as Salih perishes in the arms of his blood brother, who decides to be a transsexual.

While at the beginning Salih is approved due to his above-mentioned attitudes, which are suitable for hegemonic masculinity, his “deficiencies” prevent his success and he cannot exist in the world, which he has chosen, anymore. Here disruption on the same body can be observed. On the other hand, regarding the homosocial structure, as it was indicated above, we may also observe male bonding and rivalry. In *Ağır Roman / Cholera Street*, rivalry and interference are obviously seen between Salih or Arap Sado and Reis. Despite Arap Sado is able to oppress Reis, Salih

cannot get over it, which again corresponds to his inadequacy for the hegemonic masculinity. Here again breaking points can be observed about the representation of masculinity in *Ağır Roman / Cholera Street*. The main character tries to be a “real” man but he cannot do this because he is not “tough” enough and he is actually a very sensitive man who cannot find a place in the hegemonic masculinity world for himself.

*Babam ve Oğlum / My Father and My Son* (Çağan Irmak, 2005) represents a male character who has already chosen to be the “other” by trying to “thwart the master’s authority.” Sadık (Fikret Kuşkan) leaves his family, who lives in an Aegean village and goes to Istanbul to be a leftist journalist. Sadık’s father, Hüseyin (Çetin Tekindor) gets angry with his son and does not want to see him anymore. When Sadık returns with his little son to the family house, Hüseyin does not talk to his son until he gets sick. Sadık chooses his own way; instead of running their farm in accordance with his father’s desire, he opposes his father and becomes a journalist. After the military coup in 1980 he gets jailed and tortured. Sadık is again punished due to his choices. He ignores being a member of the “sub-hegemonic” masculinity and he also ignores the system, which can be considered as the “supra-hegemonic” masculinity system. Thus both hegemonic masculinity forms punish Sadık. When the hegemonic form cannot subordinate him – his father or the state/army – they make him the “other” by “oppressing” and “emasculating” him. He always ignores the hegemonic masculinity attitudes and these forms hurt him: First, he cannot feel any relation neither to Istanbul nor to his family house because of his father’s anger as he mentions. Secondly, the representation of “supra-hegemonic” masculinity – the military coup – causes his wife’s death and his fatal sickness. Sadık does not behave as a member of the hegemonic form, moreover he ignores that; thus we can say that Sadık – as an oppressed and emasculated man – bears a “non-hegemonic” form, which is the product of hegemonic masculinities (*sub* and *supra*).

*Issız Adam / Alone* (Çağan Irmak, 2008) represents a male character who can be considered as “marginal,” which Beasley uses to speak of non-hegemonic masculinity/others. Alper (Cemal Hünel) is a successful chef running his own restaurant. He experiences extraordinary and sadomasochistic sexual relations before



having a girlfriend who brings happiness to his life. But when Alper's mother visits them, he starts to think that his relation with his girlfriend is an ordinary relation that will possibly end with marriage and he decides to break up with her. While Alper explains the reason of the break up as his fault, he says, "I live with a germ in my blood. I do not want to get involved in somebody's life and I do not want anybody to get involved in my life. I just like it the way it is and I do not know why." Alper thus talks of his unwillingness to have an ordinary life which almost every-bloke men have. He is separated from the ordinary men models and this makes him the "other." He is not "emasculated" or "oppressed" by any other hegemonic masculinity form but his "marginal" feature indicates his difference from other hegemonic masculinity forms.

#### **4.3.3.2 Comedy-Drama**

The genre of *Her Şey Çok Güzel Olacak / Everything's Gonna Be Great* (Ömer Vargı, 1998), *Güle Güle / Goodbye Goodbye* (Zeki Ökten, 2000), *Abuzer Kadayıf* (Tunç Başaran, 2000), *O Şimdi Asker / He's in the Army Now* (Mustafa Altıoklar, 2003), *Organize İşler / Magic Carpet Ride* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2005), *Hokkabaz / The Magician* (Cem Yılmaz, Ali Taner Baltacı, 2006), and *Neşeli Hayat / Cheerful Life* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2009) can be considered as comedy-drama. These films have another important feature: All of them narrate the stories of the others in concert with Beasley's approach. In these films, the non-hegemonic masculinity is visible on the other's body who is generally oppressed by the hegemonic masculinity or isolated from the hegemonic world.

*Her Şey Çok Güzel Olacak / Everything's Gonna Be Great* (Ömer Vargı, 1998) narrates the story of two brothers who are opposite characters. Altan (Cem Yılmaz) is a troublesome, trickster, jobless, worthless, liar, and an unfaithful man who married to Ayla (Ceyda Düvenci). Nuri (Mazhar Alanson), Altan's older brother, works in a pharmaceutical warehouse, having an ordinary life. He visits his father twice a week. However, the father (Selim Naşit) always criticizes his sons. Furthermore, Nuri has nobody in his life and although Altan knows many people he still does not have a real friend. The story begins with two characters' disagreements and ends with their solidarity. At the beginning, Nuri is angry with and distrusts

Altan because Altan cheats on him. In the film, there are three phases, which persuades Nuri, which may be considered as the beginning of the solidarity between men. First, when Altan's wife insults him, Nuri, complains about women; second, two brothers visit their father but he crabs both of them. Two brothers stand on an equal footing in this situation. Altan steals a sports car which is Nuri's dream car. Nuri drives the car and lives his dream but they are caught and the car's owner batters them, especially Altan. Finally, Nuri shows up – after he drives the car he feels more self confident – and beats up the owner of the car saying “Will it be always us who are beaten?” Thus, the two brothers' solidarity starts with this and they escape to Bodrum.

Upon their return to Istanbul, they are not the men they used to be. They have common enemies and shared pain because their father passes away and they think that they are in trouble with the owner of the car. All troubles in the film occur because of Altan. He wants to open a bar to prove himself especially to his wife, but nobody believes him because he always lies. But this is not a one-sided solidarity because actually Altan, without referring, supports the solidarity. It is not only Nuri who drifts into troubles by helping his brother, but throughout this adventure, he comes out of his shell and finds himself. In the film we observe representations of “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity forms such as: the city mafia in Istanbul, the small mafia in Bodrum, and the owner of pharmaceutical warehouse who is Nuri's boss. Here, the “*supra-hegemonic*” form can be considered as the system, which Altan cannot be a part of and which Nuri leaves. All of these hegemonic forms make these two characters the others. This situation enables them with the opportunity for solidarity. In this arrangement, Altan and Nuri are placed as the “others” and we witness that the “others” may also be happy at the end. Thus the film ends with the two brothers walking on the streets as they talk about their common plans and dreams.

In *Güle Güle / Goodbye Goodbye* (Zeki Ökten, 1999) a group of old men and an old woman, all of whom have wounded pasts, struggle to send their friend Galip (Metin Akpınar) to Cuba because Galip has a lover living there. The fact that they are old is one of the reasons for their position as the other. Old age and fear of death are

always mentioned in the film. Finally, after Galip gets a fatal illness his friends decide to find money to be able to send him to Cuba, to his dream. They rob a bank and make their friend's dream come true. The robbing can be considered as another indicator of the fact that they are the others. According to Beasley's approach, these men are not in any hegemonic masculinity form because of their old age and their past troubles. They retire from the world and they live in an island. When they need one of the elements of hegemonic masculinity, money, they become hopeless and they decide to rob a bank even though it seems that they can never do this.

