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Publication Open Access Evaluation of the \"Carries' Liability\" Regime as a Part of the EU Asylum Policy under Public International Law(2008) Başaran, Ece; Bahçeşehir ÜniversitesiÖzet: İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ilticayı bir hukuki müessese haline geti¬ren Avrupa devletleri, dünya konjonktürü ve kendi ekonomik ihtiyaçlarının de¬ğişmesi ile birlikte, bu yaratımdan kurtulmak amacıyla çok çeşitli mekanizmalar üretmiştir. Bunlardan birini günümüze kadar şimdiye kadar Türk doktrininde fazla irdelenmemiş taşıyıcının sorumluluğu rejimi oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, taşıyıcının sorumluluğu rejimini tanıtmak, bu rejimin AB iltica politikası ile bağlantısını kurmak ve rejimi uluslararası kamu hukuku bakımından değerlendirmektir. Bunun için öncelikle, Avrupa'nın iltica anlayışı tarihsel perspektiften kısaca gözden geçirilmiş ve Avrupalı devletlerin iç hukukları ile AB hukukunda bu müessesenin nasıl ortaya çıktığına değinilmiştir. Daha sonra ise taşıyıcının sorumluluğu rejiminin kamu hukukunun çeşitli dalları açısından yol açtığı çeşitli hukuki sorunlar ele alınmış ve olası çözüm yöntemleri tartışılmıştır.Publication Metadata only İpoteğin ilamlı takip yoluyla paraya çevrilmesi(2010) öz Secer; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİRehin, hak sahibine başkasına ait bir mal veya hakkın paraya çevrilmesi yoluyla elde edilen tutardan alacağını elde etme yetkisi veren bir ayni haktır. Rehin hakkı, bir taşınmaz üzerinde kurulursa taşınmaz rehninden bahsedilir. Taşınmaz rehni, yalnızca alacağı güvence altına almak için alacağa bağlı, feri bir hak olarak kurulabilir ve bu halde ipotek adını alır. Çalışmamızın konusu, ipoteğin ilamlı takip yoluyla paraya çevrilmesi olup, alacaklının takip talebiyle başlayıp takibin kesinleşmesine kadar devam eden süreç ele alınmaktadır.Publication Metadata only Devlet Gözetimine Karşı Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kalkanı(2011) Elif KÜZECİ; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİGözetim, çağımızın eri çok tartışılan konularından biridir. Teknolojinin kişisel bilgilerin toplanılmasında yaygın kullanımı dikkate alındığında bu durum hiç de şaşırtıcı değildir. Devletler, rasyonel bir yönetimi ve güvenliği sağlamak için yurttaşlarını, özel teşebbüsler karlılığı arttırmak için müşterilerini, işverenler ise daha iyi bir performans elde edebilmek için işçilerini izlemektedir. Bu açıdan, bir tarafta artan bilgi gereksinimi, diğer tarafta ise özel yaşama yönelik gittikçe artan şiddette tehdit dikkat çekmektedir. Türkiye açısından konuya yaklaştığımızda ise, hızla evrilen teknoloji ülkemizde yakından takip edilirken, konuya ilişkin hukuksal güvencelerin sağlanmasında bir eksiklik bulunduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Türkiye'de halen kişisel verilerin korunmasına yönelik kapsayıcı bir yasa yürürlükte değildir. İşte tam da bu nedenle Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin konuya yaklaşımı oldukça önemlidir. Nitekim Anayasanın 90. maddesi uyarınca Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Türkiye'de ulusal hukuk sisteminin ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Bu çalışmanın amacı da, gözetime ilişkin Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararlarını incelemek suretiyle, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlarının gözetim toplumunun birer üyesi haline gelmemeleri için ne gibi güvencelerinin bulunduğunu belirlemektir.Publication Metadata only Turkey’s Compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights within the Frame of Articles 5 and 6(2011) G. Hande ULUTÜRK; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİPublication Metadata only Academic freedom: A comparative analysis of the legal protections in the united states and Turkey(2011) M. Kathleen BURCH; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİAcademic freedom is often misunderstood by politicians, the general public and even sometimes by faculty themselves to mean that faculty have carte blanche in all matters of speech &,#8211, in the classroom, in the hallway, and in publication. Academic freedom does not protect all faculty speech &,#8211, not in the classroom, the hallway, or in publication. Like other professions such as medicine and the law, the academic profession has standards by which its members, professors, must abide.If the member abides by the profession&,#8217,s standards, she will be protected by academic freedom.If the member fails to abide by the profession&,#8217,s standards, academic freedom will provide no protection.The purpose of academic freedom is not to provide the professor life-time job security, but to protect the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge is power and can be a threat to those in power. Knowledge expands society&,#8217,s frontiers through scientific discovery. Knowledge helps us to understand our culture and the cultures of others, breeding understanding and tolerance. Knowledge fuels economic development. But, most importantly knowledge prepares individuals for participation in the political process. Knowledge and thus, academic freedom, is necessary for a free and democratic society. Since the Eighteenth Century, academic freedom has protected university faculty whose research and whose search for knowledge threatens the authorities by questioning orthodox or sanctioned knowledge. Academic freedom also protects faculty from the &,#8220,tyranny of public opinion.