Publication: Free speech in time of war and terror in the united states and Turkey
| dc.contributor.author | M. Kathleen BURCH | |
| dc.contributor.institution | BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-20T20:04:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 29.07.2022 | |
| dc.description.abstract | As children we are taught that &,#8220,sticks and stones may break our bones, but words will never hurt us.&,#8221,When, however, it comes to war, we presume that words not only hurt, but that words are dangerous. This presumption is fueled by fear. Fear that the speech will threaten our way of life &,#8211, whether that is the American way of life or the Turkish way of life.Public opinion drives that fear.Politicians feed that fear, especially during elections.And, judges fear making a mistake.No one wants to be responsible for losing the war or allowing the next terrorist attack.In discerning what speech should be protected and what speech can be prohibited, the individual&,#8217,s right to free speech must be balanced against public safety and national security. The right to free speech has never been absolute. The individual right to speak or to receive information is balanced against the invasion of another individual&,#8217,s right to be let alone in their home or to maintain their privacy. When it comes to speech in time of war, the balance is not in relation to another individual&,#8217,s right, but against the collective right of society to remain safe. &,#8220,When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight&,#8221, and not Court would find that such speech was protected. As early as 1275, the British crown punished seditious libel, which included &,#8220,any false news or tales whereby discord or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the king and his people or the great men of the realm.&,#8221, By 1606, the British law of seditious libel consisted of three principles: First, a libel against a private person may be punished criminally because it may provoke revenge and thus cause a breach of the peace. Second, a libel against a government official is an even greater offense, &,#8220,for it concerns not only the breach of peace, but also the scandal of government.&,#8221, And, third, although the essence of the crime was the falsity of the libel, even a true libel could be punished. The early British theory of seditious libel was that &,#8220,if people should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of government, no government can subsist. For, it is very necessary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of it.&,#8221, The British courts even went so far as to say that &,#8220,a true libel is especially dangerous, for unlike a false libel, the dangers of truthful criticism cannot be defused by disproof.&,#8221, It is the modern day descendants of seditious libel that this essay addresses. Both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights have their roots in British common law. Not only do the First Amendment and Article 10 have common roots, but over time the United States Supreme Court&,#8217,s and the European Court of Human Rights&,#8217, jurisprudence has converged. While the European Court of Human Rights does not cite U.S. Supreme Court cases as authority and the U.S. Supreme Court does not cite the European Court&,#8217,s cases as authority, the policy concerns of the two courts and the language used by the two courts in articulating the rule of law is similar. This essay begins with a summary of the development of seditious libel in the United States from 1789 when the U.S. Constitution was ratified to the present day. The current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be summarized, with a comparison of the European Court&,#8217,s jurisprudence to the U.S. Supreme Court&,#8217,s jurisprudence. The essay will conclude with a brief discussion of the current concerns that arise when individual rights to free speech are balanced against the government&,#8217,s interests in public safety and national security. | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 124 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1304-7973 | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 83-84 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 108 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14719/5937 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 7 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.relation.journal | Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Kazancı Hakemli Hukuk Dergisi | |
| dc.subject | Siyasi Bilimler | |
| dc.subject | Hukuk | |
| dc.title | Free speech in time of war and terror in the united states and Turkey | |
| dc.type | Research Article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| local.indexed.at | TRDizin |