Another film *Abuzer Kadayıf* (Tunç Başaran, 2000) narrates an academician's story. Ersin (Metin Akpınar) is a professor of sociology and he has a dream, which is to build a house for street children, and he knows that he cannot do this with his earnings as a professor. Therefore he creates a character on his body who is a folk singer Abuzer Kadayıf (Metin Akpınar). Ersin makes his dream come true through Abuzer Kadayıf, he becomes very famous, gains a lot of money and founds a complex for street children but Ersin cannot leave his own body and continues to live as Abuzer Kadayıf. In *Abuzer Kadayıf*, the "other" chooses to become a member of the "sub-hegemonic" masculinity. He has the real big power and he can be considered as "sub-hegemonic" because we trace "supra-hegemonic" forms such as his professor identity, the political party and the mafia, all of which try to subordinate Abuzer Kadayıf. Here Abuzer Kadayıf's in-between position is revealed: He stays in-between Abuzer Kadayıf and the mafia. The breaking point of hegemonic masculinity can be seen as the submission of Abuzer Kadayıf to mafia. After that he acts against them just like a "sub-hegemonic" masculine man. In *Abuzer Kadayıf* there is also male bonding. The manager of *Abuzer Kadayıf*, Abdo (Talat Bulut), assists and supports him and, moreover, when "Ersin's" girlfriend breaks up with "Abuzer Kadayıf," Abdo sustains him and he says "let her go. This woman, who does not like her man's job, is not for you." Abuzer Kadayıf indeed lets her go and actually he acts like a man who is a member of hegemonic masculinity form.

*O Şimdi Asker / He's in the Army Now* (Mustafa Altıoklar, 2003) deals with a group of soldiers. These men are not ordinary soldiers but they pay money to do a short-term military service. The common conception in Turkey is "every man is born as a

soldier” and each man performs obligatory military service. While Beasley explains “every-bloke” man as in “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity form, she also mentions “ordinary soldiers” but as I indicated above, these men are not ordinary. We do not see any other hegemonic form in them. Yet there is a representation of hegemonic masculinity that can be seen through the commanding figures and their existence which assure the position of the “others.” On the other hand the army is a homosocial place where there are no women and masculinity which can be reconstructed and reproduced. However these soldiers do not reproduce their masculinity in this homosocial place. Instead of this, they organize a theatrical performance, which does not belong to the world of hegemonic masculinity. Again, we can see this group’s otherness. We see these soldiers as subordinated by the sub-hegemonic masculinity. But there are gaps in their sub-ordination because they pay money for this mission. This can also indicate their position as the others. In a homosocial structure, the non-hegemonic form may turn into an instrument of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, which is money.

*Organize İşler / Magic Carpet Ride* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2005) represents two forms of “others” through two characters. Süperman Samet (Tolga Çevik) is an unsuccessful comedian and he decides to commit suicide after feeling all alone and disappointed. Süperman Samet has non-hegemonic features; he is sensitive, polite, innocent, and *mollycoddle* – this feature appears in the study of Cengiz et.al as one of the non-hegemonic features. The leader of a small gang of thieves, Asım (Yılmaz Erdoğan) saves the life of Süperman Samet while he tries to commit suicide and starts taking care of him. Süperman Samet tries to do Asım’s “profession” but he cannot do this illegal work. Despite Asım bears hegemonic masculine features, his hegemony and subordination is only operative in his gang. Asım has a daughter and his wife has left him because of his “profession,” furthermore she gets married with a rich dentist. The rich dentist is the representative of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and his existence assures Asım’s position as the “other.” His otherness is assured by another case in which Asım and his men are beaten by Müslüm (Cem Yılmaz) who is the head of a dangerous and larger mafia organization. In *Organize İşler / Magic Carpet Ride* we see that the “others” are again trying to find their own way which can be

illegal – thievery – or which can be a dream – make people laugh as a comedian – and while they try to achieve their aim, they could not act against the hegemonic masculinity forms, because of their “lack of power.”

Both *Hokkabaz / The Magician* (Cem Yılmaz, Ali Taner Baltacı, 2006) and *Neşeli Hayat / Cheerful Life* (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2009) also represent “others” through the non-hegemonic masculinity form. İskender (Cem Yılmaz) in *Hokkabaz / The Magician* is an illusionist and his father, Sait (Mazhar Alanson), does not respect İskender’s job, he always criticizes him and teases his son by calling him a magician [hokkabaz] instead of an illusionist. When they are cheated by a woman, İskender becomes so sad – because he falls in love with her – that Sait decides to support his son by buying him a new caravan allowing him to travel and put out shows. Sait’s attitude, which comes after a woman’s cheating, can be considered as the indicator of male solidarity.

However, *Neşeli Hayat / Cheerful Life* narrates a story of the “other,” that of a weak, unfortunate, and poor man, named Rıza (Yılmaz Erdoğan). Rıza works in temporary jobs and he gets a job to be Santa Claus in a toy shop for a month. Because he is ashamed of his job, he does not tell anything to his wife. But at the end of the film, Rıza solves the financial problems by taking on the identity of Santa Claus. He raises money as Santa Claus for his wife’s brother and the other people around himself. But he cannot solve his personal problems. Here we can see the representations of hegemonic masculinity forms which assure Rıza’s position as a member of non-hegemonic masculinity, and they – his boss, his wife’s older brother, and his friends – subordinate Rıza. When he accepts his position as the “other” – his work and his new identity – he solves his problems.

#### **4.3.3.3 Comedy**

Non-hegemonic masculinity appears as “others” in some comedy films. These films, *Hababam Sınıfı Askerde / The Class of Chaos in the Army* (Ferdi Eğilmez, 2005), *G.O.R.A.* (Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2004), *A.R.O.G.* (Cem Yılmaz, Ali Taner Baltacı, 2008), *Recep İvedik* (Togan Gökbakar, 2008), and *Recep İvedik 2* (Togan Gökbakar, 2009), represent others as a comedy character and who has marginal features as “others”.

*Hababam Sınıfı Askerde / The Class of Chaos in the Army* (Ferdî Eğilmez, 2005) narrates a group of young men's story who are seasoned students at a high school. They are not a part of the everyday life outside the school because they stay at a boarding school. While this indicates their otherness, they are also subordinated by the school's principal through the "sub-hegemonic" masculinity and they do not relate to "supra-hegemonic" masculinity. The school's principal Bedri (Mehmet Ali Erbil) describes this group as worthless and lazy. Later on, this group is drafted and this turns out to be a nightmare for one of them as revealed at the end of the film. All men in this group are panicked and do not want to join the army. Normally most Turkish men are eager to join the army or if they do not want to join the army, they do not reveal this. But these men evidently show their fear and anxiety. These non-hegemonic men are subordinated in the army which is a homosocial structure for masculinity and where masculinity can reproduce itself. But this group does not reach at hegemonic masculine features. They continue to act as if they are in the school and they do not construct their masculinity and do not join the "sub-hegemonic masculinity." Instead they stay as immature men.