&,#8221, Those whom have threatened academic freedom and from whom faculty have needed protection have included the government, religious leaders, and owners and trustees of private universities. More recently, threats to academic freedom have come from students and corporations which fund research or are otherwise affiliated with the university. Because the role of the university is to &,#8220,attain universal knowledge,&,#8221, faculty must be free to search for that knowledge. &,#8220,[I]t would be inconsistent with the role of universities to place limits on what their academic staff can teach and research.&,#8221, Moreover, because faculty wherever they are located are searching for &,#8220,universal knowledge,&,#8221, the protections of academic freedom should be universal. The principles of academic freedom should protect faculty regardless of where they reside, teach, or conduct their research. This article explores the contours of academic freedom in the United States and in the Republic of Turkey in order to ascertain whether the protections afforded in each country are coterminous. Section I addresses why academic freedom is necessary. Section II defines the four areas that academic freedom protects. Section III discusses both private law and public law protections of academic freedom in United States. Section IV discusses academic freedom protections under Article 27 of the Constitution of Turkey and under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section V concludes with a discussion of the current threats to academic freedom and provides some suggestions to minimize those threats.Publication Metadata only Free speech in time of war and terror in the united states and Turkey(2011) M. Kathleen BURCH; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİAs children we are taught that &,#8220,sticks and stones may break our bones, but words will never hurt us.&,#8221,When, however, it comes to war, we presume that words not only hurt, but that words are dangerous. This presumption is fueled by fear. Fear that the speech will threaten our way of life &,#8211, whether that is the American way of life or the Turkish way of life.Public opinion drives that fear.Politicians feed that fear, especially during elections.And, judges fear making a mistake.No one wants to be responsible for losing the war or allowing the next terrorist attack.In discerning what speech should be protected and what speech can be prohibited, the individual&,#8217,s right to free speech must be balanced against public safety and national security. The right to free speech has never been absolute. The individual right to speak or to receive information is balanced against the invasion of another individual&,#8217,s right to be let alone in their home or to maintain their privacy. When it comes to speech in time of war, the balance is not in relation to another individual&,#8217,s right, but against the collective right of society to remain safe. &,#8220,When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight&,#8221, and not Court would find that such speech was protected. As early as 1275, the British crown punished seditious libel, which included &,#8220,any false news or tales whereby discord or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the king and his people or the great men of the realm.&,#8221, By 1606, the British law of seditious libel consisted of three principles: First, a libel against a private person may be punished criminally because it may provoke revenge and thus cause a breach of the peace. Second, a libel against a government official is an even greater offense, &,#8220,for it concerns not only the breach of peace, but also the scandal of government.&,#8221, And, third, although the essence of the crime was the falsity of the libel, even a true libel could be punished. The early British theory of seditious libel was that &,#8220,if people should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of government, no government can subsist. For, it is very necessary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of it.&,#8221, The British courts even went so far as to say that &,#8220,a true libel is especially dangerous, for unlike a false libel, the dangers of truthful criticism cannot be defused by disproof.&,#8221, It is the modern day descendants of seditious libel that this essay addresses. Both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights have their roots in British common law. Not only do the First Amendment and Article 10 have common roots, but over time the United States Supreme Court&,#8217,s and the European Court of Human Rights&,#8217, jurisprudence has converged. While the European Court of Human Rights does not cite U.S. Supreme Court cases as authority and the U.S. Supreme Court does not cite the European Court&,#8217,s cases as authority, the policy concerns of the two courts and the language used by the two courts in articulating the rule of law is similar. This essay begins with a summary of the development of seditious libel in the United States from 1789 when the U.S. Constitution was ratified to the present day. The current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be summarized, with a comparison of the European Court&,#8217,s jurisprudence to the U.S. Supreme Court&,#8217,s jurisprudence. The essay will conclude with a brief discussion of the current concerns that arise when individual rights to free speech are balanced against the government&,#8217,s interests in public safety and national security.Publication Metadata only Persuasive