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Do political commentaries command? The case of the Central Bank of Brazil, Os comentários políticos comandam? O caso do Banco Central do Brasil

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dc.contributor.authorGüneş, Gökhan Şahin
dc.contributor.authorAsfuroglu, Dila
dc.contributor.institutionGüneş, Gökhan Şahin, Department of Medical Services and Techniques, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey
dc.contributor.institutionAsfuroglu, Dila, Department of Economics, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-05T15:08:19Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether political pressure affects the conduct of monetary policy in Brazil. For the period between January 2010 and August 2020, we estimate a modified Taylor rule to empirically test whether the calls for lower interest rates by presidents induce Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) to lower the policy rate. We document that BCB is more likely to set the policy rate in line with the preferences of political leaders. We also show that the response of BCB to political pressure remained significant even though political pressure diminished in recent years. © 2023 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
dc.identifier.doi10.1590/0101-31572023-3443
dc.identifier.endpage705
dc.identifier.issn01013157
dc.identifier.issn18094538
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85167583485
dc.identifier.startpage686
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572023-3443
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14719/8265
dc.identifier.volume43
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversidade de Sao Paulo. Museu de Zoologia
dc.relation.oastatusAll Open Access
dc.relation.oastatusGold Open Access
dc.relation.sourceBrazilian Journal of Political Economy
dc.subject.authorkeywordsCentral Bank Independence
dc.subject.authorkeywordsEmerging Economy
dc.subject.authorkeywordsPolitical Pressure
dc.subject.authorkeywordsTaylor Rule
dc.titleDo political commentaries command? The case of the Central Bank of Brazil, Os comentários políticos comandam? O caso do Banco Central do Brasil
dc.typeArticle
dcterms.referencesMonetary Policy Rules, (1999), Barro, Robert T., A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 4, pp. 589-610, (1983), undefined, (1995), Berger, Helge, Central Bank Independence: An update of theory and evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 1, pp. 3-40, (2001), Threats to Central Bank Independence High Frequency Identification with Twitter, (2019), Binder, Carola Conces, Political Pressure on Central Banks, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 53, 4, pp. 715-744, (2021), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, (1998), Jackson Hole Symposium, (2012), undefined, (2021), Cover, P., Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument james, Journal of Economics and Business, 52, 4, pp. 325-341, (2000)
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.indexed.atScopus
person.identifier.scopus-author-id58531838500
person.identifier.scopus-author-id56803850400

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