Both *G.O.R.A.* (Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2004) and *A.R.O.G.* (Cem Yılmaz, Ali Taner Baltacı, 2008) represent a male character Arif (Cem Yılmaz) who bears stereotypical traits of a regular "Turkish man:" he tries to make easy money, he often makes explicit jokes, and when he is introduced to a woman, he tries to portray himself as being polite and not being sexually attracted to them, while in reality it is the reverse. As Arif lives a regular life, aliens kidnap him and take him to the planet *G.O.R.A.* where he becomes a "hero." Thus we witness the transformation of the other into a hero. When Beasley explains the "other" in her investigation, she emphasizes that "others" are oppressed by imperial power. Arif and other earthlings represent the "other," the "sub-hegemonic" masculinity. On the planet *G.O.R.A.*, Commander Logar (Cem Yılmaz) oppresses them as they are imprisoned. After Arif falls in love, his transformation starts and he saves his girlfriend from "bad guys." He is now equipped with superior powers and becomes a "superhero." While he is saving his girlfriend, he uses heterosexual masculinity as a gun against Logar: Arif makes Logar's gay relation public. On the other hand, the friendship between Arif

and the gay robot 216 (Ozan Güven) is portrayed as an unlike relationship between a straight and a gay man. As Arif says, “there is no friendship like this, on the Earth.” Homophobic masculinity does not hold on the planet *G.O.R.A.*.

In *A.R.O.G.*, Arif again becomes a “hero” in another dimension, in the Stone Age. This time, he uses football game, which belongs to man’s world, as a “gun.” He teaches people how to play football and they overcome the “bad guys” with this masculine and homosocial game. But Arif does not subordinate anybody in these films. So he is in non-hegemonic form and if someone subordinates him, he acts against this. He does not have the features of hegemonic masculinity and he is an “other” in another dimension where hegemonic masculinity forms exist. Thus he becomes a “hero” in those other worlds.

*Recep İvedik* (Togan Gökbakar, 2008) can be considered as a “popular hero” who is the most watched character of the new Turkish cinema. Three *Recep İvedik* films are being shot since 2008: *Recep İvedik* (Togan Gökbakar, 2008), *Recep İvedik 2* (Togan Gökbakar, 2009), and *Recep İvedik 3* (Togan Gökbakar, 2010). Recep (Şahan Gökbakar) has exaggerated, impolite characteristics which are considered as “vulgar.” Recep does not have a job but he is also not interested in making money. For instance, he finds a wallet and returns it back to its owner or when he gets work in his grandfather’s advertising agency, he asks for just a small amount of money. This character does not care about what people think about his attitudes; he is extremely disturbing, and he keeps breaking the working of the “system” or of the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. For instance, he goes against the rules and the manager of an international five star hotel or an international advertising agency, both of which represent the world of “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. He acts in his own way, breaks the rules, and disturbs people. A third example is his attitude at a university. He challenges a professor and wins the heart of other students. Actually, when he acts against the system, his acts are approved by some people. Recep does not subordinate anyone and he is also not subordinated. He seems different from ordinary people with his physical and social features but he interestingly manages to stay humane.

In *Recep İvedik 2*, his grandmother gives him three different tasks because she thinks that he is a worthless man. The tasks are: “getting a job, getting married, and gaining respect in the society.” These tasks are the requirements of masculinity.<sup>1</sup> Recep accomplishes two of them but he cannot manage to get married. He works in his grandfather’s advertising agency and manages to land a big contract through his extraordinary style. The advertising agency gets an award for this success and Recep is applauded by the businessmen’s organization after he makes a speech before them. Furthermore, respected business magazines publish his photographs and excerpts from his speech. Thus, he gains respect in the society. At the end of the film his grandmother dies and his cousin who is the owner of their grandfather’s advertising agency offers him a regular job at the agency but Recep refuses it and stays as an “other.”

However, Recep is in a depression in *Recep İvedik 3*. He cannot understand why he feels depressive and tries to solve his problem. In the end of the film, he complains about his physical appearance and his “genetic code.” In other words, he is not happy with his difference. Recep İvedik does not bear stereotypical male features, he cannot be subordinated, and he does not subordinate other masculinity forms. Furthermore, in all three films, he has younger friends who help him in modern life. His young helpers do not create a hegemonic relation. While Recep wants to stay away from his otherness, he breaks the rules and criticizes them. In these films, non-hegemonic masculinity becomes visible through the “other” figure who is generally oppressed by the hegemonic masculinity or isolated from the hegemonic world. As Beasley indicates, the non-hegemonic men are others because they lack the power to thwart the “master’s power.” If these characters do not relate to the hegemonic masculinity, their “marginality” – another descriptive element of the others – surfaces.

In this chapter, I tried to analyze the representation of masculinity through hegemonic masculinity and homosocial structure in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema. I tried to use Christine Beasley’s approach to group 28 films, which are

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter I, “Key Concept On Masculinity” and see Chapter II “Masculinity in Turkish Society”



chosen among the top five box-office hits of every year since 1996. Beasley de-massifies hegemonic masculinity as “*sub-hegemonic*” and “*supra-hegemonic*” and the masculine form which stands out of these two classes is the “other” which is non-hegemonic. In this context, I classified films in three groups: “sub hegemonic masculinity and its heroes, supra hegemonic masculinity and its victims, and non-hegemonic masculinity and the others.” The films of “*sub-hegemonic* masculinity and its heroes” include male characters who act against “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and sometimes sustain the “others” as Beasley indicates, too. The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity form is represented as mafia organizations or foreign states in these films. The “*sub-hegemonic*” heroes always have personal problems – which relate to national sensitivity in action-adventures – with “*supra-hegemony*” (“enemy’s initial move” which justifies heroes’ actions); sometimes their children or fathers are in danger, sometimes their friends need help and they start to fight against this “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. Even when the hero dies, the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity is punished by the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity. In these films, they are represented as the “real” man the features of whom every man should carry. In other words, they are the “idealized” men as Beasley indicates. Although they are represented as heroes, as “ideal,” regarding to “*sub-hegemonic* masculinity, each character has breaking points that prevents them from being “more perfect and more powerful.” They can get lost in a big city – *Eşkîya / The Bandit* – they may get sick – *Kabadayı / For Love and Honor* – they may already know that they could not by themselves destroy the bad effects of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity– *Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq, Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell*. So they are not superheroes but they may be accepted as the heroes of “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity because they punish the representations of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity.