analytical legal writing(2011) E. Mary ADKINS; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİIn nations with a common law tradition and, to a lesser extent, in nations with a civil law tradition, lawyers on each side of a legal controversy will argue their side of the controversy in an attempt to persuade the court to rule in favor of their client. Sometimes this argument is directed to the court itself, and sometimes the argument is directed to the opponent in the case. In any event, learning to write persuasively is an important skill for lawyers in a nation with a robust rule of law. This brief article is designed to set forth a model for a persuasive analytical legal writing document. The model is based chiefly on persuasive document structure generally used by lawyers in the United States of America.Publication Metadata only Judicial writing in America: How common Law is “made” and how understanding this process can help attorneys advocate for clients in American courts(2011) L. Brenda TOFTE; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ&,#8220,It is dangerous to let the public behind the scenes. They are easily dis-illusioned and then they are angry with you, for it was the illusion they loved.&,#8221,I. Introduction British novelist W. Somerset Maugham made the above statement regarding the writing process. Maugham explained that, as a writer, what interested him was not the illusion he created, but the way he created that illusion. Similarly, the way the common law is created is interesting to attorneys who represent clients in American courts. In fact, attorneys play a part in creating the law because judges can only decide cases that are actually filed and then can only evaluate arguments that are proffered by parties and counsel in those cases. In these next few pages, you will go &,#8220,behind the scenes&,#8221, of the American judiciary to see how common law&,#8212,the ever-growing body of judicial decisions that not only governs the actions of parties in decided cases, but also the actions of people in similar situations in the future&,#8212,is created. Although American courtrooms are generally open to the public, the actual manner of deciding cases and producing written decisions occurs behind the closed doors of judges&,#8217, chambers where only judges&,#8217, staff members are privy to the actual decision-making processes. Judges&,#8217, chambers are one of the few places where judges are out of the public eye and can thoughtfully contemplate these decisions. This article de-mystifies the judicial decision-making process by explaining how judges memorialize decisions into the written orders and opinions that comprise the American common law, and explains what kinds of authority judges must rely on when making their decisions. Understanding this decision-making process and how judges use legal authority can help attorneys in American courts effectively advocate for their clients. First, this article presents a primer on the structure of American courts and the doctrine of stare decisis. Second, this article explains the process many judges use for deciding cases, focusing specifically on how the judges produce their final written-products: the orders and opinions that make up the American common law. Although judges make the ultimate decisions, this article will demonstrate that many people may be involved in the process: the judge or judges deciding the issue, members of the judges&,#8217, staffs, and even the attorneys representing parties in court all have roles to play. Finally, the article gives attorneys suggestions for using the doctrine of stare decisis to their advantage should they ever represent clients in American courts.Publication Metadata only Explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis: A comparative civil law and common law analysis(2011) D. Michael MURRAY; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİI. Introduction In legal analysis, there are two methods of synthesis of precedent cases: rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis. Rule synthesis refers to the use of multiple authorities for the purpose of determining what is the prevailing law&,#8212,the prevailing legal rule&,#8212,on an issue. Explanatory synthesis refers to the use of multiple authorities for the purpose of demonstrating how the law should be interpreted and applied in the present circumstances based on how it has been interpreted and applied in past circumstances.Explanatory synthesis does not seek to determine what the law is, but how the law operates. Explanatory synthesis is a method of analysis and advocacy that demonstrates how the law will or should produce an outcome in a certain situation based on inductive syntheses of authorities that reveal how the law has operated in past situations. It also is a method of modern legal rhetoric that constructs knowledge and understanding of the role of precedents on the legal issue, persuading the audience as to the correctness or superiority of the attorney`s knowledge and understanding of how the law works, and seeking to motivate the audience to act in the rhetorical situation of the discourse.In comparative study of common law and civilian legal analysis, many scholars have noted a convergence in the two systems` use of precedent cases. Although common law legal theory historically has started from a position that judges are fully competent to create law and change the law through their adjudication of cases and the judicial opinions they write, and civilian theory