The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity appears as a symbol in “*supra-hegemonic* masculinity and its victims” films and this symbol represents the state. These films, which are narratively shaped by the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity affecting the male character’s behavior or life, display “*supra-hegemony*” as the state’s

omissions, service, or impositions. The effect of “*supra*-hegemony” appears on the male characters as an injury: In the beginning of these films, the male characters are members of sub-hegemonic masculinity but because of the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, they turn into victims or forced to choose to be the “others” instead of staying “in-between.” In these films, we observe the father-state’s acts or government officers who are victimized by the government’s decisions. The male characters in the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity forms are represented as the state officers – customs officer, commissar, mayor, librarian, teacher, and soldier –except *Ramo* in *Güneşi Gördüm / I Saw the Sun*. These characters’ hegemonic masculinity changes and gets re-shaped by the effect of the state’s oppressions or omissions. The father-state bears the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form as the most powerful hegemonic form in these films.

In the films of “non-hegemonic masculinity and the others,” the main character, as an oppressed or a marginal man, sometimes tries to get integrated into the system often through power and money. Their non-hegemonic features make them the “others.” But in some films – such as *Ağır Roman / Cholera Street* and *Abuzer Kadayıf* – these characters’ masculinity is transformed. Non-hegemonic masculinity is seen on the other who is generally oppressed by the hegemonic masculinity or isolated from the hegemonic world. The non-hegemonic male characters can be described as the “others” because, as Beasley indicates, they lack power to thwart the “master’s power.” When these characters do not display hegemonic masculinity, their “marginality” – another descriptive element of the other – surfaces.

Hierarchical relations among men may lead to solidarity or rivalry between them. In the socialization process, the attitudes of the males depend on the homosocial structure’s necessities. These can be named as typical socialization models and they follow eight traits in the researches, which emphasize the importance of socialization through the reproduction of masculinity. These traits are silence, loneliness, rationality, control position, physical distance, presence of outside world, violence, using of women. One of these traits, as an important element for men’s socialization, is the most effective in the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema: *presence of outside world*. This *world* includes model characters

who are powerful, painless, tough, and rational. On the other hand, the *outside world* may be cruel and thus may hurt the male characters. Thus, this *world*, as a threat to masculinity, engenders the male solidarity. Yusuf Miroğlu (*Deli Yürek: Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell*) gets help from his ex-commander while fighting against the *outside world*, Polat Alemdar (*Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*) gets help from a woman but he already has two male backers, while fighting against the *outside world*, Baran (Eşkîya) gets help from Cumali in Istanbul where there is danger as an *outside world*. Men's socialization process does not appear as an element of the construction or re-construction of masculinity. Mostly these processes lead to solidarity. However, homophobia is rarely seen in these films, gay characters are mostly subordinated.

In conclusion, through the de-massification of the representations of masculinity in the post-1990s Turkish cinema, the following features surface: Masculinity is a dynamic concept in these films. It may change and transform on the same body and among men. Furthermore, the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity subordinates other forms of masculinities even they act against it. We do not see the “*supra-hegemonic*” and “*sub-hegemonic*” features on the same body, namely these characters are not “more perfect and more powerful.” They bear local/domestic features and their masculinity has breaking points. The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity dominates the “*sub-hegemonic*” and “*non-hegemonic*” masculinities and it is the main determinant factor for shaping and transforming masculinity forms in these films. Sometimes it turns the character into a hero, sometimes into a victim or an other. Its hegemony is effective in the storyline and changes the characters that subordinate them. The existence of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity sometimes emerges with male solidarity which shows the vulnerability of masculinity.

## 5. CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to explore the representations of masculinity *forms* and their relations with each other in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema through the notion of hegemonic masculinity. How are the masculinity forms in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema shaped? In what ways do they diversify or relate to each other? Before focusing on such questions, this study outlined the analyses of the masculinity forms, the sex / gender dichotomy, the gender roles in society and family – especially in Turkey – and the notion of hegemonic masculinity and its instruments – homosocial structure.

Masculinity as a gender role bears some main features that leading researchers such as Connell, Kimmel, and Carrigan indicate: Masculinity is a dynamic and “active” concept (Connell 2005, p.185) which changes in different cultures, time periods, and among different personalities. Its dynamic structure allows the diversification of the conceptions of masculinity. Hence, there are multiple definitions of masculinity in multicultural societies (Connell 2000, p.216) which present the possibility of the investigation of the complex relations of masculinity forms, and their dominance of and subordination to each other. Often, hegemonic masculinity is seen at the centre of the system even it is not the most common masculinity form every time (Connell 2000, p.216). Hegemonic masculinity is accepted by most men because they “...benefit from the subordination of women, and hegemonic masculinity is centrally connected with the institutionalization of men’s dominance over women” (Carrigan et al. 2002, p.113). But, on the other hand, hegemonic masculinity dominates other masculinity forms and it thus leads to the domination of men (Beasley 2009, p.60), (Howson 2006, p.60). There are diverse explanations of hegemonic masculinity but, as Beasley indicates, the term hegemonic masculinity has become quite “slippery.”

In this context, the concept of hegemonic masculinity needs to be reconsidered in an attempt to be understood through film studies. Current approaches, especially Connell’s, indicate that masculinity has multiple forms and hegemonic masculinity is one such form at the “pinnacle of a pyramid” of masculinities (Connell and

Messerschmidt 2005, p.845). Moreover, Connell sees hegemonic masculinity in a “world scale” thanks to globalization. He describes this form of masculinity as the “transnational business masculinity” (Connell 2000, p.52) which includes an “elite group of socially dominant men” (Beasley 2009, p.59). On the other hand, Beasley criticizes Connell’s study, for it comes short of explaining why transnational business masculinity is the “pinnacle of a pyramid.” She also thinks that hegemonic masculinity needs more than one term – transnational business masculinity – and she adds two more terms: “sub-hegemonic and supra hegemonic” masculinity. The “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity is related to money, state, and business life on a global level, whereas the “sub-hegemonic” is on the national/local level. She also indicates that the form of “other” masculinity is non-hegemonic. Beasley’s approach has shown that hegemonic masculinity can be de-massified and pluralized.

When “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity is thought in terms of hierarchical masculinity, its place in society is positioned as in-between – supra-hegemonic and others –. According to Beasley, “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity – which is one of the reasons behind the in-between positioning of “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity – is characterized as global. With reference to this statement, I may say that, if globalization and capitalism are the prevailing concepts across the world; then, this is the dominant form in many countries, including Turkey. Besides, it is a form which is taken to be usual and accepted without questioning, as dominant and “already” existing. In this context, I may say modernization and globalization has affected masculinity forms in this time period in Turkey, too. Both modernization and globalization provided a transitional process but more than this, it may be regarded as a threat to masculinity in Turkey. Traditions, which were supportive of masculinity, are not operative or effective anymore since capital has become one of the primary decisive elements in the modern societies. On the other hand, Turkey’s difficult socio-political processes, especially the military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980, have been influential on the Turkish society and accordingly the forms of masculinity. Especially the 1980s witnessed the threats of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey through changing social, political, and economic conditions – working women, feminism, modernization, and urban life. These conditions brought

about a kind of depression for masculinity that is seen in the “woman films” of the 1980s. In the middle of the 1990s, this depression came to an end as new and different representations of masculinities started to show up more than before. These often exclude or silence women, act with solidarity, present both victim and offender positions at the same time, usually have problems with authority figures, and oppose the system. In other words, representations of masculinity have changed or been reshaped in conformance with the “dynamic” structure of masculinity.

As it is observed above, hegemonic masculinity accords the male hegemony over women and is taken to be more than a mere conception of the inequality between men and women. Furthermore, hegemonic masculinity researches have also presented the shaping of masculinity in the socialization process through homosocial structure. In this case, men’s socialization process among other men allows for the construction of particular male collectivities, which have particular features, norms, and hierarchies. Hierarchical relations among men may reveal male solidarity and rivalry. In the socialization process, men’s attitudes depend on the homosocial structure’s necessities. These can be named as typical socialization models and they emphasize the importance of socialization through the reproduction of masculinity. In these discussions, there are eight points (*See Chapter I, Homosocial Structure*) which stress the importance of socialization for the constitution of masculinity and these are legitimized in homosocial associations that men constitute. The first trait is the *presence of outside world* and this is very common in the 1990s popular Turkish cinema. In this world, the masculinity models or characters, who are powerful and rational and who do not feel pain or cry, evoke the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. The changing aspects of hegemonic masculinity forms are represented in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema in different forms. In this context, to analyze the differing hegemonic masculinity *forms*, three main masculinity *forms*, as Christine Beasley indicated, are taken into account: the “*supra-hegemonic*,” “*sub-hegemonic*,” and “non-hegemonic” masculinity. These forms are clearly observed in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema and this provided an opportunity to categorize the films in three groups: “Sub-hegemonic masculinity and its heroes,” “supra-

hegemonic masculinity and its victims,” and “non-hegemonic masculinity and the others.”

The films introducing the “*sub*-hegemonic masculinity and its heroes” feature male characters who act against the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity and sometimes sustain “others.” Despite the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity’s effective power, it still bears less masculine features and uses illegal or unlikely methods. Thus, these films show the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity as a damaging factor for masculinity and “*sub*-hegemonic” heroes punish the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity. Even though the hero dies at the end, the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity is punished by the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity and the heroes are represented as the “real” and “tough” men who stand as ideal role models for men, in Beasley’s terms. Although they are “ideal” heroes of the “*sub*-hegemonic masculinity, they also have some vulnerable sides which prevent them from being “*supra*-hegemonic” or “more perfect and more powerful”.

“*Supra*-hegemonic and its victims films” present the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form as a symbol as it coincides with the Turkish state. The films’ narration is shaped by the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity in which it determines the male characters’ behaviors or life patterns through the state’s omissions, service or impositions. The effect of “*supra*-hegemony” appears on the male characters as a defect at the beginning of these films and thus the male characters start as the members of the “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity. But through the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity, they become victims and sometimes choose being the “other” instead of staying “in-between”. In these films, we observe father-state’s attitude and the government officers who become victims because of the state’s policies. The male characters’ hegemonic masculinity form changes and are reshaped by the effect of the state’s oppressions or negligence. The father-state as considered in the “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity form is powerful and is represented as the most powerful hegemonic form in these films.

Beasley de-massifies the hegemonic masculinity as “*sub*-hegemonic” masculinity and “*supra*-hegemonic” masculinity and she describes the male characters who stay out of this classification as “others.” Others have the significant features like the

“*sub-hegemonic*” and “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinities. Beasley mentions the “others” as the marginalized “other” masculinities (2009, p.64). She defines them as “comparatively emasculated, as lacking the power to diminish the imperial master by seducing or otherwise thwarting the master’s authority” (2009, p.71). Beasley also thinks that the others or the non-hegemonic forms are “oppressed” by *sub-hegemonic* or *supra-hegemonic* forms (2009, p.73). The “others” can be considered as a product of the hegemonic masculinity. In the films, which feature “non-hegemonic” characters, the members of hegemonic masculinity generally oppress them. Thus, sometimes they try to be a part of the system to have power and money. These characters always have a dream or a goal and they sometimes try to “thwart the master’s authority” toward this end. While their non-hegemonic features make them to count as the “others,” they already start out as the “others” in these films.

The study has shown that the heroes, victims, and others are shaped or re-shaped by the effect of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, which dominates all masculinity forms in the modern and globalized world. “*Supra-hegemonic*” masculinity appears on constructions such as state, big mafia groups, capitalist system, and global power schemes. Furthermore, both the “*sub-hegemonic*” and the “non-hegemonic” masculinity have appeared as a product of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity in these popular films: If there were no representations of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, other characters were not given a chance to exist on themselves. This can be considered as a subordination function of the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. While analyzing hegemonic masculinity forms the thesis has revolved around the subordination of masculinities – *sub-hegemonic* and non-hegemonic – and their dynamics among another form of masculinity – *supra-hegemonic*. This subordination has shown that masculinity form is a dynamic structure, which may change among men and on the same body in a process. When representations of masculinity are subordinated by the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity, they took three forms: heroes, victims, and others. In the socialization process of the masculinity forms, the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity – its symbols or its representations – can be considered through the “presence of outside world.” Thus, the homosocial structure generally surfaces through the protection of or the escape from



subordination, despite some characters act against the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity as a hero. Even these characters know that they cannot destroy the subordination element; they can just limit or punish it for a while.

In conclusion, hegemonic masculinity *forms*, their features, and their socialization process were helpful while analyzing the masculinity forms through hierarchical structure. This thesis has shown that the masculinity forms in the post-1990s popular Turkish cinema are in a socialization process with the “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity and men’s attitudes and their masculinity forms are shaping through the effect of “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity. The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity shows itself as a “power” which does not represent “ideal” or “real” man. In these films we do not see any “*supra-hegemonic*” character as a hero or a real man; we see it as a dominant factor – state, mafia or international power – over other masculinity forms. The “*supra-hegemonic*” masculinity always stays in the *outside world* and works as a homogenizing mechanism for the homosocial structure – in which other masculinity forms are socialized. On the other hand, the *supra-hegemonic* masculinity can be considered as the *outside world* itself, which is one of the traits of the homosocial structure of masculinity. The existence of such a “power” and pressure led to the closure and suppression of the “*sub-hegemonic*” masculinity and non-hegemonic masculinity forms, which in turn resulted in their having local features.

In the post-1990s popular Turkish films, which were analyzed in this thesis, we do not see any global heroes or characters, but rather we witness the male characters who have the local/domestic features. This situation can be helpful to explain why these films are successful at the domestic box-office and why they are not in the international film festivals. Masculinity forms – sub-hegemonic or non-hegemonic – are shaped and re-shaped by the most “powerful” masculinity form – *supra-hegemonic*. Besides, we do not see the woman as having a dominant role to shape masculinity; but rather, we see the – *supra-hegemonic* – masculinity form being influential in the shaping of masculinity forms. Herein, the masculinity forms are in a new socialization process in these films. The representations of male characters try to accord with the new global system and to be involved in it or act against it. Both

situations require the solidarity of men. Therefore, in these films, we witness local, sub-hegemonic characters which are in male bonding because the threat which comes from the men's world is more powerful than the existence of the women. When masculinity representations in these films are analyzed within the hegemonic masculinity, which could be de-massified, it may be argued that the representations of masculinity in recent popular Turkish cinema are de-massified masculinities. Instead of characterizing this masculinity as being "in crisis," it is argued that they are "in the process of re-shaping" and such a de-massification in the analysis of men in socialization period may be an instrument for the understanding of masculinity representations.