historically has started from a position that judges are not empowered to create and change the law enacted by the legislature but rather are to read and apply the existing law to new cases, the practice of tribunals within the two families of legal analysis has not reflected clear distinctions in the approach to and use of precedent. Civilian judges refer to case law and acknowledge the persuasive effect of precedent on their determinations, and common law judges have become more civilian in their respect for legislative authority to enact laws that determine cases. A common law approach to precedent includes the theory of stare decisis, that decisions of courts in a proper position in the hierarchy of judicial authority of the appropriate jurisdiction shall issue opinions that are binding on lower courts within the same hierarchy, but it is no longer a safe proposition to suggest that a civilian judge will not find precedent to be binding and will not follow the guidance of prior judicial determinations in the adjudication of a new dispute. Similarly, a common law judge may go to extreme lengths to distinguish precedents, and precedents of the same court or same level of court will be rejected from time to time&,#8212,reversed, abrogated, modified, or replaced&,#8212,in the name of progress and justice. The purpose of this article is not to trace the exact points of convergence and comparative divergence in the use of and reliance on precedent. Rather, I use this convergence as a platform for the discussion of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. Explanatory synthesis, the inductive use of precedent in a demonstrative and persuasive presentation of how the law should be interpreted and applied, may be distinguished from rule synthesis because it does not depend on the precedent being binding or on the application of any form of the doctrine of stare decisis. Explanatory synthesis as a form of legal analysis relies on the open, scientific, inductive structure of the analysis and the use of multiple precedents for the accuracy and reliability of its predictions and conclusions. Rhetorically, explanatory synthesis relies on the structure of mathematical-scientific induction within a familiar deductive syllogistic structure, and on the open, demonstrative, and falsifiable analysis of multiple authorities both to create knowledge and understanding and for persuasive advocacy. Part II of this article will introduce the concepts of explanatory synthesis as distinguished from rule synthesis, while parts V and VI will explore the advantages of explanatory synthesis both analytically and rhetorically as a method of demonstrating the proper interpretation and application of precedents in civilian and common law systems. My discussion here is qualified by two topics that bear on the two uses of synthesis: one, the extent to which civil law and common law systems use and rely on precedent cases as a determiner and source of law, and two, the differing roles of precedent accepted within the legal structure, legal culture, judicial culture, and constitutional and statutory regime of a jurisdiction. No discussion of synthesis will be meaningful without at least noting these important background considerations that ultimately define and sometimes constrain my recommendations as to the use of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. Therefore, part III will discuss the first set of factors bearing on the two forms of synthesis, namely, four different uses and one non-use of precedent in civil law and common law systems, and part IV will discuss the second set of factors, involving the ability to synthesize precedents under a hierarchy of judicial authority in the jurisdiction, within the legal culture and the judicial culture of the jurisdiction, and under constitutional and statutory limitations of the jurisdiction. Part V will then discuss the use of explanatory synthesis in legal analysis and advocacy, and part VI will conclude with a discussion of the contemporary rhetorical implications of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis.Publication Metadata only İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi’nin Bayatyan Ermenistan’a karşı kararı ve kararın Türkiye’deki vicdanî ret hakkına etkisi(2011) Serkan KÖYBAŞI; BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİİnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi’nin Ermenistan’a karşı vermiş olduğu Bayatyan kararı sonrasında İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi’nin düşünce, din ve vicdan özgürlüğüne ilişkin 9. maddesi kapsamına vicdanî ret hakkı da dahil olmuştur. Vicdanî ret hakkı artık Avrupa kamu düzeninin bir parçasıdır. Mahkeme kararlarının Sözleşme’nin ayrılmaz bir parçası olması nedeniyle Bayatyan kararı Türkiye’yi bağlar. 1982 Anayasası’nın 90. maddesinin son fıkrası uyarınca temel hak ve özgürlüklere ilişkin uluslararası sözleşmelerle kanunların farklı düzenlemeler içermesi halinde uluslararası sözleşme uygulanır.Bu nedenle, 1111 sayılı Askerlik Kanunu’nun alternatifsiz şekilde zorunlu askerlik hizmetini öngören düzenlemesi karşısında Sözleşme’nin vicdanî ret hakkını da kapsayan 9. maddesi üstün konumdadır. Vicdanî ret davalarına bakan yargıçların bu yeni durumu göz önünde bulundurarak vicdanî retçileri cezalandırmaktan kaçınması ve Sözleşme’nin 9. maddesini uygulaması gerekmektedir. Yasama organının da vicdanî ret hakkını tanıyan ve bu hakkını kullanan vatandaşlar için alternatif bir kamu hizmeti öngören bir düzenleme yapması acil bir zorunluluktur.