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## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1 – Box Office Chart of the Films

<b>Box office year*</b>	<b>Film</b>	<b>Spectators</b>	<b>Ranking</b>
1996	Eşkıya	2.572.287	1
1997	Ağır Roman	873.833	1
1998	Her Şey Çok Güzel Olacak	1.239.015	1
1999	Kahpe Bizans	2.472.162	1
1999	Güle Güle	1.275.967	2
1999	Propoganda	1.238.128	3
2000	Vizontele	3.308.320	1
2000	Komser Şekspir	1.331.462	2
2000	Abuzer Kadayıf	864.312	3
2001	Deli Yürek Bumerang Cehennemi	1.051.352	1
2002	O Şimdi Asker	1.657.051	1
2003	G.O.R.A.	4.001.711	1
2003	Vizontele Tuuba	2.894.802	2

<b>Box office year*</b>	<b>Film</b>	<b>Spectators</b>	<b>Ranking</b>
2004	Hababam Sınıfı “Askerde”	2.586.132	1
2004	Gönül Yarası	898.000	3
2005	Kurtlar Vadisi Irak	4.256.566	1
2005	Babam ve Oğlum	3.837.885	2
2005	Organize İşler	2.617.452	3
2006	Hokkabaz	1.710.212	1
2007	Recep İvedik I	4.301.641	1
2007	Kabadayı	2.002.631	3
2008	Recep İvedik II	4.333.116	1
2008	A.R.O.G.	3.707.086	2
2008	Issız Adam	2.788.550	3
2009	Güneşi Gördüm	2.491.754	1
2009	Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun	2.423.369	2
2009	Neşeli Hayat	1.125.231	4

\*The release years of the films can be different from their box office years.  
The list is quoted from [www.sinematurk.com](http://www.sinematurk.com)

## **APPENDIX 2 – Abstracts of the Films**

### **Eşkıya / The Bandit (Yavuz Turgul, 1996)**

Baran (Şener Şen) is a bandit, who lied in prison for 35 years, when he returns to the home village, witnesses the fact that the world has changed dramatically during those years, with the village itself underwater after the construction of a dam. Then he also finds out that the person who masterminded the betrayal that brought him to jail was Berfo (Kamuran Usluer), Baran's best friend. In order to snare Keje (Sermin Şen), Baran's lover, Berfo seized his best friends gold and had Baran arrested by the gendarmes on Mountain Cudi. Then Berfo purchased Keje from her father against her will, and disappeared. While Baran going to Istanbul by train to find Berfo, meets Cumali (Uğur Yücel), a young man who is a drug dealer in Istanbul. Cumali helps Baran to find a place for staying in Istanbul. Baran sees Berfo on a TV program; he became powerful businessman in illegal ways and changed his name as Yusuf Şahoğlu. Cumali takes Baran to where Berfo lives. Baran spares the Berfo's life in consideration of Keje who never speaks when Berfo purchased him. When Keje see Baran, she speaks wit him. On the other hand, Cumali involves himself in trouble with mafia and his girlfriend. Baran helps Cumali, takes a cheque from Berfo to save Cumali but the cheque is worthless, and mafia kills Cumali. Baran kills Berfo and mafia members, after those he suicides.

**Ađır Roman / Cholera Street (Mustafa Altıoklar, 1997)**

Based on Metin Kaçan's novel, *Ađır Roman / Cholera Street*. Salih (Okan Bayülgen) is a young, automobile repairman in Kolera, a place in Istanbul as a slum quarter. He wants to imitate Arap Sado (Burak Sergen) who is a bully and protects Kolera people from Reis (Mustafa Uđurlu) who has a small mafia group. On the other hand a Tina (Müjde Ar) moves to Kolera and rents the flat of Salih's father. She is a prostitute and Salih falls in love with her. Reis' man kills Arap Sado and Salih became the new bully of Kolera but especially his love and his characteristics interfere him and he could not become the real bully as Arap Sado. The cops catch and torture Salih and Tina sleeps with Reis, when Salih sees them, he suicides.

**Her Şey Çok Güzel Olacak / Everything's Gonna Be Great (Ömer Vargı, 1998)**

Altan (Cem Yılmaz) unnecessarily involves in a fight and encounters his brother Nuri (Mazhar Alanson) who had never seen for three years. After all these years passed, this coincidence surprised both two brothers. By the fate of the game, two characters who are completely opposite each other, will together involve in some cases. Altan wants to open a bar and he steals some drugs which in his brother's work place, pharmaceutical warehouse. The two brothers get in trouble with mafia and escape to Bodrum. When they turn back, they are not opposite each other any more. The cases, which are against them, bring them together and in the end of the film, they dream together about their life.

**Propaganda (Sinan Çetin, 1999)**

Based on a true story set in 1948, customs officer Mehdi (Kemal Sunal) is faced with the duty of formally setting up the border between Turkey and Syria, dividing his hometown. With respect to his fixation of boundaries, relation with his best childhood friend Rahim (Metin Akpınar) is corrupted. Meanwhile, passionate love between son of Mehdi and daughter of Rahim, becomes impossible because of the boundary line. Rahim is unaware of the pain that will eminently unfold, as families, languages, cultures and lovers are both ripped apart and clash head on in a village once united. In the end of the film, Mehdi decides to relinquish his office and join Rahim and his family who move from the town.

**Kahpe Bizans / Perfidious Byzantine (Gani Müjde, 2000)**

A comedy, features of a Turkish tribe (Nacar) migrating to France because of drought and kangaroo attacks, finding themselves in Anatolia and facing the Byzantines. Byzantine Emperor Illetyus (Mehmet Ali Erbil) interpreting a dream to oracle, orders the killing of all the children newborn in Nacar land. The same day, a woman putting triplets in three different baskets, leaves them into the river. After years, children grow being unaware of each other and would be heroes of several intrigues. One, being the successor to the Byzantine throne in the palace; one in nomad land and the other one remains to live on the river. However, things get mixed up after the children grow. The movie is a spoof of various low budget Turkish movies from the seventies depicting Turkish exploits against the Byzantines.

### **Güle Güle / Goodbye Goodby (Zeki Ökten, 2000)**

The film narrates the story of four men and a woman, who live in the same island. The film starts with one of the characters', Galip (Metin Akpınar), deciding to visit his girlfriend Rosa who is living in Cuba, and who have met once throughout lifetime and loved forever. However, Galip experiences many obstacles through his way. Galip gets a fatal illness and he does not know about this. His friends show an incredible effort for him to meet his girlfriend, – they knock off a bank –. Galip's best friends send him to Cuba but Rosa dies before several weeks and Galip knows that but his friend does not know this as Galip does not know his sickness.

### **Abuzer Kadayıf (Tunç Başaran, 2000)**

Ersin Balkan (Metin Akpınar) is working as a professor in a university. He has a dream that found a place for street children. He recognizes that he cannot achieve his aim with his earnings and decides to try an extraordinary way. He creates a folk singer character on his own body as Abuzer Kadayıf (Metin Akpınar). He wins a lot of money, power and gains respect in the society with his manager. Furthermore, he gets trouble with a big mafia organization. When Ersin's girlfriend recognizes he is Abuzer Kadayıf himself, she decides to leave him because he cannot leave the character of Abuzer Kadayıf.



### **Vizontele (Yılmaz Erdoğan, Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2001)**

The storyline of Vizontele is based on the memories of the director Yılmaz Erdoğan, where he grew up in Hakkari while he was a little child. The story takes place in a small town in Turkey at the beginning of the 1970s. The time has come to bring technology into that small town. The first Television (or called Vizontele by the citizens) arrives and the chaos begins. Some people are excited and some are afraid of this new device, which can show live pictures from different places. Is it devils easy prey to catch us or is it just a feature of the modern time? The state does not construct any system for the television and just sends a television. The mayor (Altan Erkekli) of the town tries to find some people who can help him to set up the signal receiver on the highest position of the mountain. His team consists of one mad electrician called Emin (Yılmaz Erdoğan) and some mayor office staff members and none of them has any knowledge of TVs.

### **Komser Şekspir / Commissar Shakespeare (Sinan Çetin, 2001)**

Cemil (Kadir İnanır) is a commissar and a single father with an only daughter Su (Pelin Batu). Su, who is casting the role “Snow White” in the school play, is rehearsing when she blacks out and is taken to hospital where she is found to have leukemia. Meanwhile, Cemil's men round up a number of people, including a mafia man, a drug dealer, a drug addict, and a ageing prostitute. When Su's teacher refuses her the role of Snow White; Cemil, sensing his daughter's disappointment, decides to produce the play himself and enter it in a TV competition against the school. He fills the cast with inmates and junior police officers under his command. The district attorney manages to escape and alerts the police who arrests Cemil at the studio. Su dies of her disease in the final scene of the play. While Cemil is about to be sent to prison, it turns out that he has been pardoned and promoted due to the glowing report by the European Union Human Rights Organization about his police station. Cemil rejects the promotion and decides to form a theatre group with his former inmates and they pick Romeo and Juliet as their next project.

**Deli Yürek Bumerang Cehennemi / The Mad Heart: Boomerang Hell  
(Osman Sınav, 2001)**

Yusuf Mirođlu (Kenan İmirzalıođlu) goes with his girlfriend to Diyarbakır in southeast Turkey to attend his best friend Cemal's wedding. While performing the traditional dance “halay” at the wedding, Cemal is killed by an assassin. Cemal's widowed wife pleads Yusuf to find the people behind the murder and bring them to justice. Yusuf finds himself caught in a struggle against PKK and other big global power behind it. He takes help from his ex-commandant Bozo (Selçuk Yöntem) and he punishes the enemy by himself.

**O Şimdi Asker / He's in the Army Now (Mustafa Altıoklar, 2003)**

Turkey's northwest has suffered a devastating earthquake on August 17th, 1999. The government is in need of money to compensate the cost of recovering from this catastrophe. So they decide to pass a new, temporary law, which suggests that every man of Turkish citizenship over a certain age can now pay some certain amount of money to the government of Turkey, and in return for that, complete his military service in 28 days instead of the regular 18 months. Many people want to take advantage of that, including famous singers and businessmen, and they are all sent to the same army base to carry out their 28-day-long military service. One of them is a young man who has lost his home and his entire family in the earthquake, thus being allowed to join the 28-day crew without paying anything. All these young men, most of whom are rich or famous, live the utmost experience of their lives at the army base, involving mostly funny yet sentimental moments.

**G.O.R.A. (Ömer Faruk Sorak, 2004)**

Arif is an owner of carpet shop in a city of Turkey and he is kidnapped by aliens to G.O.R.A Planet. While Arif is a prisoner here, he saves G.O.R.A from a meteor and he meets Ceku (Özge Özberk) who is the princess. While all of these happening the commandant Logar plans to marry with Ceku for administration of G.O.R.A. Ceku do not want to marry with Logar, she falls in love with Arif and thinks an escaping plan. She sends a message and pass card to Arif for escaping together but Arif has to contend with Logar to achieve this. Garavel (Özkan Uğur) who is an earthling man on G.O.R.A. helps to Arif and he gives some special powers to him and Arif punishes Logar, they can escape from the planet.

**Vizontele Tuuba (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2004)**

Güner (Tarık Akan) exiles to eastern of Turkey because of his leftist thoughts. He travels with his family to a small town, which Deli Emin (Yılmaz Erdoğan) lives. Güner is a librarian but there is no library even there is not any book in this town. Güner and Deli Emin build a new library with the support of mayor (Altan Erkekli). Many books are sent by efforts of Güner. On the other hand Deli Emin falls in love with Güner's daughter Tuba (Tuba Ünsal) who is a disabled girl because of a traffic accident while Güner exiled to another town once upon a time. While everything is all right, one day, soldiers take Güner, because the 1980 military coup happens and Tuba has to leave the town with her mother.

**Babam ve Ođlum / My Father and My Son (Çađan Irmak, 2005)**

Sadık (Fikret Kuşkan) is one of the rebellious youth who has been politically active as a university student and became a left-wing journalist in the 1970s, despite his father's expectations of him becoming an agricultural engineer and taking control of their family farm in an Aegean village. On the dawn of September 12, 1980, when 1980 military coup hits the country, they cannot find access to any hospital or a doctor and his wife dies while giving birth to their only child, Deniz. After a long-lasting period of torture, trials, and jail time, Sadık returns to his village with 7-8 years old Deniz, knowing that it will be hard to correct things with his father, Hüseyin (Çetin Tekindor). Hüseyin does not want to speak his son but when he learns that Sadık had a fatal sickness after tortures he becomes very sad and carries his son Sadık.

**Organize İşler / Magic Carpet Ride (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2005)**

Samet (Tolga Çevik) is a superman, who is not from Krypton but Evreşe. Superman Samet while committing a suicide meets Asım (Yılmaz Erdoğan), who is a principled, professional swindler. Asım wants Samet to join his small gang but Samet is very innocent for this job. While he tries to sell a stolen car to a beautiful girl Umut (Özgü Namal) he falls in love with her but a member of Asım's gang sells a stolen car to Umut's family and a big mafia organization punishes Asım and his men.

**Hababam Sınıfı Askerde / The Class of Chaos in the Army (Ferdi Eğilmez, 2005)**

Hababam Class students, whose colleagues and peers already are workforce, – by the help of school principal Deli Bedri's (Mehmet Ali Erbil) solutions – are one morning suddenly waken up by military police. Since they are no longer tolerable, the single cure is their sending to barracks for being men. But Hababam Class does not change and continue their misbehavior, besides it is now the commanders who are dealt with. There becomes a competition between another troop in the same battalion, which is totally comprised of girls.

**Gönül Yarası / Lovelorn (Yavuz Turgul, 2005)**

Nazım (Şener Şen) is an idealist teacher in the east of Turkey. He retires and returns to Istanbul after 15 years. His family – son and daughter – lives in Istanbul and Nazım does not want to bother them. He becomes a taxi driver until he gets his earnings and he meets a single mother who works in a cheap club and becomes embroiled in her plight – a troublesome ex-husband who won't leave her alone - and starts to fall in love with her. On the other hand he understands that he omitted his family during the 15 years.

**Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak / Valley of the Wolves: Iraq (Serdar Akar, 2006)**

Polat Alemdar (Necati Şaşmaz) is an “illegal” Turkish intelligence agent who has recently severed links to the government agency for which he worked. Determined to avenge his friend Süleyman (Tayfun Eraslan) humiliation, Polat travels to Iraq along with several colleagues to seek vengeance on the American commander whose actions led to Süleyman's suicide. An Iraqi woman helps them for hiding, and in the end of the film, Polat Alemdar punishes USA army and the woman who helped them dies.

**Hokkabaz / The Magician (Ali Taner Baltacı, Cem Yılmaz, 2006)**

İskender (Cem Yılmaz) is an illusionist. He decides go on a tour to gain money with his childhood friend. They are obliged to travel with İskender's father Sait (Mazhar Alanson). Sait does not respect his son's profession. While traveling, they meet Fatma (Özlem Tekin) and she joins them. However, Fatma cheats them and takes their money. When they return to Istanbul, İskender gets into depression because he falls in love with Fatma and his father Sait worries for his son. Sait buys a new caravan and gives a new hope for them.

**Kabadayı / For Love and Honor (Ömer Vargı, 2007)**

Ali Osman (Şener Şen) is a retired bully of city of Istanbul. However, lately he gives up bully and starts to operate a synthetic pitch. Ali Osman usually meets his old friends, retired other bullies. One day, unexpectedly, Ali Osman finds the traces of the woman he was in love and had never seen for years. Then the whole action starts as a chain of events. He learns not only he had a son named Murat (İsmail Hacıoğlu), but he also realizes that Murat has an enemy called Devran (Kenan İmirzalıoğlu) who is a member of a big and international mafia organization, because of his relationship with an attractive girl. From that moment on, Devran swears to avenge Murat and Karaca and it is up to Ali Osman to protect them.

**Recep İvedik I / Recep İvedik I (Togan Gökbakar, 2008)**

Recep (Şahan Gökbakar) finds a wallet on the street, which belongs to a millionaire, and starts his journey to south in order to return it. On his way south, a series of unexpected and funny events occur, but he manages to reach and return the wallet. As a reward, he is offered a free stay in a hotel, but he politely refuses this offer. After seeing his childhood love leaving a tour bus, he changes his mind, and starts trying to gain her back. He makes several attempts trying to impress his childhood lover. He acts against the rules of holiday village and comes across many obstacles but overcomes everything in his own funny ways. The story ends when Sibel (childhood girlfriend) leaves the hotel.

**A.R.O.G. (Cem Yılmaz, Ali Taner Baltacı, 2008)**

Commander Logar (Cem Yılmaz) fools Arif (Cem Yılmaz) and sends him 1.000.000 years back in the time. Arif has to civilize people from past to reach today. Later on, Arif finds out that, a tribal leader, keeping all the people under pressure and hiding all the discoveries and investigations in a cave, prevents the development of civilization. Arif challenging this, teaches all people playing football. By the help of football game played between the tribal leader's tribe and the tribe making discoveries, the development of civilization disentangles. Hence after this victory, Ceku (Özge Özberk) going from present to past, rescues Arif.

**Issız Adam / Alone (Çağın Irmak, 2008)**

Alper (Cemal Hünal) is in his mid 30s and a good chef at his own restaurant. He loves luxury and spends his life with one-night stands and paid love. Ada (Melis Birkan) is in her late 20s and has a shop where she designs costumes for kids. She leads a modest life and one day while looking for a book, her and Alper's paths cross. Alper is fascinated by Ada's beauty and starts following her with the book she has been looking for. They both experience first signs of love, which they have never experienced before. Although Alper tries to fit Ada into his life, he realizes that this narrows his life down while on the other hand Ada has already fallen in love with him. After Alper's mother comes to visit his son Alper's perception changes about his relation and he decides to break up Ada.

**Recep İvedik II (Togan Gökbakar, 2009)**

Recep İvedik (Şahan Gökbakar) visits his grandmother. Grandma tells him that he is useless and wills him to do 3 things: Finding a job, finding a wife, and gaining reputation. After trying many attempts to find a suitable job, Recep at last, unwillingly applies to an international advertisement agency – which is bequeathed from his grandfather, and administrated by his cousin at the present. Again in this film, he disturbs people and violates the rules. After finding a job, he tries to succeed in the second will; marrying, which he never does. Nevertheless, he gains a sudden reputation in business life by acquiring an international client with his own methods.



**Güneşi Gördüm / I Saw the Sun (Mahsun Kırmızıgül, 2009)**

A mountain village perched on the border between two worlds has been the home, for generations, of the Altun family. But with the introduction of forced migration policies, the family finds itself wrenched from the village. This is the story of their relocation from east to west. Haydar and Isa Altun arrive with their respective families in Istanbul, where they decide to stay. But Davut Altun, his wife and children set their sights to a further field and travel on to Norway. Spanning a period of 25 years, the film recounts the experiences of the three families as they struggle to find their feet in alien surroundings. It is a film that condemns all of discrimination or alienation and argues that war, fighting, and contempt for anyone unlike oneself are the very problem itself

**Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath (Levent Semerci, 2009)**

*Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun / The Breath* is about a small group of Turkish soldiers in a remote patrol station in eastern Turkey facing their near-certain death during a time the conflict between Turkish Army and militant organization PKK reached its peak point. The commandant Mete (Mete Horozoğlu) who had just lost two people in his command in a combat with PKK militants arrives at the station and takes charge. Mete finds it very difficult to step out of the state of depression due to his recent loss and so intimidates his soldiers into bettering themselves to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again. During his stay there, he came across a PKK militant called the “Doctor” who intervenes in his phone calls with his wife through radio frequencies. In parallel to that, we observe daily routines of Turkish soldiers and their sincere phone calls with their loved ones as we approach to the inevitable end.

**Neşeli Hayat / Cheerful Life (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2009)**

Rıza Şenyurt (Yılmaz Erdoğan), lives in suburbs with his wife and works in temporary jobs. Some day, he learns that his friends in neighborhood lodge a claim against him, because one year ago, Rıza has invested in a commercial organization and motivated the others to do so. They all have invested in the same organization, which has bankrupted later. Rıza retain a lawyer and briefs him the story, however he has to find money to pay for the lawyer. Hence, he accepts a temporary job, which is standing in front of a toyshop wearing a Santa Claus costume. Ashamed of this, Rıza cannot tell his wife, however, he overcomes all the problems in this Santa Claus identity and his wife is proud of him.

